third eye
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What is the author cribbing about ?
A civilian is obviously wrong in whatever he does with regard to India , but then the most cherished dictator in Pk history too did the same.
Retreat from Kashmir - Asif Ezdi
Pakistan has been observing February 5 every year for the last quarter century as the day to express solidarity with the people of Jammu and Kashmir in their struggle for self-determination. Nawaz Sharif was one of the prime movers behind the observance of the first Kashmir Solidarity Day in 1990. He was then serving as the chief minister of Punjab.
His decision, with the backing of the military, to hold mass political rallies in the province in support of the Kashmiris practically forced the federal government, then under Benazir Bhutto, to follow suit and declare the day a public holiday.
The Kashmir Solidarity Day has been an annual event since then. But Pakistan’s Kashmir policy has changed beyond recognition in the intervening years. The retreat began under Musharraf and was continued by Zardari. Nawaz is now following in the footsteps of his two illustrious predecessors. Kashmir no longer has a central place in the government’s foreign policy priorities, and support for the Kashmiri freedom movement has been drastically scaled down.
Most worrisome are indications that the Nawaz government, like Musharraf and Zardari before him, would be willing to reach a ‘settlement’ that would practically legitimise India’s illegal occupation of two-thirds of the state.
The first step down this slippery slope was taken by Musharraf in December 2003 when he said publicly that Pakistan was prepared to “lay aside” the UN Security Council resolutions upon which Pakistan’s stand on Kashmir largely rests. From the Indian side, its equivalent would be a statement by their prime minister that he no longer considers Kashmir to be an “inalienable part” of India.
From the time Musharraf made that infamous declaration, his government also cut down its diplomatic support for the Kashmir cause. In 2004, he began back-channel negotiations with India for an ‘out-of-the-box’ settlement. Fortunately, he could not succeed in his plans because of the popular movement against his rule triggered by the dismissal of the Supreme Court chief justice. It is no wonder that India still rues Musharraf’s ouster, as Manmohan did publicly in his press conference last month.
Zardari could not continue the back-channel negotiations, though he had planned to, because of the Mumbai terrorist attacks in November 2008. But he continued the retreat from Kashmir in other ways. During his presidency, the government virtually gave up its long-held position that Kashmir is the core issue between Pakistan and India and in November 2011 agreed to give MFN status to India, without even demanding that India should first dismantle the formidable non-tariff barriers that it has built up against imports from Pakistan.
The Nawaz government has not only continued the retreat from Kashmir started by Musharraf and Zardari but has put that policy on a fast track. This is evident in six specific areas.
First, the Nawaz government has been very cagey about referring to UN Security Council resolutions in its official statements on Kashmir. This is no doubt in deference to Indian wishes. The new formulation, which is much more flexible in its meaning and is therefore acceptable to the Indian side, is that Pakistan would like a Kashmir settlement that is in accordance with the “aspirations of the Kashmiri people.”
Even in his message and speech on the Kashmir Solidarity Day, Nawaz did not demand the implementation of the UN resolutions but only called for a settlement of the Kashmir issue according to the “aspirations of the Kashmiri people”. Happily, the resolution passed by the National Assembly on a proposal by Fazlur Rahman, chairman of the Special Parliamentary Committee on Kashmir, reiterates Pakistan’s traditional stand that the Kashmir dispute should be resolved through a plebiscite under UN auspices.
Second, although the government claims that it continues to extend political, diplomatic and moral support to the Kashmiris, the fact is that Pakistan has largely stopped raising the issue in international forums and has often remained silent even when clear evidence exists that Indian authorities are guilty of atrocities to suppress the voice of the Kashmiris. The latest instance is the silence of the government over the exoneration last month by an Indian court-martial of five Indian soldiers accused of shooting and burning five Kashmiri civilians at Pathribal in March 2000. Even Omar Abdullah has protested against the acquittal but the Pakistan government has kept quiet.
Third, the government has been carrying on a back-channel dialogue with India despite the suspension, at India’s bidding, of the structured bilateral talks between the two countries. The meetings in Dubai and other places between Shaharyar Khan and Lambah, the longstanding Indian envoy, are being kept secret, but there are enough grounds to be suspicious. There are indications that the agenda and other terms of the back-channel are being dictated by India.
While Pakistan is making concessions on questions of interest to India, such as trade and economic relations, there is no sign of Indian flexibility on items of importance to Pakistan, such as Siachen and the water issue. It is also a matter of concern that the regular institutions of state are being sidelined and thus prevented from giving their professional input.
There are also good reasons to fear that the ground is being prepared in the back-channel to resume talks on an ‘out-of-the-box’ settlement on Kashmir which were interrupted in 2007 when Musharraf shot himself in the foot by dismissing Iftikhar Chaudhry. The keenness of the Manmohan government to bring these talks to conclusion is no secret. The deal being negotiated was so advantageous to India that a BJP-led government under Modi after India’s elections would also surely be interested in reviving the talks.
Fourth, the Nawaz government, like its predecessor, has not only delinked trade from Kashmir, it is about to give India MFN status, though under the new label of ‘non-discriminatory trade access’, which it thinks will be more palatable to the Pakistani public. This commitment was reaffirmed by the commerce minister in his joint statement with his Indian counterpart last month.
Fifth, besides opening trade with India, the government is also racing to develop economic relations in other areas such as energy and investment. The sale of electricity to Pakistan is high on India’s bilateral agenda with Pakistan, despite India’s own electricity shortages. India evidently hopes to reap rich political benefits. What Pakistan has to gain from such a deal is not clear. At a cabinet meeting last month, most of the ministers reportedly opposed the proposal to import electricity from India but they were overruled by Nawaz.
Sixth, the government has hinted recently at the opening of the country’s land routes to India for transit trade. This prospect was also contained in the election manifesto of the PML-N. It has now been suggested that under the WTO Trade Facilitation Agreement signed in Bali last December, Pakistan is under an international obligation to provide transit facilities to all countries. This is a very questionable interpretation.
Although Article 11 of the Agreement, which deals with freedom of transit, contains some new provisions to simplify formalities and documentation, it does not impose any general obligation to allow transit facilities to all countries. The agreement also reiterates that all exceptions and exemptions under GATT will continue to apply.
If we connect all these the dots, a clear picture emerges. What that picture says is that the Nawaz government is considering a sell-out on Kashmir. Nawaz’s worldview, if he has one, has been formed by his experience as a successful businessman and industrialist. Most of his closest advisers also come from the same background. When confronted with a problem, they are adept at making deals and cutting corners.
But governing Pakistan calls for very different skills. It requires statesmanship, resoluteness, the ability to lay out a clear national vision and perseverance in pursuing it. These are not qualities that he or the hangers-on who surround him are likely to be able to develop.
Until a few months ago, it could be said safely that no Pakistani leader has done more damage to the cause of Kashmiri freedom than Musharraf. Today, he has serious competition from Nawaz for that honour.
A civilian is obviously wrong in whatever he does with regard to India , but then the most cherished dictator in Pk history too did the same.
Retreat from Kashmir - Asif Ezdi
Pakistan has been observing February 5 every year for the last quarter century as the day to express solidarity with the people of Jammu and Kashmir in their struggle for self-determination. Nawaz Sharif was one of the prime movers behind the observance of the first Kashmir Solidarity Day in 1990. He was then serving as the chief minister of Punjab.
His decision, with the backing of the military, to hold mass political rallies in the province in support of the Kashmiris practically forced the federal government, then under Benazir Bhutto, to follow suit and declare the day a public holiday.
The Kashmir Solidarity Day has been an annual event since then. But Pakistan’s Kashmir policy has changed beyond recognition in the intervening years. The retreat began under Musharraf and was continued by Zardari. Nawaz is now following in the footsteps of his two illustrious predecessors. Kashmir no longer has a central place in the government’s foreign policy priorities, and support for the Kashmiri freedom movement has been drastically scaled down.
Most worrisome are indications that the Nawaz government, like Musharraf and Zardari before him, would be willing to reach a ‘settlement’ that would practically legitimise India’s illegal occupation of two-thirds of the state.
The first step down this slippery slope was taken by Musharraf in December 2003 when he said publicly that Pakistan was prepared to “lay aside” the UN Security Council resolutions upon which Pakistan’s stand on Kashmir largely rests. From the Indian side, its equivalent would be a statement by their prime minister that he no longer considers Kashmir to be an “inalienable part” of India.
From the time Musharraf made that infamous declaration, his government also cut down its diplomatic support for the Kashmir cause. In 2004, he began back-channel negotiations with India for an ‘out-of-the-box’ settlement. Fortunately, he could not succeed in his plans because of the popular movement against his rule triggered by the dismissal of the Supreme Court chief justice. It is no wonder that India still rues Musharraf’s ouster, as Manmohan did publicly in his press conference last month.
Zardari could not continue the back-channel negotiations, though he had planned to, because of the Mumbai terrorist attacks in November 2008. But he continued the retreat from Kashmir in other ways. During his presidency, the government virtually gave up its long-held position that Kashmir is the core issue between Pakistan and India and in November 2011 agreed to give MFN status to India, without even demanding that India should first dismantle the formidable non-tariff barriers that it has built up against imports from Pakistan.
The Nawaz government has not only continued the retreat from Kashmir started by Musharraf and Zardari but has put that policy on a fast track. This is evident in six specific areas.
First, the Nawaz government has been very cagey about referring to UN Security Council resolutions in its official statements on Kashmir. This is no doubt in deference to Indian wishes. The new formulation, which is much more flexible in its meaning and is therefore acceptable to the Indian side, is that Pakistan would like a Kashmir settlement that is in accordance with the “aspirations of the Kashmiri people.”
Even in his message and speech on the Kashmir Solidarity Day, Nawaz did not demand the implementation of the UN resolutions but only called for a settlement of the Kashmir issue according to the “aspirations of the Kashmiri people”. Happily, the resolution passed by the National Assembly on a proposal by Fazlur Rahman, chairman of the Special Parliamentary Committee on Kashmir, reiterates Pakistan’s traditional stand that the Kashmir dispute should be resolved through a plebiscite under UN auspices.
Second, although the government claims that it continues to extend political, diplomatic and moral support to the Kashmiris, the fact is that Pakistan has largely stopped raising the issue in international forums and has often remained silent even when clear evidence exists that Indian authorities are guilty of atrocities to suppress the voice of the Kashmiris. The latest instance is the silence of the government over the exoneration last month by an Indian court-martial of five Indian soldiers accused of shooting and burning five Kashmiri civilians at Pathribal in March 2000. Even Omar Abdullah has protested against the acquittal but the Pakistan government has kept quiet.
Third, the government has been carrying on a back-channel dialogue with India despite the suspension, at India’s bidding, of the structured bilateral talks between the two countries. The meetings in Dubai and other places between Shaharyar Khan and Lambah, the longstanding Indian envoy, are being kept secret, but there are enough grounds to be suspicious. There are indications that the agenda and other terms of the back-channel are being dictated by India.
While Pakistan is making concessions on questions of interest to India, such as trade and economic relations, there is no sign of Indian flexibility on items of importance to Pakistan, such as Siachen and the water issue. It is also a matter of concern that the regular institutions of state are being sidelined and thus prevented from giving their professional input.
There are also good reasons to fear that the ground is being prepared in the back-channel to resume talks on an ‘out-of-the-box’ settlement on Kashmir which were interrupted in 2007 when Musharraf shot himself in the foot by dismissing Iftikhar Chaudhry. The keenness of the Manmohan government to bring these talks to conclusion is no secret. The deal being negotiated was so advantageous to India that a BJP-led government under Modi after India’s elections would also surely be interested in reviving the talks.
Fourth, the Nawaz government, like its predecessor, has not only delinked trade from Kashmir, it is about to give India MFN status, though under the new label of ‘non-discriminatory trade access’, which it thinks will be more palatable to the Pakistani public. This commitment was reaffirmed by the commerce minister in his joint statement with his Indian counterpart last month.
Fifth, besides opening trade with India, the government is also racing to develop economic relations in other areas such as energy and investment. The sale of electricity to Pakistan is high on India’s bilateral agenda with Pakistan, despite India’s own electricity shortages. India evidently hopes to reap rich political benefits. What Pakistan has to gain from such a deal is not clear. At a cabinet meeting last month, most of the ministers reportedly opposed the proposal to import electricity from India but they were overruled by Nawaz.
Sixth, the government has hinted recently at the opening of the country’s land routes to India for transit trade. This prospect was also contained in the election manifesto of the PML-N. It has now been suggested that under the WTO Trade Facilitation Agreement signed in Bali last December, Pakistan is under an international obligation to provide transit facilities to all countries. This is a very questionable interpretation.
Although Article 11 of the Agreement, which deals with freedom of transit, contains some new provisions to simplify formalities and documentation, it does not impose any general obligation to allow transit facilities to all countries. The agreement also reiterates that all exceptions and exemptions under GATT will continue to apply.
If we connect all these the dots, a clear picture emerges. What that picture says is that the Nawaz government is considering a sell-out on Kashmir. Nawaz’s worldview, if he has one, has been formed by his experience as a successful businessman and industrialist. Most of his closest advisers also come from the same background. When confronted with a problem, they are adept at making deals and cutting corners.
But governing Pakistan calls for very different skills. It requires statesmanship, resoluteness, the ability to lay out a clear national vision and perseverance in pursuing it. These are not qualities that he or the hangers-on who surround him are likely to be able to develop.
Until a few months ago, it could be said safely that no Pakistani leader has done more damage to the cause of Kashmiri freedom than Musharraf. Today, he has serious competition from Nawaz for that honour.
