Rumors had it that the PLA generals and admirals swiftly withdrew their opinions about Desert Storm to the Politburo
before the Iraqi Army was completely ejected from Kuwait. The Soviets were not so quick...
Foreign Military Studies Office Publications - DESERT STORM: The Soviet View
The PLA was also keenly interested since just about everything about the PLA came from the Soviets, from equipment to organization to doctrines. Probably the only difference was that the PLA was still focused on the concept of "The People's War", which is essentially guerrilla warfare when an enemy was already in-country. The PLA had to know that if the time has come -- at that time -- for China had to abandon that concept.
Even though Iraq would lose, if the Iraqis managed to inflict serious casualties to the Allies, Soviet weaponry and doctrines would be vindicated from Western technical analyses and criticism and therefore what China learned and bought from the Soviets would be compelling enough for China to abandon the essentially defeatist concept of "The People's War".
What Zhivits did not say was that the pre-war 'special exercises' were not true exercises in the sense of maintaining readiness and inspection of units to ensure standards are met. But that those 'special exercises' were about technical verification of modifications to meet unexpected and unplanned combat opponents and conditions. The ability of the Americans and allies to do this practically blew the Soviet generals' minds. Despite the fact that the Soviet military leadership knew the Americans' penchant to make everything as multi-tasking capable and as flexible to changes as possible, it was the extent of the equipment's ability to do this made them realize that they continued to underestimate the Americans all the way up to when the first missile fired in the war.
This came from purely his own faith in Soviet equipment and doctrines as imparted to the Iraqis and had nothing relating to the technical aspects on how to detect the F-117, let alone shooting it down. Prior to Desert Storm, the F-117 did not have a positive image, at home and abroad, regarding its largely media fueled claimed ability to be 'invisible' to radar, never mind that the US military, from the start of the 'stealth' program, discouraged the use of the word 'invisible' since it was technically incorrect.
Note to F-35 skeptics: The F-35's public image today is exactly as the F-117's yesterday. Guess we will just have to splash a few J-20s to make the critics STFU.
The 90 minutes came from the inherent weakness of a centralized top-down command and control structure advocated by the Soviets and adopted by just about every Soviet trained and equipped military in the world, including the PLA. The 'shock and awe', and resultant paralysis for 90 minutes, occurred at all levels throughout this structure because each level demanded information from the lower levels before it could issue orders and/or execute its own mission and to provide intelligence to higher headquarters, who then would issue response instructions in a trickle down manner.
This 'high degree of professionalism' opinion did not sit well with both the Soviet and PLA genital...I mean...general staffs.
It is well known throughout the world that the US military non-commissioned officers (NCO) corps is the best educated, trained, and autonomous in the execution of their daily duties. From the infantry platoon sergeant to the aircraft crewchief to the sub chief-of-the-boat (COB), they are the best in the world. Without this backbone of any army in any era in history, the swift defeat of the Iraqi Army would not be possible. They put the NCO corps of the Soviets and the PLA to professional and technical shame.
The officers that lead these NCOs are devoid of political indoctrination common in both Soviet and Chinese militaries, leaving them with responsibilities are broader in scope and professional knowledge, especially technical ones, are deeper in details. This has been confirmed over and over by Soviet defectors, among the more famous are Viktor Belenko who flew the MIG-25 to Japan, and Vladimir Bogdanovich Rezun, aka Viktor Suvurov, of the GRU, the Soviet military intelligence unit.
Regarding this discussion, the PLA can at best come half way close under the current reform driven by the shame from Desert Storm.
The Soviet version of Baghdad Bob. And sounds a lot like the Chinese members here.
You read the highlighted correctly, folks.
According to the Soviets, which we could safely impute to be with the Chinese as well, an average MIG-29 pilot would probably best any F-15 adversary, and other fighters as well. Kinda like how the Chinese members here, of which not one ever served in uniform except that of a fast food joint, talks about the PLA.
The US SIGINT and EW capabilities have not rested since then. If anything, we made even greater progress. We created 'stealth', fielded it, and know how to defeat it. All the while the rest of the world, including Russia and China, are still struggling with it.
Like it or not, the J-20 and the PAK-FA are dead before they are even fielded.
We can also safely assume this to be representative of Chinese view as well for the PLA: 不足道的 (pathetic).
Now queue the Korean War...
That 'defeated U.S. pilot' does not give a sh1t about what other thinks of his Air Force and its aircrafts. To secure oil, we lowered our standards for the spoiled brat princes of Saudi Arabia and let them 'win' mock air combats, then praised their 'airmanship' effusively for the media to eat it all up. The MIG-29 pilots thinks they have the better fighter? Let them talk smack. We have the actual combat records on our side.
Despite the high overdrive the Soviets did for PR face saving, the rest of the world did came to look at Soviet military hardware and doctrines with as high a skepticism as the PR effort. The PLA wisely remained silent on the sidelines and let the Soviets played ball, fumbling all the way.
There goes those huge quantities of DF-21Ds for those fantasy saturation attacks against an American aircraft carrier.
And here is the sad reality for the Chinese members here.
Put aside hardware for now. Soviet doctrines that the PLA adopted and practiced by the Iraqis proved to be an utter failure in a real war, like communism so proven in the real world with competing ideologies practiced by other countries. The PLA generals and admirals swiftly withdrew their reports/opinions about Desert Storm and they did so with a lot of egg foo yung on their faces in front of the Politburo. Fortunately, we have the Soviet view to guide us on how the Chinese must have felt during that war.
If, as Marshal Kulikov stated that success in instructions and training are not guaranteed, what are we to make of the PLA regarding its ability to perform in a real war when it had to discard most of what it learned from the Soviets? Bring back the Korean War vets like how often the Chinese conscript rejects here have done? Militarily speaking, the PLA is as adrift as a sailboat with its sail in tatters from a storm -- a Desert Storm. All the hardware, no matter how new and boasted about by nationalistic citizens, will be as worthless as the Iraqi arms were in the face of battle tested and grimy American equipment.
The PLA is not a professional military and at best half way close to the US military. It has no recent combat records to support any doctrine it may develop or adopted. Its generals and admirals are heavily politicized and morally corrupt due to their extra-military interests in the civilian corporate sectors. If a fish rots from the head down, then the rot from the PLA's own non-professional leadership will doom the PLA in any shooting war against US.
The PLA will experience the 'shock and awe' as the Iraqis did. From the lowest private to the highest medal-ed general/admiral.
Yeah...That is what 'they' said about US back then as well. So talk away...
Not at all. You can sell the J-20 to jungle tribesmen for all we care.