Talking to the Taliban

[fatman17]

We know this, but US coming to these realizations is new - Kaplan is a an influential writer, lets wait and see if this piece represents a signal as to the substance of the policy review underway.

correct with a anti-muslim bent!

 

[Contrarian]

Muse, i find your posted articles interesting and i request you to please not post them in varying colours and sizes. They would be far more simpler to read, i assure you if you posted them as normal-the way you post your own views or the way im posting now.

 

[RabzonKhan]

Wali offers Taliban peace talks

* ANP chief says no talks with those not laying down arms

PESHAWAR: I am ready to negotiate with terrorists so long as they laid down arms, Awami National Party (ANP) chief Asfandyar Wali Khan said on Tuesday, Reuters reported.

“I want to make it clear that I can’t negotiate at gunpoint,” Asfandyar told a news conference in Peshawar.

“I again appeal to these people, even though they have accepted the responsibility for the attack, that they come and sit, because issues can be resolved through talks, not through guns,” he said.

No talks: “We still support dialogue and political solution to problems, but those holding guns must know that they have no place in our policy of peace,” Asfandyar said.

He said the ANP would never tolerate terrorism whether he remained alive or not.

“This is my motherland. We have sworn that we will defend it against all those who are out to disturb peace by attacking innocent civilians and bombing mosques and killing those offering prayers,” he said. The ANP chief also asked all the political parties to shun their ‘dubious’ policies on terrorism. “There is no mid way. They [political parties] should either stand for peace or announce their support for the Taliban,” he said. staff report/reuters

 

[fatman17]

“This is my motherland. We have sworn that we will defend it against all those who are out to disturb peace

hope he and ANP stick to their words (sic).

 

[RabzonKhan]

“This is my motherland. We have sworn that we will defend it against all those who are out to disturb peace

hope he and ANP stick to their words (sic).

I think he is sincere.

 

[muse]

Reconciliation in Afghanistan?

Najmuddin A Shaikh

Polls taken immediately after the second US presidential debate on Tuesday showed that Barack Obama had consolidated his lead. This was partly attributable to Obama’s performance, which was impressive, but largely to the fact that despite the passage of the economic rescue package, it seems that confidence has not been restored, and the economic situation is expected to deteriorate further before it improves.

This legacy of the Bush era works to the advantage of the Democrats not only in the presidential election but also in the congressional elections. A Democratic White House and a Democrat-dominated Congress are likely to emerge after the November elections.

What will this mean for American policy towards Afghanistan and Pakistan?

A full thirty minutes of the second Presidential debate were devoted to international affairs, and of this time about twenty minutes were spent on Pakistan and Afghanistan. Obama sounded convincing when, even while reiterating his previous stance that he would take out Osama bin Laden unilaterally if Pakistan “was unable or unwilling to do so”, he outlined his policy towards Pakistan as being supportive of democracy and with increased non-military assistance so that the Pakistanis would be more willing to cooperate with the US. He promised to make more troops available to the commanders in Afghanistan, tying it to the drawdown of forces in Iraq.

Defence Secretary Robert Gates has termed as “defeatist” the assessment of the senior British commander in Afghanistan, who believes that the modified objective in Afghanistan should be to reduce the level of fighting to a “low level insurgency” that Afghan security forces can handle.

Gates, however, agreed that a resolution of the conflict would need talks with the Taliban: “Part of the solution is reconciliation with people who are willing to work with the Afghan government”. (The State Department says the Afghan government’s condition is renunciation of violence and adherence to the constitution.) This is a position that has been endorsed by ISAF spokespersons and by the UN representative, who has said, “We all know that we cannot win it militarily. It has to be won through political means. That means political engagement”.

There has been a detailed report in the American media about talks under Saudi auspices between representatives of the Karzai administration and the Taliban and Hekmatyar forces. These reports have been denied by the Taliban, with Mullah Zaeef stating that while there were Afghans from these factions present at an Iftar hosted by King Abdullah, there had been no negotiations. Something, however, is happening. Australian press reports suggest former Prime Minister Nawaz Sharif is using his contacts with the Saudi monarchy and the Afghan Mujahideen to promote such talks.

What has prompted all this renewed talk of reconciliation?

The situation in Afghanistan has of course deteriorated. Unconfirmed press reports suggest that a new intelligence estimate prepared by the Directorate of National Intelligence paints a grim picture. For obvious reasons, the report is not likely to be released until after the US elections, but what it contains can be gleaned from facts on the ground and testimonies of senior military officers.

Admiral Mullen, Chairman US Joint Chiefs of Staff, told a congressional hearing that “absent a broader international and interagency approach to the problems there, it is my professional opinion that no amount of troops in no amount of time can ever achieve all the objectives we seek in Afghanistan.”

In Helmand province, the British commander maintains that they have “taken the sting out of the Taliban for 2008”. But Gulab Mangal, the governor of Helmand, says that the Taliban control more than half the province despite increased presence of British forces. In June, this British commander had spoken of having reached the “tipping point” and of having “decapitated” the Taliban leadership. Today he says a military victory is not possible.

Roads leading out of Kabul considered safe six months ago are now controlled by the Taliban. Afghan legislators from Ghazni, a province next to Kabul, have told reporters that they no longer dare to visit their homes, while residents of Wardak, the next province, actively discourage visitors from Kabul because of the danger of Taliban attacks on the highway. From interviews, American reporters have come to the conclusion that the Pashtuns see Karzai as a traitor ruling with the assistance of foreign troops and rival ethnic groups.

Casualty figures are rising dramatically. According to a UN report, 1445 civilians had been killed in the first eight months of 2008, a 40 percent increase from the same period in 2007. More than half of those killed died at the hands of the insurgents, but 577 have been killed by coalition forces — some two-thirds by air strikes.

The Taliban today are stronger force than ever before. They, according to one knowledgeable American correspondent, are “a larger, better armed and more confident militia, capable of mounting sustained military assaults”. Their forces operate in virtually every province and control many districts in areas ringing the capital. They have changed tactics and no longer punish people for owning CDs or cassettes. Unlike the past, the new Taliban structure has councils for each area of governance, appoints officials in controlled areas and confers swift justice for crimes and disputes.

Also, their propaganda machine is much more effective than anything that NATO forces have been able to muster. They are well financed, though the amount they receive from opium-related activities is far less than the $100 million that is currently being bruited about. Clearly there is external financing.

On the other hand, the quality of governance provided by the Karzai administration has gone from bad to worse. Karzai’s brother has been named in a detailed New York Times article as a major drug dealer and his subsequent denials have not been convincing. In Helmand and Kandahar, Karzai appears to remain beholden to warlords who undermine efforts to provide good governance and development.

Overall, it is the corruption of the government and its failure to provide even the most elementary of civic services that has contributed to the Taliban resurgence. Assistance from the Taliban across the Pak-Afghan border has contributed a great deal to the destabilisation of Pakistan, but has been a relatively minor factor in the Taliban resurgence in Afghanistan.

Support for this view comes from the new commander of American forces in East Afghanistan who acknowledged that much of the increase in violence in that area was attributable to Taliban fighters who had remained in Kunar last winter and intensified operations without crossing the border.

Grim the situation may be, but there should be no doubt that the Americans will stay. In retreating from Vietnam, they had only to contend with the dubious domino theory. In Afghanistan they perceive a very real and imminent threat. The Pentagon is awarding contracts for mine clearance, for building roads around the perimeter of Bagram air base and for other long-term activities. A contract has already been awarded for the building of a $50 million prison for high security prisoners at Bagram.

The exit strategy now being talked about is the building up of the Afghan army. They appear determined to find the money (estimated at $20 billion) themselves or through their allies over the next five years to bring the Afghan army to a strength of 134,000. There is no way that the Afghan economy can support an army of that size and the Americans would have to continue to finance and maintain that army.

More importantly, there are reports that more than 70 percent of the officer corps is drawn from the Tajiks and that recruitment in the Pashtun areas, possibly because of Taliban intimidation, remains very low. If a Tajik-dominated army comes into being, it will provide fuel for a further ethnic conflict and make even token stability more difficult to achieve.

On a positive note, discerning Taliban may well recognise that they cannot win; the Americans are determined to stay until some measure of peace and stability is achieved; Pakistanis, worried about themselves, are going to do whatever is needed to rid themselves of the Taliban; and much criminal activity is now being disguised as Taliban-directed efforts to rid the country of foreigners. They may well want to talk.

But for the moment, peace in Afghanistan remains a distant dream and Pakistan must frame its policies so that it can, to the extent possible, insulate itself from an unstable Afghanistan’s pernicious influence.

The writer is a former foreign secretary

 

[Spring Onion]

Will the Afghan Taleban join peace talks?

By Martin Patience
BBC News, Kabul



The Taleban's insurgency is spreading and many say there is no military solution to the Afghan conflict

Newspapers are writing about it and Afghan officials and foreign diplomats are discussing it - talks with the Taleban.

Now President Hamid Karzai's own brother has confirmed a BBC report that he met former members of the Taleban in Saudi Arabia last month as part of a first step towards peace talks.

The conflict in Afghanistan has been running now for seven years and by almost every indicator, the security situation is getting worse.

There has been an unmistakable mood shift in the Afghan capital Kabul and the notion of reconciliation with the fundamentalist Islamic movement appears to be gathering momentum as a way of reining in the violence.

But if there were to be direct talks with the senior leaders of the Taleban, what would this actually mean in practice?

Well, first of all, the term Taleban is often used as a catch-all-phrase for the insurgents - it's far more complex than that.

Military veteran

The anti-government forces are far from being a monolithic bloc - there are competing egos, strategies and aims at work.

The only point that all the groups categorically agree upon is that they oppose the Afghan government.


There are a number of players who make up the insurgency

Yes, the Taleban is a significant part of the insurgency, but there are a number of other significant players. Best known, of course, is al-Qaeda.

There's also the Hezb Islami network run by the former mujahideen leader Gulbuddin Hekmatyar as well as a grouping led by another Afghan military veteran, Jalaluddin Haqqani, whose men were linked to a deadly attack on the Indian embassy in Kabul this July.

In order to end the conflict completely you would probably need to try to reach an agreement with all the groups - not just the Taleban. That is an impossible order, particularly as almost everyone agrees that you cannot negotiate with al-Qaeda.

But let's stick with the Taleban - if you can cut a deal with the movement then you would stand a good chance of substantially reducing the conflict.

As with insurgencies in the past, there's a growing recognition that you need to deal with your enemy - in this case - the Taleban.

Political suicide

The movement commands a lot of support in the south of the country where Pashtun nationalism - which often feeds into the Taleban - is strong.


But any potential talks with the Taleban are not going to be easy.

The spiritual leader, Mullah Omar, has repeatedly demanded that all 70,000 or so foreign troops leave the country.

The Afghan President Hamid Karzai cannot agree to this as it would be an act of political suicide - his government would collapse and it's possible that the Taleban would then overrun large parts of the country.

And there's the question of who you speak to within the movement. Is it possible to speak to the senior leaders? In order to get an agreement that would stick, you would need to have these men on board.

And do the Taleban even want to hold peace talks?

From their point of view, it could be argued that things are going quite well.

The insurgency is spreading and the government is regarded as weak, corrupt and ineffective by many Afghans. Some of these people would prefer a Taleban alternative.

Influential

Some analysts believe, however, that there are a number of senior Taleban leaders who could be won over, having spent the last seven years living in harsh and dangerous conditions.

But there are also Afghans who are suspicious of President Karzai's recent overtures to the movement. They suspect it has more to do with trying to shore up his Pashtun support ahead of the planned presidential elections next year.

Another problem is that by trying to reconcile with the Taleban you could end up alienating other groups in Afghanistan.


Some are suspicious of the president's overtures

There have often been deadly rivalries between Afghanistan's various ethnic groups.

In the north of the country, for example, there are many Tajiks and Uzbeks, who fought against the Taleban during the 1990s and who were backed by Western governments to overthrow the Taleban government in 2001.
The Northern Alliance - as it was then called - is influential in the Afghan government, and it would be doubtful if it would stomach a Taleban return to the fold. In a worse-case scenario, it could end up fighting against any government that included Taleban members.

The issue of negotiations may be on the table, but, for now, there have been no significant developments. It's not even clear whether the Afghan government has a coherent strategy on the issue.

Most Afghans believe that the insurgency will run for a long time yet - and that any possible deal will not come any time soon.


BBC NEWS | South Asia | Will the Afghan Taleban join peace talks?

 

[muse]

talib have a precondition - NATO/ISAF out - do haqqani and Hikmatyar have the same preconditon? It a dent can be made in this seeming trifold wall, it would be a tremendous victory - But what is it that the US is willing to compromise on?? Karzai? Northern Alliance?.

there is also the option of a "neutral Afghanistan" gauranteed y it's neighbors, as outlined by Karl Inderfurth.

We have seen reports focusing on on what the talib want, but of course it's what the US wants that is of primary importance. The US ship is listing on one side but it has reserve of fire power and will and these ensure her dominance on the negotiating table.

 

[Spring Onion]

Muse

Sir at the moment all are fighting against US/NATO with the same goal but on different level and location separatly.

Its like the 80s when all were Mujahideen, the Ahmad Shah Masood, Hikmatyar, Rabbani, Siyaf, father of Haqqani you name and all were there fighting against one enemy with same goal and objectives but on different fronts at indiviualy but all of them were true Mujahids.

Similar is the case its only that they can not find any broker who can unite them at one platform.
I wish if we were not confronted with CIA funded trouble makers.

 

[muse]

Jana


If only it was just CIA funded trouble makers, but I think there are a lot different funded trouble makers, our Saudi, Indian, Iranian and Russian friends have their own trouble makers.

Jana, review the editorial below, it is from today's DailyTimes, see if you do not see in it what we have been discussing - we discussed a trifold wall, note the editorial discussion

After 7 years it's more like it was 16 years ago.

Editorial: Talking to the Taliban

The talk in Afghanistan of sitting down with the Afghan Taliban and thrashing out a solution to the conflict is now overt. To nudge the initiative forward, the Governor of NWFP, Mr Owais Ghani, has reiterated his earlier stance that the NATO-ISAF forces should consider talking to Mullah Umar. From Kabul, the signals too are meant for Mullah Umar and not for Al Qaeda or its other followers.

Does this show weakness? The British in Helmand are clear that war will not work. They are right because despite their acknowledged efforts half the province is still controlled by the Taliban. The NATO partners of the United States are generally averse to prolonging their stay in Afghanistan for domestic political reasons. But what is striking is that the Americans too are now talking about talks. What could be the reason for this on the eve of a political changeover in Washington in favour of someone like Barack Obama who wants to beef up the war in Afghanistan?

Many reasons have been put forward for this change of approach. Before examining them, let us say that two opposite trends are visible from these statements: first, there is the moral and political weakness of the Karzai administration; second, there is the three- or four-way split in the terrorist movement presided over by Al Qaeda, and efforts by Mullah Umar to chart a different course for the Afghan Taliban.

Mr Karzai is not heading a clean government and his own family is being accused of links with the drug smugglers who provide around $80 million to Al Qaeda annually to run its war. His control over the country remains tenuous and he has failed to get the Pashtuns of Afghanistan to back him, as is apparent from the fact that most of the new local army raised by NATO is composed of non-Pashtuns. Because Mr Karzai is seen as compounding the weakness of the NATO mission, the idea of talks with Mullah Umar is thought to possibly re-engage the Pashtuns and isolate Al Qaeda.

The second scenario is the one supported by the NWFP governor and some strategists in the West who believe that the Taliban elements are not united as one organisation but divided into factions that operate under different uncoordinated leaders. As opposed to the statement made some time ago by Interior Adviser Mr Rehman Malik that the Taliban and Al Qaeda are one and the same — which they are as far as Pakistan is concerned under their attacks — the new reading is that organisationally they are divided and can be talked to separately.

Mullah Umar has sent out signals too. He has asked the Taliban not to target schools, stay away from places where women and children can be killed as collateral damage, and not destroy CD shops. Needless to say, the Pakistani Taliban have not listened to him. This takes us back to the jihad against the Soviets when the Mujahideen commanders did not obey orders from their political leaders in Peshawar. The quality of Pashtun leadership is that it has to adjust to actions taken by the smaller commanders on the frontline in violation of their orders.

Mullah Umar of course says he will not talk unless the foreign troops leave Afghanistan. That takes us back to the dilemma of whether to start talking from a position of disadvantage. But let us assume for a moment that Mullah Umar negotiates a return of his government in Kabul in full or in coalition, then what will happen to the Taliban left behind in Pakistan? There is the phenomenon of the “emirate” in South Waziristan pretending to control all the Taliban within the Tehreek-e Taliban Pakistan (TTP). Then there are others to be taken account of. There are the Taliban in Swat under Maulana Fazlullah who can call upon “foreign fighters” controlled by Al Qaeda. Another significant element in the Pakistani Taliban is the large number of Afghan refugees who have refused to return to their country simply because they have never seen it and are active as terrorists on the Kohat-Hangu-Thall territory going towards the Kurram Agency. Joining them at Darra Adam Khel are all the jihadis predominantly drawn from Punjab, to say nothing of the local Pashtun criminal elements masquerading as Taliban.

But if the talks proceed on the lines indicated by the first step in this direction taken in Makka, on the basis of a broader regional view of the crisis, then something can be achieved. Therefore Pakistan is taking the right steps, normalising in the east with India and supporting a role for Iran in the west. If a solution is sought in this framework, then a new configuration of power can develop in Afghanistan, leaving Pakistan to deal with Al Qaeda and its “foreigners” as best it can

 

[asaad-ul-islam]

7 years and only now they start to differentiate between the two groups in afghanistan... so much blood has been shed on their account.

 

[muse]

Assad


If you review you will find that we sadi that the idea of talks between Taliban and NATO/ISAF is being facilitated by MI6.

What does this mean?

That UK government have come to conclusions that differ from those of the US.

French, Canadian etc; have zero input, this venture like Iraq is a Anglo-American venture.

It was not a accident that the secret dipolomatic cables of the UK ambassador in Afghanistan were leaked to the press, nor is it an accident that this was followed statements of the UK commander in Afghanistan that there is no military solution in Afghanistan.

What does this mean??

That the US is in deep do-doo - The Englishers want out.

Implications?

We also have said that escalation is answer when successes is hard to identify -- you will note the WAR IN PAKISTAN.

Either way, it had to come to this, now it's lose Afghanistan and lose Pakistan.

For Pakistan this is a reconning long in the making, and now is as good as any time. Either a Islamist terror free Pakistan or no Pakistan at all.

 

[AgNoStiC MuSliM]

Also remember that dialog and reconciliation with the Taliban does not mean the war in Pakistan is over.

The challenge in Pakistan, despite the MMA and PML-N's declarations of "fighting someone else's war", remains a uniquely Pakistani problem.

Yes reconciliation with the Taliban might take pressure of Pakistan in terms of the US demanding it act against groups like those of Haqqani, Nazir, Bahadur etc. - but those groups are not responsible for the mayhem in Pakistan.

The TTP, AQ etc. will continue to spread terror in Pakistan, and the reconciliation in Afghanistan (depending upon what terms are agreed upon) may in fact lead to an increase in intensity in the insurgency in Pakistan - in that the TTP and AQ will believe that if they fight and destabilize Pakistan long enough, the government will accede to their demands, as in Afghanistan (potentially).

 

[muse]

Lets let The MI6 handle the American - our task is not just elimination of the islamist terrorist but the whole framework of enablers - these mullah, maulvi, mufti and the like.

Dismantling this enabling framework is, at least to my thinking, the real challenge - the terrorist you just eliminate, but with this network of schools, networks of media production and outlet, this vast propaganda machine - to turn society as a whole away from extremist ideas, this is long term as well.

As long as Pakistan continues to be a economic basket case, parents will see a benefit to parceling children off to madaress where the children are fed and clothed (if chained and flogged, for their own good, of course) and brain washed.

 

[muse]

America's exit strategy in Afghanistan



Tuesday, October 14, 2008
Khalid Aziz

The US has publically endorsed the Saudi-British initiative for holding peace talks with the Afghan Taliban. The US has also for the first time officially declared that the Afghan problem needs to be resolved politically, through reconciliation. On Oct 9 US defence secretary Robert Gates said the US will be prepared for pursuing reconciliation with the Taliban, if the Afghan government chose to support them. These secret talks were held from Sept 24 to 27 in Makkah. This is the first official US declaration in which the Americans have spoken openly of not being averse to talks with the Taliban. Secondly, it has been learnt that Pakistan's assistance has been sought in reaching a settlement. In return, Pakistan is likely to receive financial assistance from the Saudis. However, such help will be tied to implementation of security-related conditions which assist in the positive outcome of the peace talks. Iranian and Indian help has also been sought for reaching a favourable outcome. Admiral Mullen's recent statement that India should have a role in the future security of Afghanistan should be viewed in this context. Thus, it can now be said that the outline of a US exit strategy is beginning to take shape.

There are three geostrategic events that have forced a change in the US perception regarding its policy in Afghanistan. First and most foremost is the Russian resurgence as a regional power; second is the continuously worsening situation within Afghanistan. According to the Russian ambassador to Kabul, "The Taliban influence more than 50 percent of Afghanistan's territory and control up to 20 percent of it." Tied to it is the worsening security situation in Pakistan; if Pakistan loses control over its territory it will severely affect the logistical system needed to support foreign troops in Afghanistan. Thirdly, the US and the Western economies are facing a financial meltdown which will reduce their defence capability to fight in Afghanistan; out of these the US has been seriously rattled by the Russian threat which has made it to encourage peace parleys with the Taliban.

On the geostrategic front the globalisation and penetration by Western capital of resource-rich Muslim countries like Saudi Arabia has caused a growing resentment amongst their ultra-conservative and xenophobic populations. US behaviour has been made to appear as targeting Muslims. In Pakistan this perception was translated into support for policies that are Muslim-centric and which began with Pakistan's shift to the "right" during the Mujahedeen war in Afghanistan. The first Iraq War convinced many Muslims into seeking solutions based on an Islamist worldview. This led to the rise of movements like Al Qaeda and a host of mirror organizations in the Muslim world.

The Taliban were a product of this larger movement in Afghanistan. Afghanistan descended into chaos after the ouster in 1992 of Dr Najibullah, who had been the last USSR-supported Afghan president. The Taliban, who are a peculiar afghan conservative Muslim, tribal movement, had coalesced partially into Al Qaeda, which is an Islamic transnational ideology which was provided safe haven in Afghanistan by the Taliban. Bin Laden's attack on the US on 9/11 was part of a well-thought-out strategy which had three main objectives. First, to force US troops to leave Saudi Arabia as well as other Muslim countries. Secondly, to cripple the US financially so that it's military and financial leadership could be eroded. Thirdly, to radicalise Muslim peoples so that an Islamic Caliphate could be established.

Pakistan's role has been extremely important in the birth of the Taliban; it was one of the three countries that had recognised the Taliban government in 1996. Pakistan believed that Afghanistan would be useful in a war with India and should therefore ensure that a pro-Pakistan government ruled Afghanistan. This tragic fixation on Afghanistan and India induced the Pakistani military to gridlock policy into seeking questionable goals. After 9/11, when the US attacked Afghanistan, Pakistan offered itself as an instrument to cripple the Taliban. Pakistan's assistance to the US angered the Taliban and the sympathetic mindset of a substantial number of Pakistanis was radicalised. In FATA and the NWFP a proto-Taliban movement materialised which has challenged the writ of the government.

Pakhtuns constitute about 43 percent of Afghanistan's population and are its largest ethnic group – the Taliban government in Kabul reflected their demographic dominance. The seeds of a US-Pakhtun conflict were sown by the flawed Rumsfeldian battle plan for the occupation of Afghanistan. In many ways it reflected the acme of a neo-liberal and privatissed approach to war. It was a de-institutionalised cheap war based on a CIA plan where less than four hundred US Special Forces supported by the Northern Alliance troops provided by Fahim, Dostum and Khalili pulverised the Taliban and killed hundreds of them though the use of the US air force. When the Taliban were defeated in the north, they wanted to surrender to US forces, or even the ICRC, but this was refused because the US wanted to distance itself from violation of human rights committed during the conflict; the ICRC was also not allowed. Thousands of Pakhtuns were slaughtered in an invasion sanctioned by the UN and fought by the US and NATO forces. Many Pakhtuns from FATA and the NWFP fought alongside the Taliban and died under these terrible conditions after they had surrendered.

The difficulty of reaching a settlement with the Taliban in Afghanistan or within Pakistan is contained within this dynamic of spilling of Pakhtun blood during the October 2001 invasion. The perception that the Western forces wanted to eliminate the Pakhtun has become further entrenched with increasing collateral deaths caused subsequently. There have been so many innocent people killed in this war that one shudders to think how this matter can be resolved within the conceptual framework of "badal," or revenge in Pakhtun society? The spate of suicide attacks in Pakistan is largely the consequence of collateral deaths which are being incessantly caused by military operations. Frankly, this is a dilemma to which there is no easy solution. If the military in Afghanistan or Pakistan does not challenge the feeling of ascendency in the minds of the militants there is a minimum chance of negotiating peace. However, the Catch-22 here is that the drive for ascendency or the Petraeus synonym for its "surge," which may have worked in Iraq, will cause an increase in sympathy for the Taliban. The US must reconsider such an approach in Afghanistan, FATA and NWFP. It must use political and diplomatic interventions.

Furthermore, the conflict needs to be concluded through a regional approach. The days of US unilateralism are limited because the emergence of powerful regional hegemons like China, Russia and India cannot be ignored. There is a need for the US to begin charting these issues in a collaborative manner with them while also including Saudi Arabia and Iran. However, the role of India in Afghanistan needs to be cleared with Pakistan, or there will be problems.

The US support for the Saudi-British initiative of peace with the Taliban should be welcomed. However, implementing an Afghan peace plan by placing Pakistan in a strategic vice by expanding an enlarged role for India in Afghanistan will cause distortions unless resolved earlier. Prudence demands that a "surge" should be postponed in Afghanistan if peace is to be won. An even better solution would be to discuss the issue of an increase in the number of US troops in Afghanistan in the next session of the peace talks. Secondly, the Pakistani-Afghan peace jirga may be summoned to help the peace initiative. These measures could lead to an early peace in Pakistan too.



The writer is a former chief secretary of NWFP and heads the Regional Institute of Policy Research. Email: azizkhalid@gmail.com