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Road to 1965 war – Part 1
Global Village Space |
Kashmir is simmering with a brazen homegrown resistance movement against the Indian state. Since last year, Kashmir is back as the main issue which could potentially start a war between two nuclear-armed rivals in India and Pakistan.
The war in 1965 has been couched in historical aberrations where historians from both sides of the border take diametrically different positions.
War and Kashmir have been intrinsically intertwined in the history of Indo-Pak ties. Both have locked horns many times in the past seven decades. The skirmishes in 1947-48 were followed by a full war in 1965. The war in 1965 has been couched in historical aberrations where historians from both sides of the border take diametrically different positions.
This is the first article of the six-part series which attempts to understand the 1965 war from its planning to its conduct and termination.
Read more: Changing Kashmir’s demography: India’s tactics to win Kashmir
PART-1
The first Kashmir war did not end in a decisive solution for either of the contestants. Pakistanis felt frustrated and bitter while their leadership tried to hide behind the United Nations resolutions and similar excuses.
On the other hand, Nehru, the man who had promoted himself as a person, symbolizing India, was generally content with what India had grabbed. For now, he appeared sated like a cat after it has polished off the mouse. For him, Pakistan-administered Kashmir could wait for another day. The Indian leadership, however, occasionally made noises about recovering the chunks of Kashmir India had lost to Pakistan.
According to the Indian version, Pakistan Army, having received military aid from the United States during the Cold War, and encouraged by India’s defeat in the 1962 Sino-India border war, was longing for a showdown with India.
Breaking the inertia was the main motive for Pakistan to move forward, hence the 65 War. There are many theories about the causes of this war. The explanation given by the Pakistani leadership is the refusal by India to grant the right to self-determination to the Kashmiris.
According to the proponents of this theory, the Valley was simmering with unrest due to the inept Kashmiri leadership, high- handedness of the occupation administration, and perhaps because Indian leadership was contemplating on withdrawing the special status accorded to the state under the Indian Constitution.
Presumably, Ayub based his calculations on two premises 1) a contrived insurgency will result in a major revolt against the Indian occupation. 2) The operations will remain localized to the disputed state. Bhutto’s opponents accuse him of misguiding Ayub regarding the second premise. This does not, however, exonerate Ayub from his responsibility.
According to the Indian version, Pakistan Army, having received military aid from the United States during the Cold War, and encouraged by India’s defeat in the 1962 Sino-India border war, was longing for a showdown with India.
Whatever the reason, Ayub Khan took steps to break the inertia. There should be nothing to apologize about this and start a blame game. However, Ayub started a war without proper planning and with faulty appreciation. Presumably, Ayub based his calculations on two premises 1) a contrived insurgency will result in a major revolt against the Indian occupation. 2) The operations will remain localized to the disputed state. Bhutto’s opponents accuse him of misguiding Ayub regarding the second premise. This does not, however, exonerate Ayub from his responsibility.
Read more: Pakistan finally learns what it must do to help Kashmiris
Escalation
Rann of Kutch, comprising an area of 30,000 square kilometers, is a seasonal salt marshland located between the Indian state of Gujarat and the southern tip of Pakistan’s Sindh province. Due to its marshy nature, the area was not regularly patrolled on the Pakistani side. In January 1965 the Indians reinforced the area with approximately two BSF battalions, and their patrols started probing forward towards the Rangers posts located along the Customs Track – the de-facto border.
Pakistan Army, while denying the Indian Army the possession of Rahimki Bazaar Post, captured Biar Bed, a strip of marshland to the south- west of the de facto international border.
There were accusations and counter accusations by both the sides about border violations. These were followed by attacks on each other’s posts. Pakistanis blamed Indians of establishing new posts on their side of the border, particularly the Sardar Post which was established in March 1965 on a high ground located to the south- west of Rahimki Bazaar.
The ensuing skirmishes remained localized and, harking back to the era of the limited wars, the two air chiefs agreed on keeping their respective air forces out of the conflict. Pakistan Army, while denying the Indian Army the possession of Rahimki Bazaar Post, captured Biar Bed, a strip of marshland to the south- west of the de facto international border. This was hailed as a great victory for Pakistan. Emboldened by the setback to the Indians, Major General Tikka Khan, GOC 8 Division, outlined a tactical plan called Plan Alpha to capture the northern half of the Rann. However, Ayub Khan did not allow such an offensive. Ayub Khan’s critics think he had missed an opportunity to push India further to the south (Ali, 2009; Gauhar, 1993).
Read full article.......
Road to 1965 war – Part 1
Global Village Space |
Kashmir is simmering with a brazen homegrown resistance movement against the Indian state. Since last year, Kashmir is back as the main issue which could potentially start a war between two nuclear-armed rivals in India and Pakistan.
The war in 1965 has been couched in historical aberrations where historians from both sides of the border take diametrically different positions.
War and Kashmir have been intrinsically intertwined in the history of Indo-Pak ties. Both have locked horns many times in the past seven decades. The skirmishes in 1947-48 were followed by a full war in 1965. The war in 1965 has been couched in historical aberrations where historians from both sides of the border take diametrically different positions.
This is the first article of the six-part series which attempts to understand the 1965 war from its planning to its conduct and termination.
Read more: Changing Kashmir’s demography: India’s tactics to win Kashmir
PART-1
The first Kashmir war did not end in a decisive solution for either of the contestants. Pakistanis felt frustrated and bitter while their leadership tried to hide behind the United Nations resolutions and similar excuses.
On the other hand, Nehru, the man who had promoted himself as a person, symbolizing India, was generally content with what India had grabbed. For now, he appeared sated like a cat after it has polished off the mouse. For him, Pakistan-administered Kashmir could wait for another day. The Indian leadership, however, occasionally made noises about recovering the chunks of Kashmir India had lost to Pakistan.
According to the Indian version, Pakistan Army, having received military aid from the United States during the Cold War, and encouraged by India’s defeat in the 1962 Sino-India border war, was longing for a showdown with India.
Breaking the inertia was the main motive for Pakistan to move forward, hence the 65 War. There are many theories about the causes of this war. The explanation given by the Pakistani leadership is the refusal by India to grant the right to self-determination to the Kashmiris.
According to the proponents of this theory, the Valley was simmering with unrest due to the inept Kashmiri leadership, high- handedness of the occupation administration, and perhaps because Indian leadership was contemplating on withdrawing the special status accorded to the state under the Indian Constitution.
Presumably, Ayub based his calculations on two premises 1) a contrived insurgency will result in a major revolt against the Indian occupation. 2) The operations will remain localized to the disputed state. Bhutto’s opponents accuse him of misguiding Ayub regarding the second premise. This does not, however, exonerate Ayub from his responsibility.
According to the Indian version, Pakistan Army, having received military aid from the United States during the Cold War, and encouraged by India’s defeat in the 1962 Sino-India border war, was longing for a showdown with India.
Whatever the reason, Ayub Khan took steps to break the inertia. There should be nothing to apologize about this and start a blame game. However, Ayub started a war without proper planning and with faulty appreciation. Presumably, Ayub based his calculations on two premises 1) a contrived insurgency will result in a major revolt against the Indian occupation. 2) The operations will remain localized to the disputed state. Bhutto’s opponents accuse him of misguiding Ayub regarding the second premise. This does not, however, exonerate Ayub from his responsibility.
Read more: Pakistan finally learns what it must do to help Kashmiris
Escalation
Rann of Kutch, comprising an area of 30,000 square kilometers, is a seasonal salt marshland located between the Indian state of Gujarat and the southern tip of Pakistan’s Sindh province. Due to its marshy nature, the area was not regularly patrolled on the Pakistani side. In January 1965 the Indians reinforced the area with approximately two BSF battalions, and their patrols started probing forward towards the Rangers posts located along the Customs Track – the de-facto border.
Pakistan Army, while denying the Indian Army the possession of Rahimki Bazaar Post, captured Biar Bed, a strip of marshland to the south- west of the de facto international border.
There were accusations and counter accusations by both the sides about border violations. These were followed by attacks on each other’s posts. Pakistanis blamed Indians of establishing new posts on their side of the border, particularly the Sardar Post which was established in March 1965 on a high ground located to the south- west of Rahimki Bazaar.
The ensuing skirmishes remained localized and, harking back to the era of the limited wars, the two air chiefs agreed on keeping their respective air forces out of the conflict. Pakistan Army, while denying the Indian Army the possession of Rahimki Bazaar Post, captured Biar Bed, a strip of marshland to the south- west of the de facto international border. This was hailed as a great victory for Pakistan. Emboldened by the setback to the Indians, Major General Tikka Khan, GOC 8 Division, outlined a tactical plan called Plan Alpha to capture the northern half of the Rann. However, Ayub Khan did not allow such an offensive. Ayub Khan’s critics think he had missed an opportunity to push India further to the south (Ali, 2009; Gauhar, 1993).
Read full article.......
Road to 1965 war – Part 1
