Prince Kassad
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Modern Aircrafts, Anti-Air Missiles, and Anti-Ship Missiles##
It's easy to look at number of planes, tanks, missile, etc. and come to the conclusion that Taiwan can take down approaching Chinese ships and planes. However, if you google the anti-air missile stockpiles of the ROCAF, you'll find that they face a huge issue in interoperability
(the article was published in 2018, so it's a fairly accurate assessment of the current problems faced by the ROCAF). Basically:
the ROCAF is handicapped by a mismatched ratio of missiles to aircraft [...] Although Taiwan has a significant number of AAMs, a large portion of these missiles is comprised of French-made Mica and Magic AAMs (1,440 acquired originally) mated to one aircraft type only, the French-made Mirages. At 56 airframes, the Mirages constitute only a small fraction of Taiwan’s overall fighter fleet. This stockpile yields a ratio of well over 20 AAMs per Mirage. Given the severe threat environment Taiwanese fighters would face in a cross-Strait war, it is doubtful that the Mirages would even survive enough sorties to use their way through such a large stockpile, and a large fraction of the Micas and Magics could therefore sit on the ground unused and wasted.
Essentially, if Taiwan were to lose its tiny fleet of 56 Mirage fighters, those ~1500 AAMs are as good as useless because there won't be time to retrofit them to the rest of their air force. On the flip side:
Taiwan’s F-16 fleet, on the other hand, faces the opposite problem – a curiously low ratio of AIM-120s to fighters. Taiwan’s small inventory of AMRAAMs (300-plus) and relatively large F-16 fleet (144 jets) yields a ratio of barely two AMRAAMs per F-16. This creates a double misfortune whereby many Mica and Magic missiles may be stranded on the ground in wartime with no surviving Mirage fighters to use them, while many F-16 fighters may find themselves bereft of AMRAAM missiles to use.
The article also mentions that:
Taiwanese land-based and ship-based surface-to-air missiles (SAM) can be expected to throw their weight into the fray as well. But land-based SAMs are limited by terrain, range, and relative immobility, and Taiwanese warships that carry SAMs can be expected to have their own hands full dealing with the Chinese threats that face them.
Taiwan only has 33 (31 in the article as time of writing) high-altitude SAM systems
, which are currently in the process of being replaced by the indigenous Sky-Bow 3, which is more mobile and theoretically more survivable.
But no matter how survivable your missiles are, the eyes and ears of each SAM battery--the radar--is vulnerable. From the same RAND article:
An emitting radar is like a bright neon sign and will quickly draw the attention of attack systems. China has numerous options to target located radars. Loitering antiradiation missile (ARM) weapons, such as the Harpy, in the area could attack on detection. Fixed-wing aircraft in the area could also detect and engage SAMs with air-to-ground ARM weapons. Alternatively, numerous intelligence, surveillance, and reconnaissance (ISR) systems could detect and locate the radar, cuing longer-range strikes from cruise missiles or even ballistic missiles, when the most sophisticated radars, and thus high-value targets, emit.
China's opening moves would be to destroy the SAM radars and simultaneously cratering Taiwan's runways. This immediately erodes a large portion of Taiwan's air-defense system, which would give the PLA greater flexibility to handle any Taiwanese aircrafts that do manage to make it into the sky.
Taiwan and Surrounding Country's Supply of Modern Jets##
A second major point that gets brought up is that the Taiwanese air force and surrounding country's airforce--most notably Japan's--have far more advanced fighters and airframes than the PLA.
While this is true, keep in mind that modern aircrafts are notoriously maintenance heavy
. Moreover, the PLA has been stepping up the number of flights they're doing with the express purpose of forcing any potential adversary to respond. The conclusion
that military analysts have arrived at is:
These daily scrambles are gradually wearing the F-15J fleet out. The concern is that China has some six times more fighters then the JASDF, and could further ramp up intrusions whenever it considers appropriate. The in-service life of Japan’s F-15J fleet is now almost a decision that lies with China. The easiest solution seems reducing the number of scrambles undertaken but that would be a major strategic shift.
Basically, the PLA sees it as unnecessary to get into a shooting war--right now--if it can continuously do these flybys and forcing potential adversaries like Japan and Taiwan to respond. Each scramble means additional maintenance, which consumes spare parts, oil, and money. By wearing out the airframes of their opponents, the PLA is slowly eroding any potential advantage these advanced jets may hold. An F-35 is useless if it's currently in maintenance, after all.
Taiwan Can Adopt Guerilla Tactics Once the PLA Come Ashore##
Let's just clear something up right now and throw this idea out the window: The ROC Armed Forces has NO plan for what to do after the PLA come ashore. Full stop.
As recently as 2014, Taiwan's military doctrine had been
to prevent a PLA landing by any means necessary:
Taiwan’s military doctrine states that as much of any fighting that occurs should take place as far from population centers as possible. The army is only relevant once the enemy lands on the island, while the navy and air force can range over the strait.
There's also the additional problem that Taiwan's procurement process makes no sense for its military situation. This article
covers the shortcoming as well as the actions the ROC Armed Forces have taken to help mitigate that. One of the first things it criticizes on is Taiwan's procurement of US systems:
The problem with buying U.S. systems wholesale is that they are expensive, designed to project power over great distances, and maximize mobility and networks to take the fight to the enemy with overwhelming superiority. Taiwan on the other hand, needs the opposite: systems that are short-range and defensive, able to survive an initial bombardment from a larger adversary, and suitable for deployment close to home in defense of the island should it come under blockade or attack.
Moreover, the article itself outlines the new strategy the ROC Armed Forces is beginning to implement, which is a gradual shift towards asymmetric warfare but still reliant upon their old doctrine of keeping the PLA from coming onshore:
The first phase is the decisive battle in the littoral, extending up to 100 kilometers from the island.
The second phase seeks to annihilate the enemy at the beach area, which extends approximately 40 kilometers outwards from anticipated invasion beaches.
The new concept is animated by the most critical mission of the Taiwan military: denying China the ability to land and resupply an invasion force.
The glaring problem here is that there is zero mention for what happens after the PLA has come on shore. Throughout the article, it makes mentions of how Taiwan could keep the PLA from landing sufficient forces on shore, but the tacit understanding is that once the PLA has come on shore, it's game over for Taiwan. Here is why:
Since 1984, Taiwan has been practicing the same on-shore defense in its annual Han Kuang exercises
, which emphasizes static shore defense bolstered with close-air support
. In the video, you see Apaches and tanks defend against any potential beach landings while protected by F-16 fighters overhead.
BUT: All of that is predicated on the ROC retaining air superiority!
Remember the mismatch of anti-air missiles for Taiwan's fighter force? If the PLA manages to shoot down just half(!) of the Mirage fighters, then Taiwan is stuck with a bunch of AAM they can't use. If the PLA takes out half of the radars to Taiwanese SAM batteries, then the PLA are much closer to air superiority. In those conditions, all the on-shore defenses will become an elaborate form of suicide.
The ROC Armed Forces has essentially been preparing for a fight with the PLA of the 1950s: largely infantry based with minimal air support. This is a problem with most militaries--they're constantly preparing for their last war instead of thinking of way to fight the next one.
The idea of abandoning on-shore defenses in favor of letting the PLA coming ashore and then conducting guerrilla warfare is political suicide to the ROC Armed Forces, whose office corps is aware of the fact that if Taiwan were to switch its military doctrine from shore defenses to asymmetric warfare, then the current officer corps would be out of a job. Therefore, they must stubbornly retain the idea of a near-suicidal beach defense to remain relevant.
Conclusion##
If Taiwan sticks to its current doctrine, the majority of its armed forces will come under relentless attack by the PLA in the opening hours of the conflict. By the time the PLA starts sending divisions across the strait, they'll be more or less be making an uncontested landing.
Taiwan's only hope of survival is for the US to come to its aid in the event of a Chinese invasion. In the meantime, it will put up a fierce, stubborn, but ultimately futile shore-defense - much like how the ROC put up a stubborn resistance against the Japanese at Shanghai in 1937 and got most of its professional army wiped out. Except, this time, there won't be room to conduct a 1500 mile retreat to Chongqing and grinding down the PLA in a war of attrition.
Meanwhile, the PLA is aware that Taiwan's pinning its hopes on America and her allies coming to its aid. Which is why they've invested so much in A2/AD assets designed to keep American and allied forces as far back from any potential AO as possible.
If you've noticed anything about how things have changed, it's that the US no longer sails carriers through the Taiwan strait in an attempt to dissuade China like it did in 1996--instead opting to send only missile destroyers
. Even in the South China Sea, no carriers have sailed anywhere near Chinese islands.
It's easy to look at number of planes, tanks, missile, etc. and come to the conclusion that Taiwan can take down approaching Chinese ships and planes. However, if you google the anti-air missile stockpiles of the ROCAF, you'll find that they face a huge issue in interoperability
(the article was published in 2018, so it's a fairly accurate assessment of the current problems faced by the ROCAF). Basically:
the ROCAF is handicapped by a mismatched ratio of missiles to aircraft [...] Although Taiwan has a significant number of AAMs, a large portion of these missiles is comprised of French-made Mica and Magic AAMs (1,440 acquired originally) mated to one aircraft type only, the French-made Mirages. At 56 airframes, the Mirages constitute only a small fraction of Taiwan’s overall fighter fleet. This stockpile yields a ratio of well over 20 AAMs per Mirage. Given the severe threat environment Taiwanese fighters would face in a cross-Strait war, it is doubtful that the Mirages would even survive enough sorties to use their way through such a large stockpile, and a large fraction of the Micas and Magics could therefore sit on the ground unused and wasted.
Essentially, if Taiwan were to lose its tiny fleet of 56 Mirage fighters, those ~1500 AAMs are as good as useless because there won't be time to retrofit them to the rest of their air force. On the flip side:
Taiwan’s F-16 fleet, on the other hand, faces the opposite problem – a curiously low ratio of AIM-120s to fighters. Taiwan’s small inventory of AMRAAMs (300-plus) and relatively large F-16 fleet (144 jets) yields a ratio of barely two AMRAAMs per F-16. This creates a double misfortune whereby many Mica and Magic missiles may be stranded on the ground in wartime with no surviving Mirage fighters to use them, while many F-16 fighters may find themselves bereft of AMRAAM missiles to use.
The article also mentions that:
Taiwanese land-based and ship-based surface-to-air missiles (SAM) can be expected to throw their weight into the fray as well. But land-based SAMs are limited by terrain, range, and relative immobility, and Taiwanese warships that carry SAMs can be expected to have their own hands full dealing with the Chinese threats that face them.
Taiwan only has 33 (31 in the article as time of writing) high-altitude SAM systems
, which are currently in the process of being replaced by the indigenous Sky-Bow 3, which is more mobile and theoretically more survivable.
But no matter how survivable your missiles are, the eyes and ears of each SAM battery--the radar--is vulnerable. From the same RAND article:
An emitting radar is like a bright neon sign and will quickly draw the attention of attack systems. China has numerous options to target located radars. Loitering antiradiation missile (ARM) weapons, such as the Harpy, in the area could attack on detection. Fixed-wing aircraft in the area could also detect and engage SAMs with air-to-ground ARM weapons. Alternatively, numerous intelligence, surveillance, and reconnaissance (ISR) systems could detect and locate the radar, cuing longer-range strikes from cruise missiles or even ballistic missiles, when the most sophisticated radars, and thus high-value targets, emit.
China's opening moves would be to destroy the SAM radars and simultaneously cratering Taiwan's runways. This immediately erodes a large portion of Taiwan's air-defense system, which would give the PLA greater flexibility to handle any Taiwanese aircrafts that do manage to make it into the sky.
Taiwan and Surrounding Country's Supply of Modern Jets##
A second major point that gets brought up is that the Taiwanese air force and surrounding country's airforce--most notably Japan's--have far more advanced fighters and airframes than the PLA.
While this is true, keep in mind that modern aircrafts are notoriously maintenance heavy
. Moreover, the PLA has been stepping up the number of flights they're doing with the express purpose of forcing any potential adversary to respond. The conclusion
that military analysts have arrived at is:
These daily scrambles are gradually wearing the F-15J fleet out. The concern is that China has some six times more fighters then the JASDF, and could further ramp up intrusions whenever it considers appropriate. The in-service life of Japan’s F-15J fleet is now almost a decision that lies with China. The easiest solution seems reducing the number of scrambles undertaken but that would be a major strategic shift.
Basically, the PLA sees it as unnecessary to get into a shooting war--right now--if it can continuously do these flybys and forcing potential adversaries like Japan and Taiwan to respond. Each scramble means additional maintenance, which consumes spare parts, oil, and money. By wearing out the airframes of their opponents, the PLA is slowly eroding any potential advantage these advanced jets may hold. An F-35 is useless if it's currently in maintenance, after all.
Taiwan Can Adopt Guerilla Tactics Once the PLA Come Ashore##
Let's just clear something up right now and throw this idea out the window: The ROC Armed Forces has NO plan for what to do after the PLA come ashore. Full stop.
As recently as 2014, Taiwan's military doctrine had been
to prevent a PLA landing by any means necessary:
Taiwan’s military doctrine states that as much of any fighting that occurs should take place as far from population centers as possible. The army is only relevant once the enemy lands on the island, while the navy and air force can range over the strait.
There's also the additional problem that Taiwan's procurement process makes no sense for its military situation. This article
covers the shortcoming as well as the actions the ROC Armed Forces have taken to help mitigate that. One of the first things it criticizes on is Taiwan's procurement of US systems:
The problem with buying U.S. systems wholesale is that they are expensive, designed to project power over great distances, and maximize mobility and networks to take the fight to the enemy with overwhelming superiority. Taiwan on the other hand, needs the opposite: systems that are short-range and defensive, able to survive an initial bombardment from a larger adversary, and suitable for deployment close to home in defense of the island should it come under blockade or attack.
Moreover, the article itself outlines the new strategy the ROC Armed Forces is beginning to implement, which is a gradual shift towards asymmetric warfare but still reliant upon their old doctrine of keeping the PLA from coming onshore:
The first phase is the decisive battle in the littoral, extending up to 100 kilometers from the island.
The second phase seeks to annihilate the enemy at the beach area, which extends approximately 40 kilometers outwards from anticipated invasion beaches.
The new concept is animated by the most critical mission of the Taiwan military: denying China the ability to land and resupply an invasion force.
The glaring problem here is that there is zero mention for what happens after the PLA has come on shore. Throughout the article, it makes mentions of how Taiwan could keep the PLA from landing sufficient forces on shore, but the tacit understanding is that once the PLA has come on shore, it's game over for Taiwan. Here is why:
Since 1984, Taiwan has been practicing the same on-shore defense in its annual Han Kuang exercises
, which emphasizes static shore defense bolstered with close-air support
. In the video, you see Apaches and tanks defend against any potential beach landings while protected by F-16 fighters overhead.
BUT: All of that is predicated on the ROC retaining air superiority!
Remember the mismatch of anti-air missiles for Taiwan's fighter force? If the PLA manages to shoot down just half(!) of the Mirage fighters, then Taiwan is stuck with a bunch of AAM they can't use. If the PLA takes out half of the radars to Taiwanese SAM batteries, then the PLA are much closer to air superiority. In those conditions, all the on-shore defenses will become an elaborate form of suicide.
The ROC Armed Forces has essentially been preparing for a fight with the PLA of the 1950s: largely infantry based with minimal air support. This is a problem with most militaries--they're constantly preparing for their last war instead of thinking of way to fight the next one.
The idea of abandoning on-shore defenses in favor of letting the PLA coming ashore and then conducting guerrilla warfare is political suicide to the ROC Armed Forces, whose office corps is aware of the fact that if Taiwan were to switch its military doctrine from shore defenses to asymmetric warfare, then the current officer corps would be out of a job. Therefore, they must stubbornly retain the idea of a near-suicidal beach defense to remain relevant.
Conclusion##
If Taiwan sticks to its current doctrine, the majority of its armed forces will come under relentless attack by the PLA in the opening hours of the conflict. By the time the PLA starts sending divisions across the strait, they'll be more or less be making an uncontested landing.
Taiwan's only hope of survival is for the US to come to its aid in the event of a Chinese invasion. In the meantime, it will put up a fierce, stubborn, but ultimately futile shore-defense - much like how the ROC put up a stubborn resistance against the Japanese at Shanghai in 1937 and got most of its professional army wiped out. Except, this time, there won't be room to conduct a 1500 mile retreat to Chongqing and grinding down the PLA in a war of attrition.
Meanwhile, the PLA is aware that Taiwan's pinning its hopes on America and her allies coming to its aid. Which is why they've invested so much in A2/AD assets designed to keep American and allied forces as far back from any potential AO as possible.
If you've noticed anything about how things have changed, it's that the US no longer sails carriers through the Taiwan strait in an attempt to dissuade China like it did in 1996--instead opting to send only missile destroyers
. Even in the South China Sea, no carriers have sailed anywhere near Chinese islands.
