The Foreign Policy Essay: Why China Will Become a Global Military Power

[Gufi]

I'm actually being conservative, here. Given our current GDP growth rate of 7% per year, by 2025, we will have $40 trillion GDP and a 2% Defense Defense would be $800 billion. However given that we will need to account for any unexpected growth, I'm actually average out to 2% growth, with 3% inflation and 3% currency appreciation.

The supreme art of war is to subdue the enemy without fighting.
Sun Tzu

 

[Shishike]

please, Chinese members, please don't hurt our Indian friends, cannot you hear katy perry singing firework?

 

[ito]

Compare with who? India? LOL

Do you want me spoon feed you???

Compare with US, West or any nation that are high on per capita or HRD index...

No, your President just bragged that India would become a "superpower", which is out of reach for any country except America.

Doesn't matter how big an economy is, being a superpower is a class above that.

Whereas Chinese leaders always say that China is still only a developing country, which is the truth:

China still largest developing country in world: Hu Jintao - Xinhua

Despite having a similar population to India, yet a $10.4 trillion economy, we are still a developing country. India is poorer than Africa, so it's nothing to be proud of.

Nether did India ever claimed that it is developed nation.

Kalam was a dreamer, he grew in a very poor Muslim family to become the country's president. He goes around the country to various schools and Universities and encourages students to dream and take up science. He is a very humble person.

 

[Keel]

Country of about the same size in population as China is not in the same league even on about the same starting point

Countries in the league or better do not have the same population size as China, have started earlier, by hook or by crook, or we can scale down our size by sorting out the population for comparison

 

[Aepsilons]

View attachment 183702

By Oriana Skylar Mastro
Sunday, January 11, 2015 at 10:00 AM

Lawfare › The Foreign Policy Essay: Why China Will Become a Global Military Power

For over a decade, academics, policymakers, and government officials have been engaged in a relentless debate about Chinese military capabilities and intentions. To some, China is likely an expansionist country akin to Germany before WWI. Others argue that China’s assertive behavior in its regional offshore island disputes is simply a manifestation of the Chinese Communist Party’s focus on domestic stability, which precludes any broader global ambitions.

Contrary to the extremes of the current debate, the Chinese military will be neither hollow nor a juggernaut. While the Chinese leadership would prefer to stay focused on internal development and regional issues, I argue in a recent article in The National Interest that facts on the ground will increasingly compel the Party to develop some global operational capabilities. Specifically, the burgeoning need to protect commercial assets and Chinese nationals abroad will inevitably shape modernization of the People’s Liberation Army (PLA) toward limited global power projection, regardless of its current plans or intentions. Even though the Chinese leadership will embark on this path with very limited goals in mind, Chinese thinking on how and when to use force could change once its strategy, doctrine, and capabilities evolve to incorporate these new roles.

While I posit that commercial, domestic, and international drivers will push the PLA to have an increasing global presence, this does not equate to fighting major wars and stationing troops abroad. If we define global military power by the standard of the United States, no country qualifies. The question here is not whether China would have the capacity to invade and occupy far-off countries, as only the United States can; but whether, like other second-tier powers, it will develop the capacity to project limited but meaningful force outside its immediate region.

Chinese Companies Create the Strategic Demand

In the near future, economic motivations will drive the development of China’s limited global power projection capabilities. Approximately 20,000 Chinese companies have a presence in more than 180 countries and regions, creating a constant demand for government protection of these assets. Furthermore, Chinese overseas investment is growing: at US$60 billion, China’s annual outward foreign direct investment (OFDI) in 2011 was 20 times the 2005 amount.

As Chinese investments increase, threats to those assets will increase in tandem. This is particularly the case in politically unstable countries where nationalization or seizure is always a possibility, or in countries that have ongoing territorial conflicts where anti-China protests have often resulted in damage to Chinese-owned property. While still a fledging phenomenon, there are recent examples of instances that could drive China to develop limited expeditionary capabilities to augment its response options.

These incidents are occurring more frequently and are increasingly threatening to the Party’s strategic and political interests. Statements made by the Chinese political and military leadership acknowledge that China’s need for stable access to natural resources in addition to exploding foreign investment have expanded its interests beyond the region, while their capabilities lag behind. Wang Yi in his first speech as China’s foreign minister outlined trends and principles in foreign policy, highlighting the need to align China’s foreign policy with its expanding global interests. China’s 2013 Defense White Paper noted that “security risks to China’s overseas interests are on the increase” and included for the first time a section on protecting Chinese overseas interests. And in recent months, China’s president Xi Jinping himself has publicly stressed the critical importance of a strong military to a successful foreign policy and dismissed the option of passivity.

The Chinese Public Creates the Domestic Support

An increasing number of Chinese citizens are going abroad, with many migrating to politically unstable countries as part of an exported labor force or in prospect of financial gain. In the 12 months leading up to May 2014, Chinese nationals recorded 98 million overseas trips—a number that has increased by an average rate of over 10 million a year for the last four years. By 2020, approximately 150 million Chinese citizens will be traveling and living abroad. In comparison, approximately 57 million Americans traveled abroad in 2014 and 6.3 million Americans live overseas.

Domestic public support for the development of expeditionary capabilities is coalescing as more and more Chinese nationals find themselves in dangerous situations due to a combination of misfortune and political instability in host nations. According to the Chinese government’s foreign ministry, its embassies and consulates deal with an average of 100 incidents a day regarding overseas Chinese nationals in danger. Netizens have begun to complain that the government relies too heavily on enhancing citizen awareness of dangers and diplomatic mechanisms for citizen protection, rather than using military force. A prominent Chinese public intellectual noted in the aftermath of the disappearance of flight MH370, which was carrying 157 Chinese nationals and to which the Chinese government responded by launching joint search-and-rescue teams, that “China’s capacity to engage in security operations outside its national boundary still lags far behind” developed countries and that “China has all the reason and right to turn the crisis and challenge into an opportunity to build up its security forces’ capacity to protect overseas interests.”

‘Responsible Stakeholder’ Creates the International Approval

In addition to commercial demand and domestic pressure, the Chinese leadership’s desire to create a positive international image could provide additional incentives to develop global expeditionary capabilities. International pressure for China to take on more global responsibilities organically creates international support for PLA expeditionary operations of a limited nature. A Chinese military with the ability to project power globally, even if only for a short period of time in relatively permissive environments, could contribute more to peacekeeping missions as well as humanitarian assistance and disaster relief operations. A proclaimed desire to contribute more to the global good could provide a legitimate and non-threatening rationale for the development of power projection capabilities.

A Stronger, More Globally Impactful China?

An effective global capability is not inevitable. There are real obstacles—technological, political, and ideological—to the Chinese military’s capacity to operate abroad, even on a limited scale. Scholars often point to China’s failure to resolve these obstacles today as proof that there will still be impediments tomorrow. Admittedly, the PLA’s experience with such expeditionary operations has been limited. It holds true that China currently has no bases abroad, no long-range logistics capabilities, and rudimentary satellite coverage. China is particularly weak in the key enablers required for expeditionary capability: airlift, sealift, C4ISR (command, control, communication, computers, intelligence, surveillance, reconnaissance), and logistics.

But we should not forget that at the turn of this century, the idea of China with an aircraft carrier or Chinese participation in peacekeeping operations seemed highly contentious and hypothetical. If China invests in the right platforms and technologies—such as large transport aircraft and tankers; amphibious combat ships; hospital ships and landing dock platforms; and a robust, space-based ocean surveillance system—conducting limited global operations will become more probable. At the same time, while acquiring the requisite military platforms and units is a formidable and obvious challenge, it is only one piece of the puzzle—the PLA will also have to address organizational and doctrinal impediments.

The exact shape and capabilities of a global expeditionary PLA in a decade or so remains uncertain and contingent. But powerful commercial, domestic, and international drivers will compel the Party to reshape the PLA in order to protect Chinese interests and nationals overseas and maintain its credibility. While Beijing’s motivations may be relatively narrow, such new and expansive PLA capabilities will have much wider implications for its traditional war-fighting goals as well as for future articulations of strategy and interests. Specifically, the ability to conduct limited expeditionary operations on a global scale could impact China’s non-interference policy and regional stability.

Once the PLA has the capabilities to intervene abroad, and ideological barriers have been loosened with global operations, the Chinese leadership may become more interventionist. A more assertive China may be a positive development for the United States, especially if it leads to greater Chinese cooperation on issues such as energy security, stability in the Middle East, and climate change. One possible future scenario is that China relaxes its non-interference principle as its global interests expand and overlap with those of the United States, leading to coordination between the two countries on global issues. But there are three reasons to question the feasibility of this ideal outcome. First, as the North Korean nuclear issue has demonstrated, even when Chinese and American interests overlap, divergence in their preferred tactics can inhibit progress on the issue at hand. Second, China defines its core interests narrowly in domestic terms while the United States is more likely to view issues from the perspective of maintaining the current global order. Last, abandonment of the non-intervention principle to facilitate its new global expeditionary mission would mean the potential for Chinese interference in issues in which the United States may prefer China’s traditional hands-off approach.

In terms of regional stability, while the Chinese leadership may only plan on building expeditionary forces to address non-traditional threats, the increased capabilities may shape Chinese interests and preferred methods of achieving traditional regional security objectives. The implications for the United States and its regional allies and partners are uncertain. China’s increased military role in global affairs and enhanced expeditionary capabilities could create a balancing backlash among its Asian neighbors and contribute to instability in the region, as incentives for preventive war increase with the rapid shifts in the regional balance of power. China could become confident in its ability to achieve its objectives by brute force alone, especially with domestic support. However, a global expeditionary PLA could also create a more assertive China that is positioned to provide international public goods, further enmeshing Beijing into the current world order and reducing the incentives for it to use force to resolve disputes.

Any projection about future intent and capabilities is contingent and uncertain. But as long as China continues its double-digit annual increases in defense spending, and GDP growth continues even modestly, China should be able to simultaneously develop traditional war-fighting capabilities to address regional challenges as well as global expeditionary capabilities to confront threats farther from home. While flare-ups or resolutions of persistent regional issues may delay or accelerate this future scenario, they are unlikely to reverse China’s increasingly global PLA.

***

Oriana Skylar Mastro is an assistant professor of Security Studies at the Edmund A. Walsh School of Foreign Service at Georgetown University. This piece draws on her work on trends in Chinese military modernization originally prepared for the 2014 PLA Conference presented by NBR, SSI, and USPACOM and appears in the current issue of The National Interest.

China is a global military power. They have sent some 1000 military personnel to help with the Ebola threat in West Africa, they have sent 700 PLA personnel to help maintain the peace in Southern Sudan, and the PLAN regularly maintain a presence in the Persian Gulf for anti piracy activities.

 

[Dem!god]

good luck china...
go for it...

you are already a very dominant regional power... just need to flex your muscle...

 

[Shotgunner51]

The article says the globalization of PLA is an unstoppable trend, I don't disagree with that. However I notice a very significant shortcoming that hinders China from achieving such goal - PLA bases. Comparing with optimistic increase in defense spend, progress of weaponry systems, training of personnel, etc., China's progress in building a global military base network is practically zero.

The global reaching capability of US forces is supported by >100 military bases scattered on every corners on this planet. Even when compared to countries that we thought don't carry much international security responsibilities, e.g. UK, France, they also maintain a smaller but still global of base network.

What is our goal in size terms? For sure we China don't carry as many international security responsibilities as US does, so we might eye on building a smaller one. Ideal locations I don't know, bros feel free to suggest.

How to achieve it? Note that unlike pure defense subjects, PLA alone can't do much in this arena. I think more departments in the government (e.g. diplomatic, commerce, energy admin, space admin) and even in the business sector (energy, shipping, airlines, Beidou, satcoms, construction, etc) have to work together. China's top leadership should see the complexity of it, establish a cross-department unit/commitee to co-ordinate various factions and achieve the ultimate goal.

 

[SvenSvensonov]

The article says the globalization of PLA is an unstoppable trend, I don't disagree with that. However I notice a very significant shortcoming that hinders China from achieving such goal - PLA bases.

How to achieve it? Note that unlike pure defense subjects, PLA alone can't do much in this arena. I think more departments in the government (e.g. diplomatic, commerce, energy admin, space admin) and even in the business sector (energy, shipping, airlines, Beidou, satcoms, construction, etc) have to work together. China's top leadership should see the complexity of it, establish a cross-department unit/commitee to co-ordinate various factions and achieve the ultimate goal.

You're not the first to notice this problem. China does have a real limitation that holds back any global aspiration... A lack of friends. China has a lot of business partners, but these aren't "friends". Heck, even during the Cold War the US and USSR maintained a trade relationship and they were sworn enemies. No, China lacks real friends that it shares cultural, diplomatic technological and ideological ties with. The US has overseas bases due to its alliance system, a shared set of ideological, diplomatic, and cultural ties, China doesn't really have a comparable system as it's concerned about balancing its goals with its international reputation and perception. China doesn't want to be, and can't afford to be, seen as a hegemon as this would justify attempts at containing China and justify even great military buildup in China's region to combat it. China can't afford this (think beyond money to determine the cost) and it certainly doesn't want to justify attempts against it.

We, the US, are a hegemon because we stopped caring about international perception a long time ago. International perception just doesn't bother our leaders. We know we're hypocrites and cause instability at times, all nation do, we just don't care anymore.

So, how to reverse this? Promote the pre-mentioned ties. The more linked two nations become in realms outside of business, the more friendly they become to one another. Nations keep business and politics separate, but they have a harder time ignoring cultural or ideological ties. Its cultural ties that sees France intervene in Africa and a shared Ideology that keep China and Pakistan together.

There is another option though; money. Just as the US did in Central Asia, China could lease a base. However, during peacetime conditions this could be hard. The US only got its leases for the duration of the Afghan War, and one of the leases was terminated prior to its end due to some diplomatic wrangling between the host nation and Russia. Nations don't tend to like foreign military presences in their country unless their region is threatened by turmoil. The exception is in an alliance.

Do I see China making the necessary steps? Sure, the question isn't whether or not China will try, but whether or not other nations will be receptive to its efforts. Honestly, nations like Chinese money, but they aren't too keen on Chinese ideology. Chinese culture is limited, even in China it does cede somewhat to the Western notions of Capitalism and Consumerism - even Western products have a strong reputation for quality in China, in the rest of the world Chinese culture is basically seen as, for right or wrong, Panda diplomacy and a bad reputation. Diplomatically, well China's diplomacy is often intertwined with its business capacity and as stated previously nations can and often do keep politics and business separate. They love and welcome your money, they're not so receptive of your influence over their dominion.

It's going to be a difficult sell and perhaps in nations that are already friendly to China, like Venezuela, whose ideology already converges with China's, an overseas military base is possible. I don't expect one to sprout up anytime soon, but there are some conditions that would make this possible. It's just not possible en-mass at this point in time, not on a scale like the US is privy to, and I don't foresee it being possible for many, many years to come.

Long story short; make friends and don't threaten you neighbors as it will threaten your global reputation and decrease the likelihood of actual friendship.

@Chinese-Dragon - I thought China didn't want to be a global military power? Perhaps your compatriots aren't too good at analyzing their own country. Have we all been wrong?

 

[Shotgunner51]

You're not the first to notice this problem. China does have a real limitation that holds back any global aspiration... A lack of friends. China has a lot of business partners, but these aren't "friends". Heck, even during the Cold War the US and USSR maintained a trade relationship and they were sworn enemies. No, China lacks real friends that it shares cultural, diplomatic technological and ideological ties with. The US has overseas bases due to its alliance system, China doesn't really have a comparable system as it's concerned about balancing its goals with its international reputation and perception. China doesn't want to be, and can't afford to be, seen as a hegimon as this would justify attempts at containing China and justify even great military buildup in China's region to combat it. China can't afford this (think beyond money to determine the cost).

We, the US, are a hegimon because we stopped caring about international perception a long time ago.

So, how to reverse this? Promote the prementioned ties. The more linked two nations become in realms outside of business, the more friendly they become to one another.

There is another option though; money. Just as the US did in Central Asia, China could lease a base. However, during peacetime conditions this could be hard. The US only got its leases for the duration of the Afghan War, and one of the leases was terminated prior to its end due to some diplomatic wrangling between the host nation and Russia. Nations don't tend to like foreign military presences in their country unless their region is threatened by turmoil. The exception is in an alliance.

Long story short; make friends and don't threaten you neighbors as it will threaten your global reputation and decrease the likelihood of actual friendship.

@Chinese-Dragon - I thought China didn't want to be a global military power? Perhaps your compatriots aren't too good at analyzing their own country.

Yup, alliance, friends, Post WWII order, and new geopolitical challenges.

- Just a quick review: The modern days US miitary network first took its basic shape as a direct result of post 1945 order, ending up with bases in Europe and Asia to help safeguard reconstruction on these two devastated lands (Marshall's Plan), and were further strengthened to counter communist expansion. In 1970'-1980s some bases closed in Vietnam (retreat), Philippines (local nationalism, Marcos). This shape was pretty much the same until the fall of USSR, some new bases were added as part of the NATO's eastward expansion plan (though a few relocated or removed). Then some bases are added/strengthened during the Iraq war, and Afghan war, mostly for logistical purposes.
- The formation of US global network is driven by post WWII order, and geopolitical challenges, and wars. The capability to form such a network is through either allies, future allies, friends or just as simple as paying, i.e. whatever needed to get things done
- US doesn't have a image problem at all, despite problems, it's is still the most free, most open and most vibrant land in the world since even before WWII. Ideas from NY, from Silicon Valley are aspired by the world. Go ask a Chinese, a Russian or Venezuelan about Iron Man, iPhone 6, New York Arts Festival, Oprah, NBA, UC Berkeley ... you will see their response. I personally work closely with a bunch of American fellows on a regular basis. The specific problem now is that the world are getting aware of potential danger from conservative right-wing hawks in washington, the MIC's, the banksters, There is no problem with rest of the 400 million people of black, white, hispanic, asian or native. Is with that 1%, not the 99%, they are just as good or as bad as anyone else.
- China's situation differs a lot. The need, as the article says, is driven by its emerging interests vested around the globe. I don't have a list of ideal locations (should think about our interests in Africa, Latin America, M.E. and Southern Europe, and locations that help space exploration projects), but I think the scale of it would be much smaller than a network formed back in early post WWII days. Smaller scale, both in quantity and functions (supply stations, satcom / recon stations). US will continue to shoulder most responsbilities on international security, that not just relieve China's pressure but also in some way helps protect China's overseas interests (e.g. Iraq oil exploration)

Means to achieve it would be more complicated.
- Yes, China doesn't have a post WWII order type alliance network, or friends as you described, but the US demonstrated though its comes handy but not totally essential.
- From China's need analysis, it's not an assignment that PLA alone can complete. Like you said, ties, would help, and this require more than just sending a bunch of jarhead brass to knock doors. China needs integrated, well coordinated efforts to achieve this. Build ties, be it commercial, financial, logistical, cultural, P2P, or whatever.
- Gotta admit China does have a big "brand image" problem, largely due to its "mysterious" socio-political structure to the outside world. "China Threat" theory, Sinophobia, have gained popularity. Some efforts needed to address this big problem. Maybe we should consider hiring O&M or any good PR firm to help.
- Yes, we all shouldn't threaten neighbors, in fact we shouldn't threaten anyone at all, at least we should try. China should try remedy ties with Japan, Vietnam etc, and US can try rub shoulder with Cuba, Russia, Latin America and the Muslim World.

 

[SvenSvensonov]

Yup, alliance, friends, Post WWII order, and new geopolitical challenges.

- Just a quick review: The modern days US miitary network first took its basic shape as a direct result of post 1945 order, ending up with bases in Europe and Asia to help safeguard reconstruction on these two devastated lands (Marshall's Plan), and were further strengthened to counter communist expansion. In 1970'-1980s some bases closed in Vietnam (retreat), Philippines (local nationalism, Marcos). This shape was pretty much the same until the fall of USSR, some new bases were added as part of the NATO's eastward expansion plan (though a few relocated or removed). Then some bases are added/strengthened during the Iraq war, and Afghan war, mostly for logistical purposes.

Our alliance system did have its formation in the days following WWII, that was our catalyst, but China can form its own. There are plenty of problems in the world today that China can rally behind, be seen as part of the solution, and galvanize global opinions and support for its actions. The days after WWII aren't unique in the world, just a more extreme version of any catastrophe. Even on a smaller, but no less significant scale, the events of the 1990's with the Soviet Union's collapse or the even of 9/11 have helped shape the modern order. From the Soviet Union the US and NATO received its Eastern members and from 9/11 the US gained Middle-Eastern nations that where once willing to embargo the US for its support for Israel. On an even smaller scale the problems in the SCS have reignited a desire from regional nations to see the US return with greater force.

What will be China's catalyst? I don't know, perhaps it can be something major like a growing India or Russia problems with the Western world. Perhaps it can be more mundane like overseas militancy in the Middle-East and its potential for contagion. But WWII and the US role are not unique, China too can capitalize on a catastrophe to shake the foundations of the world.

Yup, alliance, friends, Post WWII order, and new geopolitical challenges.


China's situation differs a lot. The need, as the article says, is driven by its emerging interests vested around the globe. I don't have a list of ideal locations (should think about our interests in Africa, Latin America, M.E. and Southern Europe, and locations that help space exploration projects), but I think the scale of it would be much smaller than a network formed back in early post WWII days. Smaller scale, both in quantity and functions (supply stations, satcom / recon stations).

I wont disagree with this, China doesn't face the same situation the US does, and its scale will be smaller, I think this occurs for two reasons (the lack of willing partners, and a lack of a willing China). But China's goals, even if on a smaller scale and in different regions, are the same as those of the US; global stability and a need to protect one's interests anywhere said interest occur. China may focus more on the developing and emerging world than the US does, but I don't think this means China is fundamentally different or will approach its relations any different from the US. I think, for all our differences, we will approach the rest of the world in much the same way and for the same goals.

Yes, China doesn't have a post WWII order type alliance network, or friends as you described, but the US demonstrated though its comes handy but not totally essential.

Not only isn't it essential, but it will be problematic if your goals don't align with those you are trying to cooperate with, but our alliance system causes problems to as not every nation will play along at time. France and Turkey are the most oft cited examples of rouge actors in the US-centric alliance. In addition to playing the role of an alliance member, they take an even greater role in their own geopolitical aims, which don't always coincide with the goals of the alliance.

Now this isn't something I will complain about, it's just geopolitics, every nation will pursue their own path according to their own rational. These aren't the US, they are US partners.

Alliances aren't a necessity, but China will find troubles in regions that don't share its goals. Its the reason the US has problem with the nations it does. No amount of money will entice Venezuelan or even a nation trapped between great powers such as Vietnam to host a US base, listening post, logistic station or any other overseas military capacity. A bought friend isn't a friend, it's a customer.

Perhaps China will find a way to lessen this need, I don't think it's going to be possible. Also, I already think China has a bit of an alliance system, though it isn't a defense pact and thus doesn't need to come to China's defense nor does China have an obligation to defend it, but the SCO is a type of "New World" alliance that has all the trappings of NATO, just without the formality or formal agreements. To me, as an observer on the other side, it looks an awful lot like the status quo and not a unique situation, it looks a lot like an alliance.

Fundamentally, I don't believe the US and China are too different from one another in our goals, approaches or futures. We may be focused on different regions, the world may have changed somewhat since WWII, but really its still just as similar as it's always been.

Here's to peace... but we will train for war, it's what we do (both nations)

 

[TaiShang]

Everyday chinese state media spews endless propaganda against Japan. But hey, I believe the japanese see chinese bullshit as a source of entertainment.

Can you bring up an example from last week (now that you said "everyday") of the Chinese media spewing endless propaganda against Japan?

You're not the first to notice this problem. China does have a real limitation that holds back any global aspiration... A lack of friends. China has a lot of business partners, but these aren't "friends".

Friends can easily be bought. As you yourself pointed out, Turkey has been a long time friend (a NATO partner) of the US since 1950s, but, that friend back-stabbed you when you asked them to let your soldiers be stationed for the Second Iraq Invasion. Also, while you were trying hard to punish Iran with sanctions, Turkish government members were doing business with Iran, hence the recent massive corruption scandal that involves several Iranian nationals. So, friends, but only in relative terms.

China can buy a lot friends, including lands to station troops, but will never go that direction. You consider that a shortcoming, China considers that a part of its foreign policy doctrine.

What will be China's catalyst? I don't know, perhaps it can be something major like a growing India or Russia problems with the Western world. Perhaps it can be more mundane like overseas militancy in the Middle-East and its potential for contagion.

China's catalyst is there; national security. Petty crime and criminals across the world are not to push China to build an empire of bases. Militancy in the Middle East is particular US/West problem. It is US/West UAVs hunting down ISIS in the region, currently. China only needs to increase its border protection and domestic intelligence.

Russia is a strategic partner.

For India, China has strong deterrence. None of these requires China to build overseas bases. They only require China to achieve a strong deterrence, including nuclear, against potential threats, and force projection capability -- that is, long-endurance naval and air platforms.

This seems exactly what China has been doing.

The SCO and other initiatives (like string of pearls) are soft alliances, at the best, which may give China the capability to project power when required, but do not oblige it to station permanent bases and troops. This model is more flexible. You do not have to buy governments, install puppets, negotiate costly relocation agreements, etc.

 

[Chinese-Dragon]

@Chinese-Dragon - I thought China didn't want to be a global military power? Perhaps your compatriots aren't too good at analyzing their own country. Have we all been wrong?

Hello sir. To clarify, our official policy is "永遠不稱霸" (never seek hegemony), which is correct from a practical and realistic viewpoint.

Global hegemony of the type America currently has (unmatched economic/military for hard power dominance, unmatched diplomatic/cultural/media for soft power dominance), is an unrealistic goal for any other country to attain.

The article in the OP (from an American author) seems to be more about China acquiring "limited power projection" or "limited expeditionary capabilities". The purpose being to protect our trade routes, resource routes, overseas citizens, and overseas assets from attack. Or at least deter another country from hurting these interests.

For example, if Nicaragua suddenly decided to nationalize all Chinese assets in their country right now, what would stop them? Certainly not the fear of a military response, which is extremely unlikely. We'd have to rely entirely on economic and diplomatic deterrence.

A more realistic threat would be a blockade of our trading and resource routes, in the event of say another flare-up over Taiwan. We need some degree of power projection to be able to defend against that, or forever be at the mercy of the good will of others.

It is still very much a defensive doctrine.

 

[Yizhi]

Perhaps China will find a way to lessen this need, I don't think it's going to be possible. Also, I already think China has a bit of an alliance system, though it isn't a defense pact and thus doesn't need to come to China's defense nor does China have an obligation to defend it, but the SCO is a type of "New World" alliance that has all the trappings of NATO, just without the formality or formal agreements. To me, as an observer on the other side, it looks an awful lot like the status quo and not a unique situation, it looks a lot like an alliance.

Fundamentally, I don't believe the US and China are too different from one another in our goals, approaches or futures. We may be focused on different regions, the world may have changed somewhat since WWII, but really its still just as similar as it's always been.

i think it all comes down to what kind of global power China will become. How much of this power is about economy? or military? culture? frankly everyone is still guessing. even Chinese ourselves are not so sure of the answer.

by and large i believe that China's main focus will always be at home, much more so than US today even when, let's say, China match US in per capita level. the 'mind our own business' mindset is still very much dominant that China will remain reluctant to stretch itself in an active alliance-seeking way. in this front, i do think a genuine ideology difference between China and US exists.

 

[Shotgunner51]

There are fundamental differences between China and USA. China is a very old civilization, an old empire, and has many interactions - peacefully or violently - with other civilizations over the past few millenia. Though multi-racial, but still one of them is over 90% majority, so while literally speaking it's a political country, it's perceived by outside more as a national country. Moreover, its unique socio-political structure since >60 years ago makes it somewhat "very different" from the rest of 190 countries on earth except a few. The cons of these are obvious when talking about a global acceptance of country let alone its military presence. Similar logic applies to why W Europeans don't prefer Russian presence on their soil, even when they are supposed to be a democratic country after the fall of USSR.

USA is a very new country to the planet, and possibly the last big truly political country for mankind. Since those English puritans and separatists got off the Mayflower, the first Americans build this country based on a set of values like defying colonialists (though the Brits are the most civilized among all of its kind), all men are born equal and free, etc., and these values continue to give hope to people from the old worlds, pulling them to this new land of dream, forming what is USA. Then history came to a turning point, the unprecedented event of WWII dragged this young country out of isolationism to save the old worlds that created it from the Nazis and Imperial militarism, then helped rebuild the two devastated lands, and till today US continue to police the world with its globalized network. The world welcome the presence of USA (e.g. we Chinese to some degree see US presence in Japan actually a stabilizing factor), a condensed version of UN, which was created by the world itself. However, societies evolve, US is no exception, the danger to the world including USA itself apparently would be the MIC's (as one of ex-US president has warned, i think it was Eisenhower), banksters, conservative right-wing hawks.

That's why I think while China is resurging to its rightful place in the global stage, it has to understand the reactions from other people too. China is not USA, the cons are obvious as I said above. The goal has to clearly defined, i.e. PLA's global presence (so as its network of military bases) shall be kept at minimum level to ensure basic protection needed for it's globally vested interests. Until other people have a favorable perception of China, policing the world continues to be a US responsibility, China just focus on business and its required minimum protection.

As the motto of USMC said, we all should stay sharp, ready to uphold peace with force if necessary, ready to battle the evils both foreign and domestic.

 

[Aepsilons]

There are fundamental differences between China and USA. China is a very old civilization, an old empire, and has many interactions - peacefully or violently - with other civilizations over the past few millenia. Though multi-racial, but still one of them is over 90% majority, so while literally speaking it's a political country, it's perceived by outside more as a national country. Moreover, its unique socio-political structure since >60 years ago makes it somewhat "very different" from the rest of 190 countries on earth except a few. The cons of these are obvious when talking about a global acceptance of country let alone its military presence. Similar logic applies to why W Europeans don't prefer Russian presence on their soil, even when they are supposed to be a democratic country after the fall of USSR.

USA is a very new country to the planet, and possibly the last big truly political country for mankind. Since those English puritans and separatists got off the Mayflower, the first Americans build this country based on a set of values like defying colonialists (though the Brits are the most civilized among all of its kind), all men are born equal and free, etc., and these values continue to give hope to people from the old worlds, pulling them to this new land of dream, forming what is USA. Then history came to a turning point, the unprecedented event of WWII dragged this young country out of isolationism to save the old worlds that created it from the Nazis and Imperial militarism, then helped rebuild the two devastated lands, and till today US continue to police the world with its globalized network. The world welcome the presence of USA (e.g. we Chinese to some degree see US presence in Japan actually a stabilizing factor), a condensed version of UN, which was created by the world itself. However, societies evolve, US is no exception, the danger to the world including USA itself apparently would be the MIC's (as one of ex-US president has warned, i think it was Eisenhower), banksters, conservative right-wing hawks.

That's why I think while China is resurging to its rightful place in the global stage, it has to understand the reactions from other people too. China is not USA, the cons are obvious as I said above. The goal has to clearly defined, i.e. PLA's global presence (so as its network of military bases) shall be kept at minimum level to ensure basic protection needed for it's globally vested interests. Until other people have a favorable perception of China, policing the world continues to be a US responsibility, China just focus on business and its required minimum protection.

Excellent analysis @Shotgunner51 ! China has the potential to be a great stabilizing force in many of the unstable pockets in the world -- say in Africa and in the Middle East. Where there is an apprehension for many nations in NATO to and the West to intervene in the Middle East due to the experiences of the United States and other key allies in Iraq, I believe that China has the potential to exert a semblance of stability. The reason why I say this is because for one China is not the United States and is not Russia (past Soviet Union) where there is an affiliation of old politics and that said affiliation has the propensity to rile some sort of bias for many nations in that region.

China is a major investor of Africa, as well as the Middle East, and the Chinese character that is affixed towards economic development, national harmony (balance) is keenly known in that region and beyond. China can be pivotal in the rebuilding of much of that region either through the form of monetary aid, to military-peace-keeping forces, to both. There is this ripe potential.