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The Future of Russia's Military:
August 27, 2012
Stratfor
Editor's Note: This is the first installment in a five-part series on Russia's military modernization.
Russia has been struggling to reform its military since the fall of the Soviet Union and the ensuing crisis in Russia. Some progress was made after Vladimir Putin came to power, though Russia had no viable and specific plan for its military until 2010, when Moscow drew up its first serious military doctrine in years. Reform has progressed since then, but the next few years will be a true test. Russia's goal is to create a military capable of facing the country's main challenges domestically, regionally and globally. Though the Kremlin has moved forward with its plans, major constraints could slow this progress if not stop it altogether.
Russia's drive for military modernization and reform is not new. After the crisis of the 1990s that followed the collapse of the Soviet Union, the Russian military was left with a disorganized, underfunded and -- as the Gulf War and Operation Allied Force demonstrated -- unsuitable doctrine for next-generation warfare. Given its geographic and funding pressures, Russia's military has emphasized recalibrating its weaponry and adopting a more flexible and versatile force structure that allows it to rapidly deploy across the country.
The Russian military maintains large stockpiles of equipment and weaponry, an overwhelming majority of which is dated. The military budget for the armed forces has increased substantially year-on-year during the last decade (between 4 and 24 percent every year compared to the previous year). However, the vast quantities of materiel requiring replacement means that even with more funding, it would take the military decades to replace the equipment on a one-to-one basis. Overall, the military needs a substantial budget increase specifically meant to replace the aging equipment en masse, improve training and command structures, raise the quality of life for the soldiers and maintain, if not improve on, its combat level.
Ground Forces
While the ground forces have very large stockpiles of materiel left from the Cold War, the equipment is on the whole not well-maintained and requires significant upgrades. The bulk of the equipment used by the ground forces is obsolescent if not already obsolete; most of the army's current equipment was designed or built by the Soviets. Moreover, the army is particularly lacking in precision-guided munitions and modern Command, Control, Communications, Computers, Intelligence, Surveillance and Reconnaissance systems.
A good example of the Russian army's vast but aging inventory is its armored vehicles. The army's inventory consists of tens of thousands of these vehicles, which translates into a very high ratio of armored vehicles to number of personnel. However, these numbers do not tell the whole story; it is estimated that more than 70 percent of its armored fighting vehicle holdings are in storage and non-operational. Additionally, almost all types of vehicles used -- aside from some, such as the T-90 -- were first produced during the Cold War. Even the T-90 is in essence an evolution (from Soviet-designed vehicles) rather than a revolutionary design.
Air Force
The Russian air force has an estimated 4,000 aircraft in active service, but -- as with the army's equipment -- vast numbers of these are aging platforms first built during the Cold War. Current Russian production rates are not enough to prevent a gradual decline in the inventory of fielded aircraft. Unlike the army, however, the air force has placed considerable emphasis on producing new equipment, with a flagship design being the new generation stealth PAK-FA. The Russians are also seeking to produce a number of the effective Ka-52 and Mi-28 attack helicopters to supplement the existing force of Mi-24 gunships. Overall, the Russian air force is slightly better off than the ground forces in terms of the levels of modernized equipment available, but the more technologically advanced aircraft are slowly entering service in low numbers.
Navy
The Russian navy is not as powerful as it used to be. Vast numbers of ships suffered from lack of maintenance and upkeep after the Cold War, particularly in the 1990s. Russia currently maintains a sizable number of warships, but once again, most are obsolescent designs. The Admiral Kuznetsov (Russia's sole aircraft carrier), all the cruisers and at least half of Russia's destroyers were first launched by the Soviet Union. The Russian conventional attack, nuclear attack and cruise missile submarine forces are in better shape than the surface fleet in terms of levels of modernization. However, the Russians have encountered considerable problems in developing and building Lada and Yasen class submarines, which are supposed to replace older conventional attack and nuclear attack submarines respectively.
An Aged Arsenal
Russia has a very sizable arsenal that is laced with deep structural problems associated with age and lack of upkeep and modernization. As the equipment continues to age, maintenance becomes more expensive, taking up more of the defense budget. The equipment will also be retired at an ever-increasing pace as it becomes obsolete.
The Russian military therefore is dependent on increased military funding if it wishes to maintain its current combat potential, much less increase it. At the current pace, and even if funds were increased, Russia will have to make choices about which defense sectors to prioritize.
The Kremlin has focused more on the need for a strong and modern military in recent years. Russia's previous military strategies since the fall of the Soviet Union were not really focused on strengthening the military; they emphasized trying to keep the country afloat.
Russia's military doctrine is one of the best ways to gauge Russia's intentions for military development. Over the decades, that doctrine has shifted according to the perceived threats and types of war that Moscow believes it will face. For example, the military doctrine and strategy under Josef Stalin following World War II was to create large land forces able to once again face a protracted, large-scale, yearslong land war. This military doctrine shifted under Nikita Krushchev because the Soviet Union's development of nuclear weapons made nuclear war more likely as Russia settled into the Cold War with the United States. Under Leonid Brezhnev, a more balanced military doctrine was put in place with broad concepts of war to account for various land and nuclear war scenarios. The aggressive military doctrines of these Soviet leaders started to falter in the 1980s as Moscow massively re-evaluated its military doctrine, shifting to a more defensive state as the Russians realized that they were starting to overextend their military potential (particularly financially).
Early Post-Soviet Doctrines
The military doctrines that followed the fall of the Soviet Union were an attempt to figure out how to sustain any large military and military industrial complex -- let alone an effective one -- during a time when Russia was feeling the looming threat of NATO near its doorstep and being wracked by domestic separatist threats such as Chechnya. The military and its industrial complex in the 1990s was chaotic, top-heavy and lacked any political will from the Kremlin to fix its problems (mainly because of Boris Yeltsin's concerns that the military could overthrow him one day).
The Kremlin's focus on the Russian military and its doctrine started to take serious shape in 2000 under Vladimir Putin. His main focus was to reorganize the Russian military, purge the glut and shift to a tighter and smaller military. The 2000 Russian doctrine was meant to be a period of transition for the military and industrial complex. It set up the Russian military to be defensive in character during this period. By 2006, Russia had started to come up with a coherent plan for its future -- one based on internal consolidation and a future push out into its traditional sphere of influence. This new mindset of a stronger Russia was reflected in its next military doctrine (which took two years to develop).
A New Assertiveness
It is the newest military doctrine (drawn up by then-Russian President Dmitri Medvedev and formalized in 2009 into the National Security Strategy to 2020) that is Russia's first aggressive and proactive military doctrine since the 1970s. It has a clear strategy and definable set of threats. Of course the latest security strategy was drawn up when Russia was feeling militarily stout after two decades of feeling vulnerable and weak. Russia had just successfully wrapped up a five-day war with its neighbor Georgia -- a NATO partner -- and was looking to explain to the world what its strategy from that point on would be. Russia's security policy hinges on five principles that Medvedev laid out:
1."Russia recognizes the primacy of the fundamental principles of international law, which define the relations between civilized peoples. We will build our relations with other countries within the framework of these principles and this concept of international law."
2."Second, the world should be multipolar. A single-pole world is unacceptable. Domination is something we cannot allow. We cannot accept a world order in which one country makes all the decisions, even as serious and influential a country as the United States of America. Such a world is unstable and threatened by conflict."
3."Third, Russia does not want confrontation with any other country. Russia has no intention of isolating itself. We will develop friendly relations with Europe, the United States and other countries, as much as is possible."
4."Fourth, protecting the lives and dignity of our citizens, wherever they may be, is an unquestionable priority for our country. Our foreign policy decisions will be based on this need. We will also protect the interests of our business community abroad. It should be clear to all that we will respond to any aggressive acts committed against us."
5."Finally, fifth, as is the case of other countries, there are regions in which Russia has privileged interests. These regions are home to countries with which we share special historical relations and are bound together as friends and good neighbors. We will pay particular attention to our work in these regions and build friendly ties with these countries, our close neighbors. These are the principles I will follow in carrying out our foreign policy."
Within these points, Russia is saying that it wants to redefine the regional and global system. Russia does not accept the United States' hegemony over the global system. Thus, while Russia wants a productive relationship with the United States and Europe, this depends partly on the behavior of Washington and the Europeans.
Russia is focused on its regional position in two ways. First, it is willing to protect the interests of Russians no matter where they are. This means that Moscow could intervene on behalf of Russian citizens and communities in countries such as the Baltic states or Georgia. Next, Russia has deemed the former Soviet sphere as Russia's special interest, meaning that foreign activities in this region that undermine Moscow's position there are considered a threat. Overall, this doctrine does not mean that Moscow is recreating the Soviet Union or Russian empire, but that Russia is the center of gravity in the region. The country's regional power (plus its substantial nuclear assets) allow it to be part of a global system and counter U.S. hegemony.
Based on the Medvedev Doctrine and the National Security Strategy to 2020, Russia has four categories of threats:
1.Terrorism and militancy, which mainly involve Moscow's focus on the Russian Caucasus (Chechnya and Dagestan), as well as domestic militant capability to strike outside of the Caucasus (such as the attacks on the Moscow subways, trains, schools and airport).
2.Bilateral regional conflicts, in which Russia would go against another state in the region (such as the Russo-Georgian War in 2008).
3.Regional conflicts in which Russia would intervene (such as if war broke out in the Nagorno-Karabakh region between Armenia and Azerbaijan)
4.Global threats to Russia and its sphere of influence (such as NATO, or other powers that could result in a nuclear option for Russia).
But to be able to fulfill such an ambitious strategy, Russia needs a reorganized, robust and modern military. This means two major focuses: reforming the military structure and replacing the majority of the military equipment.
Although Russia has begun reorganizing its military to make it more efficient, the need to replace the bulk of its equipment has not been addressed. During his various speeches outlining the State Armament Program 2020, Russian leader Vladimir Putin outlined a modernization plan including the acquisition of substantial quantities of advanced hardware and an overhaul of the military's Command, Control, Communications, Computers, Intelligence, Surveillance and Reconnaissance structures. Putin said the new armament program would cost $770 billion over the next eight to 10 years in addition to the current level of defense spending (adding another 25 percent every year to the defense budget). Given the ambitious nature of the program, it is unlikely that Russia will meet all of its declared goals if the plan is approved, but the Russian military will still find itself in a much better position.
The State Armament Program 2020 seems likely to divide the $770 billion by giving 24 percent to the navy, 21 percent to the air force, 13 percent to the ground forces and airborne troops, and approximately 42 percent to the strategic missile troops and aerospace defense forces. These figures clearly illustrate the priorities of the Russian military.
For the air force/naval aviation, Moscow likely will focus on upgrading existing legacy aircraft, modernizing the force just enough to keep it stable moving forward. This could mean purchasing about 50 Su-35s with deliveries from 2016-2020, approximately 30 Su-30SMs for naval aviation delivered by 2018, continuous low rate deliveries of Su-34s so that about 200 are in service by 2025 and general upgrade and low batch production of MiG-29s/-35s/-31s and Su-25s. The one truly new fighter that will enter service is the PAK-FA/T-50, with some 50 aircraft in service by 2020 if development of the aircraft is continuous and encounters few major problems. In addition, a number of transport/trainer aircraft are to be procured, but none of them are truly new aircraft types.
Overall, the aviation industry is probably well positioned to fulfill these contracts without delay. Aside from the PAK-FA, none of the other aircraft represent a revolutionary design. The Russian aviation industry has also been one of the most successful in exporting new aircraft to foreign countries.
In terms of ground forces, the Russians are trying to help the industrial base survive by infusing more cash while making the force more modern over the next decade. Russia still has massive stocks of old weaponry, and until recently the plan was to not buy any more tanks. But without the additional funds, the industrial sector tailored to producing ground equipment would have been ruined. Russian exports of land equipment usually are not new, revolutionary designs; they often consist of refitted equipment from stockpiles of materiel produced during the Soviet period and thus do not do much to help the tank-producing industrial base. However, the announced goals for the ground forces initially seem to be overambitious, given the amount of funds allocated.
With some $242 billion allocated to the strategic missile troops and aerospace defense forces, the Russian plans to upgrade their ballistic missile and air defense arsenals look more achievable. The Russians have a solid head start on surface-to-air missile systems, having funded and exported them heavily over the last two decades. New intercontinental ballistic missiles have also been developed, with a new missile tested only recently.
The navy seems to be the most problematic area for modernization. The Russians should be able to continue producing small corvettes and frigates as well as diesel-electric boats in good numbers to upgrade their conventional fleet, but they are encountering severe problems with their nuclear attack and nuclear ballistic missile submarines. These have experienced significant delays and continue to expend a great deal of resources. More importantly, even in the unlikely chance that the problems in producing these submarines are resolved, the Russians will not have an added quantitative advantage as they increasingly retire very old vessels. Many analysts have labeled the Russian fleet a coastal defense force. However, the Russians will continue to be able to maintain a significant blue water capability as newer vessels come online (although this will only maintain the current balance).
Overall, the additional resources associated with the State Armament Program 2020 make the Russian military's direction look significantly less bleak. A large portion of future resources will be necessary to maintain the Russian force as it moves forward, replacing aging equipment, maintaining the current equipment and improving living standards and salaries for the troops. The vast bulk of the equipment coming online consists of the next step in the evolution of legacy aircraft. The areas where the Russians stand to make major gains are in the strategic missile force and aerospace defense force. Russia already leads the world in terms of surface-to-air missile technology and will continue investing in this technology. The funds allocated also provide the impetus to continue developing and producing new intercontinental ballistic missiles.
For the first time in nearly three decades, the Kremlin seems to have a viable plan for ensuring its own domestic security and maintaining its power in the region.
Personnel Constraints
One challenge facing the Kremlin is recruitment. Several factors, including negative demographic trends, have undermined the military's ability to recruit and retain a sufficient number of quality personnel.
According to official numbers from the Russian armed forces, the military can currently build an estimated maximum force of 800,000 personnel -- a smaller figure than the 1 million personnel target usually given. In April 2012, the military comprised 160,100 officers, 189,700 contract soldiers and 317,200 conscripts. Taking retention rates and general attrition levels into account, the Russian military needs to conscript around 300,000 people during each of its drafts to maintain target troop levels of 1 million.
However, the military has reportedly fallen short of its conscription goals in recent years, with 280,000 Russians inducted in the fall 2010 draft, 218,720 in spring 2011, 135,850 in fall 2011 and 132,000 in spring 2012. An increasing number of violations associated with the draft is thus unsurprising. During the fall 2011 draft, officials who were under pressure to meet even the lowered targets committed some 6,000 violations in the conscription of Russians considered unfit to serve.
The conscription problems have forced the military to attempt to recruit higher numbers of contract soldiers by raising salaries and improving living conditions. These efforts require considerable funding, but they will be central to the modernization of the Russian military moving forward.
Defense Industry Constraints
Russia also faces major constraints in modernizing its military equipment. Currently, only between 20-30 percent of the country's military equipment is considered modern. The military's goal, per a December 2010 announcement by then-Russian Prime Minister Vladimir Putin, is to increase this number to 70 percent by 2020, or 11 percent annually. Despite Russia's considerable fiscal resources, it might be impossible for its military to update that much equipment in such a time frame.
The Russian defense industry consists of approximately 1,500 institutions that are partially or wholly owned by the state. Estimates suggest that the industry employs as much as 4 percent of the Russian population. But in 2010, even before Russia began its modernization push, the defense industry was experiencing production shortfalls. That year, the industry failed to deliver around 30 percent of its orders, despite full funding from the government. The industry blamed the government procurement process, while the government blamed the industry. Regardless, shortfalls and cost overruns in production were systemic even before the modernization program began, and defense industry producers reportedly have already been falling behind their current benchmarks.
Many defense industry sectors lost nearly a decade (or nearly two decades, in some cases) of technological advancement following the collapse of the Soviet Union. Still, Russia sees domestic defense production as an imperative due to the large employment base the industry creates, the potential for arms sales profits and a desire to remain self-sufficient for its defense supplies.
This imperative constrains Russia's ability to purchase large quantities of high-end, off-the-shelf defense technology from other countries. The Russia military has made a small number of such purchases, including unmanned aerial vehicles from Israel, thermal imaging systems, wheeled infantry fighting vehicles and, most notably, Mistral warships from France. While some of these purchases have provided new military capabilities, their limited scale has kept them from fundamentally improving Russian military capabilities. In reality, the desired goal of such purchases has been to gain ground in technology transferred by these weapon systems. Russia has also launched certain joint development ventures, including the fifth-generation fighter aircraft and the BrahMos supersonic cruise missile, to stay competitive in top-end technology weapons systems.
The single largest constraint hindering the military development goals is the sheer scale of modernization that is required. Even if Russia could update 70 percent of its equipment by 2020, the military would still face obstacles posed by support constraints such as network infrastructure, satellite capabilities and technology interoperability. The military would also require a significant amount of institutional knowledge to effectively train its personnel to operate within war-fighting systems -- expertise that is best garnered through experience, not purchase.
Budgetary Constraints
Another major obstacle facing the Russian military is the government's ability to finance it. Russia's gross domestic product has vastly expanded in the past decade, rising from $313 billion in 1995 to $1.7 trillion in 2011. The Russian military budget has steadily increased as well, rising between 4 percent and 24 percent annually. But the growth in military spending has been fueled by a prolonged run of high energy prices; energy revenues fund nearly half of the Russian budget.
For Russia to maintain its current military spending levels and implement Putin's vast rearmament program, the Kremlin would need to increase defense outlays by 25 percent starting in 2013 and spend an extra $77 billion each year for the next decade. To finance this, Russia would need oil prices to remain above $100 per barrel. Currently, the Russian budget is based on oil costing $117 per barrel, a price which would allow the government maintain its current spending levels without running up a deficit and even grow its rainy day funds. Should oil prices dip, Russia would not be able to fund its current budget, let alone a 25 percent expansion.
This issue is the subject of fierce discussion within the Kremlin. Putin and other security hawks want to ensure that the Russian military can fulfill plans laid out for the next decade. However, the more fiscally minded leaders understand that the Russian budget as a whole -- not just in defense -- must be slimmed down in preparation for a decline in oil prices.
The Kremlin could finance its ambitious military expansion without increasing the military budget. Russia holds more than $550 billion in currency reserves and more than $150 billion in a rainy day fund. However, these reserves are meant to ensure the country's stability during financial crises -- an evident threat considering Europe's ongoing financial instability. The funds are not intended to fuel a military spending spree. So the Kremlin must decide which is more important: financial stability or a robust military. In the past, the Kremlin has chosen the latter, contributing to bigger issues for Russia down the line.
Editor's note: An earlier version of this analysis misstated Russia's gross domestic product in 1995It was $313 billion.
August 27, 2012
Stratfor
Editor's Note: This is the first installment in a five-part series on Russia's military modernization.
Russia has been struggling to reform its military since the fall of the Soviet Union and the ensuing crisis in Russia. Some progress was made after Vladimir Putin came to power, though Russia had no viable and specific plan for its military until 2010, when Moscow drew up its first serious military doctrine in years. Reform has progressed since then, but the next few years will be a true test. Russia's goal is to create a military capable of facing the country's main challenges domestically, regionally and globally. Though the Kremlin has moved forward with its plans, major constraints could slow this progress if not stop it altogether.
Russia's drive for military modernization and reform is not new. After the crisis of the 1990s that followed the collapse of the Soviet Union, the Russian military was left with a disorganized, underfunded and -- as the Gulf War and Operation Allied Force demonstrated -- unsuitable doctrine for next-generation warfare. Given its geographic and funding pressures, Russia's military has emphasized recalibrating its weaponry and adopting a more flexible and versatile force structure that allows it to rapidly deploy across the country.
The Russian military maintains large stockpiles of equipment and weaponry, an overwhelming majority of which is dated. The military budget for the armed forces has increased substantially year-on-year during the last decade (between 4 and 24 percent every year compared to the previous year). However, the vast quantities of materiel requiring replacement means that even with more funding, it would take the military decades to replace the equipment on a one-to-one basis. Overall, the military needs a substantial budget increase specifically meant to replace the aging equipment en masse, improve training and command structures, raise the quality of life for the soldiers and maintain, if not improve on, its combat level.
Ground Forces
While the ground forces have very large stockpiles of materiel left from the Cold War, the equipment is on the whole not well-maintained and requires significant upgrades. The bulk of the equipment used by the ground forces is obsolescent if not already obsolete; most of the army's current equipment was designed or built by the Soviets. Moreover, the army is particularly lacking in precision-guided munitions and modern Command, Control, Communications, Computers, Intelligence, Surveillance and Reconnaissance systems.
A good example of the Russian army's vast but aging inventory is its armored vehicles. The army's inventory consists of tens of thousands of these vehicles, which translates into a very high ratio of armored vehicles to number of personnel. However, these numbers do not tell the whole story; it is estimated that more than 70 percent of its armored fighting vehicle holdings are in storage and non-operational. Additionally, almost all types of vehicles used -- aside from some, such as the T-90 -- were first produced during the Cold War. Even the T-90 is in essence an evolution (from Soviet-designed vehicles) rather than a revolutionary design.
Air Force
The Russian air force has an estimated 4,000 aircraft in active service, but -- as with the army's equipment -- vast numbers of these are aging platforms first built during the Cold War. Current Russian production rates are not enough to prevent a gradual decline in the inventory of fielded aircraft. Unlike the army, however, the air force has placed considerable emphasis on producing new equipment, with a flagship design being the new generation stealth PAK-FA. The Russians are also seeking to produce a number of the effective Ka-52 and Mi-28 attack helicopters to supplement the existing force of Mi-24 gunships. Overall, the Russian air force is slightly better off than the ground forces in terms of the levels of modernized equipment available, but the more technologically advanced aircraft are slowly entering service in low numbers.
Navy
The Russian navy is not as powerful as it used to be. Vast numbers of ships suffered from lack of maintenance and upkeep after the Cold War, particularly in the 1990s. Russia currently maintains a sizable number of warships, but once again, most are obsolescent designs. The Admiral Kuznetsov (Russia's sole aircraft carrier), all the cruisers and at least half of Russia's destroyers were first launched by the Soviet Union. The Russian conventional attack, nuclear attack and cruise missile submarine forces are in better shape than the surface fleet in terms of levels of modernization. However, the Russians have encountered considerable problems in developing and building Lada and Yasen class submarines, which are supposed to replace older conventional attack and nuclear attack submarines respectively.
An Aged Arsenal
Russia has a very sizable arsenal that is laced with deep structural problems associated with age and lack of upkeep and modernization. As the equipment continues to age, maintenance becomes more expensive, taking up more of the defense budget. The equipment will also be retired at an ever-increasing pace as it becomes obsolete.
The Russian military therefore is dependent on increased military funding if it wishes to maintain its current combat potential, much less increase it. At the current pace, and even if funds were increased, Russia will have to make choices about which defense sectors to prioritize.
The Kremlin has focused more on the need for a strong and modern military in recent years. Russia's previous military strategies since the fall of the Soviet Union were not really focused on strengthening the military; they emphasized trying to keep the country afloat.
Russia's military doctrine is one of the best ways to gauge Russia's intentions for military development. Over the decades, that doctrine has shifted according to the perceived threats and types of war that Moscow believes it will face. For example, the military doctrine and strategy under Josef Stalin following World War II was to create large land forces able to once again face a protracted, large-scale, yearslong land war. This military doctrine shifted under Nikita Krushchev because the Soviet Union's development of nuclear weapons made nuclear war more likely as Russia settled into the Cold War with the United States. Under Leonid Brezhnev, a more balanced military doctrine was put in place with broad concepts of war to account for various land and nuclear war scenarios. The aggressive military doctrines of these Soviet leaders started to falter in the 1980s as Moscow massively re-evaluated its military doctrine, shifting to a more defensive state as the Russians realized that they were starting to overextend their military potential (particularly financially).
Early Post-Soviet Doctrines
The military doctrines that followed the fall of the Soviet Union were an attempt to figure out how to sustain any large military and military industrial complex -- let alone an effective one -- during a time when Russia was feeling the looming threat of NATO near its doorstep and being wracked by domestic separatist threats such as Chechnya. The military and its industrial complex in the 1990s was chaotic, top-heavy and lacked any political will from the Kremlin to fix its problems (mainly because of Boris Yeltsin's concerns that the military could overthrow him one day).
The Kremlin's focus on the Russian military and its doctrine started to take serious shape in 2000 under Vladimir Putin. His main focus was to reorganize the Russian military, purge the glut and shift to a tighter and smaller military. The 2000 Russian doctrine was meant to be a period of transition for the military and industrial complex. It set up the Russian military to be defensive in character during this period. By 2006, Russia had started to come up with a coherent plan for its future -- one based on internal consolidation and a future push out into its traditional sphere of influence. This new mindset of a stronger Russia was reflected in its next military doctrine (which took two years to develop).
A New Assertiveness
It is the newest military doctrine (drawn up by then-Russian President Dmitri Medvedev and formalized in 2009 into the National Security Strategy to 2020) that is Russia's first aggressive and proactive military doctrine since the 1970s. It has a clear strategy and definable set of threats. Of course the latest security strategy was drawn up when Russia was feeling militarily stout after two decades of feeling vulnerable and weak. Russia had just successfully wrapped up a five-day war with its neighbor Georgia -- a NATO partner -- and was looking to explain to the world what its strategy from that point on would be. Russia's security policy hinges on five principles that Medvedev laid out:
1."Russia recognizes the primacy of the fundamental principles of international law, which define the relations between civilized peoples. We will build our relations with other countries within the framework of these principles and this concept of international law."
2."Second, the world should be multipolar. A single-pole world is unacceptable. Domination is something we cannot allow. We cannot accept a world order in which one country makes all the decisions, even as serious and influential a country as the United States of America. Such a world is unstable and threatened by conflict."
3."Third, Russia does not want confrontation with any other country. Russia has no intention of isolating itself. We will develop friendly relations with Europe, the United States and other countries, as much as is possible."
4."Fourth, protecting the lives and dignity of our citizens, wherever they may be, is an unquestionable priority for our country. Our foreign policy decisions will be based on this need. We will also protect the interests of our business community abroad. It should be clear to all that we will respond to any aggressive acts committed against us."
5."Finally, fifth, as is the case of other countries, there are regions in which Russia has privileged interests. These regions are home to countries with which we share special historical relations and are bound together as friends and good neighbors. We will pay particular attention to our work in these regions and build friendly ties with these countries, our close neighbors. These are the principles I will follow in carrying out our foreign policy."
Within these points, Russia is saying that it wants to redefine the regional and global system. Russia does not accept the United States' hegemony over the global system. Thus, while Russia wants a productive relationship with the United States and Europe, this depends partly on the behavior of Washington and the Europeans.
Russia is focused on its regional position in two ways. First, it is willing to protect the interests of Russians no matter where they are. This means that Moscow could intervene on behalf of Russian citizens and communities in countries such as the Baltic states or Georgia. Next, Russia has deemed the former Soviet sphere as Russia's special interest, meaning that foreign activities in this region that undermine Moscow's position there are considered a threat. Overall, this doctrine does not mean that Moscow is recreating the Soviet Union or Russian empire, but that Russia is the center of gravity in the region. The country's regional power (plus its substantial nuclear assets) allow it to be part of a global system and counter U.S. hegemony.
Based on the Medvedev Doctrine and the National Security Strategy to 2020, Russia has four categories of threats:
1.Terrorism and militancy, which mainly involve Moscow's focus on the Russian Caucasus (Chechnya and Dagestan), as well as domestic militant capability to strike outside of the Caucasus (such as the attacks on the Moscow subways, trains, schools and airport).
2.Bilateral regional conflicts, in which Russia would go against another state in the region (such as the Russo-Georgian War in 2008).
3.Regional conflicts in which Russia would intervene (such as if war broke out in the Nagorno-Karabakh region between Armenia and Azerbaijan)
4.Global threats to Russia and its sphere of influence (such as NATO, or other powers that could result in a nuclear option for Russia).
But to be able to fulfill such an ambitious strategy, Russia needs a reorganized, robust and modern military. This means two major focuses: reforming the military structure and replacing the majority of the military equipment.
Although Russia has begun reorganizing its military to make it more efficient, the need to replace the bulk of its equipment has not been addressed. During his various speeches outlining the State Armament Program 2020, Russian leader Vladimir Putin outlined a modernization plan including the acquisition of substantial quantities of advanced hardware and an overhaul of the military's Command, Control, Communications, Computers, Intelligence, Surveillance and Reconnaissance structures. Putin said the new armament program would cost $770 billion over the next eight to 10 years in addition to the current level of defense spending (adding another 25 percent every year to the defense budget). Given the ambitious nature of the program, it is unlikely that Russia will meet all of its declared goals if the plan is approved, but the Russian military will still find itself in a much better position.
The State Armament Program 2020 seems likely to divide the $770 billion by giving 24 percent to the navy, 21 percent to the air force, 13 percent to the ground forces and airborne troops, and approximately 42 percent to the strategic missile troops and aerospace defense forces. These figures clearly illustrate the priorities of the Russian military.
For the air force/naval aviation, Moscow likely will focus on upgrading existing legacy aircraft, modernizing the force just enough to keep it stable moving forward. This could mean purchasing about 50 Su-35s with deliveries from 2016-2020, approximately 30 Su-30SMs for naval aviation delivered by 2018, continuous low rate deliveries of Su-34s so that about 200 are in service by 2025 and general upgrade and low batch production of MiG-29s/-35s/-31s and Su-25s. The one truly new fighter that will enter service is the PAK-FA/T-50, with some 50 aircraft in service by 2020 if development of the aircraft is continuous and encounters few major problems. In addition, a number of transport/trainer aircraft are to be procured, but none of them are truly new aircraft types.
Overall, the aviation industry is probably well positioned to fulfill these contracts without delay. Aside from the PAK-FA, none of the other aircraft represent a revolutionary design. The Russian aviation industry has also been one of the most successful in exporting new aircraft to foreign countries.
In terms of ground forces, the Russians are trying to help the industrial base survive by infusing more cash while making the force more modern over the next decade. Russia still has massive stocks of old weaponry, and until recently the plan was to not buy any more tanks. But without the additional funds, the industrial sector tailored to producing ground equipment would have been ruined. Russian exports of land equipment usually are not new, revolutionary designs; they often consist of refitted equipment from stockpiles of materiel produced during the Soviet period and thus do not do much to help the tank-producing industrial base. However, the announced goals for the ground forces initially seem to be overambitious, given the amount of funds allocated.
With some $242 billion allocated to the strategic missile troops and aerospace defense forces, the Russian plans to upgrade their ballistic missile and air defense arsenals look more achievable. The Russians have a solid head start on surface-to-air missile systems, having funded and exported them heavily over the last two decades. New intercontinental ballistic missiles have also been developed, with a new missile tested only recently.
The navy seems to be the most problematic area for modernization. The Russians should be able to continue producing small corvettes and frigates as well as diesel-electric boats in good numbers to upgrade their conventional fleet, but they are encountering severe problems with their nuclear attack and nuclear ballistic missile submarines. These have experienced significant delays and continue to expend a great deal of resources. More importantly, even in the unlikely chance that the problems in producing these submarines are resolved, the Russians will not have an added quantitative advantage as they increasingly retire very old vessels. Many analysts have labeled the Russian fleet a coastal defense force. However, the Russians will continue to be able to maintain a significant blue water capability as newer vessels come online (although this will only maintain the current balance).
Overall, the additional resources associated with the State Armament Program 2020 make the Russian military's direction look significantly less bleak. A large portion of future resources will be necessary to maintain the Russian force as it moves forward, replacing aging equipment, maintaining the current equipment and improving living standards and salaries for the troops. The vast bulk of the equipment coming online consists of the next step in the evolution of legacy aircraft. The areas where the Russians stand to make major gains are in the strategic missile force and aerospace defense force. Russia already leads the world in terms of surface-to-air missile technology and will continue investing in this technology. The funds allocated also provide the impetus to continue developing and producing new intercontinental ballistic missiles.
For the first time in nearly three decades, the Kremlin seems to have a viable plan for ensuring its own domestic security and maintaining its power in the region.
Personnel Constraints
One challenge facing the Kremlin is recruitment. Several factors, including negative demographic trends, have undermined the military's ability to recruit and retain a sufficient number of quality personnel.
According to official numbers from the Russian armed forces, the military can currently build an estimated maximum force of 800,000 personnel -- a smaller figure than the 1 million personnel target usually given. In April 2012, the military comprised 160,100 officers, 189,700 contract soldiers and 317,200 conscripts. Taking retention rates and general attrition levels into account, the Russian military needs to conscript around 300,000 people during each of its drafts to maintain target troop levels of 1 million.
However, the military has reportedly fallen short of its conscription goals in recent years, with 280,000 Russians inducted in the fall 2010 draft, 218,720 in spring 2011, 135,850 in fall 2011 and 132,000 in spring 2012. An increasing number of violations associated with the draft is thus unsurprising. During the fall 2011 draft, officials who were under pressure to meet even the lowered targets committed some 6,000 violations in the conscription of Russians considered unfit to serve.
The conscription problems have forced the military to attempt to recruit higher numbers of contract soldiers by raising salaries and improving living conditions. These efforts require considerable funding, but they will be central to the modernization of the Russian military moving forward.
Defense Industry Constraints
Russia also faces major constraints in modernizing its military equipment. Currently, only between 20-30 percent of the country's military equipment is considered modern. The military's goal, per a December 2010 announcement by then-Russian Prime Minister Vladimir Putin, is to increase this number to 70 percent by 2020, or 11 percent annually. Despite Russia's considerable fiscal resources, it might be impossible for its military to update that much equipment in such a time frame.
The Russian defense industry consists of approximately 1,500 institutions that are partially or wholly owned by the state. Estimates suggest that the industry employs as much as 4 percent of the Russian population. But in 2010, even before Russia began its modernization push, the defense industry was experiencing production shortfalls. That year, the industry failed to deliver around 30 percent of its orders, despite full funding from the government. The industry blamed the government procurement process, while the government blamed the industry. Regardless, shortfalls and cost overruns in production were systemic even before the modernization program began, and defense industry producers reportedly have already been falling behind their current benchmarks.
Many defense industry sectors lost nearly a decade (or nearly two decades, in some cases) of technological advancement following the collapse of the Soviet Union. Still, Russia sees domestic defense production as an imperative due to the large employment base the industry creates, the potential for arms sales profits and a desire to remain self-sufficient for its defense supplies.
This imperative constrains Russia's ability to purchase large quantities of high-end, off-the-shelf defense technology from other countries. The Russia military has made a small number of such purchases, including unmanned aerial vehicles from Israel, thermal imaging systems, wheeled infantry fighting vehicles and, most notably, Mistral warships from France. While some of these purchases have provided new military capabilities, their limited scale has kept them from fundamentally improving Russian military capabilities. In reality, the desired goal of such purchases has been to gain ground in technology transferred by these weapon systems. Russia has also launched certain joint development ventures, including the fifth-generation fighter aircraft and the BrahMos supersonic cruise missile, to stay competitive in top-end technology weapons systems.
The single largest constraint hindering the military development goals is the sheer scale of modernization that is required. Even if Russia could update 70 percent of its equipment by 2020, the military would still face obstacles posed by support constraints such as network infrastructure, satellite capabilities and technology interoperability. The military would also require a significant amount of institutional knowledge to effectively train its personnel to operate within war-fighting systems -- expertise that is best garnered through experience, not purchase.
Budgetary Constraints
Another major obstacle facing the Russian military is the government's ability to finance it. Russia's gross domestic product has vastly expanded in the past decade, rising from $313 billion in 1995 to $1.7 trillion in 2011. The Russian military budget has steadily increased as well, rising between 4 percent and 24 percent annually. But the growth in military spending has been fueled by a prolonged run of high energy prices; energy revenues fund nearly half of the Russian budget.
For Russia to maintain its current military spending levels and implement Putin's vast rearmament program, the Kremlin would need to increase defense outlays by 25 percent starting in 2013 and spend an extra $77 billion each year for the next decade. To finance this, Russia would need oil prices to remain above $100 per barrel. Currently, the Russian budget is based on oil costing $117 per barrel, a price which would allow the government maintain its current spending levels without running up a deficit and even grow its rainy day funds. Should oil prices dip, Russia would not be able to fund its current budget, let alone a 25 percent expansion.
This issue is the subject of fierce discussion within the Kremlin. Putin and other security hawks want to ensure that the Russian military can fulfill plans laid out for the next decade. However, the more fiscally minded leaders understand that the Russian budget as a whole -- not just in defense -- must be slimmed down in preparation for a decline in oil prices.
The Kremlin could finance its ambitious military expansion without increasing the military budget. Russia holds more than $550 billion in currency reserves and more than $150 billion in a rainy day fund. However, these reserves are meant to ensure the country's stability during financial crises -- an evident threat considering Europe's ongoing financial instability. The funds are not intended to fuel a military spending spree. So the Kremlin must decide which is more important: financial stability or a robust military. In the past, the Kremlin has chosen the latter, contributing to bigger issues for Russia down the line.
Editor's note: An earlier version of this analysis misstated Russia's gross domestic product in 1995It was $313 billion.
