The Frailty of the Afghan War

[fatman17]

Khalil Nouri

Co-founder of New World Strategies Coalition, Inc.
Posted: January 10, 2011

The Frailty of the Afghan War

As C.S. Lewis says, "We all want progress, but if you're on the wrong road, progress means doing an about-turn and walking back to the right road; in that case, the man who turns back soonest is the most progressive."

The Obama administration has found "fragile" but "reversible" progress in its one year assessment of the surge of an addition 30,000 U.S. troops to Afghanistan.

In a recent VOA report, NATO has also echoed that coalition forces have made significant progress, but confidential U.N. maps released suggest security has deteriorated in parts of the country in 2010. In addition, a recent National Intelligence Estimate by 16 intelligence agencies also found no progress.

In either case, while the Taliban militancy may be diminished, the looming instability -- that threatens the coalition's sustainable and durable gains enabling responsible drawdown of troops and resources through 2014 -- is conditioned on the factors that neither the Obama administration nor the NATO alliance has given assessments. In hindsight, these factors are the root causes for the fragility and reversibility of the progress. Some factors have been cited repetitively overtime, but NATO'S helpless struggle against Afghanistan's youth bulge is the most burdensome and an inescapable one.

As I recall, in 1979 Afghanistan had a population of 15 million people, but now it has risen to about 34 million. This dynamic of a rapidly growing population has much to do with Afghan cultural norms that foster the idea that indeed it is robustly leveraging the war effort against the coalition. In 1979 there were around 3.5 million Afghan boys younger than 15 when the Soviet Union attacked who were merely getting ready for the fight against foreign occupiers. In 2009 and 2010, the situation had changed. There were 4.2 to 4.4 million -- mostly unemployed -- Afghan males aged 15 to 29 out of a total population of 34 million. Now there are 6.7 million Afghan boys fewer than 15 who are getting ready for battle. This is because Afghanistan's women have been averaging three or four sons each. Which means the Afghan demographics is miraculously destined to prevail in a conflict against foreigners with an enhancement of youth population over a set span of time.

Mathematically thinking, 3 percent of 6.7 million is more than the 131,000 NATO troops currently deployed in Afghanistan. Given that factor, and per counterinsurgency doctrine, the numbers indicate that Afghanistan needs as many as 600,000 soldiers and police to maintain the current strategy of counterinsurgency. Hence, the odds for reversal of the stated progress are alarming.

Moreover, there is no doubt that the militants are in their seasonal hibernal phase, making their annual return to Pakistan where they will rest until the fighting season begins again in the following spring. Though a few resistance forces are likely to keep up a hum of violence, it will be nothing like the fighting to regain their thrust at the start of spring.

Of course another factor for the frailty of the war is rampant corruption; in fact, 80 percent of Afghans believe that corruption impacts their lives daily. This is consistent with the view that corruption is preventing the Afghan government from connecting with the people; and remains one of the key root factors supporting the insurgency. Also in consort with corruption, evidence suggests that the inherent weakness of central government institutions in Afghanistan is adding fuel to the insurgent cause.

Similarly, the U.S. Military Review underscores the idea that Pakistan is central to counterinsurgency strategy -- although NWSC counters this notion -- and that progress with Pakistan to eliminate extremist safe havens is vital. And, the Obama administration is contemplating laying the foundation for a strategic partnership with Pakistan. Conversely, always-problematic Pakistan's continuing to drag its feet on suppressing insurgents in its tribal areas does reflect an awkward arrangement. In fact, the tenacity of the Taliban and their ties to Afghanistan's many Pashtun (and the reality that the Taliban will continue to enjoy a sanctuary in neighboring Pakistan) has immensely heightened their capabilities and operational reach; and has qualitatively expanded their insurgency geographically, adding plentiful funding sources which consequentially is converse to what the U.S. seeks to achieve.

One should not underestimate the conditions given, that in 2001 a victorious West claimed the Taliban was toppled, but on mission they had not been defeated; they simply retreated in the face of superior forces. In fact, employing classic guerilla tactics they simply melted away into other areas, spreading the rebellion into new parts of the country.

Additionally, because Afghanistan also remains hindered in poverty, and with the legitimacy of its graft-ridden, Western-backed government further undermined after two questionable and bizarre elections; both are conditions that created a perfect breeding ground for anti-government insurgency in 2010. Moreover, there is finally an understanding that, any insurgents who enjoy the support of the population can always bounce back.

Today many Afghans perceive ISAF as an occupying force and no longer part of the solution; they have become part of the problem. Also, the average Afghan population has difficulties absorbing the vague and shifting references akin to, "NATO alliance doesn't have an exit strategy, but has a transition strategy," or, "U.S. commitment to Afghanistan is continuing, enduring and long-lasting," or, "any troop reduction then would be responsible and conditions-based," and, "This is not a war of choice. This is a war of necessity." Afghans can plainly see all these statements as signs of ill-progress.

Therefore as initially stated, the U.S. is on the wrong road, and it should do an about-turn and walk back to the right road; in that case, she/he who turns back soonest is the most progressive.

Khalil Nouri coauthor of Afghanistan National Reconciliation is the cofounder of New World Strategies Coalition Inc Flash Intro Page, a native think tank for a nonmilitary solution studies for Afghanistan, and a member of Afghanistan Study Group A New Way Forward | Report of the Afghanistan Study Group

 

[Ratus Ratus]

Interesting article.
But there are defiantly a few more interesting ones at New World Strategies Coalition. All worth reading.

 

[fatman17]

(1/2011) Book Review:

The Longest War By Peter Bergen

Jan 13, 2011

Review By Loyd E. Eskildson

Nearly a decade after 9/11 we're still fighting in Afghanistan, and have yet to withdraw from Iraq (hopefully this year). While we haven't had another major terrorist attack since, we have spent over $1 trillion, thousands have died, and evidence indicates that we've also inspired a surge in Islamist opposition.

Currently, many reports indicate things are not going well in Afghanistan. Peter Bergen's (one of the very few Westerners to interview Osama Bin Laden) summary in "The Longest War" is interesting and credible, though suffers from a obvious errors and only superficial treatment of Afghanistan.

The first error occurs at the very beginning when Bergen asserts that 9/11 represented a miscalculation by Bin Laden, causing the collapse of the Taliban regime and the destruction of Al-Qaeda's safe have in Afghanistan. However, given the Taliban's subsequent resurgence, Al-Qaeda's successful relocation to Pakistan etc., and its continued ability to roil and financially bleed foes around the world with various bombings and even attempted bombings, Bin Laden is undoubtedly quite pleased with the trade-off.

Bergen continues with important background - how Bin Laden had concluded that the U.S. was weak, based on our pullout from Vietnam in the 1970s, Reagan's fleeing Beirut after the Marine barracks bombing, Clinton's withdrawal of forces in Somalia after the 'Black Hawk Down' incident a decade later, and our failure to respond to the U.S.S. Cole bombing just prior to Bush II becoming president. As for Al-Qaeda's contribution to the Soviet departure from Afghanistan, Bergen believes it is much overrated - the number of Afghans fighting totaled about 175,000, vs. no more than several hundred outside Arabs at any one time.

After the spectacular successes or our initial Afghanistan bombing campaign, major U.S. blunders eventually undid most of those successes. The biggest was General Franks' refusal to provide more troops at Tora Bora when Bin Laden was fleeing the country, and the Pentagon's ignoring a Special Forces request to be dropped on Pakistan's side of Tora Bora to trap Bin Laden from behind. Instead, Bergen points out, the U.S. relied on 2,000 Afghans under commanders that disliked each other more than Al-Qaeda, and also happy to take bribes from Arabs trying to escape the U.S. bombing assault.

Per Bergen, U.S. commanders at the time were overly concerned over potential casualties and offending Afghan warlords. Some also excused our inaction by claiming insufficient evidence that Bin Laden was at Tora Bora; however, Bergen also reports that V.P. Cheney stated at the time that "Bin Laden was probably there." Pakistan's military, meanwhile, was distracted at the time by a mobilization on its border with India in response to an earlier Pakistani terrorist attack on India's Parliament.

The Bush administration was terrified of another terrorist attack, and thus authorized outsourcing torture to other nations, and pushed terrorist trials by military commissions where it is not required that defendants see all evidence, and coerced testimony and hearsay evidence are admissible. Bergen, however, also goes to some length to establish that the U.S. gained more useful information via humane treatment than otherwise. Most, if not all, information touted as gained from more aggressive techniques turned out to be false alarms or dated information.

The 'War of Error' (Iraq) was meant to prevent a next attack. However, again, early military successes were nearly undone by subsequent mistakes - specifically Bremer's orders removing Baath party officials from all positions and dissolving Iraq's military, the U.S. military's refusal to negotiate with Sunni leaders until years later, failure to even attempt to secure Iraqi weapons caches estimated to total 1 million tons, humiliating home searches that widely antagonized the populace, and the Abu Ghraib scandal. As for preventing a supposed link-up between Hussein's Iraq and Al-Qaeda, Bergen reports that in 2006 the CIA estimated there were only 1,300 foreign fighters in Iraq - albeit almost all Al-Qaeda and the source of most of the suicide attackers. IEDs were the leading cause of American combat deaths by the latter half of 2005 - yet only about 10% of military transport trucks were armored, and the military delayed procurement of more - another major mistake.

Returning to Afghanistan, Bush II blocked nation-building there, we deployed only 6,000 soldiers initially, and blocked the use of non-U.S. troops outside Kabul for the first two years. Bergen believes that Pakistan's haven was the key to the Taliban's resurgence in Afghanistan. Between 2001-06, no senior Taliban leader was arrested or killed in Pakistan, despite the fact that most of them lived there. Heroin growth provided much better income to Afghan farmers than other crops, and even many urban occupations - about $12/day, per Bergen, a month's pay for most. Since about 10% of the population grew poppies, this put the U.S. in a quandary - alienate Afghans, or allow the drug to fuel social problems at home. By the time President Bush II left office, the Taliban had a presence in 72% of Afghanistan.

The 2005 London subway bombings cost about $14,000, including airfares to/from Pakistan and chemicals, and Bergen reports Bin Laden bragged in 2004 that Al-Qaeda's $500,000 'investment' in 9/11 created a $500 billion loss for the U.S. (Undoubtedly an underestimate, given our subsequent expenditures in Iraq and Afghanistan, and for Homeland Security.) Here Bergen commits his second major error - claiming that Al-Qaeda naively believed they could bleed the West dry. Between China and the War on Terror, our finances are obviously suffering.

Many fear Internet-spawned terrorism acts. Bergen, however, claims no evidence of a successful terrorist attacked operationalized mainly via the Internet. Further, while the 2003 Madrid train bombings were the product of a 'leaderless jihad' financed via local drug dealings, the most effective terrorists were usually organized training camp graduates. As for 'the bomb' - Bergen sees little likelihood Al-Qaeda will succeed because Pakistan's weapons (the most likely source) utilize electronic locks and probably are stored disassembled, and the total amount of stolen highly enriched uranium is only one-third that required to create a bomb. (Also, making a bomb requires considerable skill and precision.)

Positive U.S. moves include General Petreus' requiring troops to live among Iraqi citizens ("we can't commute to this war"), negotiating (belatedly) with local tribal leaders, creating the equivalent of gated communities, 'the surge,' increased use of drones, chain analysis of captured cell phones, and targeting IED makers. Bergen lists Malaki's initiating operations against former ally Al-Sadr and Shia forces in Basra and ending the Shia bias within its military and police forces as positive Iraqi moves.

What did we accomplish in Iraq? None of the stated goals, says Bergen. No WMDs were found or in production, no alliance between Saddam and Al-Qaeda was found, no democratic domino effect occurred in the region, peace did not come to Israel, and the war was not paid for via increased oil revenues to Iraq.

The 'good news,' per Bergen, is that Al-Qaeda is creating growing problems for itself via Muslim civilian deaths, failing to provide either a positive vision of where it is going or social services such as schools and welfare assistance, and alienating one government after another - including Iran. Surveys, however, show a positive view of the Taliban in Afghanistan; moreover, there are those discouraging reports from non-military personnel on the scene. I fear Bergen is over-optimistic.

Loyd E. Eskildson is retired from a life of computer programming, teaching economics and finance, education and health care administration, and cross-country truck driving. He's now a blogger and reviewer for Basil & Spice. Visit Loyd E. Eskildson's Writer's Page.

Copyright © 2006-2011, Basil & Spice. All rights reserved.

and CNN thinks this P/Bergen is 'the expert' on terrorism and is 'trashed' by the reviewer!

 

[Ratus Ratus]

(1/2011) Book Review:

The Longest War By Peter Bergen

Jan 13, 2011

Review By Loyd E. Eskildson

I have not read the book and doubt I ever would.

and CNN thinks this P/Bergen is 'the expert' on terrorism and is 'trashed' by the reviewer!

Yep.. X spurt.

Note to thread started: Stop making me work, I am ill a cripple and well, just a ratus ratus ..