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Sorting the confusion over extremism
Reality check
Friday, October 17, 2008
by Shafqat Mahmood
The in-camera joint sitting of the Parliament is continuing but reports filtering out indicate that there is little agreement on the nature of the extremist challenge facing the country. Some members think that we have no homegrown problem. They explain away the horrific terror acts like the one at Marriott and the Wah ordinance factory as collateral damage of our support for the American war on terror.
Trying to explain away the insurgency in Swat and other settled districts of the NWFP is a bit more complicated, but they still insist that it has no local objectives. It is portrayed as an extension of the anti-American struggle. Fazlur Rehman has gone to the extent of legitimising the extremists and bringing them on par with our armed forces, by suggesting that they should also be invited to brief the parliament.
The Maulana may have a personal angle to this suggestion, as he never does anything without a motive, but it highlights the confusion surrounding the issue of extremism in Pakistan. While the presence of homegrown outfits like the various "lashkars" and "sipahs" is generally acknowledged, the American angle has blurred all the extremists into one single anti-imperialist, anti-American entity.
Another tactic used by some to give legitimacy to those killing our soldiers and attacking our cities is to compare them to the Afghan Taliban. This is done in the context of negotiations that are reportedly taking place in Afghanistan. The argument made is that if the Americans and NATO are talking to the Afghan Taliban, why we can't do it here. The problem is that while the Afghan Taliban and Pakistani extremists may share a similar archaic vision of an Islamic state, the nature of their fight is completely different.
The Afghan Taliban are in a situation where their country is occupied by foreign forces. This gives their war the patina of a national liberation struggle. They are also almost exclusively Pakhtun, in a circumstance where this ethnic majority feels it has been dealt out of the power after the Americans took over Afghanistan. While Karzai is Pakhtun, he is seen as window dressing for rule by the Northern Alliance that comprises Tajiks, Uzbeks and other religious and ethnic minorities.
In the Afghan context, then, it makes a lot of sense to talk to the Taliban because the war in that country will never end as long as the Pakhtun keep feeling disempowered. The Americans have further stoked their anger by indiscriminate bombings that have killed thousands of their kinsmen. It is not possible for the Americans and their allies to wipe out an entire ethnicity. Therefore, the war in Afghanistan cannot end unless the Pakhtuns are appeased, compensated and brought into the power set up.
It is this stark fact that has been acknowledged by British commanders in that country. The Americans will not publicly say it but they also are in tacit agreement. This has resulted in a change of strategy and the emerging emphasis on negotiations. When choosing whom to talk to they are targeting the Taliban not only because they are their principal military adversary. They are engaging with them because the Taliban are in effect the Pakhtun national army in Afghanistan. Talking to the Pakhtuns means talking to the Taliban.
The situation in Pakistan is to an extent linked to the Afghan situation but its inherent nature is completely different. Its linkage is the sympathy factor that the Pakhtun tribes in our tribal belt have for their kinfolk in Afghanistan. Also, traditions of the Pakhtun honour code oblige them to give hospitality and comfort to the Afghan Taliban who come to rest and regroup in the tribal area. This may also be the reason why some from here have also joined the fight in Afghanistan, but the number is not very large.
Another factor that links our territory to the conflict in Afghanistan is the presence of foreign fighters and perhaps people like Osama bin Laden in our tribal belt. These elements are a hangover of the anti-Soviet Afghan war in the 80s. They have used their money and Islamic notions of brotherhood, to make a place for themselves here. The word Al Qaeda means the base, and the base for them these days for waging a war against the US and the West is parts of Afghanistan and our tribal area.
These people, Al Qaeda and Afghan Taliban, fight us because we want to deny them a base on our territory. They are supported in this conflict by their local cohorts both because they sympathise with their cause and have tribal and ethnic linkages with them. Thus, the fighting in Bajaur and Waziristan and a few of the other tribal agencies could be described as a result of our effort to deny Afghan Taliban and Al Qaeda a base, a sanctuary in Pakistan.
What is going on in Swat, on the other hand, or in parts of the settled districts of the NWFP, only has tangential links to America's war in Afghanistan. These conflicts are part of a wider agenda to impose a particular version of an Islamic state in Pakistan. Schools for girls are not being bombed in Swat to hurt the Americans. Barber shops and CD sellers are not being threatened to drive the Americans out of the region. They are part of the agenda to transform the Pakistani state.
In this conflict, which is totally homegrown, all manner of people have come together. There are radicalised Talibs in the frontier who have emerged from the local madressah system. A majority of them are poor who not only feel that the state does nothing for them; they also experience direct contradiction with their local elites. A close examination of the Swat conflict will clearly show elements of class war in it.
These people are supported directly by many of the shadowy groups in Punjab and Sindh that sprouted during the Afghan war and had state sponsorships. The lashkars, the jaish's and the sipahs actively support the struggle going on in the NWFP and play their part by facilitating terror bombings in the capital and other urban areas of the country. They also whenever the opportunity arises indulge in culture wars by threatening cinemas, music shops and last week, the entire Hall road in Lahore.
This loose coalition of our homegrown extremists is essentially working on a Pakistani agenda but it has a link with and support of anti-American elements in the region. A weak Pakistani state suits Al Qaeda because it increases the space for its activities. It is ready to contribute monetarily and with arms to help the local extremist to continue their fight against Pakistan.
Will a possible American departure from the region, unlikely though it is, bring an end to the link between Al Qaeda and local groups and thus reduce the internal conflict in Pakistan? Unlikely, because our homegrown extremists were active before American intervention in Afghanistan and their departure will make no difference to their agenda. If anything, it will embolden them and make them more aggressive.
Unless we recognise the challenge we face and come together to fight it, we will have a hard time surviving.
Email: shafqatmd@gmail.com
Reality check
Friday, October 17, 2008
by Shafqat Mahmood
The in-camera joint sitting of the Parliament is continuing but reports filtering out indicate that there is little agreement on the nature of the extremist challenge facing the country. Some members think that we have no homegrown problem. They explain away the horrific terror acts like the one at Marriott and the Wah ordinance factory as collateral damage of our support for the American war on terror.
Trying to explain away the insurgency in Swat and other settled districts of the NWFP is a bit more complicated, but they still insist that it has no local objectives. It is portrayed as an extension of the anti-American struggle. Fazlur Rehman has gone to the extent of legitimising the extremists and bringing them on par with our armed forces, by suggesting that they should also be invited to brief the parliament.
The Maulana may have a personal angle to this suggestion, as he never does anything without a motive, but it highlights the confusion surrounding the issue of extremism in Pakistan. While the presence of homegrown outfits like the various "lashkars" and "sipahs" is generally acknowledged, the American angle has blurred all the extremists into one single anti-imperialist, anti-American entity.
Another tactic used by some to give legitimacy to those killing our soldiers and attacking our cities is to compare them to the Afghan Taliban. This is done in the context of negotiations that are reportedly taking place in Afghanistan. The argument made is that if the Americans and NATO are talking to the Afghan Taliban, why we can't do it here. The problem is that while the Afghan Taliban and Pakistani extremists may share a similar archaic vision of an Islamic state, the nature of their fight is completely different.
The Afghan Taliban are in a situation where their country is occupied by foreign forces. This gives their war the patina of a national liberation struggle. They are also almost exclusively Pakhtun, in a circumstance where this ethnic majority feels it has been dealt out of the power after the Americans took over Afghanistan. While Karzai is Pakhtun, he is seen as window dressing for rule by the Northern Alliance that comprises Tajiks, Uzbeks and other religious and ethnic minorities.
In the Afghan context, then, it makes a lot of sense to talk to the Taliban because the war in that country will never end as long as the Pakhtun keep feeling disempowered. The Americans have further stoked their anger by indiscriminate bombings that have killed thousands of their kinsmen. It is not possible for the Americans and their allies to wipe out an entire ethnicity. Therefore, the war in Afghanistan cannot end unless the Pakhtuns are appeased, compensated and brought into the power set up.
It is this stark fact that has been acknowledged by British commanders in that country. The Americans will not publicly say it but they also are in tacit agreement. This has resulted in a change of strategy and the emerging emphasis on negotiations. When choosing whom to talk to they are targeting the Taliban not only because they are their principal military adversary. They are engaging with them because the Taliban are in effect the Pakhtun national army in Afghanistan. Talking to the Pakhtuns means talking to the Taliban.
The situation in Pakistan is to an extent linked to the Afghan situation but its inherent nature is completely different. Its linkage is the sympathy factor that the Pakhtun tribes in our tribal belt have for their kinfolk in Afghanistan. Also, traditions of the Pakhtun honour code oblige them to give hospitality and comfort to the Afghan Taliban who come to rest and regroup in the tribal area. This may also be the reason why some from here have also joined the fight in Afghanistan, but the number is not very large.
Another factor that links our territory to the conflict in Afghanistan is the presence of foreign fighters and perhaps people like Osama bin Laden in our tribal belt. These elements are a hangover of the anti-Soviet Afghan war in the 80s. They have used their money and Islamic notions of brotherhood, to make a place for themselves here. The word Al Qaeda means the base, and the base for them these days for waging a war against the US and the West is parts of Afghanistan and our tribal area.
These people, Al Qaeda and Afghan Taliban, fight us because we want to deny them a base on our territory. They are supported in this conflict by their local cohorts both because they sympathise with their cause and have tribal and ethnic linkages with them. Thus, the fighting in Bajaur and Waziristan and a few of the other tribal agencies could be described as a result of our effort to deny Afghan Taliban and Al Qaeda a base, a sanctuary in Pakistan.
What is going on in Swat, on the other hand, or in parts of the settled districts of the NWFP, only has tangential links to America's war in Afghanistan. These conflicts are part of a wider agenda to impose a particular version of an Islamic state in Pakistan. Schools for girls are not being bombed in Swat to hurt the Americans. Barber shops and CD sellers are not being threatened to drive the Americans out of the region. They are part of the agenda to transform the Pakistani state.
In this conflict, which is totally homegrown, all manner of people have come together. There are radicalised Talibs in the frontier who have emerged from the local madressah system. A majority of them are poor who not only feel that the state does nothing for them; they also experience direct contradiction with their local elites. A close examination of the Swat conflict will clearly show elements of class war in it.
These people are supported directly by many of the shadowy groups in Punjab and Sindh that sprouted during the Afghan war and had state sponsorships. The lashkars, the jaish's and the sipahs actively support the struggle going on in the NWFP and play their part by facilitating terror bombings in the capital and other urban areas of the country. They also whenever the opportunity arises indulge in culture wars by threatening cinemas, music shops and last week, the entire Hall road in Lahore.
This loose coalition of our homegrown extremists is essentially working on a Pakistani agenda but it has a link with and support of anti-American elements in the region. A weak Pakistani state suits Al Qaeda because it increases the space for its activities. It is ready to contribute monetarily and with arms to help the local extremist to continue their fight against Pakistan.
Will a possible American departure from the region, unlikely though it is, bring an end to the link between Al Qaeda and local groups and thus reduce the internal conflict in Pakistan? Unlikely, because our homegrown extremists were active before American intervention in Afghanistan and their departure will make no difference to their agenda. If anything, it will embolden them and make them more aggressive.
Unless we recognise the challenge we face and come together to fight it, we will have a hard time surviving.
Email: shafqatmd@gmail.com
