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Dawn Editorial
Thursday, 01 Oct,2009.
David Ignatius, in his latest op-ed column for The Washington Post, The view from Pakistans spies, has made a number of observations that should be heeded by American policymakers. Granted access to top officials at the ISI, including Gen Shuja Pasha, Ignatius has zeroed in on the existing operational/strategic dichotomy: At an operational level, the ISI is a close partner of the CIA. Officers of the two services work together nearly every night on joint operations against Al Qaeda in Pakistans tribal areas . But on the political level, there is mistrust on both sides. The United States worries that the ISI isnt sharing all it knows The Pakistanis, meanwhile, view the United States as an unreliable ally that starts fights it doesnt know how to finish.
Given that, as Ignatius notes, Pakistan and the US share common interests this is self-defeating and both sides are to blame. The ISIs claim that after 9/11 everything changed, policies of old were discarded overnight and the intelligence apparatus has never looked back is questionable and there is a mountain of circumstantial evidence to suggest otherwise. But that does not mean that the ISI, which takes its cue from the army high command, is as rigid on and ideologically wedded to militancy as the Americans often claim. Indeed, Ignatiuss column makes a remarkable revelation that indicates the extent of the army high command/ISIs pragmatism: In the ISIs view . In Afghanistan, it should work with President Hamid Karzai, who, for all his imperfections, has one essential quality that American strategists lack hes an Afghan. This is the same Karzai who has been one of the ISIs foremost critics, accusing it of all sorts of crimes against the Afghan government and people. For the ISI to suggest that the Americans work with an avowed enemy of the ISI suggests that its primary goal in Afghanistan is indeed to achieve the limited aim of rough political stability and it is willing to work with whatever forces that can help achieve that.
Moreover, the access granted to Ignatius is part of a wider attempt by the ISI to get across Pakistans genuine strategic concerns, indicating its awareness of the need to improve optics and building a case for the fact that it is not a hidebound agency reflexively clinging to the past in a changed strategic environment. This should be reflected in the USs public stance. As Ignatius points out: People want to help America more than we sometimes think. But they want to be treated with respect as full partners, not as useful CIA assets.
Thursday, 01 Oct,2009.
David Ignatius, in his latest op-ed column for The Washington Post, The view from Pakistans spies, has made a number of observations that should be heeded by American policymakers. Granted access to top officials at the ISI, including Gen Shuja Pasha, Ignatius has zeroed in on the existing operational/strategic dichotomy: At an operational level, the ISI is a close partner of the CIA. Officers of the two services work together nearly every night on joint operations against Al Qaeda in Pakistans tribal areas . But on the political level, there is mistrust on both sides. The United States worries that the ISI isnt sharing all it knows The Pakistanis, meanwhile, view the United States as an unreliable ally that starts fights it doesnt know how to finish.
Given that, as Ignatius notes, Pakistan and the US share common interests this is self-defeating and both sides are to blame. The ISIs claim that after 9/11 everything changed, policies of old were discarded overnight and the intelligence apparatus has never looked back is questionable and there is a mountain of circumstantial evidence to suggest otherwise. But that does not mean that the ISI, which takes its cue from the army high command, is as rigid on and ideologically wedded to militancy as the Americans often claim. Indeed, Ignatiuss column makes a remarkable revelation that indicates the extent of the army high command/ISIs pragmatism: In the ISIs view . In Afghanistan, it should work with President Hamid Karzai, who, for all his imperfections, has one essential quality that American strategists lack hes an Afghan. This is the same Karzai who has been one of the ISIs foremost critics, accusing it of all sorts of crimes against the Afghan government and people. For the ISI to suggest that the Americans work with an avowed enemy of the ISI suggests that its primary goal in Afghanistan is indeed to achieve the limited aim of rough political stability and it is willing to work with whatever forces that can help achieve that.
Moreover, the access granted to Ignatius is part of a wider attempt by the ISI to get across Pakistans genuine strategic concerns, indicating its awareness of the need to improve optics and building a case for the fact that it is not a hidebound agency reflexively clinging to the past in a changed strategic environment. This should be reflected in the USs public stance. As Ignatius points out: People want to help America more than we sometimes think. But they want to be treated with respect as full partners, not as useful CIA assets.
