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The Chindits

sparten

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I know rthe good Captain Lemontree/Aldrin is going to enjoy this.
http://www.chindits.info/

The Chindits were the largest of the allied Special Forces of the 2nd World War. They were formed and lead by Major General Orde Wingate DSO. The Chindits operated deep behind enemy lines in North Burma in the War against Japan. For many months they lived in and fought the enemy in the jungles of Japanese occupied Burma, totally relying on airdrops for their supplies.
There were two Chindits expeditions into Burma, the first in February 1943 Operation Longcloth, consisted of a force of 3,000 men who marched over 1,000 miles during the campaign. The second expedition, Operation Thursday, in March 1944 was on a much larger scale. It was the second largest airborne invasion of the war and consisted of a force of 20,000 British and Commonwealth soldiers with air support provided by the 1st Air Commando USAAF. Tragically their leader, General Wingate, was killed a few weeks after the launch of Operation Thursday.

2004 - 60th Anniversary
2004 marked the 60th anniversary of the 2nd Chindit campaign. To commemorate this occasion, Chindit veteran Bill Hills (7th Bn Leicester Regt., 14th Brigade) produced the below card for the Chindits Old Comrades Association.
5947a35cab724a872383d62516a78dda.jpg
The text inside reads​
THE CHINDITS​
During the 1939/45 War a Special force was trained in Commando methods to infiltrate behind the Japanese lines in Burma. They were known as the CHINDITS, a name given to them by their leader, Major-General Orde C. Wingate, D.S.O.

After the initial expedition in 1943 the full force was marched or landed in the jungle on makeshift air-strips by glider or Dakota aircraft 200 miles behind enemy lines in March 1944.

The mission was successful and called Operation Thursday, this eventually started the rot, which led to the Japanese surrender.

The force suffered many casualties killed, wounded or taken prisoner. Many of the survivors still suffer today from the hardship, rigours and strain of the two long arduous campaigns, when the only contact with base was by radio, all supplies came by air-drop.

The Chindits were very much an International Force, which include British, Burma Rifles, Hong Kong Volunteers, Gurkhas and West African Serviceman. The R.A.F. and First Air Commando , U.S.A.A.F. provided air support.

The Chindit badge on the front of this card illustrates a Chinthe, a symbolic guardian of Burmese temples, a mythical beast, half lion, half-flying griffin.
 
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:thumbsup: Yes and thanks. I will post something here later, but a little trivia for you. Indian YOs (young officers) carry out their mountain warfare field exercies in the very same area where the Chindits trained once upon a time.
 
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The think the PA jungle warfare course is still based on Chindit lines.
 
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Chindit memorial in London.
http://www.roll-of-honour.com/London/Chindits.html

THE BOLDEST MEASURES
ARE THE SAFEST
IN MEMORY OF ALL WHO FOUGHT ON THE
FIRST AND SECOND EXPEDITIONS INTO
NORTH BURMA 1943 AND 1944
WITH THE CHIUNDIT SPECIAL FORCES
FORMED, TRAINED AND COMMANDED BY
MAJOR GENERAL ORDE CHARLES WINGATE, DSO.
CHINDITS CAME FROM THE ARMED FORCES
OF THE UNITED KINGDOM, BURMA,
HONG KONG, INDIA, NEPAL, WEST AFRICA
AND THE
UNITED STATES OF AMERICA
AIR SUPPLY AND DIRECT OPERATIONAL
SUPPORT WAS GIVEN BY
THE RORYAL AIR FORCE
AND
1ST AIR COMMANDO GROUP
UNITED STATES ARMY AIR FORCE
AND
10TH UNITE DSTATES ARMY AIR FORCE
VICTORY WAS HASTENED BY THE CHINDITS
DARING EXPLOITS BEHIND ENEMY LINES
HIS MAJESTY KING GEORGE VI
GRACIOUSLY AWARDED THE VITORIA CROSS
TO
MAJOR FRANK GERALD BLAKER, MC
HIGHLAND LIGHT INFANTRY
ATTACHED 3BN 9TH GURKHA RIFLES
CAPTAIN MICHAEL ALLMAND
INDIAN ARMOURED CORPS
ATTACHED 3BN 6TH GURKHA RIFLES
LIEUTENANT GEORGE ALBERT CAIRNS
SOMERSET LIGHT INFANTRY
ATTACHED 1BN THE SOUTH STAFFORDSHIRE REGIMENT
RIFLEMAN TULBAHADUR PUN
3BN 6TH GURKHA RIFLES
THE FOLLOWING TOOK PART IN
THE CHINDIT CAMPAIGNS 1943-1944
45 RECONNAISSANCE REGIMENT RAC
ROYAL REGIMENT OF ARTILLERY
CORPS OF ROYAL ENGINEERS
ROYAL CORPS OF SIGNALS
2BN THE QUEEN'S ROYAL REGIMENT (WEST SURREY)
2BN THE KING'S OWN ROYAL REGIMENT (LANCASTER)
1BN THE KING'S REGIMENT (LIVERPOOL)
13BN THE KING'S REGIMENT (LIVERPOOL)
1BN THE BEDFORDSHIRE & HERTFORDSHIRE REGIMENT
2BN THE LEICESTERSHIRE REGIMENT
7BN THE LEICESTERSHIRE REGIMENT
1BN THE LANCASHIRE FUSILIERS
1BN THE CAMERONIANS (SCOTTISH RIFLES)
2BN THE DUKE OF WELLINGTON'S REGIMENT (WEST RIDING)
4BN THE BORDER REGIMENT
1BN THE SOUTH STAFFORDSHIRE REGIMENT
2BN THE BLACK WATCH (ROYAL HIGHLAND REGIMENT)
1BN THE ESSEX REGIMENT
2BN THE YORK & LANCASTER REGIMENT
142 COMMANDO COMPANY
ROYAL ARMY CHAPLAINS DEPARTMENT
ROYAL ARMY SERVICE CORPS
ROYAL ARMY MEDICAL CORPS
ROYAL ARMY ORDNANCE CORPS
CORPS OF ROYAL ELECTRICAL & MECHANICAL ENGINEERS
CORPS OF MILITARY POLICE
ROYAL ARMY VETERINARY CORPS
INDIAN ENGINEERS: SAPPERS & MINERS
ROYAL INDIAN ARMY SERVICE CORPS
INDIAN MEDICAL SERVICES
3BN 3ND KING EDWARD VII'S OWN GURKHA RIFLES
3BN 6TH GURKHA RIFLES
3BN 9TH GURKHA RIFLES
4BN 9TH GURKHA RIFLES
2BN THE BURMA RIFLES
HING KONG VOLUNTEER DEFENCE FORCE
6BN THE NIGERIA REGIMENT
7BN THE NIGERIA REGIMENT
12BN THE NIGERIA REGIMENT
BURMA INTELLIGENCE CORPS
RCAF RAAF RNZAF
 
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Chindit account of a Pakistani officer.
http://www.defencejournal.com/2002/dec/chindits.htm

Six weeks with the Chindits
Columnist Lt Col (Retd) Mukhtar Ahmad Gilani recounts his experiences in Burma during World War 2.
Introduction
A few months after my commission, in July 1943 I was ordered to report to the Chindit Headquarters located in the jungles of Central Provinces of India. I was told by my 2nd-in-command that I would be required to act as umpire during their training exercises. At that time I knew nothing about the Chindits and the duties of umpire.
It was raining when I reached Ghetera railway station, an unknown, desolate small place. There was no porter service. I was guided by the Station Master about the location of the Army camp, I carried my luggage and walking on a footpath, fully drenched, reached the camp. For miles the area was full of jungle. I saw some camouflaged tents and many bivouacs scattered under trees. I also saw stables of mules and horses. A British soldier took me to a dug in camouflaged tent. It was an office and I saluted the half a dozen officers present in the tent and reported my arrival. The men I saw in the camp and the officers in the tent were all stripped to the waist and bronzed by the weather. After a short while a frail looking bearded soldier without badges of rank, wearing a hat entered the tent. All stood up and I saluted again. On looking at me inquired “who is this miserable looking creature?” The senior most replied that “the 2nd/Lieut has been sent by the 2nd Punjab Regt. Centre to act as umpire for the coming exercises.” He frowned and passed derogatory remarks about those who had arranged to send a junior most officer for umpire duty. With a grin he asked me if I had played cricket. On my reply in affirmation he said that I would be required to act like a cricket umpire. When I told him my name is “Gilani”, he said, was I a Sayyed. In surprise I replied “yes sir”. Then smilingly he said “Insha Allah” we would be meeting each other. Flabbergasted, I left the tent and later was told that I had been interviewed by Maj Gen Orde Wingate, the GOC 3rd Indian Division which was called the “Chindits”.
Chindits
Wingate was commissioned in the Royal Artillery in 1923. He had spent early service in Palestine helping the Jewish settlers and fighting against the local Arab guerrillas. He was able to speak and write Arabic. He had become a passionate Zionist. For some years he was in Sudan with his local force and also operated against the Italians in Abyssinia. Gen Wavell had appreciated his guerrilla tactics and contribution as a leader and was seriously considering as to how best to implement the Long Range Penetration operation as expounded by Wingate.
As C-in-C India, Gen Wavell had ordered his staff officers to examine the problem of the reconquest of Burma. In Central Burma Wingate was collecting information about the country. He was plotting wild adventures in Burma. He expounded that the enemy was most vulnerable far behind his lines, where his troops, if he had any, were of low quality. A small force could create havoc. If it should be surprised, it could disintegrate into smaller parties to baffle pursuit. Supply should be by air and communication by wireless. His proposal was to cut the enemy’s supply line, destroy dumps, important bridges and railway lines. Wingate was commanding 77 Brigade and carrying out Long Range Penetration training in the jungles of Central Provinces. He had submitted the following reasons to Gen Wavell for going on with the operation in Burma behind the enemy lines.
1. The theory of employment of Long Range Penetration columns to be tested and proved.
2. 77 Brigade had been specially trained for an operation and any delay would cause deterioration both physical and psychological.
3. The proposed operation would provide our opportunity for finding out the chances of getting Burmese co-operation.
4. It would prevent the Japanese starting an offensive.
5. It would stop enemy infiltration across the Chindwin River.
6. It would confuse and interrupt any enemy plan for an offensive towards Assam.
Wavell had accepted Wingate’s proposal although it had no strategic value. According to Gen Wavell it was theoretically wrong to employ Wingate’s 77 Brigade before a follow up by the main force could take place, the valuable information and experience which would be gained was well worth the risk of losing even a part of the force. Wingate often came to GHQ India, squabbled with most people, got what he wanted and returned to his Brigade.
Chindit is the corruption of Burmese word Chinthy which in Buddhist mythology means a beast whose lower body is of a tiger and the upper body of an eagle. According to the Burmese belief to ward off evil spirits Chinthy sits on the entrance of Burmese Pagoda. Wingate named his force as the Chindits. Wingate was often violently rude and aggressive without provocation even to his seniors. He refused to defer or submit to anyone.....
 
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contd...
The First Chindit Operation
To continue the narrative in chronological order the operation of the First Chindit Force is briefly mentioned. 77 Brigade was 3,200 strong and was divided into 8 columns. For carrying equipment, reserve ammunition, stores, wireless sets (heavy), batteries, petrol, rations and other essential stores 1,100 mules were available for the Brigade. The troops were selected from British, Gurkha and Burmese units. Each Chindit soldier, from brigadier to the lowest rank, carried about 70 pounds on him which included weapon, equipment, ammunition, extra clothing, extra ration, water bottle and medicines. To stop braying of mules their vocal chords were severed by surgery. During training most of the movements were carried out during dark hours. Long Range Penetration exercises were carried out which involved long marches, at a stretch, of 30 to 50 miles for destruction of bridges, railway lines and laying of ambushes and for crossing rivers and streams with mules.
After intensive training in January 1943 the Chindits moved to Imphal. Three months reserve air supply had been dumped at a forward airfield. All other preparations, including air support, were finalized and orders in detail issued to all concerned. Air drop practices were held at Imphal. Wingate divided his force in two groups. After a strenuous march of 160 miles, from Imphal to the river Chindwin on 14 February the Northern group consisting of 3, 4, 5, 7 and 8 columns (numbering 2200 all ranks and 850 mules) crossed the river unopposed at Tonbe. The Southern group consisting of 1 and 2 columns (numbering 1000 all ranks and 250 mules) crossed the Chindwin 35 miles further south. No. 6 column had been broken up to replace casualties during training. The column at Myene received the air drops (About 70,000 pounds of supplies) on 15th to 18th February and surprisingly there was no interference from the Japanese.
The columns of both the groups proceeded to their respective objectives. They were operating in one of the most cruel terrain in the world. They crossed many rivers, streams, nullahs, jungles, steep hills, swamps and passed through the treacherous Kabaw valley known as the valley of death. They had tenacious skirmishes with the enemy at Sinlamaung, Indaw, Pinbon, Pinblebu, Piegon, Tigyaing, Inywa, Mu river valley, Kyaikthin, Myitson and many other places. The Chindits destroyed many bridges, railway lines, enemy supply dumps and ambushed enemy convoys and reinforcements. They had inflicted lot of casualties on the enemy. It is interesting to note that the Japanese had very little knowledge about the presence of the Chindits behind their lines. First they thought these columns were small groups possibly of intelligence personnel and took no action. The enemy commander at Katha gradually became aware from the clashes at Pinbon and Pinblebu that British forces of about a brigade strength were present in the Mu river valley. The demolition of the vital railway bridge at Kyaikthin on 3rd March had alarmed the Japanese Army Commander who ordered about two regiments to destroy the Chindit columns. But the Chindits often managed to slip away in thick jungle by changing directions and were completely free to strike when and where they would. Only once a portion of their air drop had landed in the Japanese held area.
Due to the enemy action at various places the Chindits suffered many casualties. Seriously wounded were perforce left with friendly locals and at the mercy of the enemy. Sickness and physical weakness also reduced their fighting strength. On 24th March Wingate was ordered to withdraw to the Chindwin. Out of the total strength of 3,200 only 2,182 managed to return in small parties through the forward posts by the end of April 1943. About 1,018 had been killed or died in the enemy held territory. As the saying goes “They died with their boots on”. Under the misfiring leadership of Wingate most of the Chindits had marched at least 1000 miles and some had covered even 1500 miles. They had penetrated deep into enemy territory and endured intense physical trials. They had collected valuable information about the terrain and the enemy. They had forced the Japanese to employ their reserve units against them.
 
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contd...
According to Gen Slim Commander 14 Army in Burma “The said gave little tangible return for the losses it had suffered and the resources it had absorbed.” According to the official history the operation had no strategic value but it showed that properly trained and well led troops could infiltrate through difficult terrain and vigorously operate in the enemy territory. It acted as a welcome tonic and to a large extent offset the failure in Arakan about the same period. For future operation it was also proved that even in difficult terrain forces could be maintained by air supply, provided air superiority has available. The Chindits had amassed experience on which future had begun to build.
On return from Burma the British press, particularly, gave wide publicity to the valiant deeds and exploits of the Chindits. They had become heroes and their achievements were read with great interest. Wingate went to England on the invitation of Prime Minister Churchill and was interviewed in detail. Churchill took Wingate with him to attend the summit conference in Quebec called Quadrant where the plans for future allied strategy were discussed. Wingate captured the imagination of Churchill and President Roosevelt. His plan to employ a much bigger force for Long Range Penetration operation behind the enemy lines was accepted and was promised necessary resources. He was confident his guerrillas would liberate, and fought hard to keep his strategic concept from being damaged and frequently made complaints direct to Churchill even bypassed his C-in-C and Supreme Commander.
The Chindits Jungle Training Camp
As mentioned in the opening para, I had reported my arrival during July 1943. The same evening I was ordered to proceed on a recce mission. As per my orders next day at dawn I proceeded to recce a big stream, about 10 miles away from the camp, for finding fordable places for troops, mules and light vehicles. I was given a horse, map, compass, pistol, ground sheet, haversack (for carrying cooked meal, tea, ration etc) and water bottle. I had to cover a distance of about 25 miles in 12 hours daylight and return with the information plotted on a sketch.
As I entered the nearby jungle area about thirty monkeys suddenly appeared and surrounded my horse. I fired two pistol shots and they disappeared into the jungle. I followed a narrow path at the centre. The sun was rarely visible, but with the help of map and compass I kept the direction. After about 10 miles I reached the edge of the jungle and I saw some people working in fields. After a few hundred yards the big stream became visible. I kept on moving along its bank for two miles and made inquiries from the locals about any bridge and fordable place. I was lucky to find a narrow wooden bridge for pedestrians only. A few cattle at a time could also cross on it. A few miles down stream I found two places which were used by cattle for crossing the stream and the same could be used for light vehicles when water level subsided. I measured the depth, width, height of the banks and noted the current speed. With the help of a local I was able to find a shorter route and returned to the camp before dark. My effort was appreciated.
The life in the camp was very busy. Every second night I as Umpire, was sent with patrols, ambush or raid parties covering at least a distance of 15 miles. Even as umpire I had to carry my weapon, live ammunition, grenades, cooked meal, field ration, a blanket and mosquito net. I also participated in a few two sided Long Range Penetration exercises of 4 to 5 days duration, each time covering a distance of 30 to 50 miles through thick jungle and hilly area. During one exercise supplies for the troops were air dropped.
During two sided exercises I saw Wingate carrying the same weight with the leading columns. Even during rain exercise would continue. Like the troops he would also cross flowing streams and nullahs and continue marching without changing his wet boots and socks. He corrected tactical weaknesses on the spot and often made changes in the situation to test reaction of the commanders. At times during exercises Wingate would tell his soldiers that during actual battle in Burma some of them would not return and seriously wounded would be left behind at the mercy of enemy and locals. Such frank talk though demoralizing but majority accepted his frankness because they knew that life was fleeting.
In August 1943 I completed my 6 weeks attachment with the Chindits. I returned with rich experience of Long Range Penetration, minor tactics, patrolling, raid, ambush and destruction of bridges etc, which proved very useful during the various battles in which I had participated in Burma with my battalion.
 
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contd....
The 2nd Chindit Operation
It was launched in March 1944 in Burma behind the enemy lines. The 3rd Indian Division, commanded by Maj Gen Wingate, consisted of 5 brigades (23 battalions + Morris Force + Dah Force of Levies) which operated in different directions to cut the enemy lines of communication to their troops facing Gen Stilwell’s forces in the north. Gen Stilwell was the American Commander of the Chinese and American troops. For covering the 2nd Chindit operation, even briefly, a separate full-fledged article is needed.
Death of Wingate
I was serving with my unit in Arakan when in April 1944 I came to know that on 24th March 1944 Maj Gen Wingate was killed in an air crash in the hills of Imphal. I really felt gloomy because I had developed lot of regard and respect for him. As mentioned in various military history books Wingate’s death was a profound shock to every Chindit down to the humblest mule driver. He was their inspired leader in war, their protector, their champion against the unfeeling, invisible bureaucracy of staff. He often bypassed proper channel for wanting essential items and support for his troops. Churchill, Wavell, Mountbatten, Auchinleck and Slim always protected Wingate from those who sought to frustrate his plans, which was a great tribute of his ideas and leadership qualities.
 
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