When Singapore first became an independent state in 1965 there was little question that investment in defence needed to be at the top of its agenda. The small island nation faced a severe security environment: there was the risk of deteriorating relations with Malaysia, the federation from which Singapore had just seceded; the new country's other near neighbour, Indonesia, was in political turmoil; and, with war in Vietnam escalating, there were fears that a Communist wildfire was about to tear across Southeast Asia.
Without a credible military deterrent, it was uncertain whether Southeast Asia's youngest and smallest country would survive this harsh security outlook. Yet the island was quick to establish its credentials as one of Asia's 'miracle' economies; and high, dependable levels of economic growth meant that the Singaporean government was able to ring-fence a sizeable defence budget year after year for its highly ambitious military procurement plans.
The Singapore Armed Forces (SAF) of 2010, by far the most advanced military force in Southeast Asia, are the outcome of a long-held policy of allotting defence up to 6 per cent of GDP. While defence spending has dipped below this level in recent years it was 4.3 per cent in 2009, an allocation of SGD11.4 billion (USD8.2 billion) this remains very high by regional standards. As the Indonesian defence minister recently lamented, Singapore (population less than five million) spends more on defence in real terms than Indonesia (population 230 million).
'Third-Generation' force
The SAF not only enjoy a clear capability advantage over other Southeast Asian militaries, but it is also now close to becoming the 'Third-Generation' armed force, which recent procurement and reforms have been designed to produce. The question, then, is whether the Singapore of today whose security environment appears far more benign than in the 1960s and whose economic growth rate is more modest than in previous decades needs or even intends to keep investing so heavily in defence.
