MANY functionaries of the United States State Department, who handled South Asia under the Clinton Administration, may have to face embarrassment when the Bush regime gets down to locating the factors that made it easier for terrorists to carry out the September 11 carnage.
These functionaries, it is reliably learnt, ignored the warnings about the activities and intentions of the terrorist groups operating out of Afghanistan and Pakistan.
One of such reports had come from Michael Sheehan, the head of counter-terrorism wing of the State Department. Sheehan’s report also listed the measures that the US should have taken to prevent its homeland security from being breached.
The fact that his recommendations were ignored was one of the reasons why Sheehan left the State Department to take up a job with the United Nations.
Mention is also being made of the notes put up by the former assistant secretary of state for South Asia Karl Inderfurth. He is also believed to have alerted against the looming threat and asked for urgent remedial measures.
These facts are sure to surface once the Bush regime has taken care of its immediate priority: Retaliatory strike against the harbourers of terrorists.
While the aftermath of the terrorist attack has seen partisan quarrels taking the backseat, some uncomfortable questions about the failure to foil the terrorists are sure to be asked when the focus shifts to the domestic preparedness to deal with the threat.
Attention is sure to be focused on the role of Robin Raphel, former assistant secretary of state, in downplaying the threat from Taliban, as the gaze turns inwards.
The diplomat who had upset India by her insensitive remarks over Kashmir, aggressively pushed for staying engaged with the Taliban even when evidence available with the State Department pointed to the futility of winking at the abysmal human rights record and fundamentalist agenda of the clerics ruling from Kabul.
The examination of documents may give a new turn to the debate on whether there was an intelligence failure behind the success of the terrorists.
Sources, who are familiar with the contents of the reports submitted by the counter-terrorism and South Asia desks of the State Department, feel that attacks were perhaps facilitated by the failure to act on the intelligence available with it.
Terrorists had a friend in Clinton White House called Robin
These functionaries, it is reliably learnt, ignored the warnings about the activities and intentions of the terrorist groups operating out of Afghanistan and Pakistan.
One of such reports had come from Michael Sheehan, the head of counter-terrorism wing of the State Department. Sheehan’s report also listed the measures that the US should have taken to prevent its homeland security from being breached.
The fact that his recommendations were ignored was one of the reasons why Sheehan left the State Department to take up a job with the United Nations.
Mention is also being made of the notes put up by the former assistant secretary of state for South Asia Karl Inderfurth. He is also believed to have alerted against the looming threat and asked for urgent remedial measures.
These facts are sure to surface once the Bush regime has taken care of its immediate priority: Retaliatory strike against the harbourers of terrorists.
While the aftermath of the terrorist attack has seen partisan quarrels taking the backseat, some uncomfortable questions about the failure to foil the terrorists are sure to be asked when the focus shifts to the domestic preparedness to deal with the threat.
Attention is sure to be focused on the role of Robin Raphel, former assistant secretary of state, in downplaying the threat from Taliban, as the gaze turns inwards.
The diplomat who had upset India by her insensitive remarks over Kashmir, aggressively pushed for staying engaged with the Taliban even when evidence available with the State Department pointed to the futility of winking at the abysmal human rights record and fundamentalist agenda of the clerics ruling from Kabul.
The examination of documents may give a new turn to the debate on whether there was an intelligence failure behind the success of the terrorists.
Sources, who are familiar with the contents of the reports submitted by the counter-terrorism and South Asia desks of the State Department, feel that attacks were perhaps facilitated by the failure to act on the intelligence available with it.
Terrorists had a friend in Clinton White House called Robin
