Skeptic786
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The fire of hubris
By Khurram Dastgir-Khan
In the Line of Fire is not a memoir but an unwieldy mix of autobiography and 'apologia pro vita sua', i.e., a defence of one's life. General Musharraf's private life is for Allah Almighty to judge. His public life -- from the gathering dark of October 12 1999 to the darkness in which the whole country was plunged on September 24 2006 -- has brought black prospects for Pakistan 's people and its sovereignty.
The president concludes his book with the observation that among the basic principles of governance, the most important is "a continuous and significant improvement in the human condition". This is where his failure has been greatest. As the regime's seventh year comes to a close, Pakistan languishes at 135 out of 172 countries in human development. 150 million Pakistanis live in a grossly mismanaged country amidst vicious inflation, rampant crime, crumbling infrastructure, corruption in every government office, repression in police stations, mercenary courts of law, and non-existent provision of basic health and education.
Pakistanis have now been burdened further with a book full of false bravado, fabrications, and half-lies buried in self-congratulatory prose. In the Line of Fire has been denied comprehensively. Richard Armitage, George Bush, and the CIA deny what the general alleges. Atal Behari Vajpayee denies what the general alleges. Principal Pakistani politicians deny what the general alleges. Apart from the incarcerated Dr AQ Khan, everyone who could deny has denied what the general alleges.
Yet the generalissimo has succeeded in his primary aim, which was to establish his indispensability for the United States for the foreseeable future and thereby secure his continuation in power. He has written for a western, chiefly American audience. This explains its launch seven thousand miles away from Pakistan and the subsequent media saturation in the United States. The focus is foreign to the extent that there is a Hindi translation, but none so far in Urdu [one is scheduled for release later this month ââ¬â Ed.].
The single most damaging chapter in the book is on nuclear proliferation and Dr A Q Khan. This chapter should not have been written. Regardless of the fact that western intelligence agencies know about it and western newspapers and magazines have published detailed accounts, the president should not have washed our dirty nuclear laundry in the international arena. The president's revelations will be scrutinised with even more misgiving in the aftermath of North Korea 's nuclear explosion on October 9.
General Musharraf's disingenuous design is to pin the entire blame of proliferation on Dr A Q Khan and his associates, thus shielding those commanding and guarding the nuclear programme. It is unthinkable that tons of equipment and reams of information could leave Pakistan without consent of the guardians. And if one believes the general that the unthinkable did happen, then it is without doubt the gravest intelligence failure in Pakistan's history and the officials responsible should be prosecuted.
A similar disingenuousness is evident in the chapter on Kargil. He fails to explain how a "plan calling for plugging the gaps between our positions" in mid-January 1999 was changed so that "by the end of April, the forward movement of our troops to dominating positions" was complete. And by mid-May, this was an operation that "occupied 500 square miles of Indian-occupied territory." General Musharraf's account flies in the face of all historiography on the subject. To praise Kargil as the finest hour of Pakistan 's military history might be appropriate for raising morale in an army mess, but as history it is nonsense.
The concluding assertion of the Kargil chapter is wrong to the point of absurdity. "Whatever movement has taken place so far," writes the general, "in the direction of finding a solution to Kashmir is due considerably to Kargil." The movement has all been backward -- a wholesale capitulation to India -- and against Pakistan 's national interest. By surrendering the UN-principle unilaterally, submitting to Indian demand for composite dialogue and for a fence on LoC, and then giving off-the-cuff solutions to the Kashmir issue, General Musharraf has shaken the foundations of Pakistan's stand and has practically abandoned Kashmiris in the Indian-occupied region to fend for themselves.
Another tale of submission unfolds in the chapter on 9/11. General Musharraf has retreated from asserting that he decided to support the US war on terror because it was in Pakistan's interests to do so. A craven argument appears in the book: he capitulated before a mere threat of superior US force. He also surrendered the life and safety of hundreds of Pakistanis in Waziristan and forfeited the rule of law for the Pakistanis his regime handed over to the United States in extraordinary rendition
The general would like the outside world to forget that he is a general; that he took power by force in a coup d'etat. He erased his designation from the title of his book and the author photograph is a thoughtful pose in civilian dress. He tries to hide his unconstitutional takeover behind a racy account of the alleged hijacking and the tick-tock tale of how the armed forces mobilised for takeover on 12 October 1999.
Musharraf the author also raises a more sophisticated smokescreen by quoting a letter of US President Abraham Lincoln to the effect that a limb must be amputated to save the body. He would have us believe that he amputated the limb of elected constitutional government to save the body of the country. This is a wrong example on two counts.
Lincoln wrote the letter in the middle of the American civil war when the unity of his country was in the greatest peril. He was the duly elected civilian president who in less than four years changed five army chiefs -- Scott, McClellan, Burnside, Hooker, and Meade -- until he found Ulysses Grant who would prosecute the war to Lincoln 's liking. Despite a nationwide, half-decade long conflict, civilian supremacy over the war and the United States was never in doubt.
Now let us look at the newspapers published the morning of October 12, 1999. What was the crisis that threatened 'the body' of Pakistan? Where was the breakdown of 'the limb' aka elected government? What was the problem for which the military coup was the solution?
In one of the rare glimpses of truth in his book, General Musharraf admits that the problem started in 1998 with the "meek manner in which General Karamat resigned. It caused great resentment in the army, as soldiers and officers alike felt humiliated." Further on, he writes: "[The army] would not allow another humiliation to befall us in case the prime minister tried something like this again, but we would react, never act unilaterally."
Thus the truth is revealed. The coup was a reaction to stop an elected prime minister from using his constitutional authority to replace the army chief. Dismissal of two army chiefs within one year was unacceptable because it would have created a tradition of civil supremacy over the armed forces, a concept anathema to the establishment. Where is the humiliation? The military coup humiliated 150 million Pakistanis, their elected institutions, and the fundamental law of our country.
General Musharraf's legacy is already quite tattered. He has presided over the rising mercenariness of Pakistani politics by gathering the inept and corrupt political figures under one umbrella. By suppressing mainstream political parties, he created a vacuum that was filled by extremist religious elements. His seven-year reign has badly damaged Pakistan's institutions of governance, has brought unthinkable human suffering to the people of Pakistan. His book is now part of this legacy. It has damaged Pakistan's interests and its international reputation. It has disappointed our friends and left them bereft of arguments to support us.
The principal value of 'In the Line of Fire' lies in its exposé of the mindset of the Pakistani establishment. The book is afire with hubris arising from the establishment's monopoly over defining the national interest and with the arrogant confidence that only those in uniform know what is best for Pakistan. The consent, aspirations, and the civil and human rights of the citizens are completely inconsequential. The establishment has garrisoned the state of Pakistan. Now we have the proof in writing.
The writer is a former special assistant to the prime minister. Email: kdastgirkhan@gmail.com
By Khurram Dastgir-Khan
In the Line of Fire is not a memoir but an unwieldy mix of autobiography and 'apologia pro vita sua', i.e., a defence of one's life. General Musharraf's private life is for Allah Almighty to judge. His public life -- from the gathering dark of October 12 1999 to the darkness in which the whole country was plunged on September 24 2006 -- has brought black prospects for Pakistan 's people and its sovereignty.
The president concludes his book with the observation that among the basic principles of governance, the most important is "a continuous and significant improvement in the human condition". This is where his failure has been greatest. As the regime's seventh year comes to a close, Pakistan languishes at 135 out of 172 countries in human development. 150 million Pakistanis live in a grossly mismanaged country amidst vicious inflation, rampant crime, crumbling infrastructure, corruption in every government office, repression in police stations, mercenary courts of law, and non-existent provision of basic health and education.
Pakistanis have now been burdened further with a book full of false bravado, fabrications, and half-lies buried in self-congratulatory prose. In the Line of Fire has been denied comprehensively. Richard Armitage, George Bush, and the CIA deny what the general alleges. Atal Behari Vajpayee denies what the general alleges. Principal Pakistani politicians deny what the general alleges. Apart from the incarcerated Dr AQ Khan, everyone who could deny has denied what the general alleges.
Yet the generalissimo has succeeded in his primary aim, which was to establish his indispensability for the United States for the foreseeable future and thereby secure his continuation in power. He has written for a western, chiefly American audience. This explains its launch seven thousand miles away from Pakistan and the subsequent media saturation in the United States. The focus is foreign to the extent that there is a Hindi translation, but none so far in Urdu [one is scheduled for release later this month ââ¬â Ed.].
The single most damaging chapter in the book is on nuclear proliferation and Dr A Q Khan. This chapter should not have been written. Regardless of the fact that western intelligence agencies know about it and western newspapers and magazines have published detailed accounts, the president should not have washed our dirty nuclear laundry in the international arena. The president's revelations will be scrutinised with even more misgiving in the aftermath of North Korea 's nuclear explosion on October 9.
General Musharraf's disingenuous design is to pin the entire blame of proliferation on Dr A Q Khan and his associates, thus shielding those commanding and guarding the nuclear programme. It is unthinkable that tons of equipment and reams of information could leave Pakistan without consent of the guardians. And if one believes the general that the unthinkable did happen, then it is without doubt the gravest intelligence failure in Pakistan's history and the officials responsible should be prosecuted.
A similar disingenuousness is evident in the chapter on Kargil. He fails to explain how a "plan calling for plugging the gaps between our positions" in mid-January 1999 was changed so that "by the end of April, the forward movement of our troops to dominating positions" was complete. And by mid-May, this was an operation that "occupied 500 square miles of Indian-occupied territory." General Musharraf's account flies in the face of all historiography on the subject. To praise Kargil as the finest hour of Pakistan 's military history might be appropriate for raising morale in an army mess, but as history it is nonsense.
The concluding assertion of the Kargil chapter is wrong to the point of absurdity. "Whatever movement has taken place so far," writes the general, "in the direction of finding a solution to Kashmir is due considerably to Kargil." The movement has all been backward -- a wholesale capitulation to India -- and against Pakistan 's national interest. By surrendering the UN-principle unilaterally, submitting to Indian demand for composite dialogue and for a fence on LoC, and then giving off-the-cuff solutions to the Kashmir issue, General Musharraf has shaken the foundations of Pakistan's stand and has practically abandoned Kashmiris in the Indian-occupied region to fend for themselves.
Another tale of submission unfolds in the chapter on 9/11. General Musharraf has retreated from asserting that he decided to support the US war on terror because it was in Pakistan's interests to do so. A craven argument appears in the book: he capitulated before a mere threat of superior US force. He also surrendered the life and safety of hundreds of Pakistanis in Waziristan and forfeited the rule of law for the Pakistanis his regime handed over to the United States in extraordinary rendition
The general would like the outside world to forget that he is a general; that he took power by force in a coup d'etat. He erased his designation from the title of his book and the author photograph is a thoughtful pose in civilian dress. He tries to hide his unconstitutional takeover behind a racy account of the alleged hijacking and the tick-tock tale of how the armed forces mobilised for takeover on 12 October 1999.
Musharraf the author also raises a more sophisticated smokescreen by quoting a letter of US President Abraham Lincoln to the effect that a limb must be amputated to save the body. He would have us believe that he amputated the limb of elected constitutional government to save the body of the country. This is a wrong example on two counts.
Lincoln wrote the letter in the middle of the American civil war when the unity of his country was in the greatest peril. He was the duly elected civilian president who in less than four years changed five army chiefs -- Scott, McClellan, Burnside, Hooker, and Meade -- until he found Ulysses Grant who would prosecute the war to Lincoln 's liking. Despite a nationwide, half-decade long conflict, civilian supremacy over the war and the United States was never in doubt.
Now let us look at the newspapers published the morning of October 12, 1999. What was the crisis that threatened 'the body' of Pakistan? Where was the breakdown of 'the limb' aka elected government? What was the problem for which the military coup was the solution?
In one of the rare glimpses of truth in his book, General Musharraf admits that the problem started in 1998 with the "meek manner in which General Karamat resigned. It caused great resentment in the army, as soldiers and officers alike felt humiliated." Further on, he writes: "[The army] would not allow another humiliation to befall us in case the prime minister tried something like this again, but we would react, never act unilaterally."
Thus the truth is revealed. The coup was a reaction to stop an elected prime minister from using his constitutional authority to replace the army chief. Dismissal of two army chiefs within one year was unacceptable because it would have created a tradition of civil supremacy over the armed forces, a concept anathema to the establishment. Where is the humiliation? The military coup humiliated 150 million Pakistanis, their elected institutions, and the fundamental law of our country.
General Musharraf's legacy is already quite tattered. He has presided over the rising mercenariness of Pakistani politics by gathering the inept and corrupt political figures under one umbrella. By suppressing mainstream political parties, he created a vacuum that was filled by extremist religious elements. His seven-year reign has badly damaged Pakistan's institutions of governance, has brought unthinkable human suffering to the people of Pakistan. His book is now part of this legacy. It has damaged Pakistan's interests and its international reputation. It has disappointed our friends and left them bereft of arguments to support us.
The principal value of 'In the Line of Fire' lies in its exposé of the mindset of the Pakistani establishment. The book is afire with hubris arising from the establishment's monopoly over defining the national interest and with the arrogant confidence that only those in uniform know what is best for Pakistan. The consent, aspirations, and the civil and human rights of the citizens are completely inconsequential. The establishment has garrisoned the state of Pakistan. Now we have the proof in writing.
The writer is a former special assistant to the prime minister. Email: kdastgirkhan@gmail.com
