THE ART OF WAR - Sun Tzu

[ChinaToday]

Ask a dozen people to name the best business book ever and chances are several of them will say, "The Art of War."

The Art of War was written by a Chinese general named Sun Tzu more than 2,500 years ago, possibly in the 6th Century BC.

The book has long been heralded for its advice on military success. And this advice has since been co-opted by legions of armchair soldiers and generals in the business world.

The book is composed of 13 chapters, each of which focuses on a different aspect of war. It's a smart book. It's also poetic, repetitive, and arcane. So we've boiled it down for you.

ON MANAGEMENT: Care about your team, but also be a hard-***
There are five dangerous faults which may affect a general:
recklessness, which leads to destruction;
cowardice, which leads to capture;
a hasty temper, which can be provoked by insults;
a delicacy of honour, which is sensitive to shame;
over-solicitude for his men, which exposes him to worry and trouble.

Regard your soldiers as your children, and they will follow you into the deepest valleys; look upon them as your own beloved sons, and they will stand by you even unto death.

If, however, you are indulgent, but unable to make your authority felt; kind-hearted, but unable to enforce your commands; and incapable, moreover, of quelling disorder: then your soldiers must be likened to spoilt children; they are useless for any practical purpose.

When the general is weak and without authority; when his orders are not clear and distinct; when there are no fixed duties assigned to officers and men, and the ranks are formed in a slovenly haphazard manner, the result is utter disorganization.

ON MANAGEMENT: Hire great people, because weak, frustrated subordinates will cripple you

When the common soldiers are too strong and their officers too weak, the result is insubordination. When the officers are too strong and the common soldiers too weak, the result is collapse.

When the higher officers are angry and insubordinate, and on meeting the enemy give battle on their own account from a feeling of resentment, before the commander-in-chief can tell whether or not he is in a position to fight, the result is ruin

ON STRATEGY: Know thine enemy
If we know that our own men are in a condition to attack, but are unaware that the enemy is not open to attack, we have gone only halfway towards victory.

In your deliberations, when seeking to determine the military conditions, let them be made the basis of a comparison, in this wise:--
which of the two generals has the most ability?
on which side is Discipline most rigorously enforced?
which army is stronger?
on which side are the officers and men more highly trained?
in which army is there the greater constancy both in reward and punishment?

Move not unless you see an advantage; use not your troops unless there is something to be gained; fight not unless the position is critical.

ON TACTICS: All warfare is based on deception

Hold out baits to entice the enemy. Feign disorder, and crush him.


ON TACTICS: Be decisive and quick

Though we have heard of stupid haste in war, cleverness has never been seen associated with long delays.

There is no instance of a country having benefited from prolonged warfare.

The quality of decision is like the well-timed swoop of a falcon which enables it to strike and destroy its victim.

Therefore the good fighter will be terrible in his onset, and prompt in his decision.

Whoever is first in the field and awaits the coming of the enemy, will be fresh for the fight; whoever is second in the field and has to hasten to battle will arrive exhausted...

Rapidity is the essence of war: take advantage of the enemy's unreadiness, make your way by unexpected routes, and attack unguarded spots.

ON TACTICS: Exploit your enemy's weaknesses, avoid his strengths
If your opponent is of choleric temper, seek to irritate him. Pretend to be weak, that he may grow arrogant.

Attack him where he is unprepared, appear where you are not expected.

If we wish to fight, the enemy can be forced to an engagement even though he be sheltered behind a high rampart and a deep ditch. All we need do is attack some other place that he will be obliged to relieve.

So in war, the way is to avoid what is strong and to strike at what is weak.


ON TACTICS: Don't just do something for the sake of doing something -- make sure it helps you

If it is to your advantage, make a forward move; if not, stay where you are.



ON TACTICS: Plan ahead -- don't make it up as you go
Ponder and deliberate before you make a move.

Carefully study the well-being of your men, and do not overtax them. Concentrate your energy and hoard your strength. Keep your army continually on the move, and devise unfathomable plans.

The skillful tactician may be likened to the shuai-jan. Now the shuai-jan is a snake that is found in the Ch'ang mountains. Strike at its head, and you will be attacked by its tail; strike at its tail, and you will be attacked by its head; strike at its middle, and you will be attacked by head and tail both.

We cannot enter into alliance with neighbouring princes until we are acquainted with their designs. We are not fit to lead an army on the march unless we are familiar with the face of the country - its mountains and forests, its pitfalls and precipices, its marshes and swamps. We shall be unable to turn natural advantages to account unless we make use of local guides.

Hence the saying: The enlightened ruler lays his plans well ahead; the good general cultivates his resources.


WARNING: Don't attack someone just because they pissed you off
No ruler should put troops into the field merely to gratify his own spleen; no general should fight a battle simply out of pique.


INFORMATION IS KING: Don't go into battle without knowing what you're up against
What enables the wise sovereign and the good general to strike and conquer, and achieve things beyond the reach of ordinary men, is foreknowledge.

Now this foreknowledge cannot be elicited from spirits; it cannot be obtained inductively from experience, nor by any deductive calculation.

Knowledge of the enemy's dispositions can only be obtained from other men. [i.e., spies.]

Spies cannot be usefully employed without a certain intuitive sagacity.

They [spies] cannot be properly managed without benevolence and straightforwardness.

Without subtle ingenuity of mind, one cannot make certain of the truth of their reports.

Be subtle! be subtle! and use your spies for every kind of business.

When a general, unable to estimate the enemy's strength, allows an inferior force to engage a larger one, or hurls a weak detachment against a powerful one, and neglects to place picked soldiers in the front rank, the result must be rout.

He who knows things, and in fighting puts his knowledge into practice, will win his battles. He who knows them not, nor practices them, will surely be defeated.

Carefully compare the opposing army with your own, so that you may know where strength is superabundant and where it is deficient.


HOW TO LOSE: Tell your people to do something they can't; promote idiots; or work your team to death
There are three ways in which a ruler can bring misfortune on his army:
By commanding the army to advance or to retreat, being ignorant of the fact that it cannot obey. This is called hobbling the army.
By attempting to govern an army in the same way as he administers a kingdom, being ignorant of the conditions which obtain in an army. This causes restlessness in the soldier's minds.
By employing the officers of his army without discrimination, through ignorance of the military principle of adaptation to circumstances. This shakes the confidence of the soldiers.


The clever combatant looks to the effect of combined energy, and does not require too much from individuals. Hence his ability to pick out the right men and utilize combined energy

When he utilizes combined energy, his fighting men become as it were like unto rolling logs or stones. For it is the nature of a log or stone to remain motionless on level ground, and to move when on a slope; if four-cornered, to come to a standstill, but if round-shaped to go rolling down

MISCELLANEOUS: Drag your *** out of bed early -- and other tips

Now a soldier's spirit is keenest in the morning; by noonday it has begun to flag; and in the evening, his mind is only on returning to camp.

When the soldiers stand leaning on their spears, they are faint from want of food.

If those who are sent to draw water begin by drinking themselves, the army is suffering from thirst.

If there is disturbance in the camp, the general's authority is weak. If the banners and flags are shifted about, sedition is afoot. If the officers are angry, it means that the men are weary.

Thus the skilful general conducts his army just as though he were leading a single man, willy-nilly, by the hand.

It is the business of a general to be quiet and thus ensure secrecy; upright and just, and thus maintain order.

He must be able to mystify his officers and men by false reports and appearances, and thus keep them in total ignorance.

Bestow rewards without regard to rule, issue orders without regard to previous arrangements


ON WINNING
Thus we may know that there are five essentials for victory:
He will win who knows when to fight and when not to fight.
He will win who knows how to handle both superior and inferior forces.
He will win whose army is animated by the same spirit throughout all its ranks.
He will win who, prepared himself, waits to take the enemy unprepared.
He will win who has military capacity and is not interfered with by the sovereign.

In the practical art of war, the best thing of all is to take the enemy's country whole and intact; to shatter and destroy it is not so good. So, too, it is better to recapture an army entire than to destroy it, to capture a regiment, a detachment or a company entire than to destroy them.

Therefore the skillful leader subdues the enemy's troops without any fighting; he captures their cities without laying siege to them; he overthrows their kingdom without lengthy operations in the field.


The good fighter is able to secure himself against defeat, but cannot make certain of defeating the enemy.

Hence the saying: One may know how to conquer without being able to do it.

THE BOTTOM LINE
If you know the enemy and know yourself, you need not fear the result of a hundred battles. If you know yourself but not the enemy, for every victory gained you will also suffer a defeat. If you know neither the enemy nor yourself, you will succumb in every battle.

The Art Of War, By Sun Tzu

 

[Elucid]

Here is the complete book,

Chapter 1 : Initial Estimations

Sun-tzu said:
"Warfare is the greatest affair of state, the basis of life and death, the Way [Tao] to survival or extinction. It must be thoroughly pondered and analyzed.

"Therefore, structure it according to [the following] five factors, evaluate it comparatively through estimations, and seek out its true nature.' The first is termed the Tao, the second Heaven, the third Earth, the fourth generals, and the fifth the laws [for military organization and discipline].
"The Tao causes the people to be fully in accord with the ruler.' [Thus] they will die with him; they will live with him and not fear danger.'
"Heaven encompasses yin and yang, cold and heat, and the constraints of the seasons.
"Earth encompasses far or near, difficult or easy, expansive or confined, fatal or tenable terrain.'
"The general encompasses wisdom, credibility, benevolence, courage, and strictness.
"The laws [for military organization and discipline] encompass organization and regulations, the Tao of command, and the management of logistics.
"There are no generals who have not heard of these five. Those who understand them will be victorious; those who do not understand them will not be victorious.

"Thus when making a comparative evaluation through estimations, seeking out its true nature, ask:
Which ruler has the Tao?
Which general has greater ability?
Who has gained [the advantages of] Heaven and Earth?
Whose laws and orders are more thoroughly implemented?
Whose forces are stronger?
Whose officers and troops are better trained?
Whose rewards and punishments are clearer?
"From these I will know victory and defeat!

"If a general follows my [methods for] estimation and you employ him, he will certainly be victorious and should be retained. If a general does not follow my [methods for] estimation and you employ him, he will certainly be defeated, so dismiss him.'

"After estimating the advantages in accord with what you have heard, put it into effect with strategic power [shih]" supplemented by field tactics which respond to external factors. As for strategic power, [it is] controlling the tactical imbalance of power [ch'uan] in accord with the gains to be realized."

"Warfare is the Way [Tao] of deception. Thus although [you are] capable, display incapability to them. When committed to employing your forces, feign inactivity. When [your objective] is nearby, make it appear as if distant; when far away, create the illusion of being nearby.

"Display profits to entice them. Create disorder [in their forces] and take them.
"If they are substantial," prepare for them; if they are strong, avoid them.
"If they are angry, perturb them; be deferential to foster their arro- gance.
"If they are rested, force them to exert themselves.
"If they are united, cause them to be separated.
"Attack where they are unprepared.
"Go forth where they will not expect it.
"These are the ways military strategists are victorious. They cannot be spoken of in advance.

"Before the engagement, one who determines in the ancestral temple that he will be victorious has found that the majority of factors are in his favor. Before the engagement one who determines in the ancestral temple that he will not be victorious has found few factors are in his favor.
"If one who finds that the majority of factors favor him will be victorious while one who has found few factors favor him will be defeated, what about someone who finds no factors in his favor?"
"If I observe it from this perspective, victory and defeat will be apparent."

Chapter 2 : Waging War

Sun-tzu said:
"In general, the strategy for employing the military [is this]: If there are one thousand four-horse attack chariots, one thousand leather-armored support chariots, one hundred thousand mailed troops, and provisions are transported one thousand li, then the domestic and external campaign expenses, the expenditures for advisers and guests, materials such as glue and lacquer, and providing chariots and armor will be one thousand pieces of gold per day. Only then can an army of one hundred thousand be mobilized.

"When employing them in battle, a victory that is long in coming will blunt their weapons and dampen their ardor. If you attack cities, their strength will be exhausted. If you expose the army to a prolonged campaign, the state's resources will be inadequate.
"When the weapons have grown dull and spirits depressed, when our strength has been expended and resources consumed, then the feudal lords will take advantage of our exhaustion to arise. Even though you have wise generals, they will not be able to achieve a good result.
"Thus in military campaigns I have heard of awkward speed but have never seen any skill in lengthy campaigns. No country has ever profited from protracted warfare. Those who do not thoroughly comprehend the dangers inherent in employing the army are incapable of truly knowing the potential advantages of military actions.

"One who excels in employing the military does not conscript the people twice or transport provisions a third time. If you obtain your equipment from within the state and rely on seizing provisions from the enemy, then the army's foodstuffs will be sufficient.
"The state is impoverished by the army when it transports provisions far off. When provisions are transported far off, the hundred surnames are impoverished.
"Those in proximity to the army will sell their goods expensively. When goods are expensive, the hundred surname's wealth will be exhausted. When their wealth is exhausted, they will be extremely hard pressed [to supply] their village's military impositions.
"When their strength has been expended and their wealth depleted, then the houses in the central plains will be empty. The expenses of the hundred surnames will be some seven-tenths of whatever they have. The ruler's irrecoverable expenditures-such as ruined chariots, exhausted horses, armor, helmets, arrows and crossbows, halberd-tipped and spear-tipped [large, movable] protective shields, strong oxen, and large wagons-will consume six-tenths of his resources.
"Thus the wise general will concentrate on securing provisions from the enemy. One bushel of the enemy's foodstuffs is worth twenty of ours; one picul of fodder is worth twenty of ours.

"Thus what [motivates men] to slay the enemy is anger; what [stimulates them] to seize profits from the enemy is material goods. Thus in chariot encounters, when ten or more chariots are captured, reward the first to get one. Change their flags and pennants to ours; intermix and employ them with our own chariots. Treat the captured soldiers well in order to nurture them [for our use]. This is referred to as `conquering the enemy and growing stronger.'

"Thus the army values being victorious; it does not value prolonged warfare. Therefore, a general who understands warfare is Master of Fate for the people, ruler of the state's security or endangerment."

 

[Elucid]

Chapter 3 : Planning Offensives

Sun-tzu said:
"In general, the method for employing the military is this: Preserving the [enemy's] state capital is best, destroying their state capital second-best. Preserving their army is best, destroying their army second-best. Preserving their battalions is best, destroying their battalions second-best. Preserving their companies is best, destroying their companies second-best. Preserving their squads is best, destroying their squads second-best. For this reason attaining one hundred victories in one hundred battles is not the pinnacle of excellence. Subjugating the enemy's army without fighting is the true pinnacle of excellence.

"Thus the highest realization of warfare is to attack the enemy's plans; next is to attack their alliances; next to attack their army; and the lowest is to attack their fortified cities.
"This tactic of attacking fortified cities is adopted only when unavoidable. Preparing large movable protective shields, armored assault wagons, and other equipment and devices will require three months. Building earth- works will require another three months to complete. If the general cannot overcome his impatience but instead launches an assault wherein his men swarm over the walls like ants, he will kill one-third of his officers and troops, and the city will still not be taken. This is the disaster that results from attacking [fortified cities].
"Thus one who excels at employing the military subjugates other people's armies without engaging in battle, captures other people's fortified cities without attacking them, and destroys others people's states without prolonged fighting. He must fight under Heaven with the paramount aim of `preservation.' Thus his weapons will not become dull, and the gains can be preserved. This is the strategy for planning offensives.

"In general, the strategy for employing the military is this: If your strength is ten times theirs, surround them; if five, then attack them; if double, then divide your forces. If you are equal in strength to the enemy, you can engage him. If fewer, you can circumvent him. If outmatched, you can avoid him. Thus a small enemy that acts inflexibly will become the captives of a large enemy.

"The general is the supporting pillar of state. If his talents are all-encompassing, the state will invariably be strong. If the supporting pillar is marked by fissures, the state will invariably grow weak.

"Thus there are three ways by which an army is put into difficulty by a ruler:
"He does not know that the Three Armies should not advance but instructs them to advance or does not know that the Three Armies should not withdraw and orders a retreat. This is termed 'entangling the army.'
"He does not understand the Three Armies' military affairs but [directs them] in the same way as his [civil] administration. Then the officers will become confused.
"He does not understand the Three Armies' tactical balance of power [ch'uan] but undertakes responsibility for command. Then the officers will be doubtful.
"When the Three Armies are already confused and doubtful, the danger of the feudal lords [taking advantage of the situation] arises. This is referred to as `a disordered army drawing another on to victory.'

"Thus there are five factors from which victory can be known:
"One who knows when he can fight, and when he cannot fight, will be victorious.
"One who recognizes how to employ large and small numbers will be victorious.
"One whose upper and lower ranks have the same desires will be victorious.
"One who, fully prepared, awaits the unprepared will be victorious.
"One whose general is capable and not interfered with by the ruler will be victorious.
"These five are the Way [Tao] to know victory.

"Thus it is said that one who knows the enemy and knows himself will not be endangered in a hundred engagements. One who does not know the enemy but knows himself will sometimes be victorious, sometimes meet with defeat. One who knows neither the enemy nor himself will invariably be defeated in every engagement."

Chapter 4 : Military Disposition

Sun-tzu said:

"In antiquity those that excelled in warfare first made themselves uncon- querable in order to await [the moment when] the enemy could be conquered.
"Being unconquerable lies with yourself; being conquerable lies with the enemy.
"Thus one who excels in warfare is able to make himself unconquerable, but cannot necessarily cause the enemy to be conquerable.
"Thus it is said a strategy for conquering the enemy can be known but yet not possible to implement.

"One who cannot be victorious assumes a defensive posture; one who can be victorious attacks. In these circumstances by assuming a defensive posture, strength will be more than adequate, whereas in offensive actions it would be inadequate.

"Those who excel at defense bury themselves away below the lowest depths of Earth. Those who excel at offense move from above the greatest heights of Heaven. Thus they are able to preserve themselves and attain complete victory.
"Perceiving a victory that does not surpass what the masses could know is not the pinnacle of excellence. Wrestling victories for which All under Heaven proclaim your excellence is not the pinnacle of excellence.
"Thus lifting an autumn hair cannot be considered great strength; seeing the sun and moon cannot be considered acute vision; hearing the sound of thunder cannot be considered having sensitive ears.
"Those that the ancients referred to as excelling at warfare conquered those who were easy to conquer. Thus the victories of those that excelled in warfare were not marked by fame for wisdom or courageous achievement. Thus their victories were free from errors. One who is free from errors directs his measures toward [certain] victory, conquering those who are already defeated.

"Thus one who excels at warfare first establishes himself in a position where he cannot be defeated while not losing [any opportunity] to defeat the enemy.
"For this reason, the victorious army first realizes the conditions for victory, and then seeks to engage in battle. The vanquished army fights first, and then seeks victory.

"One who excels at employing the military cultivates the Tao and preserves the laws; therefore, he is able to be the regulator of victory and defeats"

"As for military methods: the first is termed measurement; the second, estimation [of forces]; the third, calculation [of numbers of men]; the fourth, weighing [relative strength]; and the fifth, victory.
"Terrain gives birth to measurement; measurement produces the estimation [of forces]. Estimation [of forces] gives rise to calculating [the numbers of men]. Calculating [the numbers of men] gives rise to weighing (strength]. Weighing [strength] gives birth to victory.

"Thus the victorious army is like a ton compared with an ounce, while the defeated army is like an ounce weighed against a ton! The combat of the vic- torious is like the sudden release of a pent-up torrent down a thousandfathom gorge. This is the strategic disposition of force [hsing]."

 

[Elucid]

Chapter 5 : Strategic Military Power

Sun-tzu said:

"In general, commanding a large number is like commanding a few. It is a question of dividing up the numbers. Fighting with a large number is like fighting with a few. It is a question of configuration and designation.

"What enable the masses of the Three Armies to invariably withstand the enemy without being defeated are the unorthodox [ch'i] and orthodox [cheng].
"If wherever the army attacks it is like a whetstone thrown against an egg, it is due to the vacuous and substantial.

"In general, in battle one engages with the orthodox and gains victory through the unorthodox. Thus one who excels at sending forth the unorthodox is as inexhaustible as Heaven, as unlimited as the Yangtze and Yellow rivers. What reach an end and begin again are the sun and moon. What die and are reborn are the four seasons.
"The notes do not exceed five, but the changes of the five notes can never be fully heard. The colors do not exceed five, but the changes of the five colors can never be completely seen. The flavors do not exceed five, but the changes of the five flavors can never be completely tasted. In warfare the strategic configurations of power [shih] do not exceed the unorthodox and orthodox, but the changes of the unorthodox and orthodox can never be completely exhausted. The unorthodox and orthodox mutually produce each other, just like an endless cycle. Who can exhaust them?

"The strategic configuration of power [ship] [is visible in] the onrush of pent-up water tumbling stones along. The [effect of] constraints [is visible in] the onrush of a bird of prey breaking the bones of its [target]. Thus the strategic configuration of power [shih] of those that excel in warfare is sharply focused, their constraints are precise. Their strategic configuration of power [shih] is like a fully drawn crossbow, their constraints like the release of the trigger.

"Intermixed and turbulent, the fighting appears chaotic, but they cannot be made disordered. In turmoil and confusion, their deployment is circular, and they cannot be defeated.

"[Simulated] chaos is given birth from control; [the illusion of] fear is given birth from courage; [feigned] weakness is given birth from strength. Order and disorder are a question of numbers; courage and fear are a question of the strategic configuration of power [shih]; strength and weakness are a question of the deployment [of forces (hsing)].
"Thus one who excels at moving the enemy deploys in a configuration ]hsing] to which the enemy must respond. He offers something which the enemy must seize. With profit he moves them, with the foundation he awaits them.

"Thus one who excels at warfare seeks [victory] through the strategic configuration of power [shih], not from reliance on men. Thus he is able to select men and employ strategic power [shih].

"One who employs strategic power [shih] commands men in battle as if he were rolling logs and stones. The nature of wood and stone is to be quiet when stable but to move when on precipitous ground. If they are square they stop, if round they tend to move. Thus the strategic power [shih] of one who excels at employing men in warfare is comparable to rolling round boulders down a thousand-fathom mountain. Such is the strategic configuration of power [shih]."

Chapter 6 : Vacuity and Substance

Sun-tzu said:

"In general, whoever occupies the battleground first and awaits the enemy will be at ease; whoever occupies the battleground afterward and must race to the conflict will be fatigued. Thus one who excels at warfare compels men and is not compelled by other men.

"In order to cause the enemy to come of their own volition, extend some [apparent] profit. In order to prevent the enemy from coming forth, show them [the potential] harm.

"Thus if the enemy is rested you can tire him; if he is well fed you can make him hungry; if he is at rest you can move him. Go forth to positions to which he must race. Race forth where he does not expect it.

"To travel a thousand li without becoming fatigued, traverse unoccupied terrain. To ensure taking the objective in an attack, strike positions that are undefended. To be certain of an impregnable defense, secure positions which the enemy will not attack.
"Thus when someone excels in attacking, the enemy does not know where to mount his defense; when someone excels at defense, the enemy does not know where to attack. Subtle! Subtle! It approaches the formless. Spiritual! Spiritual! It attains the soundless. Thus he can be the enemy's Master of Fate.

"To effect an unhampered advance, strike their vacuities. To effect a retreat that cannot be overtaken, employ unmatchable speed. Thus if I want to engage in combat, even though the enemy has high ramparts and deep moats, he cannot avoid doing battle because I attack objectives he must rescue.
"If I do not want to engage in combat, even though I merely draw a line on the ground and defend it, he will not be able to engage me in battle because we thwart his movements.

"Thus if I determine the enemy's disposition of forces [hsing] while I have no perceptible form, I can concentrate [my forces] while the enemy is fragmented. If we are concentrated into a single force while he is fragmented into ten, then we attack him with ten times his strength. Thus we are many and the enemy is few. If we can attack his few with our many, those who we engage in battle will be severely constrained.

"The location where we will engage the enemy must not become known to them. If it is not known, then the positions which they must prepare to defend will be numerous. If the positions the enemy prepares to defend are numerous, then the forces we will engage will be few. Thus if they prepare to defend the front, to the rear there will be few men. If they defend the rear, in.. the front there will be few. If they prepare to defend the left flank, then on the right there will be few men. If they prepare to defend the right flank, then on the left there will be few men. If there is no position left undefended, then there will not be any place with more than a few. The few [are the ones] who prepare against others; the many [are the ones] who make others prepare against them.

"Thus if one knows the field of battle and knows the day of battle, he can traverse a thousand li and assemble to engage in combat. If he does not know the field of battle nor know the day for battle, then the left flank cannot aid the right nor the right flank aid the left; the front cannot aid the rear nor the rear aid the front. How much more so when the distant are some tens of li away and the near several li apart? As I analyze it, even though Yueh's army is numerous, of what great advantage is it to them for attaining victory? Thus I say victory can be achieved. Even though the enemy is more numerous, they can be forced not to fight.

"Thus critically analyze them to know the estimations for gain and loss. Stimulate them to know the patterns of their movement and stopping. Determine their disposition of force [hsing] to know the tenable and fatal terrain. Probe them to know where they have an excess, where an insufficiency.
"Thus the pinnacle of military deployment approaches the formless. If it is formless, then even the deepest spy cannot discern it or the wise make plans against it.

"In accord with the enemy's disposition [hsing] we impose measures on the masses that produce victory, but the masses are unable to fathom them. Men all know the disposition [hsing] by which we attain victory, but no one knows the configuration [hsing] through which we control the victory. Thus a victorious battle [strategy] is not repeated, the configurations [hsing] of response [to the enemy] are inexhaustible.

"Now the army's disposition of force [hsing] is like water. Water's configuration [hsing] avoids heights and races downward. The army's disposition of force [hsing] avoids the substantial and strikes the vacuous. Water configures [hsing] its flow in accord with the terrain; the army controls its victory in accord with the enemy. Thus the army does not maintain any con- stant strategic configuration of power [shih]; water has no constant shape [hsing]. One who is able to change and transform in accord with the enemy and wrest victory is termed spiritual! Thus [none of] the five phases constantly dominates; the four seasons do not have constant positions; the sun shines for longer and shorter periods; and the moon wanes and waxes."

 

[Elucid]

Chapter 7 : Military Combat

Sun-tzu said:

"In general, the strategy for employing the army is this: [From the time] the general receives his commands from the ruler, unites the armies, and assembles the masses, to confronting the enemy and encamping, there is nothing more difficult than military combat. In military combat what is most difficult is turning the circuitous into the straight, turning adversity into advantage.
"Thus if you make the enemy's path circuitous and entice them with profit, although you set out after them you will arrive before them. This results from knowing the tactics of the circuitous and the direct.

"Thus combat between armies is advantageous; combat between masses is dangerous. If the entire army contends for advantage, you will not arrive in time. If you reduce the army's size to contend for advantage, your baggage and heavy equipment will suffer losses.
"For this reason if you abandon your armor [and heavy equipment] to race forward day and night without encamping, covering two days normal distance at a time, marching forward a hundred li to contend for gain, the Three Armies' generals will be captured. The strong will be first to arrive, while the exhausted will follow. With such tactics only one in ten will reach [the battle site]. If one contends for gain fifty li away, it will cause the general of the Upper Army to stumble, and by following such tactics half the men will reach [the objective]. If you contend for gain at thirty li, then two-thirds of the army will reach [the objective].
"Accordingly, if the army does not have baggage and heavy equipment it will be lost; if it does not have provisions it will be lost; if it does not have stores it will be lost.

Thus one who does not know the plans of the feudal lords cannot prepare alliances beforehand. Someone unfamiliar with the mountains and forests, gorges and defiles, the shape of marshes and wetlands cannot advance the army. One who does not employ local guides cannot gain advantages of terrain.

"Thus the army is established by deceit, moves for advantage, and changes through segmenting and reuniting. Thus its speed is like the wind, its slowness like the forest; its invasion and plundering like a fire; unmoving, it is like the mountains. It is as difficult to know as the darkness; in movement it is like thunder.

"When you plunder a district, divide the wealth among your troops. When you enlarge your territory, divide the profits. Take control of the strategic balance of power [ch'uian] and move. The one who first understands the tactics of the circuitous and the direct will be victorious. This is the strategy for military combat.

"The Military Administration states: `Because they could not hear each other they made gongs and drums; because they could not see each other they made pennants and flags.' Gongs, drums, pennants, and flags are the means to unify the men's ears and eyes. When the men have been unified the courageous will not be able to advance alone, the fearful will not be able to retreat alone. This is the method for employing large numbers.
"Thus in night battles make the fires and drums numerous, and in daylight battles make the flags and pennants numerous in order to change the men's ears and eyes.

"The ch'i of the Three Armies can be snatched away; the commanding general's mind can be seized. For this reason in the morning their ch'i is ardent; during the day their ch'i becomes indolent; at dusk their ch'i is exhaust- ed. Thus one who excels at employing the army avoids their ardent ch'i and strikes when it is indolent or exhausted. This is the way to manipulate ch'i.

"In order await the disordered; in tranquility await the clamorous. This is the way to control the mind.

"With the near await the distant; with the rested await the fatigued; with the sated await the hungry. This is the way to control strength.

"Do not intercept well-ordered flags; do not attack well-regulated forma- tions. This is the way to control changes.

"Thus the strategy for employing the military: Do not approach high mountains; do not confront those who have hills behind them. Do not pursue feigned retreats. Do not attack animated troops. Do not swallow an army acting as bait. Do not obstruct an army retreating homeward. If you besiege an army you must leave an outlet. Do not press an exhausted invader. These are the strategies for employing the military."

Chapter 8 : Nine Changes

Sun-tzu said:

"In general, the strategy for employing the military is this. After the general has received his commands from the ruler, united the armies, and assembled the masses:

"Do not encamp on entrapping terrain.
"Unite with your allies on focal terrain.
"Do not remain on isolated terrain.
"Make strategic plans for encircled terrain.
"On fatal terrain you must do battle.
"There are roads that are not followed.
"There are armies that are not attacked.
"There are fortified cities that are not assaulted.
"There is terrain for which one does not contend.
"There are commands from the ruler which are not accepted-'

"Thus the general who has a penetrating understanding of the advantages of the nine changes knows how to employ the army. If a general does not have a penetrating understanding of the advantages of the nine changes, even though he is familiar with the topography, he will not be able to realize the advantages of terrain.
"One who commands an army but does not know the techniques for the nine changes, even though he is familiar with the five advantages, will not be able to control men.

"For this reason the wise must contemplate the intermixture of gain and loss. If they discern advantage [in difficult situations], their efforts can be trusted. If they discern harm [in prospective advantage], difficulties can be resolved.

"Accordingly, subjugate the feudal lords with potential harm; labor the feudal lords with numerous affairs; and have the feudal lords race after profits.

"Thus the strategy for employing the army: Do not rely on their not coming, but depend on us having the means to await them. Do not rely on their not attacking, but depend on us having an unassailable position.

"Thus generals have five dangerous [character traits]:

"One committed to dying can be slain.
"One committed to living can be captured.
"One [easily] angered and hasty [to act] can be insulted.
"One obsessed with being scrupulous and untainted can be shamed.
"One who loves the people can be troubled.

"Now these five dangerous traits are excesses in a general, potential disaster for employing the army. The army's destruction and the general's death will invariably stem from these five, so they must be investigated."

 

[Elucid]

Chapter 9 : Maneuvering the Army

Sun-tzu said:

"As for deploying the army and fathoming the enemy:

"To cross mountains follow the valleys, search out tenable ground, and occupy the heights. If the enemy holds the heights, do not climb up to engage them in battle. This is the way to deploy an army in the mountains.

"After crossing rivers you must distance yourself from them. If the enemy is forging a river to advance, do not confront them in the water. When half their forces have crossed, it will be advantageous to strike them. If you want to engage the enemy in battle, do not array your forces near the river to confront the invader but look for tenable ground and occupy the heights. Do not confront the current's flow. This is the way to deploy the army where there are rivers.

"When you cross salt marshes and wetlands, concentrate on quickly getting away from them; do not remain. If you engage in battle in marshes or wetlands, you must stay in areas with marsh grass and keep groves of trees at your back. This is the way to deploy the army in marshes and wetlands.

"On level plains deploy on easy terrain with the right flank positioned with high ground to the rear, fatal terrain to the fore, and tenable terrain to the rear. This is the way to deploy on the plains.

"These four [deployments], advantageous to the army, are the means by which the Yellow Emperor conquered the four emperors.

"Now the army likes heights and abhors low areas, esteems the sunny [yang] and disdains the shady [yin]. It nourishes life and occupies the sub- stantial. An army that avoids the hundred illnesses is said to be certain of victory.

"Where there are hills and embankments you must occupy the yang side, keeping them to the right rear. This is to the army's advantage and [exploits the natural] assistance of the terrain.

"When it rains upstream, foam appears. If you want to cross over, wait until it settles.

"You must quickly get away from deadly configurations of terrain such as precipitous gorges with mountain ********, Heaven's Well, Heaven's jail, Heaven's Net, Heaven's Pit, and Heaven's Fissure. Do not approach them. When we keep them at a distance, the enemy [is forced to] approach them. When we face them, the enemy [is compelled to] have them at their rear.

"When on the flanks the army encounters ravines and defiles, wetlands with reeds and tall grass, mountain forests, or areas with heavy, entangled undergrowth, you must thoroughly search them because they are places where an ambush or spies would be concealed.'

"If [an enemy] in close proximity remains quiet, they are relying on their tactical occupation of ravines. If while far off they challenge you to battle, they want you to advance [because] they occupy easy terrain to their advantage.

"If large numbers of trees move, they are approaching. If there are many [visible] obstacles in the heavy grass, it is to make us suspicious. If the birds take flight, there is an ambush. If the animals are afraid, [enemy] forces are mounting a sudden attack.

"If dust rises high up in a sharply defined column, chariots are coming. If it is low and broad, the infantry is advancing. If it is dispersed in thin shafts, they are gathering firewood. If it is sparse, coming and going, they are encamping.
"One who speaks deferentially but increases his preparations will advance. One who speaks belligerently and advances hastily will retreat.
"One whose light chariots first fan out to the sides is deploying [for bat- tle].
"One who seeks peace without setting any prior conditions is [executing] a stratagem.
"One whose troops race off but [who] deploys his army into formation is implementing a predetermined schedule.
"One [whose troops] half advance and half retreat is enticing you.

"Those who stand about leaning on their weapons are hungry. If those who draw water drink first, they are thirsty. When they see potential gain but do not know whether to advance, they are tired.

"Where birds congregate it is empty. If the enemy cries out at night, they are afraid. If the army is turbulent, the general lacks severity. If their flags and pennants move about, they are in chaos. If the officers are angry, they are exhausted.

"If they kill their horses and eat the meat, the army lacks grain. If they hang up their cooking utensils and do not return to camp, they are an exhausted invader.

"One whose troops repeatedly congregate in small groups here and there, whispering together, has lost the masses. One who frequently grants rewards is in deep distress. One who frequently imposes punishments is in great diffi culty. One who is at first excessively brutal and then fears the masses is the pinnacle of stupidity.

"One who has emissaries come forth with offerings wants to rest for a while.

"If their troops are aroused and approach our forces, only to maintain their positions without engaging in battle or breaking off the confrontation, you must carefully investigate it.

"The army does not esteem the number of troops being more numerous for it only means one cannot aggressively advance. It is sufficient for you to muster your own strength, analyze the enemy, and take them. Only someone who lacks strategic planning and slights an enemy will inevitably be captured by others.

"If you impose punishments on the troops before they have become attached, they will not be submissive. If they are not submissive, they will be difficult to employ. If you do not impose punishments after the troops have become attached, they cannot be used.

"Thus if you command them with the civil and unify them through the martial, this is what is referred to as `being certain to take them.'

"If orders are consistently implemented to instruct the people, then the people will submit. If orders are not consistently implemented to instruct the people, then the people will not submit. One whose orders are consistently carried out has established a mutual relationship with the people."

Chapter 10 : Configurations of Terrain

Sun-tzu said:

"The major configurations [hsing] of terrain are accessible, suspended, stalemated, constricted, precipitous, and expansive.
"If we can go forth and the enemy can also advance, it is termed 'accessible.' In an accessible configuration, first occupy the heights and yang [side], and improve the routes for transporting provisions. Then when we engage in battle, it will be advantageous.
"If we can go forth but it will be difficult to return, it is termed `sus- pended.' In a suspended configuration, if they are unprepared go forth and conquer them. If the enemy is prepared and we sally forth without being victorious, it will be difficult to turn back and [is] not advantageous.
"If it is not advantageous for us to go forth nor advantageous for the enemy to come forward, it is termed 'stalemated." In a stalemated configuration, even though the enemy tries to entice us with profit, we do not go forth. Withdraw [our forces] and depart. If we strike them when half the enemy has come forth, it will be advantageous.
"As for constricted configurations, if we occupy them first we must fully deploy throughout them in order to await the enemy."' If the enemy occupies them first and fully deploys in them, do not follow them in. If they do not fully deploy in them, then follow them in.
"As for precipitous configurations, if we occupy them we must hold the heights and yang sides to await the enemy. If the enemy occupies them first, withdraw [our forces] and depart. Do not follow them.
"As for expansive configurations, if our strategic power [shih] is equal, it will be difficult to provoke [them to] combat. Engaging in combat will not be advantageous.
"Now these six are the Tao of terrain. Any general who undertakes responsibility for command cannot but investigate them.

"Thus there are [six types of ill-fated] armies: running, lax, sinking, crumbling, chaotic, and routed. Now these six are not disasters brought about by Heaven and Earth but by the general's errors.
"Now if, when their strategic power [shih] is equal, one attacks ten, this is called `running [off].
"If the troops are strong but the officers are weak, it is termed `lax.'
"If the officers are strong but the troops weak, it is termed `sinking.'
"If the higher officers are angry and insubordinate, engaging the enemy themselves out of unrestrained anger while the general does not yet know their capability, it is termed `crumbling.'
"If the general is weak and not strict, unenlightened in his instructions and leadership; the officers and troops lack constant [duties]; and their deployment of troops into formation is askew, it is termed `chaotic.'
"If the general, unable to fathom the enemy, engages a large number with a small number, attacks the strong with the weak while the army lacks a properly selected vanguard, it is termed `routed.'
"Now these six are the Tao of defeat. Any general who undertakes responsibility for command cannot but investigate them.

"Configuration of terrain is an aid to the army. Analyzing the enemy, taking control of victory, estimating ravines and defiles, the distant and near, is the Tao of the superior general.' One who knows these and employs them in combat will certainly be victorious. One who does not know these nor employ them in combat will certainly be defeated.

"If the Tao of Warfare [indicates] certain victory, even though the ruler has instructed that combat should be avoided, if you must engage in battle it is permissible. If the Tao of Warfare indicates you will not be victorious, even though the ruler instructs you to engage in battle, not fighting is permissible.
"Thus [a general] who does not advance to seek fame, nor [fail to retreat] to avoid [being charged with the capital] offense of retreating, but seeks only to preserve the people and gain advantage for the ruler is the state's treasure.

"When the general regards his troops as young children, they will advance into the deepest valleys with him. When he regards the troops as his beloved children, they will be willing to die with him.
"If they are well treated but cannot be employed, if they are loved but cannot be commanded, or when in chaos they cannot be governed, they may be compared to arrogant children and cannot be used.

"If I know our troops can attack, but do not know the enemy cannot be attacked, it is only halfway to victory. If I know the enemy can be attacked, but do not realize our troops cannot attack, it is only halfway to victory.
"Knowing that the enemy can be attacked, and knowing that our army can effect the attack, but not knowing the terrain is not suitable for combat, is only halfway to victory. Thus one who truly knows the army will never be deluded when he moves, never be impoverished when initiating an action.
"Thus it is said if you know them and know yourself, your victory will not be imperiled. If you know Heaven and know Earth, your victory can be com- plete."

 

[Elucid]

Chapter 11 : Nine Terrains

Sun-tzu said:

"The strategy for employing the military is [this]: There is dispersive terrain, light terrain, contentious terrain, traversable terrain, focal terrain, heavy terrain, entrapping terrain, encircled terrain, and fatal terrain.'
"When the feudal lords fight in their own territory, it is `dispersive terrain.
"When they enter someone else's territory, but not deeply, it is `light sa terrain.""
"If when we occupy it, it will be advantageous to us while if they occupy it, it will be advantageous to them, it is `contentious terrain.
"When we can go and they can also come, it is `traversable terrain.'
"Land of the feudal lords surrounded on three sides such that whoever arrives first will gain the masses of All under Heaven is `focal terrain.'
"When one penetrates deeply into enemy territory, bypassing numerous cities, it is `heavy terrain.'
"Where there are mountains and forests, ravines and defiles, wetlands and marshes, wherever the road is difficult to negotiate, it is 'entrapping terrain.'
"Where the entrance is constricted, 160 the return is circuitous, and with a small number they can strike our masses, it is `encircled ter- rain.'
"Where if one fights with intensity he will survive but if he does not fight with intensity he will perish, it is `fatal terrain.""

"For this reason on dispersive terrain do not engage the enemy.
"On light terrain do not stop.
"On contentious terrain do not attack.
"On traversable terrain do not allow your forces to become isolated.
"On focal terrain unite and form alliances [with nearby feudal lords.]
"On heavy terrain plunder for provisions.
165 "On entrapping terrain move [through quickly].
"On encircled terrain use strategy.
"On fatal terrain engage in battle.

"In antiquity those who were referred to as excelling in the employment of the army were able to keep the enemy's forward and rear forces from connecting; the many and few from relying on each other; the noble and lowly from coming to each other's rescue; the upper and lower ranks from trusting each other; the troops to be separated, unable to reassemble, or when assembled, not to be well-ordered. They moved when it was advantageous, halted when it was not advantageous.

"If I dare ask, if the enemy is numerous, disciplined, and about to advance, how should we respond to them? I would say, first seize something that they love for then they will listen to you.

"It is the nature of the army to stress speed; to take advantage of the enemy's absence; to travel unanticipated roads; and to attack when they are not alert.

"In general, the Tao of an invader is that when one has penetrated deeply [into enemy territory], the army will be unified, and the defenders will not be able to conquer you.

"If one forages in the fertile countryside, then the Three Armies will have enough to eat. If you carefully nurture them and do not [over-]labor them, their ch'i will be united and their strength will be at maximum.

"When you mobilize the army and form strategic plans, you must be unfathomable.

"Cast them into positions from which there is nowhere to go and they will die without retreating. If there is no escape from death, the officers and soldiers will fully exhaust their strength.

"When the soldiers and officers have penetrated deeply into [enemy territory], they will cling together. When there is no alternative, they will fight.
"For this reason even though the soldiers are not instructed, they are prepared; without seeking it, their cooperation is obtained; without covenants they are close together; without issuing orders they are reliable. Prohibit omens, eliminate doubt so that they will die without other thoughts.

"If our soldiers do not have excessive wealth, it is not because they detest material goods. If they do not live long lives, it is not because they abhor longevity. On the day that the orders are issued the tears of the soldiers who are sitting will soak their sleeves, while the tears of those lying down will roll down their cheeks. However, if you throw them into a hopeless situation, they will have the courage of Chu or Kuei.

"Thus one who excels at employing the army may be compared to the shuaijan [snake]. The shuaijan is found on Mt. Ch'ang. If you strike its head the tail will respond; if you strike its tail the head will respond. If you strike the middle [of the body] both the head and tail will react. If I dare ask, can we make the army like the shuaijan, I would say we can. For example, the people of Wu and Yueh hate each other; but if, when fording a river in the same boat they encounter severe wind, their efforts to rescue each other will be like the left and right hands.

"For this reason fettering the horses and burying the chariot wheels are inadequate to rely on [to prevent the soldiers from fleeing]. Unify their courage to be as one through the Tao of administration. Realize the appropriate employment of the hard and soft through the patterns of terrain.

"Thus one who excels at employing the army leads them by the hand as if they were only one man, so they cannot avoid it.

"It is essential for a general to be tranquil and obscure, upright and selfdisciplined, and able to stupefy the eyes and ears of the officers and troops, keeping them ignorant. He alters his management of affairs and changes his strategies to keep other people from recognizing them. He shifts his position and traverses indirect routes to keep other people from being able to anticipate him.

"At the moment the general has designated with them, it will be as if they ascended a height and abandoned their ladders. The general advances with them deep into the territory of the feudal lords and then releases the trig- ger. He commands them as if racing a herd of sheep-they are driven away, driven back, but no one knows where they are going.

"Assembling the masses of the Three Armies, casting them into danger, is the responsibility of the general.

"The nine transformations of terrain-the advantages deriving from contraction and expansion, the patterns of human emotions-must be investigated.

"In general, the Tao of the invader is [this]:
"When the troops have penetrated deeply, they will be unified, but where only shallowly, they will [be inclined to] scatter.
"When [the army] has left the state, crossed the [enemy's] border, and is on campaign, it is `isolated terrain.'
"When the four sides are open [to others], this is `focal terrain.'
"When you have advanced deeply, it is `heavy terrain.'
"If you have penetrated only shallowly, it is `light terrain.'
"If you have strongholds behind you and constrictions before you, it is `encircled terrain.'
"If there is no place to go, it is `fatal terrain.'
"For this reason on dispersive terrain I unify their will.
"On light terrain I have them group together.
"On contentious terrain I race our rear elements forward.
"On traversable terrain I focus on defense.
"On focal terrain I solidify our alliances.
"On heavy terrain I ensure a continuous supply of provisions.
"On entrapping terrain I [speedily] advance along the roads.
"On encircled terrain I obstruct any openings.
"On fatal terrain I show them that we will not live.

"Thus it is the nature of the army to defend when encircled; to fight fervently when unavoidable; and to follow orders when compelled [by circumstances].

"For this reason one who does not know the plans of the feudal lords cannot forge preparatory alliances. One who does not know the topography of mountains and forests, ravines and defiles, wetlands and marshes cannot maneuver the army. One who does not employ local guides will not secure advantages of terrain. One who does not know one of these four or five cannot [command] the army of a hegemon or a true king.

"Now when the army of a hegemon or true king attacks a great state, their masses are unable to assemble. When it applies its awesomeness to the enemy, their alliances cannot be sustained. For this reason it does not contend with any alliances under Heaven. It does not nurture the authority [ch'uan] of others under Heaven. Have faith in yourself, apply your awesomeness to the enemy. Then his cities can be taken, his state can be subjugated.

"Bestow rewards not required by law, impose exceptional governmental orders. Direct the masses of the Three Armies as though commanding one man. Press affairs upon them, do not explain the purpose to them. Compel them with [prospects for] profit, but do not inform them about the [potential] harm.

"Cast them into hopeless situations and they will be preserved; have them penetrate fatal terrain and they will live. Only after the masses have penetrated dangerous [terrain] will they be able to craft victory out of defeat.

"The prosecution of military affairs lies in according with and [learning] in detail the enemy's intentions. If one then focuses [his strength] toward the enemy, strikes a thousand li away, and kills their general, it is termed 'being skillful and capable in completing military affairs.'

"For this reason on the day the government mobilizes the army, close the passes, destroy all tallies, and do not allow their emissaries to pass through. Hold intense strategic discussions"' in the upper hall of the temple in order to bring about the execution of affairs.

"If the enemy opens the door, you must race in.

"[Attack] what they love first. Do not fix any time for battle; assess and react to the enemy in order to determine the strategy for battle.

"For this reason at first be like a virgin [at home]; later-when the enemy opens the door-be like a fleeing rabbit. The enemy will be unable to withstand you."

Chapter 12 : Incendiary Attacks

Sun-tzu said:

"There are five types of incendiary attack: The first is to incinerate men, the second to incinerate provisions, the third to incinerate supply trains, the fourth to incinerate armories, and the fifth to incinerate formations.'

"Implementing an incendiary attack depends on the proper conditions. Equipment for incendiary attack should be fully prepared before required. Launching an incendiary attack has its appropriate seasons, igniting the fire the proper days. As for the seasons, it is the time of the dry spell; as for the day, when the moon is in chi, pi, i, or chen. When it is in these four lunar lodges, these are days the wind will arise.

"In general, in incendiary warfare you must respond to the five changes of fire:
"If fires are started within [their camp], then you should immediately respond [with an attack] from outside.
"If fires are ignited but their army remains quiet, then wait; do not attack.
"When they flare into a conflagration, if you can follow up, then do so; if you cannot, then desist.
"If the attack can be launched from outside without relying on inside [assistance], initiate it at an appropriate time.
"If fires are ignited upwind, do not attack downwind.

"Winds that arise in the daytime will persist; those that arise at night will stop.

"Now the army must know the five changes of fire in order to defend against them at the astrologically appropriate times. Thus using fire to aid an attack is enlightened, using water to assist an attack is powerful. Water can be used to sever, but cannot be employed to seize.

"Now if someone is victorious in battle and succeeds in attack but does not exploit the achievement, it is disastrous, and his fate should be termed `wasteful and tarrying.' Thus it is said the wise general ponders it, the good general cultivates it.

"If it is not advantageous, do not move. If objectives cannot be attained, do not employ the army. Unless endangered do not engage in warfare. The ruler cannot mobilize the army out of personal anger. The general cannot engage in battle because of personal frustration. When it is advantageous, move; when not advantageous, stop. Anger can revert to happiness, annoyance can revert to joy, but a vanquished state cannot be revived, the dead cannot be brought back to life.
"Thus the enlightened ruler is cautious about it, the good general respectful of it. This is the Tao for bringing security to the state and preserving the army intact."

Chapter 13 : Employing Spies

Sun-tzu said:

"When you send forth an army of a hundred thousand on a campaign, marching them out a thousand li, the expenditures of the common people and the contributions of the feudal house will be one thousand pieces of gold per day. Those inconvenienced and troubled both within and without the border, who are exhausted on the road or unable to pursue their agricultural work, will be seven hundred thousand families.
"Armies remain locked in a standoff for years to fight for victory on a single day, yet [generals] begrudge bestowing ranks and emoluments of one hundred pieces of gold and therefore do not know the enemy's situation. This is the ultimate inhumanity. Such a person is not a general for the people, an assistant for a ruler, or the arbiter of victory.

"The means by which enlightened rulers and sagacious generals moved and conquered others, that their achievements surpassed the masses, was advance knowledge.
"Advance knowledge cannot be gained from ghosts and spirits, inferred from phenomena, or projected from the measures of Heaven, but must be gained from men for it is the knowledge of the enemy's true situation.

"Thus there are five types of spies to be employed: local spy, internal spy, turned spy [double agent], dead [expendable] spy, and the living spy. When all five are employed together and no one knows their Tao, this is termed "spiritual methodology." They are a ruler's treasures.
"Local spies-employ people from the local district.
"Internal spies-employ their people who hold government positions.
"Double agents-employ the enemy's spies.
"Expendable spies-are employed to spread disinformation outside the state. Provide our [expendable] spies [with false information] and have them leak it to enemy agents.
"Living spies-return with their reports.
"Thus of all the Three Armies' affairs, no relationship is closer than with spies; no rewards are more generous than those given to spies; no affairs are more secret than those pertaining to spies.

"Unless someone has the wisdom of a Sage, he cannot use spies; unless he is benevolent and righteous, he cannot employ spies; unless he is subtle and perspicacious, he cannot perceive the substance in intelligence reports. It is subtle, subtle! There are no areas in which one does not employ spies.

"If before the mission has begun it has already been exposed, the spy and those he informed should all be put to death.

"In general, as for the armies you want to strike, the cities you want to attack, and the men you want to assassinate, you must first know the names of the defensive commander, his assistants, staff, door guards, and attendants. You must have our spies search out and learn them all.

"You must search for enemy agents who have come to spy on us. Tempt them with profits, instruct and retain them. Thus double agents can be obtained and employed. Through knowledge gained from them, you can recruit both local and internal spies. Through knowledge gained from them, the expendable spy can spread his falsehoods, can be used to misinform the enemy. Through knowledge gained from them, our living spies can be employed as times require.
"The ruler must know these five aspects of espionage work. This knowledge inevitably depends on turned spies; therefore, you must be generous to double agents.

"In antiquity, when the Yin arose, they had I Chih in the Hsia. When the Chou arose, they had Lu Ya [the T'ai Kung] in the Yin. Thus enlightened rulers and sagacious generals who are able to get intelligent spies will invariably attain great achievements. This is the essence of the military, what the Three Armies rely on to move."

The End

 

[Elucid]

As The Art of War is the most famous treatise on war in the world therefore i request the mods to make this thread sticky.

 

[bolo]

"HOW TO LOSE: Tell your people to do something they can't; promote idiots; or work your team to death"

This is very common in today's N. American business culture (promoting idiots).

 

[Nan Yang]

As The Art of War is the most famous treatise on war in the world therefore i request the mods to make this thread sticky.

There is another call the 36 stratagem which is more wicked type of strategy.

Thirty-Six Stratagems - Wikipedia, the free encyclopedia

 

[Elucid]

Art of War presents a more general theory. Different strategies and tactics emanate from this higher theory of warfare. As Sun tzu says,

"The notes do not exceed five, but the changes of the five notes can never be fully heard. The colors do not exceed five, but the changes of the five colors can never be completely seen. The flavors do not exceed five, but the changes of the five flavors can never be completely tasted. In warfare the strategic configurations of power [shih] do not exceed the unorthodox and orthodox, but the changes of the unorthodox and orthodox can never be completely exhausted. The unorthodox and orthodox mutually produce each other, just like an endless cycle. Who can exhaust them?"

The combinations (strategies) are infinite.

 

[ephone]

After seeing the translations, it feels it is weird that whether the original Sun-Tzu's meanings are totally expressed in the translations though.