The importance of North waziristan operation

[Cheetah786]

The writer is a retired Lieutenant Colonel of the Pakistan Army and is currently pursuing PhD in civil-military relations from Karachi University

Finally the much-awaited military operation against militants in the troubled North Waziristan Agency of Federally Administered Tribal Areas (Fata) has been launched. There was never any doubt that a ‘military operation’ was the only viable option and the only genuine solution available with the civilian government to root out terrorism. Why was then the operation being pended and delayed?

The political reason is too obvious as all politicians want to avoid any ‘scandalous activity’ that may cost them the votes that win them elections and keep them in power. It’s the military reason that has counted the most here and has really stood out. All military academies in the world teach ‘military commanders resolve’ as an outstanding military principle to achieve military successes. No doubt General (retd) Pervez Musharraf and General Kayani were top line generals of our army but they belonged to the same league. Together sharing the military leadership of Pakistan Army for 14 long years, they represented a military mindset that shared and believed in the ‘sacred doctrine of strategic depth’ that possibly was the reason that tied their hands behind their backs as the army continued fighting a ‘stalemated war’ that was being characterised more by ‘firefighting acts’ than any military actions of substance.

General Raheel Sharif, from the outset, vouched to respond to every terrorist act with a military action. Air strikes on the militant hideouts became a norm and it was generally being perceived that the new military commander was pushing his civilian bosses to agree to the initiation of a ‘military operation’ as the most-favoured option. All military commanders know that ‘the success of half of any military operation is reaching there, the other half is its execution’. If anything, the beginning of the military operation suggests that the army may also have reached a conclusion. It will no more guard and protect the ‘ideological frontier’ which it created and sustained and of which the Taliban were an essential part. A frontier, within which the Taliban once trained, nourished, housed and were even protected. If there ever is going to be a ‘responsible end’ to this war, it will come only if the army has finally decided that it no more recognises and accepts the notion of strategic depth and will meet all ‘ideological crusaders’ with a singular treatment.

Addressing the National Assembly, Prime Minister Nawaz Sharif has announced that the “the Zarb-e-Azb operation will not end till all terrorists are eliminated”. The people of Pakistan must own and rally around this mission statement given by the prime minister. Winning this war will not be easy. Nobody is even clear at this stage what really the definition of winning this war is. Surely it can’t only be the successful culmination of tactical operations in the battlefield zone. It has to be something more strategic. Something wider in scope — a single unanimous will of an entire nation, which should, in fact, act as a much ‘wider team’ to execute the prime minister’s given mission statement. In this dreadful irregular war that we fight across the length and breadth of the country, the complete nation will have to stand together to achieve this difficult but not impossible victory.

The real worry that the security establishment faces now is, how to counter the blowback and the retaliatory strikes by the Taliban in the country’s heartland? The Taliban spokesperson has already threatened and reminded the government that ‘our response will be tough’.

The war engulfs the entire country. Pakistan, today, is a war zone and the Taliban will fight this war where it will hurt the government and the army the most. Not in the mountains, gorges and deep valleys of North Waziristan. There these local and foreign militants will lie low or withdraw through the porous border into the neighbouring provinces in Afghanistan.

It’s their vanguards who will retaliate — the likes of the group of terrorists that recentlyattacked the Karachi airport. These small groups of terrorists harbouring in the urban centres in the country are the real part of the Taliban’s response force. They have the capacity and the capability to create the nightmare that all custodians of safety and security of this country dread and fear. It is against these likely ‘violent and destructive’ militant actions in the urban centres by the death squads of the Taliban, that Pakistan is least prepared. The soft underbelly of Pakistan in the war on terror is its weak ‘second tier security apparatus’.

The example of Karachi — the port city and hub of Pakistan’s business and commercial activity — clearly illustrates why Pakistan’s mega cities may be the choice targets of Taliban’s ‘retaliatory strikes’. A city of over 25 million people, Karachi boosts a police force of only 35,000 men. Most of these men were recruited by the ruling parties on mutually agreed and shared quotas without meeting the required standards of recruitment. Highly unprofessional and corrupt, this is hardly a force that can be relied to put up a defense against the stealth techniques and sneaky and covert operations of the Taliban insurgents. As if their unprofessionalism was not enough — the police force that is highly politicised is mostly involved in serving and protecting the VIPs. According to a rough estimate, over 18,000 men are deployed to protect and serve only the city elite. No wonder the chief minister of Sindh deputed and tasked the military to guard the sensitive installations in the city.

Except the odd IED attacks or small hit-and-run operations, I don’t see any likelihood of the Taliban raising their head in the operational area to meet the challenge that the Pakistan Army has thrown at them. Not under the lurking eyes of the ‘reconnaissance drones’ that the Pakistan Army now flies in the battlefield zone or the cobra helicopters that hover in the skies or even the fighter jets that will now target them day in and day out. The boots on ground will also be deeply relieved and now highly motivated as for them ‘the push has finally come to shove’. The army has enough troops on ground to clear and hold the nerve centres and vital tactical grounds in the operational area. Even if the Afghan Army does not shield its border and prevent the retreating ‘terrorists’ from infiltrating, the Pakistan Army will continue to flush out these terrorists towards the Afghan border.

The procrastination in the decision to launch a military operation by Pakistan’s military and civil elite gave Taliban tremendous military leverage. This all is about to change. The commencement of the military operation is no guarantor of ultimate success against the Taliban, but it surely is the most vital tool now being used by the state from its ‘options tool-kit’ to tip the balance in favour of the state.

Published in The Express Tribune, June 24th, 2014.

 

[Cheetah786]

In wake of the airport attack: Are we targeting the right enemy? - Blogs - DAWN.COM

It has been over a week since Karachi Airport was attacked.

Security, we are told, has been beefed up and authorities plan to 'construct a wall' between the perimeter fence north of the airport and Bhitaiabad, closing down the road connecting Shar-e-Faisal with Pehlwan Goth. More than 100 CCTV cameras will be installed around Jinnah Terminal along with many other benign measures. Police have also detained 20 suspected Afghan nationals near Sohrab Goth for questioning.

The attacks may have triggered the long-awaited military operation in North Waziristan. The ISPR now claims that airstrikes have killed many foreign militants including Abu Abdul Rehan Al Maani — Commander of Islamic Movement of Uzbekistan and the alleged mastermind of Karachi attack.

Let's take some time out to examine the attack and see if ISPR's claim is satisfying enough to assure the June 8 attacks won't be happening again.

Also read: 'CJ seeks report over Karachi airport attack within two weeks'

The most sensitive area of any airport is considered to be its restricted ‘Airside’. The perpetrators of June 8 attacks were obviously aware that the essential aviation services at the airport were at least a kilometre inside the fences of the well-lit and heavily fortified ‘Karachi Airport Airside’ with flat earth in between. It is also protected by a large and well-trained airport security force. Any attempt to enter through these fences was sure to encounter massive and lethal resistance.

Terrorists attempting to enter through the ‘Fokker Gate’ at PIA Engineering & nearby customs ‘air freight unit’ (ICG gate) indicates that the perpetrators were aware of the fact that both facilities were manned by lightly-armed ASF guards with no picket or barricades on the apron side (the area where aircraft are parked, unloaded or refueled).

According to eyewitnesses, as the graveyard shift started, there was a single ASF guard at the Fokker Gate and two working ASF guards at the scanner just inside. Terrorists dressed in ASF uniforms coming from the Pehlwan Goth side easily killed the guard outside and the two ASF men at the scanner. But the fourth guard behind the open grill returned fire and held his ground against the heavily armed militants until he finally lost his life.

Also read: 'Uzbek fighters claim involvement in Karachi airport attack'

Pandemonium, however, alerted the ASF men on the apron. Attackers appeared oblivious of the fact that just outside, PIA wide-body ‘Ispahani Hangar’ was merely 300 meters on the left and the crucial ‘Air Traffic Control Tower’ 200 meters on the right. Militants continued their killing rampage until they were finally killed by the security forces before they came out of PIA Engineering.

Meanwhile the second lot of the terrorists struck the ICG gate. The lone, unarmed customs guard ran to save his life along with horrified importers. The two unsuspecting ASF guards at the apron were quickly mowed down but the third guard positioned behind the wooden post fought back.

According to eyewitnesses, he too, died fighting till the last moment.

That allowed the terrorists to move across into the apron near the aircraft night parking area. As the militants came out, they were forced to retreat back inside the private cargo sheds on the eastern side of the ICG due to overwhelming ASF fire.

The indiscriminate firing by the terrorists damaged a Boeing-747, Airbus-310 grounded for maintenance and at least a cargo plane sitting duck at ‘night parking area’. Over two dozen lives were lost, part of a cargo terminal burnt and international confidence lost in the nation’s financial hub being a safe place to travel.

If the terrorists had come out and turned right, barely 150 meters away they would have found the ‘Jet fuel’ storage facility. A single hit over those gigantic fuel tanks could have resulted in a cataclysm at the airport.

As demonstrated by their poor execution, it was obvious these racing-to-die 'Uzbek' attackers were not the ones who planned the attack. All attackers were killed that night, leaving us with the question, 'who were the planners and where did they go?'

Also read: 'Karachi airport attack signals alarming tactical shift by Taliban'

The security system at the airport has a number of shortcomings that may have facilitated the attack. Entry to the airside is allowed only through ‘airport entry pass’, which is issued only by ASF after police clearance. But unfortunately, not every functionary lives in this city and policemen in faraway districts would perhaps be more sympathetic towards blood and kin than to the cause of protecting a place hundreds of miles away.

Moreover, when airport functionaries lose their job, they do not always surrender their ‘entry cards’ immediately.

And while ASF is responsible for defending the airside, the airport itself remains the responsibility of the ‘Airport Police Station’ - a lucrative posting in Karachi.

There are a number of other possible factors like the above ones, which may have played a role.

But the question worth asking here is, are we targeting the right enemy in the ongoing operation? The planners could well be working inside the Karachi airport, with possible links extending to North Waziristan.

Allow me to go off on a tangent to November 6, 2012:

Rangers raided Ashraf ul Madaris, less then a kilometer from ASF camp and Runway 07L. According to the rumour mills, Rangers came looking for a ‘high profile militant’ from TTP Swat visiting Maulana Hakim Akhtar. However, during the ensuing exchange of fire, panic and commotion, the militant slipped away.

Next day, a powerful bomb ripped through the Rangers compound in North Nazimabad. Naeem Bokhari of Lashkar-e-Jhangvi swiftly claimed responsibility for that attack. LeJ, mind you, is an offshoot of sectarian Sipah-e-Sahabah known for its close links with Islamic Movement of Uzbekistan, TTP and Al Qaeda.

The point I'm trying to make is that there's a need to appreciate that a very powerful nexus exists between militants, certain religious parties and groups in the country, which is probably more lethal than any bunch of ragtag militants in some faraway mountain ranges.

While the beefed up security and other measures announced by the authorities could protect Karachi Airport from future attacks by militants, hoping that such actions could dissuade motivated militants who may still be working inside the airport is flawed thinking.