The Doval Doctrine, from High Definition to Low Yield

[Zarvan]

When a leader’s deshbhaktialone is deemed to be more than sufficient to overcome strategic structural limitations, the country runs the risk of punching above its weight

Prime Minister Narendra Modi with NSA Ajit Doval before a meeting in Ufa last Friday. PTI Photo by Manvender Vashist

If there is not much talk of a “Doval doctrine” it is perhaps because it has had a kind of a soft launch. It can be reasonably suggested that the doctrine was first articulated by the newly appointed National Security Adviser during his Beijing visit in September 2014. In a chat with China-based Indian media, Ajit Doval saw the possibility of the Sino-India relationship undergoing “an orbital jump” because both President Xi Jinping and Prime Minister Narendra Modi are “two powerful and very popular, very decisive leaders.” By way of elaboration he added that both were “serious” leaders and both had “the mandate in the party and parliament, besides sufficient time ahead of them.”

Though Doval was careful to suggest that the relationship was not necessarily “only dependent on [a] single factor”, he did betray the new collective thinking in New Delhi. In the new in-house working wisdom it is understood that India’s strategic autonomy and options stand maximised overnight just because we have a maximum leader. Many of the diplomatic tantrums of the past one year can be easily traced to this new internal operational maxim.

The new accent on a decisive role for the “leader” fits in well with the overall political theology of the Sangh Parivar. A leader’s deshbhakti, or patriotism,alone is deemed to be more than sufficient to overcome strategic structural limitations. Since the early Jan Sangh days, this worldview has favoured a leader who would be nationalistic enough to take an aggressive, confrontational attitude towards one and all, especially our neighbours, China and Pakistan; the Parivar is prone to prefer someone who would not be afflicted with “Hindu cowardice”, an expression once used by a Sangh affiliate for Atal Bihari Vajpayee. The quest for such a leader has suggested itself in the last two decades as the Indian middle class became more and more nationalistic. During the last Lok Sabha campaign, Narendra Modi presented himself as just the man who would look world leaders “in the eye”.

Not much is known of the Doval-Modi relationship. Till the 2009 Lok Sabha elections when LK Advani and the BJP got worsted by a “weak Prime Minister,” Doval was very much a part of the “Advani crowd.” It is difficult to say when he switched allegiance. However, among knowledgeable circles in New Delhi it is understood that by the time Modi won a third term in Gujarat in 2012, “Doval Sahib” had become a valued counsellor. His familiarity with the secretive world of “non-state actors” and the shadowy business of intelligence agencies fitted rather well with Narendra Modi’s own preference for taking a dark view of men and matters. Doval is known to have been mentoring Modi in acquiring an appreciation of the difficult and intricate world of diplomacy. Not surprisingly, the two got along like a house on fire.

The Doval doctrine of “a strong leader” became attractive because it dovetailed itself to the Prime Minister’s immense faith in his own popularity, wisdom and capability. Much of the ruddy vigour that is deemed to have been injected into our foreign policy can easily be attributed to Modi’s penchant for event management. The Doval-Modi duo has provided wonderful photo-ops, satisfying the Indian middle class’s newly aroused need for global status and “respect”. And, India’s corporate classes are only too happy to go along with Modi and play the 21st century version of comprador bourgeoisie.

A year later, the Doval doctrine’s limits are all too evident, especially in our neighbourhood. And it is just as well. The world out there is far too complex to bend to our current accent on the “leader” as game-changer. Because of this preoccupation we have failed to notice that the China-Pakistanjugalbandi has acquired a sophisticated but deadly edge. There was, for example, no need to make the Prime Minister take up with Chinese President Xi Jinping Beijing’s vote on Zaki-ur-Rehman Lakhvi; and, then going global with this sophomoric spin – primarily for domestic consumption – of a “direct” message to the Chinese leader from a no-nonsense Prime Minister. The next day, there was an open rebuff – though dressed up in high-sounding invocation of principles – from Beijing. A Prime Minister’s willingness to be blunt does not, and cannot, go very far unless backed by hardwired realpolitik.

A year down the line, the others, too, have read Modi. Just as bowling coaches read and spot weaknesses among new batsmen, strategic analysts have figured out the Prime Minister, his strengths as also his weaknesses. The Chinese and the Pakistanis are already exploring, in tandem, his vulnerabilities.

The rest of the world has noted – and outsiders are much more brutal in making such assessments – that the Prime Minister has taken pride in dismantling the national consensus, however tenuous and however fragile it was. And no new consensus has been forged; nor has a need been felt for such a consensus. The Chinese, who every scholar tells us, take a long-term view, must be wondering how a nation of India’s size and ambition can sustain a sensible foreign policy without an elite consensus behind it.

What is more, the respect previous PMs had for personal courtesy and diplomatic protocol is mocked as a sign of weakness. A willingness to be rude and rough on the global stage may impress the domestic audience or the NRI crowd but it does not create a lasting impression in any chancellery. As a seasoned strategic observer put it bluntly, no one will give India a Security Council seat just because the Prime Minister himself led the mega yoga event at Rajpath.

The problem with the Doval doctrine is that it puts disproportionate pressure on the “leader” to compensate for strategic weaknesses. As Henry Kissinger once remarked, “Accepting the limits of one’s capacities is one of the tests of statesmanship.” Additionally, the Doval doctrine tends to induce a kind of a lazy approach that unthinkingly neglects the traditional tools of diplomacy and instruments of statecraft. There is even an apprehension that the “leader-centric” approach may encourage a dilution of our national defence assets, assiduously built over the past 15 years.

And, no leader is immune from unfavourable political winds. Narendra Modi too will hit a rough patch, sooner than later. That will be the time when we would need to firewall our lasting national interests from getting entangled with personal foibles and political frailties of the leader.

Harish Khare is Editor-in-Chief of The Tribune

Courtesy: The Tribune
The Doval Doctrine, from High Definition to Low Yield | The Wire

 

[GURU DUTT]

adarsh sikular librals at it again = NaMo bashing

 

[magudi]

adarsh sikular librals at it again = NaMo bashing

All india adarsh liberal Vice president Siddharth Varadarajan runs The Wire what else do you expect

But here's the real deal about Doval doctrine :

India-Pakistan ties are back to normal - that is, the usual state of semi-peace and semi-war. That this is being interpreted in political and media circles as a defeat for Narendra Modi's recalibration of Pakistan policy to resume talks shows how little people understand strategy.
The correct Indian strategy against Pakistan will always have to be multi-faceted - realistic dialogue, backed by tough action and aggressive retaliation on the ground, when required. Both peace talk and war-like actions are critical to strategy. We do not seem to understand that war and peace go together, not separately. The readiness to wage peace, when the time is opportune, and the readiness to wage war, when required, is what makes for successful strategy. One without the other will lead to failure.
Indian policymakers, unfortunately, have never understood the importance of the iron fist in a velvet glove. We have let strategy be decided by public emotion or political peace fantasies, leading to regular failure. This is why we have lurched from extraordinary optimism when peace talks appear to be heading somewhere (Shimla, Lahore, and last May), and undiluted anger when Pakistani perfidy becomes visible (this usually follows the first).
To those who think that India's strategy should only focus on Pakistan's perfidy and nothing else, the simple point is this: this response, too, is driven by anger. It is not effective. Those who say we should not engage Pakistan at all, should ask themselves this: if this policy is right for Pakistan, why don't they apply this logic to China, India's bigger enemy and more potent threat to our long-term territorial and strategic interests? But all analysts steadfastly, without any fear of contradiction, maintain that we should both engage China and be prepared to defend our borders with it.
The logic of engagement and tough ground postures on the border with Pakistan is stronger for another reason: we cannot have a Pakistan strategy that is separate from our China strategy. What we are up against is a Sino-Pak joint strategic gameplan where Pakistan will take on India from the west while China will start pressuring us from the east (Myanmar, Arunachal).
PM Modi and National Security Advisor Ajit Doval. FirstpostPM Modi and National Security Advisor Ajit Doval. Firstpost
There is huge strategic convergence between Pakistan's and China's postures towards India right now because both are "greedy" powers that want the territorial status quo with India altered without any concessions on their part. Pakistan wants to keep Azad Kashmir and wrest a bit of Muslim Kashmir, and China wants to keep China-occupied Kashmir and grab a piece of Arunachal, especially Tawang. These are problems left behind by our mistakes in 1948, and China's in 1962. In 1948, we failed to keep the war going in Kashmir long enough to recapture Azad Kashmir (we possibly needed another month or two to finish the job), and China made the mistake of retreating from large parts of our north-east due to the onset of winter and its own doubts about its ability to hold on. It now wants to make up for that lapse, now that it has the military and economic capacity to do so. Tawang is key to final Chinese control of Tibet.
This convergence of Sino-Pak territorial interests makes it vital for us to work both prongs of dialogue and defence capability simultaneously. We need to carry this strategy forward till we are in a position to deter both our enemies with the development of economic and military strength.
The Chinese are trying to do exactly that with Pakistan. They are planning to build a $40 billion economic corridor to ensure that Pakistan is strengthened economically and strategically to counter India - and to slow down our economic and military renewal process. This is an economic-cum-military race we cannot afford to lose.
So, the Modi government is right to work on both axes - dialogue and determined military responses to cross-border provocations. That Pakistan is busy testing our determination so soon after Ufa should come as no surprise. It was to happen and has happened.
The difference between Pakistan and India is this: Pakistani strategy is decided by the army, which uses civilian governments to send out dovish messages even while deciding the stance on the border without civilian intervention. In India, civilian government is deciding strategy (no doubt, with military inputs) both on the diplomatic front and on the border. Till recently we had a half-baked non-strategy decided by hope or anger or despair with Pakistan.
Manmohan Singh had the right idea on engaging Pakistan, but the wrong one on not ever responding to border provocations. Under Modi and National Security Advisor Ajit Doval, the ground response is being made robust - and as long as talk and military action below the threshold of war continue consistently, Pakistan will get the message. The only danger is this government too will behave emotionally to Pakistani provocations by suspending talks - as we did last year. We cannot afford to again be so inconsistent. Then we are back to square one - that is, a situation of zero strategy, where our enemies have the initiative and we are only reactive.
The fact that Pakistan has felt it necessary to demolish the Ufa goodwill so quickly is proof that the dual-strategy of dialogue-plus-military response is working. We need to stay the course.

Pakistan's provocations show that the Modi-Doval dual strategy is working - Firstpost

 

[TheFlyingPretzel]

All india adarsh liberal Vice president Siddharth Varadarajan runs The Wire what else do you expect

But here's the real deal about Doval doctrine :



Pakistan's provocations show that the Modi-Doval dual strategy is working - Firstpost

That Pakistan is busy testing our determination so soon after Ufa should come as no surprise. It was to happen and has happened.​

Pretending to know how Pakistan will react and reading that, and every other Pakistani action, as part of the Modi-Doval strategy shows exactly how lost India actually is.

The fact that Pakistan has felt it necessary to demolish the Ufa goodwill so quickly is proof that the dual-strategy of dialogue-plus-military response is working. We need to stay the course.​

Additionally Pakistan's withdrawal from holding true to the joint-statement at Ufa is not an indication of a working Modi-Doval strategy but rather the failure of it thereby. Just to give a rough idea of how stupid India looks on the global stage, India declared that the Ufa statement was successful because Pakistan bound itself to commitments on India's terms without bring up the issue of Kashmir. Now that Pakistan has apparently backed out of the Ufa statement, India is claiming this to be yet another success; Pray, tell, how? This unhealthy praise of the Modi-Doval axis has no grounding fact but is rather a national gimmick to persistently hone national consensus in favour of the incumbent Modi government. A ploy to keep them popular and in power.

Drawing on the way the Modi-Doval Pakistan-strategy has been worked by the media houses, if tomorrow Pakistan invades India the Indians would unabashedly praise it as the success of the Modi-Doval strategy or if the Indians invaded Pakistan it would still be praised as the success of the Modi-Doval strategy. There is no working reality to the praise just as there is no working Modi-Doval strategy.

If anything Pakistan's association of a condition with the Ufa commitments shows that Pakistan's sole purpose of the statement, at the time, was to acquire membership of the SCO. It could not have got the membership without the eyewash statement which the Chinese and Russians had asked for, hence the joint-statement in question.

I wonder how much longer the Indian media can hold ground declaring that every move Pakistan makes is actually a calculated return of the Modi-Doval strategy. They've been good at fooling all of India so far, but that's about it. It's not fooling the Pakistanis. It' definitely not fooling the Chinese and, to my mind, as OP's put it too, it's high on definition but low on yield.