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Submarine Proliferation and International Security

HRK

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A detail Article written by Jan Joel Andersson published in US Naval War College Issue of Winter-2015, provide a brief understanding of issues related to Training, Deployment, Maintenance & Logistics of Submarine force
Link: https://www.usnwc.edu/getattachment/9c43a160-2281-4bd9-9ad4-787f4c24fedf/The-Race-to-the-Bottom.aspx

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A noob question

Why have the americans and British exited the international submarine market. Why don't they make diesel subs anymore?
 
A noob question

Why have the americans and British exited the international submarine market. Why don't they make diesel subs anymore?

It's not a noob question. Actually quite pertinent!!

The diesel sub market isn't very big. Plus you have the political angle to think about (who will you be selling to and why). Secondly to maintain the industrial base, you require a certain element of domestic buying. With that missing from the equation, it becomes unfeasible to maintain an industrial base, exclusively for exports.
 
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A noob question

Why have the americans and British exited the international submarine market. Why don't they make diesel subs anymore?

As per 2013 figures global submarine market was only $13 billion which is expected to grow $ 21-22 billion ... so not such lucrative market I guess for USA & UK ....
 
Why have the americans and British exited the international submarine market. Why don't they make diesel subs anymore?

The USN hasn't bought a diesel submarine since the70s. And the last conventional sub was decommissioned in the early 90s.

Diesel worked for the Pentagon's War Plans to deter the Soviets, they'll be launched from forward bases in the Pacific, England, Cuba, Australia, combined with the Allied subs, would take out Communist Naval forces securing and keeping open Naval routes. Back then you needed not only proximity to well traveled routes but the quantity to slug it out against the enemy, now a Destroyer captain can launch Harpoons to take out a sub tens of miles away.

Diesel Subs are meant to sneak into the Enemy's coastal waters loiter there for a few weeks, Nuclear Subs with the advancement of ICBMs can wretch havoc on Beijing from the waters of Chile.

The Soviets fell, the Pentagon couldnt find a bogeyman to maintain it's "500 ship Navy". Diesel works well in wolfpacks. The USN is dispersed through out the world. Odds are that if a war does break out with say N. Korea the USN isn't going to have enough ships to confront the initial wave Kim Jung will throw, but the technical gap itself will preserve the force.

The US is the world's undisputed policeman. There only needs to be enough deterrent to deter aggression than the quantity of ships that can be thrown.

At the end of the day it's dollars and cents. Sure the Soviets bankrupted themselves trying to match President Ronald Reagan's military expansion, but the US itself was on the fence. While the USN is planning on decreasing it's Submarine Force, Japan is expanding there's so is Australia, Germany, and perhaps Britain?

Sure the Swedish Gotland caused a panic to the US Naval Admirals, but when the US decide to rent the sub to formulate, test, and train it's crews to counter the most advanced diesel sub to date, it had to be shipped to the Pacific on a barge!!!

SSKs are impractical for the USN. You'll need forward bases, security for those bases in the form of a marine force, an airbase, security for that airbase, jets for that airbase, etc etc etc.

Like earlier it comes to money. Why not let the US focus on the big guns, ie Nuclear Subs, and let Japan/ Australia/ UK/ France focus on the SSKs. Because in the end, those will be the forwards bases and in close proximity to any conflict that will rise.

This is all written without analysis of the US Military Industrial Complex. There's allot more money to be made with a few Nuclear Subs than ~7 Diesel ones.
 
@HRK No mention of Pakistani Subs, or Navy?

its good that Mr. Andersson has not mention anything about PN subs other then their numbers ....

Author in a way has grilled all the countries submarine forces he has mentioned in the article from south Africa, Australia, Malaysia to Canada .... :lol:

But one or two things which I learned from this article in perspective of PN acquisition of Chinese subs are ....

- by acquiring 8 subs we will only be able to deploy 2 or max 3 subs continuously
- if the technology of these Chinese sub are based on Russian subs (which seems it is) then their service life will be shorter
- Therefore these subs might required more maintenance with the passage of time then their counterparts such as French Scorpène sub in Indian Navy
- Which again raise the question about the PN Financial position in future
- We will be required to maintain a major maintenance facility for these subs, arrangements like Agosta 90-B submarine will not be helpful; therefore this deal should bring a respectable percentage of TOT (something similar to JF-17 deal) arrangements
- To attain mastery over these subs at least 8-10 years will be required
 
its good that Mr. Andersson has not mention anything about PN subs other then their numbers ....

Author in a way has grilled all the countries submarine forces he has mentioned in the article from south Africa, Australia, Malaysia to Canada .... :lol:

But one or two things which I learned from this article in perspective of PN acquisition of Chinese subs are ....

- by acquiring 8 subs we will only be able to deploy 2 or max 3 subs continuously
- if the technology of these Chinese sub are based on Russian subs (which seems it is) then their service life will be shorter
- Therefore these subs might required more maintenance with the passage of time then their counterparts such as French Scorpène sub in Indian Navy
- Which again raise the question about the PN Financial position in future
- We will be required to maintain a major maintenance facility for these subs, arrangements like Agosta 90-B submarine will not be helpful; therefore this deal should bring a respectable percentage of TOT (something similar to JF-17 deal) arrangements
- To attain mastery over these subs at least 8-10 years will be required
1. Well, in 1965 we had only one sub and was active during conflict so I do not necessarily agree that hardly 40% of fleet will be active at any one point of time.

2. His assertion (short life of Russian subs) is based on cold-war era Russian subs and it was not because of technological inferiority but Russian doctrine. This doctrine was not restricted to subs only and same could be said for their Air force. At the peak of the cold war, some 400+ Russian subs were patrolling world's waters*.

3. Compared to long-range oceangoing subs, Pakistani subs will mostly remain close to their bases and require less maintenance hence war time availability will be higher.

4. Chinese subs may be based on Russian technology but this not necessarily suggestive of their short life.

5. Malaysia is a poor example who is new to the game. Pakistan navy is operating subs for 52 years and has facilities, technical knowhow, and 52 years experience of maintaining subs and keeping them seaworthy.

6. South Africa, like Pakistan Navy is maintaining subs from late 60s but we must not forget that following 1994 regime change, their forces are experiencing a continues decline in quality and professionalism and it is not only their navy, their air force is also suffering greatly.

* more details:

From 1945 through 1991, the Soviet Union produced 727 submarines—492 with diesel-electric or closed-cycle propulsion and 235 with nuclear propulsion. This compares with the U.S. total of 212 submarines—43 with diesel propulsion (22 from World War II programs) and 169 nuclear submarines (including the diminutive NR-1). Not included are Soviet midget submarines or the single U.S. midget, the X-1 (SSX-1).

The building rates averaged almost 16 submarines per year for the Soviets compared with 4.6 for the United States, demonstrating the difference in naval warfare emphasis between the two countries. Not included are submarines built in both countries for foreign navies—about 50 by Soviet shipyards and 4 (for Peru) by the U.S. Electric Boat yard.
 
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its good that Mr. Andersson has not mention anything about PN subs other then their numbers ....

Author in a way has grilled all the countries submarine forces he has mentioned in the article from south Africa, Australia, Malaysia to Canada .... :lol:

But one or two things which I learned from this article in perspective of PN acquisition of Chinese subs are ....

- by acquiring 8 subs we will only be able to deploy 2 or max 3 subs continuously
- if the technology of these Chinese sub are based on Russian subs (which seems it is) then their service life will be shorter
- Therefore these subs might required more maintenance with the passage of time then their counterparts such as French Scorpène sub in Indian Navy
- Which again raise the question about the PN Financial position in future
- We will be required to maintain a major maintenance facility for these subs, arrangements like Agosta 90-B submarine will not be helpful; therefore this deal should bring a respectable percentage of TOT (something similar to JF-17 deal) arrangements
- To attain mastery over these subs at least 8-10 years will be required

I feel Mr.Anderson hasn't grilled the countries you have quoted, but stated the obvious. Submarine warfare is one of the most challenging fields out there, and these countries seem to be having serious issues for quite some time now.

1) The current deployment rate of PN is much better than what Mr.Anderson has mentioned. The Chinese subs, used to be based on Russian designs, but that is not the case anymore. They are much better designed and built now. Most importantly it has to meet PN's specifications.

2) The latest Chinese subs are now built along the western concept of modules, making both production quality and maintenance better. This also makes refits easier. So them requiring more maintenance then their western counterparts, might not actually be true.

3) Finance for these subs is no longer an issue.

4) This time around PN should be getting better ToT then the JF-17 ;) Obviously some serious MRO / production facilities will have to be built, in order to accommodate these new subs.

5) PN officers have quite a good understanding of Chinese Subs, systems and doctrine, and have had, for quite some time. They won't take that long to master.

As much as I would like to reveal more info, this is a public forum and I have to follow some protocols. Hope you gentlemen will understand my limitations.

Best Regards
 
- by acquiring 8 subs we will only be able to deploy 2 or max 3 subs continuously
- if the technology of these Chinese sub are based on Russian subs (which seems it is) then their service life will be shorter
- Therefore these subs might required more maintenance with the passage of time then their counterparts such as French Scorpène sub in Indian Navy

I be crazy to say I know a lot about China's submarine program, as anyone other than the people in the know, knows. However, there are a lot you can infer, from information available and Chinese patterns else where.

Where I want to compare is High speed rails and Jet engines, seemingly unrelated, they represent a pattern and a strategy that we employee.

With Jet engines, we want to match Western standards in both life and efficiency. We haven't managed that, and thus fighters have been stuck in factory waiting for engines, and the entire airforce has been effectively on hold. the fact we still have J-7s means that in the beginning and even now we want to maintain a certain number of fighters, and we haven't been able to produce these new ones.

This means unless it has met certain standards it won't be made available.

Then we look at the HSR, Japan came up with it first and had a stellar record, but being a much bigger country, one year of HSR service has more or less equals to a decade of service in Japan in terms of distance covered and add to the fact there are far more difficult terrain in play. It proves the quality that we can bring and what would happen if we can bring that quality. Also what quantity means to a project and can prove for a project.

What this has to do with subs is first, the quantity of subs we have means it's operational capability has reached an acceptable range, and it's quality has also been proven, by the fact we have far more of these than anyone else in service. Being in a hostile environment against the best anti sub forces in the world bar none, means we know exactly what these subs need to be since they are always "under fire."

So, what you assumed, may or may not be true, but it seems unlikely at this point.
 

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