Sam Dhanraj
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This is an interesting article which discusses the current and future reforms envisioned by PLA. There are some interesting facts I did not knew earlier such as 50% of Chinese Soldiers are officers. It also touched the volunteers vs conscripts recruitment, Where China seems to implement/ed Mixed system.
An interesting read nevertheless.
Size doesn't mean strength in modern war
* Source: Global Times
* [21:08 January 28 2010]
Teng Jianqun
China's army has a proud record both in combat and during natural disasters, but how have the skills needed by soldiers changed? With numerous singers, dancers, comedians, writers, businessmen and athletes all enjoying military rank, how can the military hierarchy be restructured? What will a more streamlined and efficient Chinese military look like?
Global Times (GT) reporter Wang Yuan talked with Teng Jianqun (Teng), director of the Centre of Arms Control Studies at China Institute of International Studies, and Yang Chengjun (Yang), a senior military researcher on nuclear and missile studies.
GT: What qualities do modern Chinese soldiers need? How can we meet these challenges?
Teng: Starting from the late 1970s, China reinstituted college entrance examinations as well as military higher education. All current army officers have a background in higher education.
Now, with the quickened tempo of modern warfare and the increased use of high-tech weaponry, all armies must adapt.
We need to reinforce the training of commanding officers with all-around abilities, including technical and professional skills. They need to not only have leadership skills, but also master new technologies.
Yang: Soldiers' education is a crucial issue. In the past, China's enlisted men mostly had a high school education at best, but now we have begun to recruit soldiers from colleges and universities.
According to research, most of the technical knowledge one learns in university becomes outdated five to eight years after graduation. This means that soldiers must constantly update their knowledge and also optimize the way they learn.
With this in mind, we have started to attract large amount of personnel from civilian universities, while in the past, our officers were mainly from military schools. We used to focus just on training soldiers, but now we are strengthening continuing education within our services.
However, there is still room for us to enhance the capabilities of the soldiers. An obvious problem is that we have not done enough comprehensive training.
Sometimes we unilaterally emphasize soldiers' education, sometimes age, and sometimes professional qualities. In fact, our soldiers should possess all these basic capabilities.
GT: China has not been involved in an actual war for 30 years, so how can we improve soldiers' performance?
Yang: This is really an important issue. China hasn't engaged in a war for 30 years, while in recent years some Western countries have been continuously training their armies in various actual wars, testing their weapons and equipment, and inspecting and optimizing their operational systems and combat abilities.
The only way is to carry out military exercises with ammunition, creating an approximation of actual combat along with the harsh environment and conditions of war.
In doing this, we can also explore the rules of warfare and develop military doctrine.
Of course, combat exercises pale in comparison to real war.
Yang Chengjun
Teng: There are essential differences between military exercises and actual wars, but with advanced simulation technologies, modern military exercises can be very close to actual war. Such technologies have been abundantly used by developed countries to train their troops.
In some countries, especially the US, maneuver scenario devised during military exercises have been converted into battle plans. There have been some clear proofs of this in recent wars the US has been involved in.
This is one of the areas where we will be working hard.
GT: How to adjust and realign the structure of our military?
Teng: In this field, there are still many shortcomings, one of which is the existing regional command, which comes from the Cold War era. Once a military region command falls, the others could march forward as reinforcements.
But the current situation is that a general headquarters always has thousands of personnel, while it only commands two to four corps of field troops. This top-heavy system has long perplexed our military reform.
There is only one solution: continue to deepen the reform, reduce command facilities and establishments, and raise the ratio of frontline troops to support personnel.
In addition, we need to flatten the command system. We have shortened the command levels. For example, a key part of the military downscaling carried out from 2003 to 2005 involved cutting out some divisional institutions so that corps could directly command brigades.
By doing this we shortened the time required to transmit orders, ensuring that commanders could grasp fleeting tactical opportunities in combat. Further efforts are still needed.
Yang: Over 50 percent of Chinese soldiers are officers, while in the US, the ratio is only 17 percent, and in Russia about 30 percent.
The consequence is that we cannot always dispatch enough soldiers when there are urgent tasks. This happened when we participated in disaster relief work during the Wenchuan earthquake in 2008.
Therefore, the ratio of officers in the army must be reduced, or we won't be able to respond with efficiency and agil-ity to crisis.
Another problem is that there are too many overstaffed non-combat units in our army, including culture troupes, sports units, medical units, and so on.
Moreover, you have the ridiculous situation that lots of singers and athletes have very high military rank. Some are even generals! It takes away from the seriousness of the military hierarchy.
To streamline the army is an important task of military reform, and these overstaffed non-combat units should be cut down.
GT: How can we optimize the proportion of different arms?
Yang: The problem with the Chinese military is that our land forces, which make up about 50 percent of the whole, have too large a proportion. It's a historic issue.
China is making efforts to reduce the proportion of land forces and adding more technical arms. But there is still a long way to go. Our abilities at long-range strikes are too weak, and we lack professional rescue teams, like natural disaster relief teams, nuclear, chemical and other special disaster relief teams, and anti-terrorist teams.
To optimize the composition of different arms is to meet the new calls for modern tasks and missions, forming an army with quicker response and higher efficiency.
Teng: Focusing on the development of the navy, air force and other high-tech services is inevitable in the process of military reform. In recent years, the CPC Central Military Commission has attached much importance to the development of our navy, air force and second artillery.
China's military reform needs to meet the quickened tempo of modern war, or else it cannot be regarded as successful. This just reflects the necessity and urgency of favoring technical arms.
GT: How can we establish a professional army? Shall we focus on recruiting volunteer or compulsory servicemen?
Teng: To have a professional armed force has been the worldwide development trend in military reform. Western countries have generally implemented a system of all volunteer staff, that is, servicemen should sign a contract with their service. Thus being in the service is not only a duty, but also a career.
By doing so, the armed force could retain a large amount of talent and thus improve their fighting capability.
Another option is a mixed system, such as Russia's, so both volunteers and conscripts are recruited.
China has tried recruiting volunteer servicemen in recent years. For example, we employed the system of signing contracts for petty officers, retaining lots of key personnel.
But an all-volunteer staff requires a huge amount of capital, which China can't afford yet. So for now, we will adopt a mixed system.
An interesting read nevertheless.
Size doesn't mean strength in modern war
* Source: Global Times
* [21:08 January 28 2010]
Teng Jianqun
China's army has a proud record both in combat and during natural disasters, but how have the skills needed by soldiers changed? With numerous singers, dancers, comedians, writers, businessmen and athletes all enjoying military rank, how can the military hierarchy be restructured? What will a more streamlined and efficient Chinese military look like?
Global Times (GT) reporter Wang Yuan talked with Teng Jianqun (Teng), director of the Centre of Arms Control Studies at China Institute of International Studies, and Yang Chengjun (Yang), a senior military researcher on nuclear and missile studies.
GT: What qualities do modern Chinese soldiers need? How can we meet these challenges?
Teng: Starting from the late 1970s, China reinstituted college entrance examinations as well as military higher education. All current army officers have a background in higher education.
Now, with the quickened tempo of modern warfare and the increased use of high-tech weaponry, all armies must adapt.
We need to reinforce the training of commanding officers with all-around abilities, including technical and professional skills. They need to not only have leadership skills, but also master new technologies.
Yang: Soldiers' education is a crucial issue. In the past, China's enlisted men mostly had a high school education at best, but now we have begun to recruit soldiers from colleges and universities.
According to research, most of the technical knowledge one learns in university becomes outdated five to eight years after graduation. This means that soldiers must constantly update their knowledge and also optimize the way they learn.
With this in mind, we have started to attract large amount of personnel from civilian universities, while in the past, our officers were mainly from military schools. We used to focus just on training soldiers, but now we are strengthening continuing education within our services.
However, there is still room for us to enhance the capabilities of the soldiers. An obvious problem is that we have not done enough comprehensive training.
Sometimes we unilaterally emphasize soldiers' education, sometimes age, and sometimes professional qualities. In fact, our soldiers should possess all these basic capabilities.
GT: China has not been involved in an actual war for 30 years, so how can we improve soldiers' performance?
Yang: This is really an important issue. China hasn't engaged in a war for 30 years, while in recent years some Western countries have been continuously training their armies in various actual wars, testing their weapons and equipment, and inspecting and optimizing their operational systems and combat abilities.
The only way is to carry out military exercises with ammunition, creating an approximation of actual combat along with the harsh environment and conditions of war.
In doing this, we can also explore the rules of warfare and develop military doctrine.
Of course, combat exercises pale in comparison to real war.
Yang Chengjun
Teng: There are essential differences between military exercises and actual wars, but with advanced simulation technologies, modern military exercises can be very close to actual war. Such technologies have been abundantly used by developed countries to train their troops.
In some countries, especially the US, maneuver scenario devised during military exercises have been converted into battle plans. There have been some clear proofs of this in recent wars the US has been involved in.
This is one of the areas where we will be working hard.
GT: How to adjust and realign the structure of our military?
Teng: In this field, there are still many shortcomings, one of which is the existing regional command, which comes from the Cold War era. Once a military region command falls, the others could march forward as reinforcements.
But the current situation is that a general headquarters always has thousands of personnel, while it only commands two to four corps of field troops. This top-heavy system has long perplexed our military reform.
There is only one solution: continue to deepen the reform, reduce command facilities and establishments, and raise the ratio of frontline troops to support personnel.
In addition, we need to flatten the command system. We have shortened the command levels. For example, a key part of the military downscaling carried out from 2003 to 2005 involved cutting out some divisional institutions so that corps could directly command brigades.
By doing this we shortened the time required to transmit orders, ensuring that commanders could grasp fleeting tactical opportunities in combat. Further efforts are still needed.
Yang: Over 50 percent of Chinese soldiers are officers, while in the US, the ratio is only 17 percent, and in Russia about 30 percent.
The consequence is that we cannot always dispatch enough soldiers when there are urgent tasks. This happened when we participated in disaster relief work during the Wenchuan earthquake in 2008.
Therefore, the ratio of officers in the army must be reduced, or we won't be able to respond with efficiency and agil-ity to crisis.
Another problem is that there are too many overstaffed non-combat units in our army, including culture troupes, sports units, medical units, and so on.
Moreover, you have the ridiculous situation that lots of singers and athletes have very high military rank. Some are even generals! It takes away from the seriousness of the military hierarchy.
To streamline the army is an important task of military reform, and these overstaffed non-combat units should be cut down.
GT: How can we optimize the proportion of different arms?
Yang: The problem with the Chinese military is that our land forces, which make up about 50 percent of the whole, have too large a proportion. It's a historic issue.
China is making efforts to reduce the proportion of land forces and adding more technical arms. But there is still a long way to go. Our abilities at long-range strikes are too weak, and we lack professional rescue teams, like natural disaster relief teams, nuclear, chemical and other special disaster relief teams, and anti-terrorist teams.
To optimize the composition of different arms is to meet the new calls for modern tasks and missions, forming an army with quicker response and higher efficiency.
Teng: Focusing on the development of the navy, air force and other high-tech services is inevitable in the process of military reform. In recent years, the CPC Central Military Commission has attached much importance to the development of our navy, air force and second artillery.
China's military reform needs to meet the quickened tempo of modern war, or else it cannot be regarded as successful. This just reflects the necessity and urgency of favoring technical arms.
GT: How can we establish a professional army? Shall we focus on recruiting volunteer or compulsory servicemen?
Teng: To have a professional armed force has been the worldwide development trend in military reform. Western countries have generally implemented a system of all volunteer staff, that is, servicemen should sign a contract with their service. Thus being in the service is not only a duty, but also a career.
By doing so, the armed force could retain a large amount of talent and thus improve their fighting capability.
Another option is a mixed system, such as Russia's, so both volunteers and conscripts are recruited.
China has tried recruiting volunteer servicemen in recent years. For example, we employed the system of signing contracts for petty officers, retaining lots of key personnel.
But an all-volunteer staff requires a huge amount of capital, which China can't afford yet. So for now, we will adopt a mixed system.
