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Rommel VS Montgomery Art of War

Lol some people talk about things without doing any prior research.
Exactly.
Rommel was a gentleman. The Arabs viewed him favorably over the British and Italians. He forbade his troops from scorched Earth tactics (poisoning wells, destroying villages, burning of crops etc) out of respect for the locals even though this gave his enemies an advantage.
Praising your own heroes and military commanders is obv a good thing one must never forget his own heroes but to diss/abuse others just because they were better or you personally don't like them is not the way to go.

Wehrmacht Generals have contributed a lot to how wars will/should be fought Guderian for eg Operation Barbarossa is still taught in our military academies if i am not wrong pulling off something like that is not an "easy" task how and why it failed can be discussed but this is a hard fact that in 6 months they captured over 2000 KM of territory and destroyed countless Soviet field armies respect and credit should be given where it's due. @Signalian

You know it's really disturbing to see comments from senior members and than praises for such comments from even more senior/proffessional members.
 
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@The Sandman

I have a very high opinion of the combat performance of the Wehrmacht in person. What it pulled off in WW2, was beyond the capability of most armies of its time and even today.

Nobody has doubts about the tactical genius of Bernard Law Montgomery and Erwin Rommel. What these two general pulled off in the battlefield, is far ahead of anything we have seen in wars between Pakistan and India; Sir @Irfan Baloch pointed out the same.
 
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@MastanKhan @Irfan Baloch @Indus Falcon @Joe Shearer @hellfire @Mentee @Knuckles @Rafi
Which one of the arts of war resembles most with India and Pakistan?
A mix of both Generals in rare occasions, however mostly resembling Montgomery and lesser to that of Rommel. Ranks at level of Lt. Col, Brig and once or twice at Maj General Level performed brilliantly. At Lt. Gen and Gen level, the results were usually disappointing. That was in the past (65,71 etc)
The recently and continually fought WOT on western front has seen many successful operations planned and executed with good results from all commanding ranks upto General levels. I haven't researched thoroughly to compare fully with Rommel/Montgomery art of war, so apologies on that account. I can however give you an outline.

From past, You can read about:
1. Brig. Iftikhar Janjua (Rann of Kutch ops under 8 Div, 1965)
2. Now promoted, Maj General Iftikhar Janjua (23 Division attack on Chamb, 1971)
3. Brig Tajamul Hussain Malik (203 Brigade Operation in E-pak, 1971)
4. Brig Nisar (Changez force, 1971)

In recent WOT.
1. Operation Zarb-e-Azab
2. Operation Radd-ul-Fassad.
The Divisional commanders, brigade commanders as well as the GHQ staff like DGMO planned and carried out the operation professionally. There have been many troop formations involved during the operations. However 7 and 9 Divisions along with FC were always present. The professionalism shown by likes of Gen Raheel Shareef, GOC's and different IG FC's can be viewed and read.
 
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whereas the above mentioned 2 scumbags fought their wars in the occupied lands at the expense of those unfortunate people . one general represented a fascist homicidal maniac whereas the other represented a repressive imperial regime that had killed millions of people through starvation and war.

And that is the truth.
 
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Erwin Rommel's Art of War
A set of possible major categories of operational principles was compiled during research. The purpose of selecting major categories, as they became evident during research, was to focus the research process. Also, the categories allow an organized presentation of Rommel's operational principles, and will laid the comparison with Bernard Montgomery. The categories are:
  • Combined Arms
  • Offensive Action
  • Momentum
  • Command and Control - Decision-making
  • Risk
  • Strategic Linkage
  • Operational Sustainment
  • Reinforcement of Success - Exploitation of Opportunity

The operational principles of Erwin Rommel, organized into those major categories, are:

Combined Arms

o Use the air arm (or other long-range fire support) to disrupt the enemy in time and space.

o Use non-mobile forces, where best suited, to deny enemy options; use mobile forces, in large groupings, against the (enemy's dispersed mobile forces.

o Plan to reduce the effect of the enemy's combined arms force; plan to create multiple combined arms effects for which the enemy is neither physically nor mentally prepared.

o Air-ground cooperation is imperative. Air reconnaissance,- long-range bombing, and close support are required for a successful ground plan.

o Tanks protect the infantry by destroying anti-infantry weapons and positions; infantry protects tanks by destroying anti-tank weapons and positions.

o Maneuver-fire support coordination is a must for successful operations. Planning and liaison must be coordinated at all levels.

o Organize forces so as to produce the maximum amount of cooperation among the arms.

Offensive Action

o Offensive action (attack or counterattack) decides the issue.

o Attack to a depth beyond the enemy's reserves to reach the operational goal. -. "He wins who fires first and can deliver the heaviest fire."

o The enemy's sustaining base is a proper operational objective. Attack it and the enemy's ability to continue the fight is greatly reduced.

o Flanking and enveloping attacks threaten the enemy, attack, his will, and cause him to pause. The pause creates further opportunity to attack.

Momentum

o Keep moving at the greatest possible speed to the objective (and beyond it if the circumstances dictate).

o Do not limit the counterattack to reducing enemy forces in the main area of battle. Continue the counterattack into the enemy rear.

o Time is the critical element of mission accomplishment. Speed is the critical element in accomplishing the mission in the prescribed time.

o It is allowable to bypass points of local resistance. Follow-on detachments can reduce these. The main force must continue to its assigned objectives.

o Demand and continue to accept nothing less than all-out performance from subordinate commanders and the staff when conducting high-tempo operations.

Command and Control - Decision-making

o Lead well forward.

o Consider the enemy's mentality and war-fighting methods when making decisions.

o Locate the small command and signal element at the decisive place.

o Look beyond merely countering the enemy's plan for today.

o Use simple techniques to facilitate rapid transmission of orders.

Risk

o Make decisions in order to reduce the greater risk. Risk may be reduced through surprise and speed of operations.

o Logistics risk may be reduced by seizing logistics centres, ports, and airfields. (This action sustains momentum.)

o Risk disobeying higher orders when favourable opportunities arise.

o Bluff, daring, and bold action confuse the enemy and, thereby, reduce risk.

Strategic Linkage (Note that Rommel failed here.)

o Ensure that operational goals are consistent with strategic objectives.

o Ensure that operational goals are within strategic means.

o Do not revise strategic objectives to be consistent with operational goals and methods.

Operational Sustainment (Note that Rommel failed here too.)

o Consider logistics requirements for achieving operational goals.

o Consider the depth of operational objectives in terms of sustainment.

o Consider the planned time of operations in terms of sustainment.

o Selection of proper objectives can mitigate initial logistics restraints.

Reinforcement of Success - Exploitation of Opportunity

o The enemy's sound estimate of our possible actions is a main ingredient for our success; his estimate allows opportunities to be created; once created, take full advantage of them.

o A pause in enemy thinking or action creates an opportunity to be taken advantage of.

o Do not stop pursuit because planned time or distance has been reached; continue with the successful action to deeper goals.

o Maintain the integrity of the main force in order to achieve the higher end.

Bernard Montgomery Art of War

The operational principles shown here were deduced from the information presented throughout the chapter. Each section of the chapter addressed, in part, the operational principles of Bernard Montgomery -- the development and evolution of his notions of war-fighting, the influence of prevailing doctrine, and the decisions he made in battle.

The operational principles of Bernard Montgomery, organized into the major categories are:

Combined Arms

o Air-ground cooperation is required for success in the land battle.

o Air superiority in the area of attack is required for a successful attack.

o Air force and army staffs should be located at the same headquarters.

o Mobile and non-mobile troops should be used to perform complementary tasks.

o The essential requirement is the cooperation of all arms. The cooperation is ensured through detailed planning.

Offensive Action

o Offensive action is required for victory.

o The defense can be used to wrest the initiative from the attacker; once gained, begin the offense.

o The object of all offensive action is to throw the enemy off balance and to keep him off balance.

Momentum

o Momentum can be maintained by keeping the enemy off balance.

o Switch major formations to the front of the attack to maintain momentum.

o Use concentrated firepower to break through the crust of enemy defenses.

Command and Control - Decision-making

o The commander must make the plan.

o The commander must not become immersed in details.

o Train staffs and subordinates to work and act on verbal orders.

o The scope of operations must be limited to that which has a good and reasonable chance of success.

o Match the objective with the capabilities of the force.

o It is imperative that the commander understand what is required to succeed in battle.

o The commander's major effort is to ensure that the basic operational aspects of the plan remain intact.

o Simplicity is vital in planning operations.

Risk

o Planning and preparation reduce uncertainty and risk.

o Do not take risks that involve unaffordable losses.

Strategic Linkage

o Match the strategically desirable to what is tactically possible with the forces available.

o Decide the development of operations before the initial blow is struck.

o View the plan as one whole; not only the operation at hand, but also the operation in the context of the campaign and the war.

Operational Sustainment

o Proper administration in the rear is required for a successful battle in the front.

o The plan must be resourced to achieve overwhelming power at the decisive point.

Reinforcement of Success - Exploitation of Opportunity

o Plan to maintain your own balance and to upset the enemy's balance; continue to press the enemy to prevent his regaining his balance.

Further Reading,
OPERATIONAL PRINCIPLES:
THE OPERATIONAL ART OF ERWIN ROMMEL AND BERNARD MONTGOMERY
by
I T.L. MCMAHON, MAJ, USA
B.A., Washington College, 1965



According to me it is not even comparable. Since it neither suits Pakistan's or India's military doctrine. Our's are mostly tit-for-tat responses and mostly confined in and around Kashmir. We never expect, and mark the word expect the war to explode out of proportion. The fact that India didn't expect Pakistan forces to occupy Kargil heights or Pakistan never expected India to open a new front along IB in 1965.

I'm pretty sure that it's never in the remote thoughts let alone doctrine of India to occupy Quetta or Peshawar some day or Pakistan thinking of occupying Bangalore and Chennai. It's just impossible for both nations. And neither are we ready to fight a war of attrition, the fact that all Indo-Pak wars simply ended on UN table. :p:
 
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@MastanKhan @Irfan Baloch @Indus Falcon @Joe Shearer @hellfire @Mentee @Knuckles @Rafi
Which one of the arts of war resembles most with India and Pakistan?


I would take it as a dynamic process, an interplay of the above principles while adapting to the dynamism in the battlefield.

When the insistence on the commander dissociating him/herself from the finer points of the planning and instead delegate it to the staff, which has to be adequately trained, there are imperatives like limitation in the knowledge base of the staff involved (it may be lack of familiarity with the terrain or a dissonance between the difficulties envisaged to those actually encountered, or even mundane but critical issues like amount of water to be carried) or the flexibility and dynamism as a character trait.

Why I am giving an example of flexibility and dynamism is due to the "fog of war", a condition of delay/dissonance in the information to the imperatives of action required. This proves to be, more oft than not, of critical importance in execution of a military task and the result thereof. Similarly, with evolving tactical situation or change in strategic situation, at times in a matter of hours, the overall aim may change, and therefore, a commander not abreast with the plans being executed, may be hard put to match his/her resources to the task needed to be urgently executed.

I believe all commanders follow these principles, be it at a section/squad level, a platoon or even a Corps level. However, the importance is relative and quite dynamic.

PS: You will find the similarity in Jomini, von Clausewitz, Kautilya, Sun Tzu .. just to name a few. Each has tried to elucidate the principles on roughly same principles.

none
because both India and Pakistan are defending their own territories we cant afford to gamble large parts of the land to try out war tactics of fake retreat encircling and maneuvers . there are large populations on either side of the borders (southern part along Rajhistan being exception).

Even that is not possible on the Indian side.

whereas the above mentioned 2 scumbags fought their wars in the occupied lands at the expense of those unfortunate people . one general represented a fascist homicidal maniac whereas the other represented a repressive imperial regime that had killed millions of people through starvation and war.

So, when they were fighting for respective political belief system, what do they deserve to be tagged as scumbags? Isn't that what the armed forces of any nation are required to do, execute the political directive? By calling them scumbags, don't you think that as a professional, it leaves even others to varying degree of interpretation and name calling?

it is time we celebrate our own war heroes of the past.

True, but then, they too have followed respective political directives, which may be construed as being 'scumbag' like, where do we draw the line?

Isn't our doctrine is to stop Indian thrust in it's tracks?

No, it would be to check. There is a very subtle difference.
 
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o Planning and preparation reduce uncertainty and risk.

o Do not take risks that involve unaffordable losses.
When comparing Montgomery with Rommel, you have to keep in mind that Rommel was mostly working with his guts, some HUMINT and then reports from his local commanders, so mostly he was planning his moves in dark. Montgomery on the other hand, through Ultra from Bletchley Park had a clear idea about the condition of Rommel's supplies, troops fighting condition and in some cases even his plans. So Montgomery had a clear advantage over Rommel when it comes to preparation and risk management.
 
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When comparing Montgomery with Rommel, you have to keep in mind that Rommel was mostly working with his guts, some HUMINT and then reports from his local commanders, so mostly he was planning his moves in dark. Montgomery on the other hand, through Ultra from Bletchley Park had a clear idea about the condition of Rommel's supplies, troops fighting condition and in some cases even his plans. So Montgomery had a clear advantage over Rommel when it comes to preparation and risk management.
Exactly. Thats what make Rommel a formidable commander.
 
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When comparing Montgomery with Rommel, you have to keep in mind that Rommel was mostly working with his guts, some HUMINT and then reports from his local commanders, so mostly he was planning his moves in dark. Montgomery on the other hand, through Ultra from Bletchley Park had a clear idea about the condition of Rommel's supplies, troops fighting condition and in some cases even his plans. So Montgomery had a clear advantage over Rommel when it comes to preparation and risk management.
Rommel had quite a lot of inside information due to the incompetence of Americans based in Cairo. He would know most of the allied plans well in advance.

While Rommel was an inspiring tactical leader, he did not do his job in Africa.
He was tasked to stabilize the situation, and he wasted his resources on a number of offensives which were his ideas, not the ideas of the general staff.
The logistic support they were prepared to spend were not enough,
so he ran out of supplies.
 
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