The Empire struck back - Russia's great game

[Neo]

The Empire struck back - Russia's great game - I​

EISUKE SUZUKI
ARTICLE (August 27 2008): The United States is in the presidential election year. George W. Bush has become a lame duck president. The economy is in bad shape. Two wars are being fought today in Iraq and Afghanistan: Nato troops are deployed in Afghanistan and the Coalition of the Willing is fighting an unpopular war in Iraq. They cannot afford to be drawn into another war in a country that is right in the backyard of Russia.

The leadership of the United States and that of Europe have each cultivated much closer relationships with Russia in the wake of the collapse of the Soviet Union. The whole world saw a TV news clipping of George W., jovial, laughing and patting the shoulder of Vladimir Putin, as if buddies, at the opening of the Olympic Games in Beijing. [Did he say, "Yo, Putin"?] Putin, the hegemon of the post-Soviet Russia, has conscientiously reorganised and rebuilt the military, thanks to enormous oil revenue, to the respectable, but awesome, level of real power. I mean real power that he will use.

Nobody expected a new Russia would behave like a "bully." Let's face it. Russia is a member of G-8, the most exclusive club of rich countries. Russia applied for membership in the WTO. Russia knows the international code of conduct it is expected to abide by. Everybody thought so. How could Russia run over this tiny country of a little over 4 million people? Everybody was taken for a surprise.

The New York Times' editorial of August 14, 2008 epitomises the general state of confusion about the nature of the Georgian crisis. The NY Times said: "Georgia's sovereignty must be guaranteed. It will almost certainly have to give up its hopes of asserting control over the two breakaway regions-but Moscow must not be allowed to annex them by force." Hello?

Georgia is an independent state and a member of the United Nations since July 31, 1992. The so-called breakaway regions, South Ossetia and Abkhazia, declared independence from Georgia in the course of the 1991-92 war and the 1992-93 war, respectively, but not a single member state of the United Nations has recognised either country as a "state." That means neither country has international status; they are still de jure part of Georgia. Russia should be reminded of its own action against Chechnya.

Russia is interfering in Georgia's internal affairs by giving Russian passports to South Ossetians starting in 1992 and to Abkhazians since 2000, thereby making them as Russian citizens. In so doing, Russia is de facto annexing them as part of the Russian territory.

Russian President Dmitri Medvedev's statement is testimonial: "Under the Constitution and the Federal law ... I must protect the life and dignity of Russian citizens wherever they are." For a long time Russia or the Soviet Union regarded the Caucasus region within its sphere of influence. In the wake of the collapse of the Soviet Union that sphere of influence has contracted considerably. The Baltic countries not only regained their respective independence, but also became members of the Nato, so did Poland, not to mention Bulgaria and Romania! Ukraine and Georgia applied for membership in Nato and wish to join the EU. Russia considers these developments a direct threat to its security.

President Vladimir Putin told President Bush at their bilateral meeting on April 6 this year in Sochi: "In order to improve relations with Russia it is necessary not to pull former Soviet republics into political-military blocs but rather to develop relations with Russia itself, thereby guaranteeing stability in the region." Russia is suggesting Washington's acknowledgement in practice of its sphere of influence in return for strategic co-operation with Nato and the United States.

Out of the national slump and devastation caused by the fall of the Soviet Union, Russia re-emerged onto the international stage as a confident, self-assured power player. The Empire struck back! Russia's Great Game just started. Russian Foreign Minister's remark to US Secretary of State Rice on August 11, 2008 was bold and straight: "Saakashvili must go."

It has become almost a cliché to cite Kosovo as a precedent in support of the secession of South Ossetia and Abkhazia since Kosovo's claim to independence was achieved in spite of Serbia's strenuous objection. Russia has exploited this analogy to rationalise their action and the western media seemingly fell into it. Russia's propaganda machinery is relentlessly harping on Georgia's alleged "genocide" and "ethnic cleansing" and accusing President Saakashvili of war crimes.

It is the forced argument to make the situation mirror that of Kosovo. Yes, South Ossetia and Abkhazia, like Kosovo within Serbia, are rife with ethnic-minority/majority conflicts within Georgia. Beyond this superficial similarity, the real context of Kosovo cannot be compared with that of South Ossetia and Abkhazia.

Unlike Serbia, Georgia has not been conducting a campaign of "ethnic cleansing" against the people of these provinces. On the contrary, it is internationally recognised that the ethnic cleansing and massacres of Georgians had taken place in Abkhazia, as documented in the May 15, 2008 UN General Assembly resolution (GA/10708). Russia's allegations of ethnic cleansing and genocides of South Ossetians by Georgians are yet to be established. In any case the two Georgian enclaves have been patrolled by Russian "peacekeepers" for the past 15 years.

It seems the US and international media had been taken for a ride for the first several days of the Russia/Georgia conflict by massive public relations campaigns carried out by Russia's propaganda machinery.

Let us remember a few indisputable facts: (a) Georgia is an independent state and a member of the United Nations; (b) Russia is a permanent member of the United Nations Security Council, primarily responsible for the maintenance of peace and security; (c) South Ossetia and Abkhazia are part de jure of the territory of Georgia; and (d) Georgia did not invade the territory of Russia, but it is Russia that invaded Georgia in violation of the United Nations Charter.

When Russia was bombarding and torching Chechnya, no other country invaded Russia. Assuming, arguendo, that Russia reacted to Georgia's provocation in South Ossetia by protecting Russian "peacekeeping forces" and Russian "citizens" in South Ossetia and Abkhazia, the scale of military mobilisation, the speed at which such mobilisation was carried out, and the manner by which force was applied against Georgia have raised serious questions.

Let's examine relevant events that took place in time sequence: the pre-August 7 phase, the conflict phase, and the cease-fire phase up to date. Since the Rose Revolution that brought Mikheil Saakashvili to the Presidency of Georgia in January 2004, the relationship between Georgia and Russia has precipitately deteriorated as Saakashvili vigorously pursued the country's move towards greater integration with the West, adopting the market economy, seeking membership in Nato and the European Union and sending Georgian troops to fight with American forces in Iraq.

Russia, so peeved at Georgia's what Russia considers "unfriendly acts," applied sanctions against Georgia, such as deporting over-stayed Georgians from Russia, banning the import of Georgian food stuff, and instituting a naval blockade at the Black Sea, increasing the price of gas to Georgia by more than double, and so on.

In particular, Russia withdrew from the Conventional Forces in Europe treaty in July 2007, thereby allowing the unfettered movement of the Russian army. Russia's attitude to Georgia took a sharp negative turn by taking a series of preparatory actions after Nato's annual summit was held at Bucharest in April this year. The then-President Putin authorised extensive diplomatic relations, short of formal recognition, with South Ossetia and Abkhazia on April 16, 2008.

As reported by William Brian of Eurasianet (August 17, 2008), in the second half of July this year, less than one month before Russia's invasion of Georgia on August 8, 2008, Russia held massive military training exercises in the North Caucasus, not far from Georgia's border, involving 8,000 servicemen and 700 pieces of military hardware, and at center stage in those manoeuvres was Russia's 58th Army, the unit that played a key role in the invasion.

Brian quotes Pavel Felgunhauer, a Moscow-based military analyst, "A decision was made for the war to start in August. The war would have happened regardless of what the Georgians did. Whether they responded to the provocations or not, there would have been an invasion of Georgia," Felgenhauer says. "The goal was to destroy Georgia's central government, defeat the Georgian army, and prevent Georgia from joining Nato."

The invasion by Russia of Georgia was aptly called a "blitzkrieg," and it is a reasonable conclusion that without prior planning, such a massive mobilisation of tanks, armoured vehicles, and soldiers and actually executing the large scale invasion of Georgia within a short period of time would not have been possible. The level of force applied in this invasion was utterly disproportionate to "the Georgian attack" allegedly preceding Russia's invasion.

The use of force is regulated by the principles of necessity and proportionality. Necessity determines whether the situation warrants the use of force. Proportionality determines whether counter-measures are reasonable and legitimate. In light of these principles, Russia's action is questionable at best under the first principle and certainly not justified under the second principle.

Russia is a permanent member of the Security Council of the United Nations. Russia has ipso facto an obligation to conduct itself properly as a responsible member of the Security Council in accordance with the Charter of the United Nations and international law. Regrettably, Russia did not live up to the international standard of behaviour expected of her.

(To be concluded)

 

[gpit]

[Did he say, "Yo, Putin"?]

Haha,

 

[batmannow]

Putin: US Provoked Georgia Conflict
August 29, 2008
Australian Broadcasting Corporation

Russian Prime Minister Vladimir Putin has accused the United States of orchestrating the conflict in Georgia for domestic political purposes, prompting angry denials from the White House, as tensions between the former Cold War rivals escalate.

Putin used an interview with the American television network CNN to say that his defence officials had told him the war was triggered to benefit one of the U.S. presidential candidates.
The White House is now considering scrapping a key nuclear agreement with Russia in response to the recent events.

Putin accused the U.S. military of arming and training the Georgian army and said the U.S. then provoked Georgian soldiers to retake the separatist region of South Ossetia and kill Russians in the process.
"The fact is that U.S. citizens were indeed in the area in conflict during the hostilities," Putin said.
"It should be admitted that they would do so only following direct orders from their supervisors," he said. "Therefore, they were acting in implementing those orders. Doing as they were ordered. And the only one who can give such orders is their supervisors."
Putin did not elaborate on just which candidate he was talking about but the conflict has certainly played to Republican John McCain's strengths in foreign policy, as the Republican Party prepares to nominate Vietnam War veteran Sen. John McCain, R-Ariz., to run for president in November.
The remarks have infuriated the White House, where spokeswoman Dana Perino was quick to reject Putin's allegations.
"I think that those claims, first and foremost, are patently false but it also sounds like his defence officials who said that they believed this to be true, are giving him really bad advice," she said.
"To suggest that the United States orchestrated this on behalf of a political candidate, just sounds not rational."
In a sign of how quickly relations between the US and Russia are deteriorating, Ms Perino confirmed that the Bush administration was now considering scrapping a U.S.-Russia civilian nuclear cooperation pact.

"I don't think there is anything to announce yet but I know that that is under discussion," she said.

Overnight Russia tested an inter-continental missile, one of the weapons it is building in response to the proposed US missile defence shield in Europe.
Another flash-point continues to develop in the Black Sea as U.S. warships move in to deliver humanitarian supplies to Georgia.
The chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, Admiral Mike Mullen, is worried about a possible confrontation with the Russian navy.
"Certainly there is potential there because physically the Russian navy is operating in the Black Sea, so is the United States navy, and so are other navies, quite frankly, that live in that part of the world," he said.
To cap things off Putin also used his CNN interview to announce Russia was imposing import bans on some U.S. poultry products.....

© Copyright 2008 Australian Broadcasting Corporation. All rights reserved.

 

[muse]

Khaleej Times Online
Is it a Return of History?
Fareed Zakaria (World View)

2 September 2008
Many in Washington have described Russia’s attack on Georgia as a turning point in international affairs. Pundits thunder that we are returning to an age of great-power conflicts. Globaliaation and integration have been exposed as shams. Russia is playing this new Great Game with ruthless brilliance and we ó the United States and Europe ó are foundering.


As events unfold, however, almost all of this instant analysis will prove sensationalist, misguided and incorrect. It’s certainly true that today’s world is characteriaed by the emergence of new powers like China, Russia and India (a phenomenon I have termed “the rise of the rest&#8221. This is not a contradiction of globalization but a consequence of it.

Economic growth is producing new centers of influence. And that’s leading to greater national pride, confidence and assertiveness. But there are also powerful new countervailing forces — yes, of globalisation and integration — that are working to mitigate nationalism and unilateralism.

The attack on Georgia will go down not as the dawn of a new era of Russian power but as a major strategic blunder. Look at what has happened. Russia has scared its neighbouring states witless, driving them firmly into the arms of the West.

For almost two years, Poland had been dragging its feet on the American proposal to deploy missile interceptors in that country as part of a continent wide shield (a few months ago public support for the shield varied between 15 and 25 percent).

Within days of the Russian attack, Warsaw agreed to the deployment. Ukraine had long been divided on whether to have closer ties to the West. A few years ago, 60 per cent of the country wanted some kind of federation with Russia instead. Now the Kiev government has unhesitatingly asked for a path to NATO membership.

Vladimir Putin has done more for transatlantic unity than a President Barack Obama ever could. The United States and Europe are now in greater strategic agreement than at any point in the last two decades. Even the autocracies in the Caucasus have reacted negatively to the attack, refusing to endorse Russia’s actions and legitimise the new facts on the ground. China has refused its support. And what did Russia get for all this? Seventy thousand South Ossetians.

Several diplomats and commentators have compared the attack on Georgia to the Soviet Union’s invasions of Hungary in 1956 and Czechoslovakia in 1968. I think a more telling historical parallel might prove to be the invasion of Afghanistan in 1979. Then, as now, a Kremlin elite drunk on high oil prices foolishly overreached and triggered a countervailing reaction in the region and across the world.

The truth is, we’re not in the 19th century, where the Russian intervention would have been standard operating procedure for a great power. In fact, only 50 years ago Britain and France clung to their colonies — in Algeria, Vietnam, Kenya, Cyprus — with much greater determination and violence than has Moscow. By contrast, this is the first time since the breakup of the Soviet Union that Russia has sent troops into a neighbouring country (a country that it had ruled since 1801). Its actions are deplorable but the reaction to them — worldwide — is a sign of how much the rules have changed. President George W. Bush seemed to understand this when he spoke of Russia’s behaviour as being unacceptable “in the 21st century.” Diplomats are now searching for ways to make Moscow pay some price for its actions, to weaken its standing in international bodies, suspend some agreements, break some joint enterprises.

These are all worth looking into but it’s also worth noting that we only have this leverage with the Russians because we have spent the last two decades building up ties with them. In fact, the real challenge we face in dealing with Moscow is that we have too few such ties and, as a result, too little leverage.

The problem is not that Russia has been integrated into a world order that has failed to deter it, but rather that the country remains largely unintegrated — and thus feels it has little to lose by breaking the rules. Some of Moscow’s isolation may have been caused by Western foreign policyócertainly that is the Russian perceptionóbut more has to do with oil. As the price of oil and other natural resources has risen over the past decade, Russia has become more dysfunctional, corrupt, dictatorial and assertive. And oil wealth everywhereófrom Venezuela to Iran to Russia — breeds independence from and indifference to international norms, markets and rules.

The single best strategy for bringing Russia in line with the civilized world would be to dramatically lower oil prices, which would force the country to integrate or stagnate. Pending that, we should shore up Georgia and assist countries like Poland and Ukraine.

At the same time we should stay engaged with the Russians so that we continue to work on issues of common concern — like nuclear proliferation — but also to develop leverage with them. A strategy that further isolates Moscow would only reduce the levers that we have to affect its behaviour.

Imagine if we had kicked Russia out of the G-8 and broken most ties with Moscowóas the Republican nominee, John McCain, and many neoconservatives have long wanted to do. Then, when the Russians attacked Georgia, we would have had only two options — appeasement or war.

Fareed Zakaria is Editor of Newsweek International


Does Mr. Zakaria mean to say that the U.S essentially is responsible for and controls the price of oil??

 

[Neo]

The Empire struck back - Russia's great game - II​

ARTICLE (September 03 2008): It is known that President Saakashvili put a high priority on reuniting three separatist regions that refused to recognise Tbilisi's rule: Ajaria, Abkhazia and South Ossetia. After quickly bringing back Ajaria, a Black Sea region on the border with Turkey, into the authority of Tbilisi, he had hoped to woo South Ossetia back before tackling Abkhazia, but his overtures in 2005 were spurned.

Since then, there had been skirmishes of increasing intensity between Georgian troops and militias of breakaway regions. And on August 7, 2008 Georgian troops went in to re-establish authority and control in South Ossetia, which is still part de jure of Georgia.

The question who pulled the trigger first is yet to be established satisfactorily, and that is the subject of intense media campaigns on both sides: Georgia claims that Russian tanks and troops were already inside South Ossetia whiles Russia argues that Georgia started shooting and bombardment first.

To suggest that Georgia somehow got what it deserved or, in acerbic Maureen Dowd's words, "Georgia made the mistake of baiting the bear" is tantamount to saying that a woman who was raped asked for it by the way she dressed provocatively. It sounds like a Schadenfreude. The pattern of conduct Russia has exhibited in the course of implementing the first six- point ceasefire agreement of August 12, 2008 and the subsequent revised agreement of August 16, 2008 has been dismal at best and skulduggery on the whole.

In the beginning of the commencement of the ceasefire, there was literally no compliance with the ceasefire agreement; rather, more Russian tanks and armoured vehicles carrying more Russian troops advanced farther into the Georgian territory and not only took up several strategic positions, but also started digging in their heels in trenches around the newly acquired strategic positions.

Although hostilities per se ceased, the Russian troops' movement was more akin to "occupation forces" contrary to the fourth point of the ceasefire agreement that required troops to withdraw to their pre-August 7 positions. Russian troops cut Georgia's east-west railway line by blowing up a bridge in the Kaspi district, which connects Tbilisi to ports on the Black Sea while they destroyed or sunk naval and coast guards ships and boats in the main port of Georgia. These actions took place after the ceasefire agreement was worked out.

The so-called Russian "peacekeeping forces" that were stationed both in South Ossetia and Abkhazia, as part of the ceasefire arrangements brokered by Russia in 1992 and 1993, respectively, are biased in favour of South Ossetia and Abkhazia as they are dependent on Russia for military and economic aid. However unsatisfactory these arrangements might have been, they merely reflected the political reality of that part of the world.

What Russian Foreign Minister Andrey Kozyrev said back in 1993 at the UN General Assembly, "Russia realises that no international organisations or group of states can replace our peacekeeping efforts in this specific post-Soviet space," resonates what then Russian President Putin's suggestion on Russia's sphere of interest made to President Bush, as mentioned in the first instalment of this article last week. Russia is using these two separatist regions as Trojan Horse to re-establish its control over Georgia as did Joseph Stalin before and to prevent Georgia from joining Nato.

Nonetheless, the ceasefire is just that: the two contending parties have ceased the exchange of firing at each other. None of the fundamental issues that led to the war has been resolved; they are, for the time being, shelved, so to speak, for making sure that the ceasefire holds. There are, however, much broader geopolitical questions than ethnic issues between Georgians and South Ossetians or Georgians and Abkhazians.

Georgia is not only the West's main ally in the Caucasus, but also maintains the oil and gas pipelines that run from Azerbaijan's Caspian Sea fields through Central Asia across Georgia to the ports on the Black Sea and onto Turkey, all free of Russian interference: The Baku-Supsa oil pipeline which runs from the Caspian Sea field to the Supsa terminal on the Black Sea, from where oil will go either to Poti or Batumi on the coast.

The Baku-Tbilisi-Ceyhan pipeline takes oil from the Caspian Sea to the Mediterranean through Azerbaijan and Georgia. The South Caucasus gas pipeline runs from Baku on the Caspian Sea through Tbilisi to Erzurum in Turkey. For all of them, Georgia is the only route for the export of oil and gas from Caspian that is not controlled by Russia. What will happen to these pipelines and the port facilities on the Black Sea? Who is going to monitor the ceasefire?

The European Union (EU) announced that they would be ready to send a group of experts to monitor the progress of ceasefire on August 13, 2008, but no progress has been made so far in the face of the rejection from Russia's actual controllers on the ground, who are not amenable to such a suggestion by the EU.

Only on August 23, 2008 did President Nicolas Sarkozy and President Medvedev were reported to have agreed on the urgency of creating an international peace-keeping mechanism under the auspices of the Organisation of Security and Co-operation in Europe (OSCE), but it was denied again. Even under the new ceasefire agreement of August 16, 2008, Russia still maintains troops as "peacekeepers" in South Ossetia and Abkhazia.

Russian troops set up a checkpoint at the port of Poti, which is outside the so-called "security zone." Russian troops are controlling the main gate to the port. Though not Georgia's busiest port for oil like Batumi, Poti, a Black Sea port with an oil terminal, can load up to 100,000 barrels per day of oil products. Poti is also the gateway for goods imported to not only Georgia itself, but also other Caucasus republics and Central Asia.

The United States and European Union members, such as France and Germany, demand the full and immediate withdrawal of all Russian troops from Georgia and Russia's full compliance with the ceasefire agreement of August 16, 2008.

As witnessed already, the state of compliance is patchy and, alarmingly, areas where non-compliance has so far occurred are of strategic significance: mining the key railway line connecting the East and the West, setting up checkpoints in key strategic areas such as Gori along the East-West highway and Poti; and taking positions in the buffer zone around South Ossetia. They are designed to choke the economy of Georgia. Regrettably, Russian troops are not listening. Who is going to enforce the ceasefire agreement?

The United Nations Security Council may discuss various issues and questions over the Georgia War, but Russia being a permanent member of the Security Council will veto any resolution against the interest of Russia or the two secessionist regions. In fact, following Russian parliament's resolutions calling for the recognition of the breakaway regions as independent states, President Medvedev just did that on August 26, 2008!

That would lead to the seal of a fait accompli! Remember the partition of Cyprus as a result of the Cyprus conflict of 1974?

Outside the Security Council decision-making process, what are realistic remedies that may be available to the EU, the United States, and other allies? First and foremost, despite Russia's recognition, non-recognition of the breakaway regions must continue. So long as non-recognition is in place, the two secessionist regions will only depend on Russia's assistance.

How about Russia? Is it advantageous to isolate Russia as part of the sanctioning process? There are various suggestions of sanctions against Russia ranging from the expulsion from the Group of 8 industrialised nations to the denial of Russian membership in the World Trade Organisation. To these suggestions, said the former President of the Soviet Union, Mr Mikeil Gorbachev, "these are empty threats" in his Op-Ed article, "Russia Never Wanted a War" (NY Times, August 19, 2008).

Instead, Mr Gorbachev suggests that if there is anything that needs to be reconsidered is: "the habit of talking to Russia in a condescending way, without regard for its positions and interests." Mr Gorbachev has forgotten, for some reason, why he is so much admired and respected in the world. He should have known that respect is something that you earn by your conduct, and not by bullying others by your positions and interests.

THERE IS A RANGE OF POSSIBILITIES FOR SANCTIONS AGAINST RUSSIA: (a) suspension of Russia's participation in G-8 meetings; (b) any objection to Russia's membership in the WTO; (c) scaling down the level of bilateral relations with Russia in terms of Nato and economic affairs; (d) lowering the level of priority treatment in financial/banking transactions with Russian banks; (e) boycotting the Moscow winter Olympic Games; and so on.

For the immediate purpose of maintaining minimum order, international peace-keeping forces must be instituted as soon as possible, and such forces should be organised under the auspices of the OSCE. In the context of the post-Georgia War, it is necessary to re-examine whether the 1974 ceasefire agreement still remains valid. It should be more natural to consider that it has been superseded by the latest ceasefire agreement of August 16, 2008, which has become a new regime that governs the condition of the ceasefire today.

For the future of the two breakaway regions, Georgia needs a more conscientious new strategy. Pro-Moscow people of South Ossetia and Abkhazia have lost linguistic and cultural ties with Georgia. Mutual suspicion and mistrust permeate everywhere. The status quo, ie, de facto independent statehood for the two regions, will continue for the foreseeable future. Tbilisi needs a more sensible policy toward these separatist regions.

At present, no attempts are being made to engage the people of South Ossetia or Abkhazia. The Georgians should re-focus on rebuilding Georgia proper, thereby ensuring continued economic growth, and to demonstrate both South Ossetian and Abkhazian leaderships and the Ossetian and Akhazian peoples that a newly prosperous and tolerant Georgia is a better option than remaining within Russia's shadow.

 

[Marshal]

Russia sends warplanes on Venezuela training mission

Two Russian strategic bombers have landed in Venezuela as part of military manoeuvres, the Interfax news agency reported today, at a time when US-Russian relations are at their most strained since the cold war.

Interfax cited a Russian defence ministry statement as saying the two Tu-160 strategic bombers landed today to carry out training flights over neutral waters in the next few days before returning to Russia.

The arrival of the Russian strategic warplanes in what the US considers its backyard followed a statement at the weekend by the Venezuelan government saying that four Russian ships would participate in joint exercises in the Caribbean this year.

The US sought to make light of that announcement. A US state department spokesman, Sean McCormack, said that if Russia really intended to send ships to the Caribbean, "then they found a few ships that can make it that far".

Venezuela said a taskforce including four Russian naval ships and 1,000 Russian military personnel would take part in mid-November exercises with Venezuelan frigates, patrol boats, submarines and aircraft.

News of the planned exercise came shortly after Vladimir Putin, the Russian prime minister and former president, warned that Nato's deployment of several warships to the Black Sea in the aftermath of Russia's invasion of Georgia last month would not go unanswered.

The Russian agreement to send planes and ships could be seen as part of a campaign by the Venezuelan president, Hugo Chávez, who never loses an opportunity to take a jab at the US, to build up his military. Chávez has been on an arms-buying spree and has proposed a hemispheric South American defence council aimed at the US.

Thanks to high oil prices, Venezuela – a member of the Opec oil cartel - has been able to spend $4bn (£2.2bn) on weapons since 2004. Bought mostly from Russia, the arms included the purchase of 53 Russian helicopters and 24 Sukhoi fighter jets.

Venezuela is buying the rights and technology for a Kalashnikov assault rifle factory near Caracas. During a visit to Russia in July, Chavez said the two countries had formed a strategic partnership and he was buying a Russian missile defence system to thwart a potential US air attack.

Venezuela is reported to be considering buying as many as five diesel-powered Russian submarines. The deal would make Venezuela the region's top naval force.

Last year when he was still president, Putin said Russia would permanently resume long-distance patrol flights of strategic bombers, which were suspended in 1992 after the collapse of the Soviet Union. Since then, there have been several incidents in which British fighter planes have scrambled to intercept Russian warplanesRussia sends warplanes on Venezuela training mission | World news | guardian.co.uk

 

[Marshal]

Russia Warns it May Target US Missiles in Europe


By VOA News
10 September 2008


Russian news reports say a top defense official has warned that Russia may point ballistic weapons at a U.S. missile defense system in Europe.

News agencies Wednesday quote General Nikolai Solovtsyov as saying Russia may take the action if the United States moves forward with a missile defense plan in Poland and the Czech Republic.

The United States and Poland signed a missile defense agreement in Warsaw last month. It allows the United States to deploy 10 defensive missiles in Poland. The United States also plans to set up guidance radar in the Czech Republic.

Russian Foreign Minister Sergei Lavrov (file photo)
Russian Foreign Minister Sergei Lavrov (file photo)
The warning comes before Russian Foreign Minister Sergei Lavrov meets in Warsaw this week with his Polish counterpart, Foreign Minister Radoslaw Sikorski, to discuss security issues.

Russian media report Wednesday that Lavrov will "firmly express" Russia's objection to the U.S. - Poland missile defense agreement.

Washington says the missile shield is designed to protect against what it says are threats from rogue countries, such as Iran. But Moscow rejects that reasoning and says the deployment of the system in Europe is designed to undermine Russia's own missile capability and threatens its security.

Lavrov is also expected to address differences with Poland over the developments in the former Soviet republic of Georgia.

Russia has recognized Georgia's breakaway regions of South Ossetia and Abkhazia as independent states and has set up diplomatic ties with both regions.
VOA News - Russia Warns it May Target US Missiles in Europe

 

[RabzonKhan]

Goodness, the Russian bear is back with vengeance, and so far the United States seems unable to do much about it.


President Medvedev threatens Russian Arctic annexation

September 18, 2008

Tony Halpin in Moscow

Russia triggered a fresh scramble for the oil wealth of the Arctic yesterday after President Dmitri Medvedev called on security chiefs to establish a formal border in the region.

Mr Medvedev laid claim to a vast tranche of the Arctic, telling his National Security Council that it had "strategic importance" for Russia. Estimates suggest that the polar region contains billions of tons of oil and gas reserves, which are increasingly accessible as global warming melts the ice cap.

"We must wrap up all the formalities for drawing the external border in the continental shelf. This is our direct responsibility to future generations," Mr Medvedev told the Kremlin meeting.

Nikolai Patrushev, the director of the security council, said that Russia would defend its interests in the Arctic against rival claims from the United States, Canada, Norway and Denmark.

Mr Patrushev, former head of Russia's Federal Security Service (FSB), the successor to the KGB, said: "We must define the borders in the north of our country, where the Arctic lies. Our estimate is that it makes up 18 per cent of our territory. And we are saying that 20,000 kilometres of the state border runs in this region."

The order to assert the Kremlin's rights came just over a year after a team of Russian explorers became the first to reach the Arctic seabed. They dived 4,261 metres (13,980ft) in two min-submarines and planted a titanium flag on the ocean floor to stake Russia's claim to an area of territory the size of western Europe.

The expedition brought back soil samples as part of Russia's campaign to demonstrate that the Lomonosov Ridge, an underwater shelf that runs through the Arctic, is really an extension of its territory. The Kremlin poured $40 million into the project.

Russia lodged a claim in 2001 to 1.2 million square kilometres of the Arctic ocean with the UN Convention on the Law of the Sea. The UN asked for more scientific data and Russia is planning to submit a fresh application next year, the centenary of the first journey to the North Pole, using information from the expedition.

Mr Patrushev said that Russia was undertaking research work to bolster its claims, but added: "It is important that it be done faster and more precisely."

Canada and the other Arctic nations - Norway, the United States and Denmark, through its sovereignty over Greenland - all reject Russia's arguments. Denmark and Canada claim that the Lomonosov Ridge is linked to their territories, while Norway is conducting a survey to strengthen its case.

Under international law, each country is entitled to control an economic zone within 200 miles of its continental shelf, but the limits of the shelf are disputed.

Canada's then foreign minister, Peter MacKay dismissed the Russian expedition as a throwback to 15th century imperialism, saying: "You can't go around the world and just plant flags and say 'We're claiming this territory'."

Russia's daring descent to the seabed unnerved its rivals, however, by demonstrating its ability to enforce a physical presence in the hostile Arctic environment. The United States Geological Survey estimates that the region contain 90 billion barrels of oil.

The FSB under Mr Patrushev created a special Arctic Directorate in 2004 to further Russian interests in the region. He even flew to the North Pole to plant a Russian flag on the surface.

 

[su-47]

The Russian rumble is just beginning. if oil prices continue to rise, Russia will be even stronger and US will get weaker. add the US stock market crisis to the equation, and the Russia-US gap seems at its narrowest since the meltdown of the soviet union.

 

[RabzonKhan]

We won't go back behind the Iron Curtain, warns Medvedev as Rice demands the West stand up to 'bullying' Russia

By Mail Foreign Service
Last updated at 10:25 PM on 19th September 2008

Russian President Dmitry Medvedev yesterday accused Nato of stoking up the Georgia conflict.

He said the alliance’s role in the clash showed it was unable to provide security in Europe – underlining the need for its replacement.
‘
What did Nato secure, what did Nato ensure?’ he demanded. ‘Nato only provoked the conflict, and not more than that.’

A Nato spokesman said: ‘There is nothing provocative in promoting democratic reform, economic reform and supporting a country’s aspirations to move closer to the Euro-Atlantic community.’

Medvedev's comments appeared to be a response to U.S. Secretary of State Condoleezza Rice, who warned Russia yesterday that its policies have put it on a path to isolation and irrelevance.

"They are, in fact, pushing us onto the development track that is based not on normal and civilised cooperation with other countries, but on autonomous development behind thick walls and an 'iron curtain,"' he said at a meeting with non-governmental organisations.

This is not our track, and it makes no sense to return to the past."

In addition, he vowed that Russia would set its own course.

"No new outside factors, let alone outside pressure on Russia, will change our strategic course," Medvedev said.

The unusually blunt remarks made yesterday by the U.S. Secretary of State came as tensions between Washington and Moscow escalated.

But she was also admonished by former Soviet President Mikhail Gorbachev today for her comments.

"I believe that the secretary of state should be more careful and should show greater calm and responsibility for her judgment in calling for the West to unite against Russia," Gorbachev said through an interpreter at a press conference in Philadephia.

He made his comments shortly before receiving the Liberty Medal, which was presented by former president George H.W. Bush, at the National Constitution Centre.

Gorbachev said that Russia had to respond to Georgia's military action in breakaway South Ossetia. He echoed the view that relationship between the two countries has grown increasingly strained throughout the year, reaching a new low with Russia's invasion of Georgia last month.

Dr Rice warned Russia that its policies have put it on a path to isolation and irrelevance.

In a speech in Washington, she said: 'The attack on Georgia has crystallised the course that Russia's leaders are taking and brought us to a critical moment for Russia and the world.

'We cannot afford to validate the prejudices that some Russian leaders seem to have: that if you pressure free nations enough - if you bully, and threaten, and lash out - we will cave in, and forget, and eventually concede.'

She added: 'The United States and Europe must stand up to this kind of behaviour, and all who champion it.'

However her determination was somewhat undermined by the lack of firm policy initiatives supporting her demands for a strong stand.

In a show of defiance, Russia has threatened to block Nato from using its air space for operations in Afghanistan.

The 26-member alliance upset the Kremlin by saying that its use of force in the recent conflict was disproportionate.

Nato has also said that Georgia will eventually be allowed to join - putting it at odds with Russia, which is fiercely opposed to any further expansion of the organisation.

In a further provocation, Moscow has also offered aid to its old Cold War ally Nicaragua. The deal appears to be a payoff to the Central American country for its recognition of South Ossetia and Abkhazia as independent states after they broke away from Georgia.

Russia has already renewed warm relations with Cuba, the island at the centre of the missile crisis in 1962 which proved an iconic moment of the Cold War.

Cuba was offered help in areas which were devastated by the recent hurricanes, while Nicaragua has been given assurances of political support and aid for offshore oil prospecting.

Moscow's push for influence in Latin America is Russian premier Vladimir Putin's hawkish response to what he sees as U.S. interference in his own sphere of influence in the Caucasus and Black Sea.

 

[muse]

Khaleej Times Online

The Putin of Arabia
Mai Yamani

27 September 2008
Almost undetected, Russia is regaining much of the influence that it lost in the Middle East after the Soviet Union collapsed. Ever since Russia invaded Georgia in August, Arab satellite television and websites have been rife with talk about the region’s role in an emerging “new Cold War.” Is the Arab world’s Cold War patron really back, and, if so, what will it mean for peace in the region?

With the USSR’s demise, communist ideology, which Muslims believe contradicts their faith, ended too. Communism never stopped Arab regimes opposed by the United States from accepting arms supplies from the Soviet-era Russians, but it did prevent Russia from securing the kind of intimate influence that America had secured with its regional allies.

Now, even Islamists are welcoming Russia back as a regional player in order to strengthen their struggle against American hegemony, conveniently forgetting Russia’s brutal suppression of Chechen Muslims during the 1990’s.

This is a complete reversal of the pattern that prevailed in the 1950’s. Back then, the US encouraged Islam as a bulwark against communism. Its allies in the Middle East, especially Saudi Arabia, justified US influence on the grounds that Americans were Christian and thus part of the Ahl-e-Kitab (the people of the Book). The Soviets were regularly attacked as dangerous enemies of God.

Today, US power in the Middle East is at its historical nadir, and Russia is seeking to fill the vacuum. Even America’s closest allies — Saudi Arabia, Egypt, and Israel — are vulnerable as they face the aggressive expansion of “radical forces” represented by Iran, Hamas, Hezbollah, Syria, and the Iraqi resistance.

In the prevailing atmosphere of turmoil and confusion, the radical Islamists attack the Americans as barbarous Crusaders who have replaced the communists as the enemies of Islam. Indeed, for the conservative majority in the region, the US, with is pop culture and liberal democracy, is seen as a far more problematic ally than the autocratic and wealth-loving Russians.

Russia’s inroads in the region began with former president Vladimir Putin’s state visit to Iran in October 2007 – the first visit by a Russian leader since Stalin’s trip to Teheran in 1943. Russia, of course, helped Iran kick off its nuclear programme, and has often defended the Iranian regime from stiffer United Nations sanctions.

Russia views its relations with Iran as a means to leverage its diplomatic influence in the wider Middle East, where the US has sought (successfully) to marginalise the Kremlin since the Cold War’s end. Russia’s other aim has been to exempt from UN sanctions the Bushehr nuclear reactor that it has been building for Iran. A full UN-sponsored financial squeeze on Iran would jeopardise Russia’s profits from providing nuclear fuel for the reactor, which is due to be commissioned soon.

Indeed, for the first time in Russia’s history in the Middle East, it can depend on genuinely powerful local allies. The Soviet Union lost Egypt in 1972, and its naval bases in Syria were abandoned in 1989.

Now, Russia has signed strategic agreements with Iran and is reconstructing military bases in Syria in response to an appeal by President Bashar Al-Assad (who visited Moscow in a brazen bid for Kremlin support just after the Georgian war ended).

Iran’s regime is eager to publicise its partnerships with Russia, and to make concessions to it in order to face the American and Israeli threat and to gain more time to pursue its nuclear programme.

Hamas, too, is proud of its Russian connections, so much so that it was one of only three regimes in the world to recognise the independence of Abkhazia and South Ossetia, the regions that Russia has helped break away from Georgia.

In response to America’s failed policies in the Middle East, whether in Iraq, Iran, Syria, Lebanon, or Palestine, Russia appears to be using its oil-fired wealth to knit together a new bloc to counter the US presence. Even in Iraq, Russia is making headway. It has written off some $12 billion in debt dating from Saddam regime and is pushing to create an Iraq-Syria oil pipeline, which will further its bid to control much of the transport of oil and gas.

Russia is also ready and willing to provide more developed weapons to Syria and Iran.

In the short-term, Russia armed with high oil prices has nothing to lose but in the long-term, Russia’s policy in the Middle East appears to be doubly misguided.

A nuclear-armed Iran on its doorstep is certainly not in Russia’s national interest, particularly given the increasing radicalisation of Russia’s own 20 million Muslim citizens — the only part of its population that is actually growing. Indeed, Iran was a keen backer of the Chechen separatists that Russia spent almost a decade fighting to put down.

With Muslims becoming a bigger factor in Russian domestic politics in the decades ahead, it may be wise for Russia to take an interest in Middle East affairs.

But strengthening the hands of the region’s most radical elements will only empower them to turn their attention one day to the “oppressed” Muslims of Russia.

Mai Yamani is a Visiting Scholar at the Carnegie Middle East Center, Beirut

 

[muse]

Russia blasts US dominant role in world affairs By EDITH M. LEDERER, Associated Press Writer
Sat Sep 27,2008

UNITED NATIONS - Russia called Saturday for a revival of the global anti-terrorism coalition that formed after Sept. 11, 2001 but started to unravel with what it called the subsequent domination by a single power — a veiled reference to the United States.

"The solidarity of the international community fostered on the wave of struggle against terrorism turned out to be somehow `privatized'," Russian Foreign Minister Sergey Lavrov told the U.N. General Assembly's annual ministerial meeting.

Lavrov cited the U.S. invasion of Iraq "under the false pretext of fight on terror and nuclear arms proliferation" and questions of excessive use of force against civilians in counterterrorism operations in Afghanistan.

And he said the recent crisis over Georgia's breakaway provinces of Abkhazia and South Ossetia proved again that "it is impossible or even disastrous to try to resolve the existing problems in the blindfolds of the unipolar world."

"Today, it is necessary to analyze the crisis in the Caucuses from the viewpoint of its impact on the region and the international community on the whole," Lavrov said.

"It has become crystal clear that the solidarity expressed by all of us after 9/11 should be revived (without double standards) when we fight against any infringements upon the international law," he said.

Lavrov called for a new "solidarity" of the international community and a strengthened United Nations, saying only in the post-Cold War world can the organization "fully realize its potential" as a global center "for open and frank debate and coordination of the world policies on a just and equitable basis free from double standards."

"This is an essential requirement, if the world is to regain its equilibrium," he said.

Lavrov also lashed out at Georgia's "aggression" and bombing of South Ossetia's sleeping capital of Tskhinvali on Aug. 8 and defended Russia's intervention "to repel aggression" and fulfill its peacekeeping commitments.

Georgia disputes this, claiming that the Russian side initiated the conflict. The United States and the European Union have backed Georgia, contending that the Russian response was disproportionate.

But Lavrov made clear that Moscow would not brook any challenge to its recognition of the unilateral declarations of independence of the two breakaway provinces.

"This problem is closed now. The future of the peoples of Abkhazia and South Ossetia has been reliably secured by the treaties between Moscow (and their governments)," he said. "The situation around the two republics is finally going to be stabilized."

Declaring that Europe's security architecture "did not pass the strength test" in Georgia, Lavrov reiterated Russian President Dmitry Medvedev's proposal in June for a new Treaty on European Security.

It would strengthen peace and stability and participants would reaffirm the non-use of force, peaceful settlement of disputes, sovereignty, territorial integrity and noninterference in another country's affairs, he said. Finally, he added, it would promote "an integrated and manageable development across the vast Euro-Atlantic region."

Lavrov said work on the new treaty could be started at a pan-European summit and include governments as well as organizations working in the region.

He referred to it as "a kind of `Helsinki-2'," a follow-up to the 1975 Helsinki Treaty between all European nations, together with the U.S. and Canada, which evolved into the present-day Organization for Security and Co-operation in Europe, the largest conflict-prevention and security organization on the continent

 

[Marshal]

Russia aims to upgrade nuclear arsenal
Russia aims to upgrade nuclear arsenal - CNN.com

September 26, 2008 -- Updated 1930 GMT (0330 HKT)
MOSCOW, Russia (AP) -- Russia must modernize its armed forces and upgrade its nuclear deterrent, in part by building a new air and space defense network, the president said Friday.

President Dmitry Medvedev also announced plans to begin large-scale production of warships, primarily nuclear-powered submarines armed with cruise missiles.

Medvedev said the need for the modernization was demonstrated by last month's military conflict with Georgia. Russia responded to Georgia's attack on the breakaway region of South Ossetia with overwhelming force and easily crushed the Georgian army, but the brief war highlighted Russia's aging arsenal.

"We must ensure superiority in the air, in carrying out precision strikes at land and sea targets and in the timely deployment of forces," Medvedev told military commanders after military exercises in the southern Orenburg region.

His remarks were posted on the Kremlin Web site and carried by state news agencies.

The president said Russia must have "a guaranteed nuclear deterrent system" in place by 2020, and he gave military commanders until December to come up with a plan.

Medvedev emphasized the need for nuclear-powered submarines armed with cruise missiles and also multi-purpose attack submarines.

But he made no mention of the new Borei-class nuclear submarines, which are designed to carry a new intercontinental missile that is seen as a key future component of Russia's nuclear forces.

The missile was successfully test fired last week after repeated failures. The first of the new submarines is to be commissioned later this year and two more are being built.

Russia's economic troubles after the 1991 Soviet collapse hit the armed forces hard. But in recent years, flush with oil money, the Kremlin has been pumping more money into new weapons systems.

 

[muse]

What Russia Wants

Moscow is not bent on world domination, just regional influence.

Ted Galen Carpenter


Russia’s military intervention in Georgia has provoked a storm of negative reactions in the United States and Europe. To most Americans—and apparently to spluttering Bush administration officials—Moscow’s actions came as an unpleasant surprise. Pundits and policy experts immediately began to speculate about the Kremlin’s motives in Georgia and beyond.

To Russophobes the answer is clear: the evil empire has been reborn and is on the march. They issued shrill warnings that Moscow’s dust-up with Georgia was just like the Soviet Union’s invasions of Hungary in 1956 and Czechoslovakia in 1968. Some even invoked the threadbare 1930s analogy, with Russia playing the role of Nazi Germany. According to that logic, Moscow’s actions had little to do with the obscure territorial disputes between Georgia and its secessionist regions of South Ossetia and Abkhazia. Rather, Russia cannot abide the proliferation of democratic, pro-Western governments in neighboring countries. If the United States and its NATO allies do not repel Moscow’s aggression in Georgia, hawks warn, Ukraine and the Baltic Republics will be the next targets.

The argument that Russia is a malignantly expansionist power is now common fare across the political spectrum. The perspective of the Washington Post and such Democratic luminaries as Madeleine Albright and Zbigniew Brzezinski is not substantially different from the views of neoconservatives such as William Kristol and Robert Kagan—or GOP presidential nominee John McCain.

Contrary to such alarmism, it is more likely that Russia’s strategic aims are modest, largely confined to its own neighborhood, and typical for a major power. Moscow’s actions also appear to be more defensive than offensive—a belated reaction to clumsy, arrogant policies that the United States and its NATO allies have pursued for more than a decade.

One key aspect of the Georgia conflict is that Russia’s position on Abkhazia and South Ossetia is nothing new. Those regions, with Moscow’s backing, achieved political autonomy—actually, de facto independence—by defeating Georgian military forces in the months following the breakup of the Soviet Union in December 1991. Russian “peacekeepers” established a presence in both regions during the presidency of Boris Yeltsin, not Vladimir Putin.

Moscow’s policy appears to include ethnic, security, and economic factors. Following the demise of the Soviet Union, the Kremlin’s relations with a newly independent Georgia were contentious. It was tempting for Russian leaders to exploit tensions between Tbilisi and ethnic groups in Abkhazia and South Ossetia to weaken what was fast emerging as a hostile neighboring state. It was also an easy target, since those tensions had existed for generations. Indeed, the inclusion of Abkhazia and South Ossetia as part of Georgia was an arbitrary edict that the Soviet government made under Josef Stalin. (A similar decision that Moscow made under Nikita Khrushchev added the Russian-inhabited Crimea to Ukraine—another ethnic time bomb that bears watching.) Most Abkhazians and South Ossetians have never been happy being governed by Tbilisi.

Georgia’s periodic attempts to re-establish sovereignty over those regions created tensions and instability on Russia’s southern flank—developments that would ignite security concerns for any country.

Russian leaders are especially nervous about the prospect of turmoil in the Caucasus in light of the smoldering conflict in their own territory of Chechnya. Moscow had warned both current Georgian president Mikheil Saakashvili and his predecessor, Eduard Shevardnadze, not to disrupt the status quo. When Saakashvili ordered an artillery barrage on the South Ossetian capital in early August, Russian forces were ready—and probably eager —to teach Tbilisi a lesson.

Important economic considerations reinforce ethnic and security concerns. There has been speculation in the United States and Europe that Russia’s coercion of Georgia is part of a plot to gain control of the oil pipeline that runs from Baku in Azerbaijan to the Turkish port of Ceyhan, going through Georgia and passing near Tbilisi. The pipeline power-grab thesis is probably too simplistic. But there is little doubt that Russia wants to gain more influence over the potentially vast oil riches of the Caspian Basin. The Baku-Ceyhan pipeline is a significant part of the policy mosaic. Once again, though, the motives may be as much defensive as offensive—an effort to counter the growing Western economic presence in that region.

Russia’s actions in Georgia are not much different from the typical conduct of other great powers—including the United States—in their neighborhoods. A few weeks before the onset of the fighting, Secretary of State Condoleezza Rice asserted that the notion of “spheres of influence” in world affairs was obsolete. That argument was either naïve or hypocritical. Certainly, Washington’s conduct in the Western Hemisphere suggests that U.S. officials have not abandoned their belief in an American sphere of influence. Since World War II, the United States has invaded and occupied the Dominican Republic, Grenada, Panama, and Haiti. Washington orchestrated a successful coup against the government of Guatemala and tried to do the same both to Fidel Castro’s regime in Cuba and the Sandinista government in Nicaragua. It is a bit much for American leaders to admonish the Russians not to molest small, hostile neighbors.

Moscow is also increasingly angry at the West’s repeated disdain for Russian policy preferences—indeed, core Russian interests—in Europe. The insensitivity of the United States and its allies was already apparent in the mid-1990s, with the effort to expand NATO by adding Poland, Hungary, and the Czech Republic. That move violated assurances given to the Kremlin when Mikhail Gorbachev’s government agreed to the reunification of Germany and continued German membership in NATO. Secretary of State James Baker assured Russian officials that the alliance would not expand eastward from Germany.

Not content with that provocation, in 2004 the U.S. pushed through NATO’s incorporation of Latvia, Estonia, and Lithuania, entities that had been part of the Soviet Union. And NATO expansion is not the only manifestation of contempt for Russia’s interests. So is Western policy in the Balkans, traditionally a key region for Moscow. In 1995, NATO forces intervened in Bosnia’s civil war to undermine the Serbs, Russia’s coreligionists and longstanding political allies. Then in 1999, the United States and its allies waged an air war against Serbia, ultimately wrenching away its province of Kosovo. They bypassed the UN Security Council to do so, thereby evading a Russian veto.

Although Russia’s political leaders fumed at such treatment, they could do little except issue meaningless complaints. The country was too weak, with both its economy and military in disarray. But that situation has changed. As a leading exporter of oil and natural gas, Russia has benefited enormously from the decade-long boom in the prices of commodities. With oil at $110 a barrel—to say nothing of the price earlier this year of $145 a barrel—the country is in a fundamentally different bargaining position than it was in the mid and late 1990s, when oil was mired in the $10 to $20 a barrel range. The Kremlin has also used some of the revenue from that boom to refurbish and modernize its military.

Today Russia is much stronger than it was in the 1990s, and Moscow has begun to push back. One indicator came earlier this year when Kremlin leaders warned that NATO membership for Georgia and Ukraine would cross a bright red line and not be tolerated. The vehemence of Moscow’s reaction was one factor that led France, Germany, and other key NATO members to oppose the U.S. lobbying effort.

But Washington remains tone deaf in its policy toward Russia. In addition to the campaign to admit Georgia and Ukraine to NATO, the Bush administration has made plans to deploy missile defenses in Poland and the Czech Republic a high priority. In response, Russia has warned Warsaw and Prague that it will target both countries for retaliation in the event of war.

Washington’s Balkan policy has also blundered ahead, dismissing Moscow’s objections. In February, the United States and its leading European allies again bypassed the UN Security Council (and Russia’s veto) to grant Kosovo independence. Russian foreign minister Sergei Lavrov warned that such a step set a dangerous international precedent that would encourage secessionist movements around the world. America, he said, had “opened a Pandora’s box.” Ominously, he noted specifically that the Kosovo precedent would seem to apply to South Ossetia and Abkhazia.

At least in part, Russia’s actions in Georgia amount to payback for the West’s refusal to respect even the most basic Russian interests and an emphatic reassertion of its sphere of influence. Moscow appears to want two things: pre-eminence in its own region and treatment by the United States and NATO as a serious power whose wishes must be respected. Using military force as it did in Georgia is a crude way to make those points, but they were made effectively. The Bush administration’s vocal support for Saakashvili proved to be devoid of substance. Moscow demonstrated that it could coerce a small U.S. ally on its border, and Washington’s response was impotent. The response of NATO and the European Union reflected the same reality. For all the verbal bluster of those organizations, the Europeans, cognizant of their dependence on Russia for energy supplies (among other considerations), do not want a hostile relationship with Moscow.

The Georgia episode underscores the limits of Washington’s deterrence capabilities, and it should send a warning about a dangerous defect in U.S. foreign policy. The reality is that the United States can do little to protect vulnerable client states in Russia’s neighborhood—unless Washington is willing to risk a military confrontation with nuclear implications. That remains true even for clients such as the Baltic states, which are formal members of NATO.

At the same time, Russia must be careful not to overplay its hand. That possibility arose in late August when Moscow sought an endorsement from the Shanghai Cooperation Organization—the association of Russia, China, and the Central Asian republics—for military intervention in Georgia and the subsequent recognition of independence for South Ossetia and Abkhazia. Much to the dismay of Russian officials, the SCO refused to give its imprimatur. Indeed, the SCO statement expressed the importance of respecting the territorial integrity of countries. That should not have come as a surprise to Moscow. Several of the Central Asian countries have their own secessionist problems and do not wish to see the Kosovo and South Ossetia precedents spread. Even more important, China vehemently opposes secessionism, given its problems with Tibet, Xinjiang, and Taiwan. The SCO summit was a test of will between Moscow and Beijing—and Russia lost.

That result illustrates the limits of Moscow’s power. Russia may be capable of establishing a modest sphere of influence along its perimeter, but it does not have the strength to reconstitute the Soviet empire—much less pose an expansionist threat to the heart of Europe as the USSR did during the Cold War. American opinion leaders need to curb their alarmism. Moscow’s conduct in Georgia may have been brutal, but it is not out of the norm for a great power to discipline an upstart small neighbor. There is no credible evidence that Moscow has massive expansionist impulses. And even if it did, Russia lacks the power to achieve such goals. Russia is not the Soviet Union, and it certainly is not the equivalent of Nazi Germany. U.S. policymakers need to take a deep breath, accept that Russia has returned to the ranks of major powers, and realize that Washington can no longer ignore, much less trample on, core Russian interests. The sooner they make that course correction, the better.

Ted Galen Carpenter, vice president for defense and foreign policy studies at the Cato Institute, is the author of eight books on international affairs, including Smart Power: Toward a Prudent Foreign Policy for America.

 

[Marshal]

Gorbachev to form political party in Russia
10/1/2008 8:00:58 AM

A Russian billionaire has said he is teaming up with former Soviet President Mikhail Gorbachev to
form a new political party that will challenge the country's recent steps away from democracy.

Alexander Lebedev, a former lawmaker who has built a fortune in business and investment, said he and Gorbachev would work together in a political movement tentatively named the Independent Democratic Party.

Kremlin critics say that during his eight years as president, current Prime Minister Vladimir Putin reversed Russia's post-Soviet movement toward democracy and enhanced state control over the economy, courts and media.

Gorbachev could not immediately be reached for comment, and it wasn't clear if the 77-year-old planned to seek an active political role more than 17 years after the Soviet Union collapsed around him, costing him his job as its last leader.

It would be an uphill battle: Gorbachev is popular abroad, but is reviled by many Russians who blame him for the Soviet breakup. He won less than 1 per cent of the votes in the 1996 presidential election and has not run since.

In a statement on his Web site, Lebedev said the new party was Gorbachev's idea. "The initiative belongs to President Gorbachev. He gave our people freedom, but we have not learned how to use it."

Lebedev said the party would advocate a "return to a normal electoral system," calling for the restoration of gubernatorial elections, a stronger parliament, independent courts and media, and a smaller state role in the economy.

Gorbachev has generally praised Putin for lifting the nation out of the post-Soviet troubles that many Russians blame on the late Boris Yeltsin, a longtime rival of Gorbachev who replaced him in the Kremlin.
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