Strike on Iran Nuclear Assets

[zavis2003]

An example for israel

The Osirak Strike
The Israeli raid on the Osirak reactor was a high-risk gamble born out of desperation. The government of Prime Minister Menachem Begin was divided on the wisdom of the raid in discussions that began almost immediately after Begin’s election in 1977. The Iraqi program had been underway for several years at that point, but had made only moderate progress. New intelligence available in May 1977 indicated that the nuclear complex at al-Tuwaitha was growing rapidly and that the reactor facility might soon be ready. The debate was intense enough and the risk high enough that Begin stated he would not act without the support of the full cabinet. Several in the cabinet, including the Deputy Prime Minister and the head of the Mossad intelligence service were strongly opposed. Others, including most notably the Agricultural Minister Ariel Sharon, were in favor.9
Begin decided to wait as long as possible before acting. In the meantime, the Mossad would take steps to buy additional time. These steps included allegedly sabotaging the reactor cores for Osirak before the French could deliver them, as well as assassinating Iraqi nuclear officials. At the same time, the IAF began contingency planning for a strike on Osirak.
The plan to buy time worked to some degree, but could not stop the Iraqi nuclear program. In October 1980, the Mossad reported to Begin that the Osirak reactor would be fueled and operational by June 1981. Begin called another cabinet meeting, where the intense debate about both the possibility and utility of attacking Osirak was renewed. Agriculture Minister Sharon again weighed in on the side of attacking. When some argued that the attack would alienate both the United States and Europe, Sharon allegedly quipped “If I have a choice of being popular and dead or unpopular and alive, I choose being alive and unpopular.”10 Prime Minister Begin ultimately agreed and the rest of the cabinet fell in behind him. Osirak would be struck before it became operational.11
A sixteen-plane strike package launched from Etzion airbase in the Sinai. The flight profile was low altitude, across the Gulf of Aqaba, southern Jordan and then across northern Saudi Arabia. Two F-15s remained circling over Saudi Arabia as a communications link back to Israel.
The remaining six F-15s and the F-16s continued on to al-Tuwaitha, the site of the Osirak reactor. The F-16s carried two Mk 84 2,000 lb bombs with delayed fuses. These bombs were “dumb,” meaning that they had no guidance other than that provided by the aircraft dropping them. The F-16 did have onboard targeting systems that would make the dumb bombs fairly accurate, but it would require the plane to get close to the target.
The strike package arrived near Osirak undetected and at low altitude. The F-16s formed up on predetermined points to begin their bombing runs, while the F-15s set up barrier combat air patrols to intercept Iraqi fighters. At four miles from the target, the F-16s climbed to five thousand feet in order to dive at Osirak and release their bombs. Despite some navigation problems and Iraq air defenses, at least eight of the sixteen bombs released struck the containment dome of the reactor.

The strike package then turned and climbed to high altitude, returning much the way it had come. All sixteen of the planes successfully returned to Israel after recrossing Jordan. The results of the raid were spectacular. The reactor was totally destroyed, leaving much of the surrounding area undamaged. President Ronald Reagan, upon being shown satellite imagery of Osirak after the strike, is alleged to have called it “a terrific piece of bombing.

link http://web.mit.edu/ssp/Publications/working_papers/wp_06-1.pdf

 

[zavis2003]

Assuming that a military strike is issued, Israel cannot hope to destroy Iran’s entire nuclear infrastructure: facilities are distributed across the country and there are too many sites to plan to attack them all. To have a reasonable chance of success, both in the mission and in the ultimate goal of rendering Iran’s nuclear program impotent, the target set must be narrowed to concentrate on the critical nodes in Iran’s nuclear infrastructure. Most experts agree that the most difficult part of nuclear weapons development is obtaining the nuclear material itself; thus, if the means of fissile material production can be destroyed, the setback for Iran will be maximized. Iran’s nuclear complex has three critical nodes: Esfahan, with its conversion facility, the Natanz enrichment facility, and the heavy water plant and future plutonium production reactors at Arak.
In the past, concern over Iran’s nuclear weapons program centered on Tehran’s agreement with Russia to build a light water civilian reactor complex at Bushehr26. For the purposes of this paper, however, the Bushehr reactor is not considered a crucial element to a successful Iranian nuclear weapon and will not be included in the target set. Bushehr, as discussed below, is simply not essential to an Iranian nuclear weapons program.
Three reasons for concern about the Bushehr reactor are typically given. First, the United States has expressed concern that the availability of nuclear technology from Russia could enable the Iranians to strengthen their nuclear weapons program by concealing delivery of controlled equipment under the cover of legitimate civilian purposes. Second, concerns have been voiced that the knowledge and expertise of Russian nuclear engineers will be shared with the Iranians. Finally, the issue of spent fuel and the Iranian ability to separate plutonium from the spent fuel raises a third set of concerns.
The concerns voiced by many over the Bushehr reactor are easily refuted. First, the transfer of technology to Bushehr is close to completion, while simultaneously monitored by the IAEA to ensure no illicit transfers of material. Secondly, Russian scientists and engineers who are employed at the Bushehr reactor likely know nothing more about nuclear weapons development than the Iranians – nuclear power engineering is quite different than weapons development – and the Bushehr reactor deals with Russia are heavily scrutinized. Lastly, on February 27, 2005 Iran and Russia signed an agreement in which Russia would provide the nuclear fuel for the Bushehr reactor, however, at the point of discharge the spent fuel would be returned to Russia. This repatriation of spent fuel is simple to follow and confirm (either independently or through the IAEA) and denies Iran the opportunity to harvest plutonium from Bushehr spent fuel.
Additionally, the design of the particular reactor at Bushehr produces extremely undesirable plutonium. If Iran were to use this reactor as a means to produce plutonium as a fuel for nuclear weapons, the reactor would either require refueling far more often (on the order of weeks to a few months, not 18 months as designed), which would undoubtedly be noticed, or would result in a plutonium-based nuclear weapon that would be highly unreliable27. Based on Iran’s willingness to safeguard the Bushehr reactor and
8
agree, however reluctantly, to return the spent fuel to Russia, it is likely that Tehran considers Bushehr to be of limited utility for weapons production.
In addition to Bushehr, the three facilities whose civilian purposes are questioned most often are the Arak heavy water facility (also the site of a planned plutonium production reactor), Iran’s Uranium Conversion Facility (UCF) located at the Esfahan Nuclear Technology Center, and the uranium enrichment facility nearing completion at Natanz. These three sites present a serious dual-use challenge – it is certainly within Iran’s rights to develop a complete fuel cycle; however, these facilities are required for nuclear weapons production and the secrecy which Iran has displayed regarding the construction and ultimate use of these complexes makes their development suspicious.
Iran’s UCF is the starting point for Iran’s uranium enrichment program, providing the means for production of UF6. The loss of a domestic supply of UF6 for enrichment activities as well as the loss of lines for the conversion of UF6 back to uranium metal would have a great effect on Iran’s ability to produce enough enriched uranium for a nuclear weapon in the future. Because the agreement with Russia for fueling the Bushehr reactor requires Russia to provide fuel for the reactor, loss of the UCF would not have an immediate effect on Iran’s ability to supply electric power. Destruction of the UCF would, however, severely limit Iran’s indigenous capabilities in terms of enrichment and fuel fabrication, as the primary means of production of UF6 and UO2 would be destroyed28.
Similarly, the loss of the UCF will slow Iran’s plutonium production reactor operations schedule, as the UCF is the main facility that converts uranium ore to natural uranium fuel. This fuel will be used in the plutonium producing heavy water reactors scheduled to be built at Arak. Even though the PPR at Arak is years away from completion, denying Iran the capability to manufacture fuel for these reactors will decrease the likelihood that Iran is able to construct a plutonium-based nuclear weapon, as it is likely that an agreement with any country for the provision of fuel for Arak would also require Iran to return spent fuel to prevent reprocessing from taking place.
Destruction of the UCF is complicated, however, by the activities that have already taken place. Many tons of uranium exist at the UCF in various chemical forms. Destruction of the facility will certainly result in the release of tons of UF6, UF4, and other fluorine and uranium products into the atmosphere. In addition to the environmental contamination due to the release of uranium, the presence of fluorine in the atmosphere will almost certainly result in significant production of hydrofluoric acid, an intensely corrosive substance that has the potential to cause extensive damage. Complicating the situation is the proximity of the city of Esfahan, a metropolis of close to four and a half million people. Assuming that the Israelis are willing to assume the risks inherent in attacking a chemical facility close to a major city, the destruction of the UCF at the ENTC would interrupt the production of UF6 feed gas for uranium enrichment, as well as the preparation of UO2 fuel for heavy-water reactors.
The Natanz enrichment facility is probably the most troublesome of Iran’s nuclear facilities, as considerable progress has been made without international knowledge. Rumors in the open press have linked the serial proliferator A.Q. Khan with the development of centrifuges for the Natanz site, fueling suspicion that Iran’s true intentions lie in the production of weapons-grade uranium29. The plant is composed of a pilot fuel enrichment plant and a much larger commercial facility. The pilot plant is
9
housed in six buildings above ground, designed to house about 1200 centrifuges. The commercial facility has been built underground, with three huge underground structures intended to hold more than 50,000 centrifuges. The site itself is located approximately 200 miles south of Tehran, about 40 miles from the nearest city.
To ensure that this facility is no longer able to enrich uranium, Israel must be certain that the vast majority of the centrifuges at Natanz are completely destroyed. It would be possible for Iran to enrich uranium using less than 1000 centrifuges (although it would take significantly longer than using 50,000) meaning that over 98% of the centrifuges must be destroyed beyond repair. A window of time thus appears during which a military strike would be most beneficial: after the centrifuges have been installed but before large quantities of UF6 have been introduced to increase the likelihood of the destruction of enrichment capability without running the risk of Iran enriching some quantity of uranium and removing it from the facility.
The final fissile material production facility that could be targeted is the heavy water plant and associated plutonium production reactors under development at Arak. The heavy water plant is an extremely large facility located in central Iran approximately 150 miles southwest of Tehran. The site itself is about 20 miles from the nearest town.
Iran currently has only a small research reactor that uses heavy water as coolant, but the Arak HW facility is believed to be able to produce over 16 tons of heavy water per year – much more than required by this reactor and more than almost all civilian applications. It is possible, though not likely, that Iran has built a larger plutonium production reactor (PPR) that has not been discovered, but Iranian officials have stated their intentions to build heavy-water reactors in the near future which will utilize some of the heavy water produced at Arak. Plans have been discussed with Russian officials to begin building a full-scale, power-producing PPR at Arak beginning in mid-2004 and scheduled for completion in 2008.
Construction of a plutonium production reactor by Iran should be viewed with deep suspicion by the international community: plutonium-producing heavy-water reactors of the kind Iran intends to build are the most dangerous plutonium proliferation risk. Iranian officials have told the IAEA (only after direct questioning) that they also intend to build reprocessing facilities at Arak in order to separate “long-lived isotopes” from spent fuel burned in future PPRs at the site30. It is highly likely that the Arak facility’s ultimate purpose is for the production of weapons-grade plutonium – the same hot cells can be used to recover plutonium from spent fuel, and with all the facilities required on site, the plutonium manufacturing process can be streamlined. Even though construction on the reactor is in only the initial stages, the Arak facility is a serious concern, and eliminating the heavy water plant will significantly slow Iran’s plutonium production process.

Link http://web.mit.edu/ssp/Publications/working_papers/wp_06-1.pdf

 

[zavis2003]

Available Munitions


The IAF has developed substantially better munitions for attacking hardened point targets, such as reactor containment facilities or buried centrifuge plants than it had in 1981. These improvements come in two forms: enhanced accuracy and enhanced penetration. The combination of these characteristics in munitions makes them both easier to deliver and more likely to destroy the target.
The introduction of precision-guided munitions (PGMs) to the IAF in the 1980s and 1990s changed the dynamics of bombing. Accurate delivery no longer required approaching at low altitude and then “popping up” to dive directly at the target as at Osirak. Instead, using both Global Positioning System (GPS) and laser guided bombs (LGBs), Israeli aircraft can approach at low altitude and perform a short climb near the target to “loft” the guided (but unpowered) bomb. They can then quickly dive back down below the radar horizon.31
Alternately, they could deliver munitions from high altitude. This has the disadvantage of exposing the aircraft to enemy radar and surface to air missiles (SAMs). However, it places the aircraft more or less beyond the range of less accurate but more voluminous ground fire (including everything from small arms up to automatic cannons) as well as giving longer standoff range from the target.32
Both GPS and LGB munitions also offer greatly enhanced accuracy. The F-16s used against Osirak had a computerized aiming system, which, if the aircraft could make a reasonably steady approach, would give the unguided bombs a Circular Error Probable (CEP) of roughly 8 to 12 meters.33 In contrast, GPS munitions have a roughly comparable (if not better) accuracy dropped from high altitude and long standoff range. LGBs have substantially better accuracy, with modern LGBs having a CEP of less than 3 meters. Both GPS and LGB munitions have less restrictive “envelopes” for accurate launch than computer aided bombing, as they can maneuver themselves on target after launch.34 The IAF, well equipped with PGMs, thus has considerably greater ability to hit fixed targets safely than in 1981.
Similarly, munitions for attacking hardened and/or buried targets have been extensively developed since the Osirak raid. These weapons, known as penetrating warheads or “bunker busters,” have seen extensive use by the U.S. Air Force and the IAF has closely 35monitored these operations. Early versions of these weapons are essentially delay-fused bombs that have been modified to have a more “pointed” shape and extensively structurally reinforced. Impacting at high speed and steep angles, the kinetic energy of these munitions allows them to penetrate tens of feet of earth, and even several feet of reinforced concrete. Later versions include warheads designed to detonate in stages to increase penetration.36 Note that for optimal penetration these weapons must be dropped from fairly high altitude, which implies that the IAF will be flying a high-altitude attack profile, at least in the terminal approach phase.
The IAF currently has access to a domestic penetrating weapon, a 1000-lb class bomb known as the PB 500A1.37 The government of Israel has also expressed interest in acquiring two heavier penetrating warheads from the United States. In September 2004, Israel announced that it would acquire approximately 5000 PGMs from the U.S., including about 500 GBU-27s equipped with the 2000-lb class BLU-109 penetrating warheads.38 More recently, Israel has received approval to purchase one hundred GBU-28s equipped with the 5000-lb class BLU-113 warheads.39 Note that for clarity, the remainder of the paper will refer to the BLU-113 and BLU-109 (the penetrating warhead) rather than GBU-27 and GBU-28 (the entire bomb).
As a final note on weaponeering capabilities, Israel maintains two elite special forces units dedicated to assisting with air strikes, one dedicated to laser target designation (Sayeret Shaldag/Unit 5101) and one to real time bomb damage assessment (Unit 5707).40 These units are extremely well-trained and could potentially be infiltrated to the target zone prior to attack. While it would be both difficult and risky to deploy these units inside Iran, they would be very useful in aiding the strike package, particularly in bad weather.

link http://web.mit.edu/ssp/Publications/working_papers/wp_06-1.pdf

 

[zavis2003]

Israeli Deep Strike Capabilities
In the more than two decades since the Osirak strike, the IAF’s deep strike capability has improved dramatically. This has increased the range and lethality of Israel’s “Long Arm.” An early display of this growing capability was the 1985 IAF strike on the Palestinian Liberation Organizations headquarters in Tunis, a more than 4000 km round trip.52
In terms of aircraft, Israeli deep strike capability remains centered on F-15s and F-16s. However, Israel now fields 25 of the F-15I Ra’am and approximately 25-50 of the F-16I Soufa, both of which are specially configured for the deep strike mission.53 The F-15I is the Israeli version of the F-15E Strike Eagle, an extremely capable variant of the F-15 which has been modified to optimize its air-to-ground capability. The F-15I is equipped with conformal fuel tanks (CFTs), which combined with external drop tanks could likely give it an unrefueled combat radius of roughly 1700 kilometers while carrying four 2000-lb bombs.54 These bombs, discussed in more detail below, can be targeted using either the LANTIRN or LITENING targeting pod. In addition, the F-15I has a built in electronic warfare and countermeasures system and can carry AIM-120 AMRAAM , AIM-9 Sidewinder, and Python 4 missiles for air-to-air combat.
The F-16I is an F-16 Block 52/60 variant produced specifically for Israeli deep strike requirements. Like the F-15I, the F-16I has CFTs to extend its radius of action. The F-16Is exact combat radius is unknown, but is believed to be in the 1500-2100 km range with CFTs and external fuel tanks.55 Given the Israeli decision to forgo additional F-15I procurement in favor of increased F-16I procurement, its range is presumably not significantly less than the F-15I. It is equipped with the same targeting systems as the F-15I and could deliver two 2000-lb bombs while carrying external fuel tanks.
In addition to these dedicated deep strike aircraft, Israel also has a large fleet of F-16s which could potentially be retrofitted with the F-16I’s CFTs. In particular, Israel has approximately 50 F-16D aircraft which have a “dorsal spine” modification. This dorsal spine is a fairing extending from the rear of the cockpit to the vertical stabilizer. It apparently houses a significant anti-radar Wild Weasel system, self-protection jamming, as well as other specialized electronics. These aircraft, if retrofitted with CFTs, could accompany the deep strike aircraft and provide significant suppression of enemy air defense (SEAD) capability.
The IAF also has over 40 F-15A and F-15C aircraft which could be used as fighter escorts for the strike and SEAD aircraft. The F-15A/C is a highly capable fightermix of AMRAAM, Python 4, and Sidewinder missiles.
Improved aircraft, in conjunction with the various communications, intelligence and support assets of the IAF/IDF, have greatly enhanced Israeli deep strike capability. However, it’s most likely target is both farther away and better protected than either Osirak or the PLO headquarters in Tunis.

Link http://web.mit.edu/ssp/Publications/working_papers/wp_06-1.pdf

 

[zavis2003]

recently israeli PM natayn yaho visited mascow along with national security advisor on secrit trip to prevents the sell of S300 as it seems to be only potent threat to israelz plain

 

[zavis2003]

now question for debate is that on such usefull info produced above is ISRAEL be able to get success in Such deep dtrike missions?

hope for positive assertions

 

[Patriot]

A single strike like Osirak strike won't work.They'll have to bomb a lot of times and Israel alone cannot do it without US Navy help.

 

[K^se]

The thing is will Jordan,Syria, and Saudi Arabia allow a 100 F-15S, and F-16D block 52 go through their air space to attack Iran? Other thing is Iran is bolstering how they managed to indigenously develop their own S-300 systems, Russia has denied supplying or the deal died..But Russia always play their double games..More importantly Israel is always telling us to do their dirty work..If you are going to attack them go for it, Why the Hell are you looking at us for confirmation...

 

[Patriot]

The thing is will Jordan,Syria, and Saudi Arabia allow a 100 F-15S, and F-16D block 52 go through their air space to attack Iran? Other thing is Iran is bolstering how they managed to indigenously develop their own S-300 systems, Russia has denied supplying or the deal died..But Russia always play their double games..More importantly Israel is always telling us to do their dirty work..If you are going to attack them go for it, Why the Hell are you looking at us for confirmation...

Because they can't do it alone.It is impossible for them to stop Iran's nuclear project without US Navy Support.

 

[K^se]

We can't fund a third it's not possible, and how would that implicate that to the rest of the muslim world invading another muslim country?? Political/Civilian unrest to the core.. Not to mention how OPEC might put an embargo on oil crude exports, and how Iran is trying to signal it will destroy the oil fields in the Persian Gulf.. Having Russian and Chinese interests in the regions, the repercussions of a strike on Iran is absolutely disastrous..Crippling 2nd largest Gas reserves and 3th Largest oil reserves in the world...Israel just go do your strike, we gave your all the necessary equipment just go and have a blast...Tired of listening to you whine, in the media..

I have Jewish friends, So I need to keep it at ease :O...

 

[Thomas]

The thing is will Jordan,Syria, and Saudi Arabia allow a 100 F-15S, and F-16D block 52 go through their air space to attack Iran? Other thing is Iran is bolstering how they managed to indigenously develop their own S-300 systems, Russia has denied supplying or the deal died..But Russia always play their double games..More importantly Israel is always telling us to do their dirty work..If you are going to attack them go for it, Why the Hell are you looking at us for confirmation...

Syria wouldn't the rest would covertly. publicly they would scream about violating their airspace. Behind the scenes they would support a strike since they fear Iran far more then Israel. Chances are though Iran will know they are coming ahead of time. Iran's folly is if they open the conflict into a wider war by trying to shut down the straight of Hormuz. Expect Hezbollah to mobilize and Syria to saber rattle as well.

 

[Patriot]

and rightfully so.They should make it more disastrous for the enemy to bomb them.I completely support Iran's view regarding West.You people are talking as if Iran should welcome the bombs with flowers.Iran is no iraq.They can bring the world into huge huge recession.

 

[H2O3C4Nitrogen]

Iran lashes out at Sarkozy's nuclear remarks

TEHRAN — Iran's foreign ministry has lashed out at French President Nicolas Sarkozy for saying his intelligence services are certain Tehran is working on a nuclear weapons programme.

The president's remarks were "very far from a realistic and correct understanding of Iran's peaceful nuclear programme," ministry spokesman Hassan Ghashghavi said, quoted by ISNA news agency.

The remark had been "issued with utmost bias and is politically motivated," the spokesman said.

On Tuesday, Sarkozy said the French intelligence services were certain that Iran was working towards a nuclear weapons programme.

"We cannot let Iran acquire nuclear" weapons because it would also be a threat to Israel, Sarkozy said during a meeting at the Elysee presidential palace with MPs from his conservative UMP party.

"It is a certainty to all of our secret services. Iran is working today on a nuclear (weapons) programme," he said.

Ghashghavi said Sarkozy's comments were "overtly contradictory" to statements made by other members of the P5+1 group comprised of Britain, China, France, Russia and the United States, plus Germany.

"This kind of comment will not influence or effect Iran's determination to pursue its rights and will also not impact the cooperation between the Islamic republic of Iran and the IAEA," Ghashghavi said referring to the UN nuclear watchdog, the International Atomic Energy Agency.

France and the other five world powers will hold talks with Iran on its nuclear programme on October 1.

The United States, the European Union and Israel fear that Iran is secretly developing nuclear weapons under the guise of its civilian nuclear power programme, but Tehran denies the charge and insists its programme is peaceful.

The United Nations Security Council has imposed three sets of sanctions against Iran over its refusal to freeze its uranium enrichment activities which could be used to build an atomic bomb.

AFP: Iran lashes out at Sarkozy's nuclear remarks

 

[r3alist]

is it true that israel do not have the airpower to level irans nuclear facilities?

 

[graphican]

Self deleted.