fatman17
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The British knew how to deal with Pakistan's restive tribes
PESHAWAR, Pakistan - The northwest frontier has been called the most dangerous place in Pakistan. That's not very reassuring for a native son who has, for the last 35 years, returned periodically to this city to teach at the university and to reconnect with his roots.
In the past, I have written about the deteriorating law-and-order situation in the country and particularly in the North West Frontier Province, where a Taliban insurgency is in full swing in the tribal areas abutting Afghanistan. A slow and creeping infiltration of the Taliban into the urban areas has caused the locals to wonder if the chickens have finally come home to roost.
A week ago, a suicide bomber detonated his charge in the middle of a large gathering of tribal chiefs about 20 miles south of Peshawar, killing 40 people. They had gathered to discuss ways to curb the rising tide of religious militancy. But it was not the number of people killed that was most disturbing, for there have been worst attacks in the past. It was location of the incident.
It happened inside the tribal territory where once the writ of the elders reigned supreme. The basic fabric of this tribal society, where there has always been a tacit subordination to the wishes of the graybeards, has been severely frayed. In many tribal areas, a new law of the jungle has evolved where a strict enforcement of a restrictive form of Islamic (Sharia) law has relegated the time-honored tribal customs to a distant secondary status. The mullah now holds a more pivotal position than the traditional tribal chief.
And in this changed landscape the war against terrorism is being fought against an invisible and shadowy enemy. No amount of brute force, the experts admit, can quench the menace of religious fanaticism.
The war against terrorism, in reality, is being fought more vigorously on the political stump in the United States and in the power corridors of Washington than on the ground here. Despite massive U.S. aid to transform tribal areas, very little tangible progress has been made. One cannot buy loyalties except for a short time, and unless a basic understanding of mutual objectives is reached among the parties (Afghanistan, Pakistan, the tribes, and the United States), there is no hope of success.
According to one knowledgeable source, an American, most of the money earmarked for developmental projects in the tribal areas is literally going to waste, and there is precious little to show for it. At this pace, it will take another 50 to 100 years to realize the stated objectives of ridding the area of Islamic militancy and terrorism. America, this expert says, has an extremely short attention span when it comes to long-term commitments.
A recent wrinkle in Pakistan-U.S. relations is the agreement whereby U.S. forces would train and equip Pakistani paramilitary forces, the Frontier Constabulary, to do the fighting in the tribal areas. In other words American boots would have to be on the ground in Pakistan to have a measure of success against the Taliban.
In reality, this has already been happening. U.S. drones regularly target suspected Taliban strongholds in the tribal religions of Pakistan. It is also widely believed that NATO forces in Afghanistan have made forays into tribal areas of Pakistan.
Is there a political solution to the current impasse?
For that, one has to look back in history to find some reference points to the current situation.
Employing a classic reward-and-punishment approach, the British were able to deal with the tribes. They would enter into an agreement with a tribe and would reward them with subsidies and incentives to keep their word. If there was a violation by any member of the tribe a collective punishment was meted out. This included, more often than not, withholding the subsidy, demolishing the dwellings, and destroying crops. They maintained a fine balance between the carrots they offered and the length of stick they carried. The tribes did not like the Brits any more than they like American or Pakistani forces, but they respected the Brits. The policy worked for over 100years, until the departure of the British from the Subcontinent in 1947. And yes, even then there were plenty of religious fanatics who were determined to rid their lands of the foreign "infidels."
Despite the awesome capability of modern firepower, a lesson from the past might serve us better.
Dr. S. Amjad Hussain is a Toledo surgeon whose column appears every other week in The Blade.
PESHAWAR, Pakistan - The northwest frontier has been called the most dangerous place in Pakistan. That's not very reassuring for a native son who has, for the last 35 years, returned periodically to this city to teach at the university and to reconnect with his roots.
In the past, I have written about the deteriorating law-and-order situation in the country and particularly in the North West Frontier Province, where a Taliban insurgency is in full swing in the tribal areas abutting Afghanistan. A slow and creeping infiltration of the Taliban into the urban areas has caused the locals to wonder if the chickens have finally come home to roost.
A week ago, a suicide bomber detonated his charge in the middle of a large gathering of tribal chiefs about 20 miles south of Peshawar, killing 40 people. They had gathered to discuss ways to curb the rising tide of religious militancy. But it was not the number of people killed that was most disturbing, for there have been worst attacks in the past. It was location of the incident.
It happened inside the tribal territory where once the writ of the elders reigned supreme. The basic fabric of this tribal society, where there has always been a tacit subordination to the wishes of the graybeards, has been severely frayed. In many tribal areas, a new law of the jungle has evolved where a strict enforcement of a restrictive form of Islamic (Sharia) law has relegated the time-honored tribal customs to a distant secondary status. The mullah now holds a more pivotal position than the traditional tribal chief.
And in this changed landscape the war against terrorism is being fought against an invisible and shadowy enemy. No amount of brute force, the experts admit, can quench the menace of religious fanaticism.
The war against terrorism, in reality, is being fought more vigorously on the political stump in the United States and in the power corridors of Washington than on the ground here. Despite massive U.S. aid to transform tribal areas, very little tangible progress has been made. One cannot buy loyalties except for a short time, and unless a basic understanding of mutual objectives is reached among the parties (Afghanistan, Pakistan, the tribes, and the United States), there is no hope of success.
According to one knowledgeable source, an American, most of the money earmarked for developmental projects in the tribal areas is literally going to waste, and there is precious little to show for it. At this pace, it will take another 50 to 100 years to realize the stated objectives of ridding the area of Islamic militancy and terrorism. America, this expert says, has an extremely short attention span when it comes to long-term commitments.
A recent wrinkle in Pakistan-U.S. relations is the agreement whereby U.S. forces would train and equip Pakistani paramilitary forces, the Frontier Constabulary, to do the fighting in the tribal areas. In other words American boots would have to be on the ground in Pakistan to have a measure of success against the Taliban.
In reality, this has already been happening. U.S. drones regularly target suspected Taliban strongholds in the tribal religions of Pakistan. It is also widely believed that NATO forces in Afghanistan have made forays into tribal areas of Pakistan.
Is there a political solution to the current impasse?
For that, one has to look back in history to find some reference points to the current situation.
Employing a classic reward-and-punishment approach, the British were able to deal with the tribes. They would enter into an agreement with a tribe and would reward them with subsidies and incentives to keep their word. If there was a violation by any member of the tribe a collective punishment was meted out. This included, more often than not, withholding the subsidy, demolishing the dwellings, and destroying crops. They maintained a fine balance between the carrots they offered and the length of stick they carried. The tribes did not like the Brits any more than they like American or Pakistani forces, but they respected the Brits. The policy worked for over 100years, until the departure of the British from the Subcontinent in 1947. And yes, even then there were plenty of religious fanatics who were determined to rid their lands of the foreign "infidels."
Despite the awesome capability of modern firepower, a lesson from the past might serve us better.
Dr. S. Amjad Hussain is a Toledo surgeon whose column appears every other week in The Blade.
