Russian missiles – advanced technology, but funding required

[ironman]

Russian missiles – advanced technology, but funding required​

Today, Russian Precision Guidance Munitions [PGM] makers face the challenge of setting up a cost-efficient production of weapons, suitable for “4++” and 5th generation combat jets in conditions of limited access to long-term affordable finance.

Almost absent in the time of the Soviet Union, economic issues are the key question now. The once great Soviet-legacy technology potential has been reduced, while advanced aircraft (especially those of the 5th generation) come with new, demanding requirements. Specifications for 5th generation fighter jets demand weapons carriage in a limited volume of bays inside the fuselage. High-powered onboard radars need to be adequately matched by the performance of the missiles, and a large portion of Russian PGMs are exported. To stay competitive, they must have price tags below (or at least comparable to) western weapons otherwise they lose attractiveness.

New Russian jet types, notably the Su-34 interdiction aircraft, MiG-35 and Su-35 multi-role fighters and its exportable version FGFA (fifth generation fighter aircraft) feature advanced radars, with electronically scanned phased-arrays and digital shaping of the radar beam. Use of Soviet legacy PGMs is possible on these aircraft but the disparity between the weapons and platforms performance would render this combination far from ideal.

The 300km range

Russian strategic strike weapons have traditionally been fired at much longer ranges than 300km.

The Kh-55 cruise missile, and its derivatives, Kh-101 and Kh-555, have a firing radius of four digits. Derived from the naval Granat series, these weapons relied on the Glonass satellite navigation system, coupled with preloaded digital map for guidance onto a target. It seems likely that China acquired some Kh-55s that were produced in Kharkov, Ukraine. The Chinese clone is designated C-602, however Glonass is unlikely to guide them to the target.

Still, the 300km range remains quite a challenge for developers of general purpose tactical missiles, and air-to-air missiles. The pact between the White House and Kremlin on non-proliferation of strike missile technologies comes with a self-imposed limitation at 300km, making the figure even more desirable for certain developers and their customers.

At the turn of the century, China specifically asked for that range in relation to strike weapons. The requirement was put on the table during talks on Su-30MK2 multi-role fighter for PLA navy air units – 28 airframes delivered 2003-2004. At the time, it led to the resumption of certain missile programs. A Sukhoi managers recalls: “The Chinese asked us for what they called a ‘Long Striking Hand,’ with firing ranges much exceeding those for ordinary R-77, R-27, Kh-29 and Kh-31P missiles sold to them before. They asked that the aircraft be able to fire at enemy targets at maximum range before being detected.”

This only encouraged Russian designers who had started thinking of such weapons in the late 1980s. The Soviet air force had similar intentions when putting together specification for the Su-27M. In turn, this reflected the success of the Russian air defense force crews manning the S-200 long-range SAM. Defending Latakia during the 1982-1984 in the Lebanon War, Russian servicemen claimed the shooting down of an Israeli air force E-2 Hawkeye AWACS – a very valuable target previously considered out of reach.

Since that time, the 300km range has been obsession of Russian developers working on tactical missile systems for Su-30MK derivatives. With China seeking even more advanced weapons, further sales of “300km-class” PGMs are expected. This stimulates Russian exporters.

With a tightening security regime in Russia, details of their work remain scarce. However, there are indications that certain earlier shelved programs have been resumed, such as the Novator KS-172 air-to-air missile with 750kg launch weight and advertised range of 400km. By comparison, the biggest Russian AAM to have entered service (but never exported), the R-33, has launch weight of 490kg and range between 120-160km. The range of the exportable R-27ER-1 is 130km. Another heavy missile, the R-31P with 200+km range, represents “air-to-air” version of the anti-ship Kh-31A. Reportedly, it was flight tested before the turn of the century and shelved subsequently, with no news of program resumption. There have been suggestions that a new missile with an active radar seeker, developed for the Buk M1-2 SAM, may also equip fighters. The missile, apparently a further evolution of the 9M317 accepted into Russian service in 1999, weighs about 720kg and currently undergoes firing trials.

Another extended range missile under work is ramjet version of the R-77 (export designation RVV-AE), dubbed “AMRAAMski” in the West. The initial R-77 entered service in 1994 and by now has been exported to several countries, including China and India. It is believed that its latest version under development shall match the AIM-120C-9 (AIM-120D), with range extended to 170-180km. Initial proposals of such a derivative surfaced in mid-1990s.

During a Le Bourget Airshow earlier this decade, people manning the stand of the Vympel design house were distributing leaflets of a ramjet-powered missile with the top part torn off. They explained that at the beginning of the show they were instructed to “amend” the handout to conceal the designation of the missile. The general view and advertised performance was clear – launch weight rises from 175kg (RVV-AE) to 225kg, reflecting the replacement of solid-propellant engine with “…hybrid solid fuel ramjet with controllable consumption of cruise gas generator.”

Resumption of interest in 300km weapons is caused by significant success in development of advanced fighter radars. The most advanced is the N-035 Irbis on the Su-35, existing in several prototypes, including one designated the 902. The N-035’s advertised performance boasts detection range in excess of 400km against aerial targets with a cross-section of 3sq.m. The radar has a resolution of one metre when working in ground observation mode. Russian specialists believe the Su-35 can detect the F-22A Raptor at a distance of 165-240km with the Irbis radar and 70km in the rear and 40km in the forward hemisphere, with the OLS-35 electro optics locator. Ranges for previous generation aircraft with less stealth features are even higher.

Another platform with capable sensors is the MiG-31B/BN that completed acceptance trials with the Russian air force and has entered service in small numbers (in-service MiG-31s are turned into this version during major repair at NAZ Sokol manufacturing plant). The MiG-31BM features Zaslon-AM radar with fighter detection range of 280-300km. The Indian air force Su-30MKI features N011M Bars that can detect a fighter target at 140km. Similarly equipped Algerian Su-30MKA and Malaysian Su-30MKM are currently the most advanced Russian-built fighters exported. The Chinese Su-30MK2 has the less sophisticated N-001M unit.

The Flanker series have an advertised weapons load of 8,000kg. The central under fuselage hard point can bear a load of 4,000kg. This is sufficient to attach such large weapons as PJ-10 BrahMos or Yakhont, its Russian prototype (other designation Onix). After a long wait, Sukhoi have recently sent a positive answer to the Indian air force’s question whether a PJ-10 could actually be fitted onto Su-30MKI central pylon. But the aircraft will have to fire or drop the load, since it cannot land with it. BrahMos started deliveries of the Mach 3 PJ-10 missiles for the Navy in 2005 and the Army in 2006.

Reports in the Russian media insist that around 1992, an air launched version of the 3M80E Moskit was adapted into service. At 4,000kg launch weight, such a weapon appears to be the heaviest fitting to the Flanker – in this particular case the Su-34. The 3M80 is powered by 3D83 ramjet engines. This anti-ship missile entered service in early 1980s and it equips Russian Navy and PLA Navy Project 956 destroyers.

Another “de-navalised” system is Novator’s Club (Club-N on Indian navy Project 11356 frigates, Club-S on the Indian navy and PLA Navy “Kilo” class submarines Project 636, 636M and 877EKM). At Aero India 2007, RSK MiG advertised the MiG-35 as able to carry 3M-14AE, air-launched version of the 2275kg baseline cruise missile with firing range of 235km. The fighter is offered to the Indian air force MMRCA tender with these missiles in the package.

A shore-based version of the Club has been selected by two Asian nations. China is not among them, with its preference laying with the Kh-59MK in the Su-30MK2 delivery package. At ILA’2008 the Tactical Missile Corporation revealed information on the Kh-59MK2 with advertised range of 285km. Fire trials of this version were said to be “…ongoing and nearly complete.” The 5.7m-long missile weighs 900kg, coming either with a 320kg penetrating or 283kg cassette type warheads. The Kh-59MK2’s propulsion is similar to the Granat series, including its Club derivatives. A dual-flow turbojet engine on under fuselage pylon accelerates the missile to 900-1,050km/h. The Kh-59MK2 is a “fire-and-forget” weapon intended for stationary targets with known coordinates. Pre-programmed trajectories can be employed, including terrain following at 50-300m altitude using satellite navigation and digital maps. Near the target the OE-M homing head is activated, giving 3-5m accuracy.

The Kh-59MK series has attracted several customers, including the Russian air force. The missile, with both TV and radar heads, was seen on a few occasions under Su-24M2 interdiction aircraft, allowing a conclusion that the system has been accepted into Russian service. At one time, the Su-24 was the only type to carry initial Kh-59 (with tele-code homing system) since 1984. Some were assembled at Smolensk plant before the Russian MoD ran out of money. Reportedly, four missiles were used in the Chechen campaign against bridges and rebel pint-point targets in the mountain areas. These missiles had a TV head and solid-propellant propulsion. With the advent of RDK300 compact dual-flow turbojet engine on the Kh-59M, the range more than doubled. This version had more accuracy with an active radar head. Information on it first surfaced in 1992, but economic difficulties halted its development until 2002 when China took an interest.

Now with the radar-guided Kh-59MK series being procured for the Russian air force, the nation is adding a second air-launched anti-ship system in active service - the K-22M using the Kh-22 missiles on Tu-22M3 swing-wing bombers. At one time an exportable version of the huge supersonic Kh-22E was on offer, with an advertised range of 290km.

In the near term, Russia will make every effort to raise sales of the 300+ km systems that seems to be of interest to Asian customers – including those who have filled its stocks with less advanced weaponry.

The future of tactical missile systems may have a hypersonic nature. Russia is now preparing the GLL-AP-2 hypersonic flying laboratory weighing 550-600kg – like general purpose tactical missiles. It runs on carbon-hydrogen fuel with active flight lasting 30 seconds. At an altitude of 20-30km, the vehicle is expected to develop Mach number M=4-6. If experiments on this and other demonstrators end up with a positive result, the technologies will feed the ambitions plan of BrahMos joint venture between Russia and India to develop the BrahMos-2 strike missile which would fly hypersonically, at Mach number M=5.6. Development time is said to be five years, but this seems to be too optimistic.

Hypersonic themes are a good illustration of the change in Russian policies of publicity. Previously the Raduga design house has shown a full scale mockup of GELA, the Russian acronym for “Hypersonic Experimental Air Vehicle.” It looked like a prototype of a hypersonic strike missile. Today, if you find Raduga people at an air show and ask about GELA, they would answer that they do not know what you are talking about. In the 1990s, Russia was openly demonstrating some of its very advanced weaponry, including development prototypes. Russian firms had permission to demonstrate their new systems in a hope that foreign investors be found, willing to pay for completion of the work on commercial terms. Some of the systems demonstrated that time are “classified” now.

Shorter range

At the MAKS’2007 exhibition, the Tactical Missile Corporation demonstrated three new items, the Kh-38ME multipurpose, Kh-58UKShE anti-radiation and Kh-31AD anti-ship missiles. The Kh-38ME was being prepared for tests, the Kh-31AD and Kh-58UShKE were undergoing firing trials. The Kh-38ME is a totally new design. It is developed for the destruction of armoured, strengthened or non-fortified targets, as well as ships, at a distance up to 40km. Provision is made for ease of combining homing systems and warheads, so as to give air force units a flexible tactical weapon system fitting fixed wing aircraft and helicopters. The missile’s length is 4.2m and fuselage diameter 0.31m. Launch weight is given at 520kg, warhead at 250kg or 48%. Previous Kh-25M had the latter figure at less than 30%. Four versions were announced: the Kh-38MLE with laser semi-active guidance; Kh-38MKE navigating by satellite signals; Kh-38MTE with TV self-homing; and Kh-38MAE with an active radar head. Wing and empennage are made folding, for ease of fitting into internal weapons bays of 5th generation fighters.

Apparently, the Kh-38MLE is intended replacement for long-serving Kh-29 and Kh-25 families of general purpose tactical missiles. Both were used during Soviet invasion of Afghanistan, with Su-25 attack aircraft having fired 139 missiles at the rebels. The Kh-29 weighs 660-680kg, and exists in two major versions, the Kh-29T with TV homing and Kh-29L with laser.

The Kh-25 is lighter, at 300kg. This model’s history goes back to early 1960s, when MiG-19 and Su-9 crews tried firing RS-2US radar-beam riding air-to-air missiles at high-contrast ground targets. The RS-2US later evolved into Kh-66 (entry into service 1966) with engines from another air-to-air missile, the R-8. The Kh-66 served as a platform for smarter Kh-23 and then Kh-25. The Kh-25M family entered service in 1981. It employed modular principles, allowing easy replacement of warheads. Indexes changed accordingly for MR, ML, MP, MT, MTP, MA or MPU. After USSR collapsed, only Kh-25ML was kept in production, until 1997. A total of about 25,000 Kh-25M family missiles were assembled, more than 5,000 exported. For some, shelf-life was extended to 20 years. Most of Kh-25s and Kh-29s were useful only in daylight and good weather.

The production stopped for economic reasons. Still, the manufacturer continued efforts on improving baseline design, in a hope Russian MoD would place orders. In 1999, the Kh-25MAE with active radar head was demonstrated. Another new version is Kh-25MCE, combining radio-command and satellite guidance, and capable of all-weather use against stationary or slow-moving targets. A thermal imager was also tried onto the platform.

Since entry-into-service in 1980, the Kh-58 armed Su-24 interdiction aircraft. The recent version Kh-58UShKE is anti-radar weapon with passive wide-frequency band homing head coupled with inertial navigation. The missile has a foldable wing, for container storage. Firing altitude ranges between 200 and 20,000m, range between 76-245km. Launch weight is 650kg, including 149kg warhead.

Another anti-radiation missile revealed recently is the Kh-31PD with range of 150km. It has an extended fuselage for larger fuel storage as compared to the initial Kh-31P, with 110km range. The latter passed fire trials in 1988. Next year, the Kh-31A with active radar seeker extended the arsenal of the Su-24M interdiction aircraft. Few production examples were assembled before the Soviet Union collapsed. Desperate for sales, the manufacturer applied to the US Navy, being selected as an air drone with help of McDonnell Douglas. US Navy QF-4B Phantoms made successful launches of this drone in 1996. Sufficient orders came from other direction, though. Since 1997 production of Kh-31 has resumed as a result of contracts with India, China, Vietnam and Yemen.

The Kh-31 series uses a combined solid-propellant/ramjet engine, with the former acting as a booster, and latter as a sustainer, with the 600kg missile cruising at speeds 4100-4700 km/h. “P” versions is for “passive” (anti-emission), “A” for active (radar head).

The Kh-35E development began almost simultaneously with the Kh-31, but it was quite another story. The 620kg missile is subsonic, propelled by compact R95TM300 dual-flow turbojet, giving it 130km firing range. The same basic missile was meant for three applications: air-to-air (Kh-35E), ship (3M24 Uran) and coastal defense (Bal). While the Kh-31A/P fire trails necessitated 150 launches during 5 years, the Kh-35E was accepted into service after 26 launches, with first in 1985. Development of the active radar head took longer than expected. It was ready in 1992, the year the whole project was shelved due to funding shortages. India rescued it from oblivion. In 1993-1996, a series of contracts was signed. Accepted into Indian service in 1999, the Uran-E systems armed 12 Indian navy ships within six years. In 1999, Ilyushin ordered an air launched version for the Il-38SD antisubmarine warfare aircraft for the Indian navy. In 2005, two successful launches were made from Il-38SD.

The Russian MoD ran its own acceptance trials on the Kh-35E as part in the Uran-E ship and Bal-E shore systems in 2003-2005. Latest modifications included improved radar seeker, more smart and resistant to jamming. Plans call for adopting the Kh-35E onto the Su-30MK and MiG-29K fighters.

Strategy

In 2002, Vladimir Putin established the Tactical Missile Corporation, Russian acronym, TRV. Now it unites about 20 companies, including all leading developers of tactical missiles. TRV reported strong growth in 2005-2007, mainly with sales to India and China. Last year the sales began to subside. “Many of the items that are exported in numbers today will have their export potential depleted in the next few years,” TRV general manager Boris Obnosov said. The lion’s share of export is Soviet legacy designs. Some of them remain competitive through modernisation, but many are becoming outdated. There are too many types, and many can only be used in daylight and good weather conditions. TRV has reduced the number of types from 21 to 12, and plans further reductions.

For the next 2-3 years, testing will continue on new systems “…so as to supply the fifth generation fighter market with new missiles,” Obnosov says. The State budget allocates funds for only part of new R&D programs. Attracting commercial credits may reduce the development cycle, but the banking interest rates in the Moscow capital market have risen from 10-12% to some 20%. This makes credits unaffordable. It becomes increasingly difficult to raise sufficient funding for long-term R&D. Stricter rules on advertising new products have led to a situation when getting permission takes “a few years.” In some cases, Russian makers can get such permission only after their weapon passes firing trials. This makes it impossible to raise funding at early stages of development, when cash is very much needed to reduce development cycle.

So, creating a new missile becomes a trickier game. Obnosov hopes TRV will be on time with new products. “It is a key point, to create a new weapon on time, when it is actually needed. Making it earlier does not pay off. Using new weapons on older platforms is not sensible. It is paramount to develop new weapons at such a time when the aircraft itself ready.”
Most important directions for TRV are: use round-the-clock, in all weathers; and higher invulnerability to jamming by means of many-channel guidance. New activities include unmanned reconnaissance-and-strike methods using UCAVs as a weapons platform. Higher technical performance necessitates intensive use of advanced materials and propulsion (further development of hypersonic engines is specially mentioned), information and telecommunication technologies, decision making technologies, simulation and modeling, and artificial intelligence. Trajectory control is becoming increasingly important for greater ranges and also for overcoming defenses on the way to the target.

Defence Review Asia Magazine | June 09