Stealth vs Jammer : The AirSea Battle Concept

[gambit]

Well wish I had the time for this debate...but why not mount a jammer or a stealthy aircraft?

Am assuming you are asking why not put a jammer ON a 'stealth' aircraft.

Every body -- including humans -- can be an emitter. Even reflections would make a body an emitter. An emission, even from the mode of reflection, by nature is active. So if an aircraft is emitting in any manner, that aircraft can and will be EM observable. So to be 'low radar reflective' or 'low radar observable', a body must somehow minimize or hopefully completely eliminate any emission at all.

For an aircraft to be EM observable, it can do one or all of three things:

- Transmit its own radar
- Transmit its radio communication
- Reflect other sources of EM radiation

Items 1 and 2 can be done at will via the ON-OFF switches. Item 3 is where things get complicated and financially costly, even for US. At this time, an aircraft cannot switch ON-OFF its own reflective behavior.

Shaping the aircraft's body to REDIRECT reflections is the current method of radar 'stealth'. Absorption of impinging radar signals is another method. Each have its advantages and disadvantages, but for now shaping is primary.

If the goal is to make the aircraft be as low an EM emitter as possible, putting on a jammer, which is an EM active component, whether that jammer is a standalone pod or somehow internalized, would negate the goal of being low radar observable. If the aircraft is already 'stealthy' from controlling the above 3 items, transmitting a radar countermeasure signal would be like turning ON item 1.

That said, it does not mean a 'stealth' aircraft cannot tactically use a jammer. It is possible to use an active countermeasure signal without putting oneself into a tactically inferior position provided that the countermeasure signal is precise enough to target one or more inherent weaknesses in the seeking radar signal.

Countermeasure can be 'spot', 'sweep', or 'barrage'. A wiki source is good enough for basic information.

https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Radar_jamming_and_deception

For the 'stealth' aircraft, its interest would be the 'spot' jamming method but with reduced power. The goal is not to blind but to temporarily confuse the seeking radar whenever the 'stealth' aircraft is at the highest risk of being detected.

For example...A 'stealth' fighter would still use terrain masking to even increase the difficulty level of detection. But in its transition from one terrain mask (hill) to another mask (forest), it maybe close enough to a radar station in a network that it will be detected long enough to alert the other stations. A brief countermeasure signal specifically targeted at a certain frequency may just confuse that station long enough for the 'stealth' fighter to escape persistent detection.

A typical radar transmission consists of pulses. A 'pulse train' is when there is a group of pulses with a duration of time before and after it. So a typical radar transmission actually contains pulse trains. Let us say there is a pulse train of 100 pulses.

If only 10% of that train returned, the seeking radar would dismiss them because of low statistics. If 50% returned, we can design the system to flag for monitor. If 70% returned, we can design the system to alert the operator that there is something out there. If the 'stealth' aircraft is close enough, it can produce that statistically significant reflected signal level and do it over time from pulse train to pulse train.

If the countermeasure signal is precise enough in terms of frequency matching and power output, the seeking radar would be sufficiently confused as to if one pulse train is more accurate than another and keep this confusion long enough for the 'stealth' fighter to escape this one radar station.

This is just one example of how an EM active countermeasure component could be used by a 'stealth' fighter in contrast of its inherent design of being a low EM emitter. The AESA radar systems in the F-22 and F-35 already have this capability of being a passive analyzer and a precision spot jammer when needed.

 

[satishkumarcsc]

Am assuming you are asking why not put a jammer ON a 'stealth' aircraft.

Every body -- including humans -- can be an emitter. Even reflections would make a body an emitter. An emission, even from the mode of reflection, by nature is active. So if an aircraft is emitting in any manner, that aircraft can and will be EM observable. So to be 'low radar reflective' or 'low radar observable', a body must somehow minimize or hopefully completely eliminate any emission at all.

For an aircraft to be EM observable, it can do one or all of three things:

- Transmit its own radar
- Transmit its radio communication
- Reflect other sources of EM radiation

Items 1 and 2 can be done at will via the ON-OFF switches. Item 3 is where things get complicated and financially costly, even for US. At this time, an aircraft cannot switch ON-OFF its own reflective behavior.

Shaping the aircraft's body to REDIRECT reflections is the current method of radar 'stealth'. Absorption of impinging radar signals is another method. Each have its advantages and disadvantages, but for now shaping is primary.

If the goal is to make the aircraft be as low an EM emitter as possible, putting on a jammer, which is an EM active component, whether that jammer is a standalone pod or somehow internalized, would negate the goal of being low radar observable. If the aircraft is already 'stealthy' from controlling the above 3 items, transmitting a radar countermeasure signal would be like turning ON item 1.

That said, it does not mean a 'stealth' aircraft cannot tactically use a jammer. It is possible to use an active countermeasure signal without putting oneself into a tactically inferior position provided that the countermeasure signal is precise enough to target one or more inherent weaknesses in the seeking radar signal.

Countermeasure can be 'spot', 'sweep', or 'barrage'. A wiki source is good enough for basic information.

https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Radar_jamming_and_deception

For the 'stealth' aircraft, its interest would be the 'spot' jamming method but with reduced power. The goal is not to blind but to temporarily confuse the seeking radar whenever the 'stealth' aircraft is at the highest risk of being detected.

For example...A 'stealth' fighter would still use terrain masking to even increase the difficulty level of detection. But in its transition from one terrain mask (hill) to another mask (forest), it maybe close enough to a radar station in a network that it will be detected long enough to alert the other stations. A brief countermeasure signal specifically targeted at a certain frequency may just confuse that station long enough for the 'stealth' fighter to escape persistent detection.

A typical radar transmission consists of pulses. A 'pulse train' is when there is a group of pulses with a duration of time before and after it. So a typical radar transmission actually contains pulse trains. Let us say there is a pulse train of 100 pulses.

If only 10% of that train returned, the seeking radar would dismiss them because of low statistics. If 50% returned, we can design the system to flag for monitor. If 70% returned, we can design the system to alert the operator that there is something out there. If the 'stealth' aircraft is close enough, it can produce that statistically significant reflected signal level and do it over time from pulse train to pulse train.

If the countermeasure signal is precise enough in terms of frequency matching and power output, the seeking radar would be sufficiently confused as to if one pulse train is more accurate than another and keep this confusion long enough for the 'stealth' fighter to escape this one radar station.

This is just one example of how an EM active countermeasure component could be used by a 'stealth' fighter in contrast of its inherent design of being a low EM emitter. The AESA radar systems in the F-22 and F-35 already have this capability of being a passive analyzer and a precision spot jammer when needed.

Thank you. Long time no see. How have you been Gambit?

 

[UkroTurk]

The Boeing EA-18G Growler is an American carrier-based electronic warfare aircraft, a specialized version of the two-seat F/A-18F Super Hornet. The EA-18G replaced the Northrop Grumman EA-6B Prowlers in service with the United States Navy. The Growler's electronic warfare capability is primarily provided by Northrop Grumman. The EA-18G began production in 2007 and entered operational service in late 2009.

MALD SYSTEMS

Raytheon has delivered the first eight Miniature Air Launched Decoy Jammer initial operational test and evaluation units to the U.S. Air Force. During IOT and E, the Air Force will conduct numerous flight tests on the MALD-J to evaluate the system in operationally realistic and demanding scenarios.

MALD is a state-of-the-art, low-cost flight vehicle that is modular, air-launched and programmable. It weighs less than 300 pounds and has a range of approximately 500 nautical miles (about 575 statute miles).

MALD protects aircrews and their aircraft by duplicating the combat flight profiles and signatures of U.S. and allied aircraft. The MALD-J adds radar-jamming capability to the basic MALD platform.

“Because MALD-J offers the warfighter stand-in jamming capability, the need for aviators to fly to conduct dangerous jamming missions will be greatly reduced once the system reaches initial operational capability in late 2012,” said Harry Schulte, Raytheon Missile Systems’ vice president of Air Warfare Systems.

“The MALD family is versatile, flexible and modular, and can carry almost any payload the warfighter can imagine, including indigenously produced jammers and electronic packages.”

MALD can autonomously fly a pre-planned route and mimic the radar signatures of other aircraft ranging from large strategic bombers to stealth fighters, or even entire formations of bombers or fighter jets, to mislead enemy defence systems.

 

[UkroTurk]

Jammer pods

 

[UkroTurk]

An ALQ-188 ECM pod mounted on a Duluth 148th F-16 aircraft.

ALQ-167 on Bahrain-based A-6 during the Gulf War

AN/ALQ-99 system on EA-6B Prowler

EF-111A Raven in the foreground carrying a fixed tail pod for receiving and a fixed transmitting pod on underside. Note that while the EA-6B carries removable transmitter pods, the EF-111 has the transmitter built into the underside of the aircraft.

RAF Tornado
Skyshadow-2

Cerberus

 

[UkroTurk]

EW version of LCA Tejas
EL/L-8222

jammer on board Su-30MKI, Mig-21 Bison and Mig-27


Source: https://defence.pk/threads/ew-pods-systems-of-the-indian-air-force.117329/#ixzz4CIRZ4Zls
mirage 2000

 

[UkroTurk]

Turkish F-4E Phantom with Israeli built Elta ECM pod .

Elta ECM pod F16

Su-24MP "Fencer-F" (EW, sigint): Electronic warfare/jamming/sigint variant to replace Yak-28PP `Brewer-E'; dielectric nose panels differing from those of Su-24MR; under-nose narrow long-chord antenna fairing; `hockey stick' communications-jamming antenna at bottom of fuselage under nose section of each engine air intake; centreline SPS-5 Fasol EW pod. Starboard cockpit display panels replaced by EW console; some aircraft had narrow fairing on spine, behind cockpit.2

 

[UkroTurk]

 

[UkroTurk]

KNIRTI SAP-14 “Escort Jammer” support jamming pod. The new SAP-14 is analogous to the US ALQ-99E series pods, but employs a fundamentally different antenna arrangement optimised to suppress emitters in the forward and aft hemispheres of the escort jamming aircraft. The pod has been cleared for carriage on the Su-30MK Flanker G/H airframes and the Su-34 Fullback (T5 Studio image - click to download hi res copy).

A Russian SPS-141 jamming pod mounted on a Sukhoi Su-17.

Exelis (NYSE:XLS) will continue to supply the Advanced Capability Pod (ACaP) for U.S. Air Force and U.S. Navy F-15, F-16, and F/A-18 tactical aircraft under a new $68 million multiyear indefinite-delivery, indefinite-quantity contract.

 

[UkroTurk]

ITT to supply Electronic Countermeasure pods to Pakistan

AN-ALQ-211 v9 Pod CLOSED Cover2

By Jon Grevatt and James Hardy

The US Air Force has awarded ITT Systems a USD49 million fixed-price contract to supply Pakistan with electronic countermeasure pods to equip its fleet of Lockheed Martin F-16 fighter aircraft, it was announced on 5 July.

NRA-3B of the Pacific Missile Test Center in 1982

A-3 WITH JAMMER

 

[UkroTurk]

BM/KG300G
The BM/KG300G self-protection jamming pod is an airborne ECM pod that was first revealed to the public at 1998 Zhuhai Air Show, China, and it is designed by Southwest Institute of Electronic Equipment (SWIEE) at Chengdu.

The jamming pod is designed to counter land-based, airborne, and naval radars at I/J bands, particularly pulse Doppler radars. The pod is highly digitized, and can be installed on a variety of platforms from helicopters to heavy bombers. The system adopts modular design and with open architecture software programming, and it is fully automatic, though human intervention is also optional. In addition to automatic warning, the system can also automatically select and implement the best form of countermeasure. The system is highly adaptive and can be integrated as an overall self-defense system with other avionics such as RWR, and is compatible with MIL-STD-1553B standard. Built-In Test Equipment (BITE) function is also incorporated.

Although generally used for self-defense, the BM/KG300G can also be used as part of the offensive weaponry by deploying it in the way similar to that of EA-6B when deployed with anti-radar and air-to-surface missiles, but the launching sequence of the missile must be completed by human operators. The next generation BM/KG300G pod is already in development and is designed to MIL-STD-1773standard.


JF-17

 

[UkroTurk]

 

[UkroTurk]

 

[UkroTurk]

 

[UkroTurk]

Communication and network stand off jammer aircraft design-Aselsan

Source: https://defence.pk/threads/turkish-radar-ew-programs.77790/page-15#ixzz4CL8ED1Go

Royal Air Force Bombardier Sentinel R.1 ZJ690

Of the dedicated long range EW aircraft, at least eight Y-8GX3 (or Y-8G) ECM aircraft are in service with the Chinese Air Force, which are thought to be dedicated, long range stand-off jamming aircraft, and a new variant based off the Y-9 platform is also confirmed to exist.

Another key difference in the Soviet SEAD doctrine was a reliance on both stand-off weapons and stand-off jamming. While American SEAD and electronic wafare aircraft functioned close to their targets to insure a kill, the Soviets favored longer ranged weapons that could saturate the area and stand-off jamming using specialist aircraft that could jam radars from even a hundred miles out. These jamming aircraft were usually based on either bomber aircraft like the Tu-16 Badger or the Tu-22 Blinder or transport aircraft like the An-12 Cub. The Soviets even fielded a stand-off jamming helicopter version of the Mi-8 that could jam radar systems out to 62 miles. Barrage jamming from stand off ranges would fill the skies with static while SEAD aircraft assigned to the task groups could prosecute specific air defense assets as part of the integrated plan to deprive NATO of its nuclear weapons and aircraft. Shorter-ranged battlefield systems like the British Rapier SAMs or the French Roland were essentially ignored unless they were specifically arrayed in defense of a task group target. These short range systems were to be dealt with by artillery units of the Soviet and Warsaw Pact armies. Anti-radar missiles were reserved soley for high-value assets and targets in the Soviet doctrine as it was felt that over-saturating those assets was the only way to defeat the West's technological superiority.