The Folly of Foreign-Made Jets

[Andross]

The Indonesian Armed Forces recently announced it had accepted a grant of 24 F-16 jet fighters from the United States, and that during the course of 2014 it plans to buy even more. According to the military, this is part of an overall program to upgrade the Air Force.

However, these plans beg the question as to whether the top brass understands what is required to really develop the country, for how much deterrence these US jets will achieve is questionable. And focusing on the purchase of foreign weapons systems means missing out on a great opportunity for economic development.

Regarding the military deterrent that is the goal of these plans, it must be remembered that the F-16 is a so-called fourth-generation fighter jet. Most countries in the region, such as China, India, Australia, Japan and Singapore, are currently working on an upgrade of their air forces to fifth-generation fighters, like the Chinese-made J-20, the American F-35 and the Russian T-50/PAK-FA. South Korea and Malaysia are also rumored to be considering such a move. Even the most modern version of the F-16 will be little more than a sitting duck in any dogfight with these advanced military aircraft.

There is also the question of how modern exactly the F-16s in question will be. It is a well-known fact that the United States does not sell the cutting-edge technologies that are behind its own military superiority. The Arms Export Control Act of 1976 prohibits it from doing so. That is why the United States has not put its top-of-the-line fighter jet, the F-22, up for sale to anyone. And that is why the sale of the American F-35 to Britain was stalled for a long time, as — much to the dislike of the British — the United States insisted on keeping some of the jet’s technological components a secret.

The Argentinian experience during its war with Britain over the Falkland Islands in 1982 provides the conclusive argument against relying on arms purchases for the establishment of a military deterrent. During that war, the Argentinians used French-made Exocet missiles against the British Navy — with great success. The British prime minister at the time, Margaret Thatcher, therefore placed a call to French President Francois Mitterrand, who said she threatened “to launch the atomic weapon against Argentina unless I supply her with the secret codes that render deaf and blind the missiles we have sold to the Argentinians.”

This clearly shows that it is common practice for weapons manufacturers to build into their weapons systems special coding that allows the manufacturer to shut down the weapons at any desired moment. For the seller, this ensures the weapons can never be used against him. But for the buyer, this means the weapons can never be really relied upon during times of need.

The fact of the matter is that a real military deterrent cannot be bought. It can only be developed locally.

The benefits of doing so are not only strategic, however. By producing the needs of the military locally, there are also important economic benefits. The economists that researched what is called Military Keynesianism have identified the following:

First, purchasing weapons abroad causes money to leave the country, generating incomes for foreign firms and their workers, while producing and purchasing weapons locally generates income for local firms and their workers.

Second, a government policy that aims at producing a military deterrent at home will force the government to focus on establishing the basic requirements for any successful economy: excellent infrastructure and a high-knowledge population. This is because the demands of a military deterrent in today’s world require a defense industry that is high-tech in every sense. A government policy that aims to produce a home-grown military deterrent will therefore drive government expenditure on roads, schools and communications technology, thereby laying a foundation from which other industries can develop and prosper.

And third, in order to maintain a military deterrent, a defense industry must realize continuous improvements in technology. A focus on research and development is therefore only natural for the defense industry. And many examples can be given of technological innovations that were developed in the defense industry but spilled over into civil industries: jet engines, computers, nuclear power and the Internet are just a few examples.

A government policy that aims to produce a military deterrent at home could therefore not only be the starting point of a new Indonesia — an Indonesia set for real development and growth — but also the force driving the development of the nation’s industrial base, supplying products to the world and allowing full employment with the highest possible wages.

Therefore, this is what Indonesia is missing out on through its focus on purchasing foreign weapons: real military deterrence and a big chance for real economic development.

Some may say that in its present state, a policy that aims to produce a military deterrent domestically is simply not an option for Indonesia. But this thinking is not only incorrect, it is also what will keep the country from ever developing.

To think there are ways to pull a country of 237 million people out of poverty that do not require long-term planning, dedication and hard work is self-deceit. Any attempt to find such shortcuts for development will only leave one far removed from achieving what it truly needs.

Idries de Vries is a Jakarta-based economic and geopolitical affairs analyst.

The Folly of Foreign-Made Jets | The Jakarta Globe

 

[Andross]

This clearly shows that it is common practice for weapons manufacturers to build into their weapons systems special coding that allows the manufacturer to shut down the weapons at any desired moment. For the seller, this ensures the weapons can never be used against him. But for the buyer, this means the weapons can never be really relied upon during times of need.

The fact of the matter is that a real military deterrent cannot be bought. It can only be developed locally

Im no military expert but this seems quite worrying if it is true.

 

[Chogy]

The Argentinian experience during its war with Britain over the Falkland Islands in 1982 provides the conclusive argument against relying on arms purchases for the establishment of a military deterrent. During that war, the Argentinians used French-made Exocet missiles against the British Navy — with great success. The British prime minister at the time, Margaret Thatcher, therefore placed a call to French President Francois Mitterrand, who said she threatened “to launch the atomic weapon against Argentina unless I supply her with the secret codes that render deaf and blind the missiles we have sold to the Argentinians.”

This clearly shows that it is common practice for weapons manufacturers to build into their weapons systems special coding that allows the manufacturer to shut down the weapons at any desired moment. For the seller, this ensures the weapons can never be used against him. But for the buyer, this means the weapons can never be really relied upon during times of need.

Hogwash. When will this horrible notion of "secret codes" die?

Thatcher didn't want a magic code for the Exocet, she wanted hard info right from the manufacturers on the technical specifications on how it can be defeated. Specifics on frequencies, pulse-repetition, known weaknesses in the design.

You cannot digitally burst some code like "djh68fvh35g09ry" at a system and magically have it fall from the sky. No manufacturer does this, because of the very real likelihood that such a "code" could be sold by traitors or spies for billions of $$.

Plus, note the timeline:
May 4, 1982: Two French-made Argentine jets attacked the Britain's destroyer HMS Sheffield, which was on its way towards the Falkland Islands, using a French-made Exocet missile. The surface-skimming missile hit the ship, resulting in 20 fatalities and 24 injured crew.

Immediately, Thatcher made her demands. But ooops. Apparently the magic codes didn't work too well...

25 May: The 15,000 ton merchant ship Atlantic Conveyor was struck by two Exocet anti-ship missiles.
12 June: Two MM38 ship-to-ship Exocet missiles were removed from the old destroyer ARA Seguí, a retired US Sumner class, and transferred to an improvised launcher for land use. One of these was fired at, and caused damage to, the Destroyer HMS Glamorgan.

 

[The SC]

These secret codes are well known, the best example is the F-16, that is why Turkey and others insisted on having their own software for weapons controls, otherwise if the weapons locked on NATO or Israeli Planes they will recognize them as friends not foes even in the eventuality of confrontation, while the opposing side does not have this issue.
Argentinian type 209 German made submarines locked many times on british destroyers in falckland war, but they could not fire their torpedos, the swiches were reversed !!!
There are many more examples, the most notorious is a French emitting device that was built in the Iraqi reactor Osirac by the French, and was activated during the Israeli raid on the reactor in Bagdad enabling it to hit the core reactor with pinpoint precision.
Iran attacked that reactor many times before during its war with Iraq, but could not hit it with that precision, even with F-14 Tomcats, one of the most sophisticated warplanes ever!

 

[Pangu]

The F-16 can be "disabled" via satellite, as commented by some guy who knows someone in the industry. Myth or truth, is your call.

 

[punit]

an easy solution is to not fight with ur allies !!