Resetting ties with US

[jeypore]

The recent public allegations of the just retired US military chief, Adm Mullen, accusing the Pakistan Army and the ISI of encouraging the Haqqani ‘network’ to attack US targets in Kabul, allowing Taliban ‘safe havens’, and much else, have added insult to the injury of the US incursion in Abbottabad, continuing US drone strikes, the Raymond Davis incident and withheld military repayments. Further unilateral military intervention within Pakistan was also threatened but has since been retracted. The Democratic administration’s unofficial mouthpiece, the New York Times, went so far as to call for sanctions against the ISI and its personnel.

The sense of outrage in Pakistan is understandable. The Americans know full well that that their military and political difficulties in Afghanistan are mainly internal, not external; that Pakistan has never supported insurgent attacks against the US; that Pakistan has paid a terribly heavy price for its support to the US and cannot be expected to pay more; that the only solution is a negotiated peace and orderly withdrawal from Afghanistan.

Thus, to those in Islamabad who were prepared to persist in cooperating with Washington even after the US violations of Pakistan’s sovereignty, the ratcheted-up anti-Pakistan rhetoric has come as a rude surprise. Until earlier this year, Pakistan-US objectives in Afghanistan, if not tactics, seemed to be converging.

When former US defence secretary Gates visited the region last year, he noted that the Taliban were part of the political fabric of Afghanistan and would have to be accommodated in any settlement. Last October, Pakistan’s army chief conveyed some concrete suggestions to Washington. He advocated that the military strategy in Afghanistan should be subservient to the political strategy and that the peace process should start with a mutual de-escalation and halt in hostilities, enabling the dialogue with the insurgency to commence.

On Feb 18 this year, in a policy statement at the Asia Society, Secretary Clinton announced “an intensified diplomatic push to bring the Afghan conflict to an end”. She expressed US readiness to “reconcile with an adversary” and to support “an Afghan-led peace process supported by intense regional diplomacy”.

Most significantly, Clinton clarified that the US demands for the Taliban to “renounce violence, abandon the alliance with the Al Qaeda, and abide by the [Afghan] constitution” were no longer preconditions but the “necessary outcomes of any negotiation”. She added that “for reconciliation to succeed, Pakistan will have to be part of the process”.

On June 22, President Obama announced a new strategy for Afghanistan, which 1) envisaged an end to the US military role in Afghanistan by 2014 and 2) focused on counterterrorism against “Al Qaeda, its affiliates and adherents”. Pakistan conveyed its readiness to support both the US and President Karzai to achieve the objectives of a negotiated peace in Afghanistan. It deliberately (and perhaps wrongly) refrained from launching its own peace initiative.

Initial opposition to negotiations from the Taliban was anticipated. But the obstacles that have been raised in the way of the peace process by the US are surprising. First, although the Afghan peace council was available, and Pakistan’s offer of assistance on the table, the US attempted to use other channels for talks with the Taliban, both direct and through the ‘good offices’ of Germany and Qatar. These attempts failed; one of them, involving a Taliban impostor, quite embarrassingly. Thus, the prospects of dialogue have been complicated, if not impeded, by the US, not Pakistan, as American officials have asserted.

Second, despite President Obama and Secretary Clinton’s policy statements, US generals in Afghanistan have continued to adhere to what Gen Petraeus described as a strategy, of ‘swatting’ the Taliban ‘to the negotiating table’. From the outset, Pakistan made no secret of its reservations about this ‘fight and talk’ tactic.

It did not work for the Soviets; it is unlikely to work for the US (and Nato). It is incomprehensible that the US should want to attack and kill the very insurgent leaders with whom it wishes to negotiate peace. Attacking the Afghan insurgents will also push them closer to Al Qaeda, making it more difficult to isolate and ‘defeat’ the latter, supposedly the principal aim of the new Obama strategy.

Third, US officials added a codicil to the Obama strategy which was absent from his June 22 statement, that, even after 2014, the US would want to maintain a ‘limited’ military presence in Afghanistan.

In the famous words of the American baseball player, Yogi Berra: “This is déjà-vu all over again”! The Soviets too at one time wanted to leave behind a support force in Afghanistan. As it was for the Afghan Mujahideen in the 1980s, this desire for a permanent foreign military presence in Afghanistan will be a deal-breaker for the Taliban. Even if Karzai agrees to a new ‘strategic cooperation agreement’, allowing the stationing of US troops, Kabul will be obliged to retract this if and when a genuine Afghan peace is negotiated with the Afghan insurgency. But it is quite possible that the objective of those pressing for this permanent US military presence is precisely to scuttle the option of talking peace with the Taliban.

This prospect of a permanent military presence in Afghanistan also raises serious strategic concerns for Pakistan and other regional states. Such presence will provide the US with the capability not only for counter-insurgency operations within Afghanistan (and to prop up whoever it wants to hold power in Kabul) but also for intimidation and intervention against all of Afghanistan’s neighbours, including Pakistan.

In the aftermath of the Osama operation, and given Pakistan’s legitimate concerns about US intentions to ‘grab and snatch’ or destroy its nuclear capabilities, such a permanent US military presence in Afghanistan will no doubt evoke strong opposition from Islamabad (and, for similar reasons, from Tehran).

The recent Karzai lurch to New Delhi fits into the strategic mosaic that Islamabad fears is being put in place for this region.

Yet, it may be best for Pakistan to ignore this latest petulance. Afghanistan’s symbiotic links with Pakistan are dictated by geography, history, ethnicity, faith and economics. These cannot be changed. India’s potential for ‘encircling’ Pakistan through a western ‘pincer’ will be extremely limited without a US military ‘godfather’ in Afghanistan. If the US fears Pakistani ‘capabilities’ in Afghanistan, one can imagine how exposed Indian security forces would feel if their government committed the folly of deploying them in any capacity in Afghanistan.

Resetting Pakistan-US relations will require a mutual retreat from the rhetoric and recriminations of recent months. However, the major precondition for putting the Pakistan-US relationship back on track is a clear reconfirmation of the strategy announced by President Obama on June 22, 2011. It is up to the White House to bring all the elements of the administration — civilian and military — into line with the president’s declared policy.

However, if this policy has changed, or if it contains undeclared caveats that significantly change its content and portent, Pakistan must prepare itself for a period of tough tensions with its oldest, largest and most difficult ‘ally’. Islamabad should not itself escalate tensions but be prepared to defend its ‘red lines’ and respond to further provocations.

Although the correlation of forces, as the Soviets used to say, may be weighted against Pakistan, it has legitimacy and history on its side. Sooner rather than later, the US, like other foreign ‘visitors’, will realise that the cost of staying on in Afghanistan outweighs any present or future advantage.

The writer is a former Pakistan ambassador to the UN.

 

[jeypore]

India’s potential for ‘encircling’ Pakistan through a western ‘pincer’ will be extremely limited without a US military ‘godfather’ in Afghanistan. If the US fears Pakistani ‘capabilities’ in Afghanistan, one can imagine how exposed Indian security forces would feel if their government committed the folly of deploying them in any capacity in Afghanistan.

This yellow journalism cofuses me even more because it talks about one thing, but leads to other. Take Agno for example.....

Even further scare tactics used by these Pakistanies for the populace:

However, if this policy has changed, or if it contains undeclared caveats that significantly change its content and portent, Pakistan must prepare itself for a period of tough tensions with its oldest, largest and most difficult ‘ally’. Islamabad should not itself escalate tensions but be prepared to defend its ‘red lines’ and respond to further provocations.

ps.

link of course:

http://www.dawn.com/2011/10/23/resetting-ties-with-us.html

 

[jeypore]

Although the correlation of forces, as the Soviets used to say, may be weighted against Pakistan, it has legitimacy and history on its side. Sooner rather than later, the US, like other foreign ‘visitors’, will realise that the cost of staying on in Afghanistan outweighs any present or future advantage.

I love the part about the "CORRELATION OF FORCES"!!!!!!!!

And now all Pakistanies have today is this old saying that Soviets were kicked out so can US, but the problem is, problems are becoming reverse, but the old saying keeps on beating to the old useless drums!!!!!!!!!

 

[Imran Akhtar]

US Interests Demand Pak-Afghan Stability

By Sajjad Shaukat

Now when America has realised that its continued pressure tactics, followed by threatening style have failed on Pakistan, therefore, taking note of the ground realities, Washington has started displaying a realistic approach. America knows that without the support of Pakistan, withdrawal of foreign troops from Afghanistan in 2014 will not be completed. And the Taliban’s perennial attacks on the US-led NATO troops and Afghan forces will not allow the Kabul government to achieve stability in the post-2014 scenario. That is why, US wants a peace deal with the Afghan militants including Haqqani group, requesting Pakistan to play a key role in this context...

Original Article..

 

[muse]

Well done Jeypore - though unfortunately not enough of our forum readers have been able to appreciate the import of the thread.

So where do we stand after the "power" visit? Exactly where we were before the visit - The US are playing a very risky game, they don't hold the cards they wish they did, they know it and worse for them, the Pakistanis know it. The US message to Pakistan is the same, deliver the Talib to the US and get out of Afghanistan - The Pakistani response has been to put the US support to the TTP and other insurgents on the public agenda - I leave it you to figure how that will play in Pakistan, though if this forum is any kind of reflection of public opinion in Pakistan, we can all guess where this latest US effort at coercion will fare. Yet another failure

Pakistani and Indian readers should note that the Indian and Pakistani governments positions are actually much closer to each other than they are to the US position - it's quite incredible:


US puts the squeeze on Pakistan
By M K Bhadrakumar

In a carefully framed diplomatic formulation, India's External Affairs Minister S M Krishna has warned of "devastating consequences" if the United States and Pakistan failed to heal their rift. Krishna chose to speak in the presence of the visiting French Foreign Minister Alain Juppe at their joint press conference in New Delhi. France just pulled out the first batch of 200 troops from Afghanistan as part of its withdrawal plans. Krishna said:

This concerns the relationship between two friendly powers - the US and Pakistan - and it is India's desire that all outstanding issues between the two countries should be settled across the table and thereby, create a situation in the region which will be conducive for the development.

Because, anything which upsets the region will have devastating consequences on the developmental agenda of other countries and, more particularly, India. So, we sincerely hope that they will be able to solve their differences.

This is the nearest India has gone to imply that the US's regional strategies are not invariably or necessarily always working in the interests of regional security and stability.

Two, it is the most clear-cut signal so far that India is not party to the US pressure tactic against Pakistan. India is demonstratively giving a wide berth to the US-Pakistan boxing ring and is charting its own course toward the Afghan problem - and indeed toward the dialogue with Pakistan. If the word "US" in Krishna's string of consciousness can be replaced by "India", the formulation could as well have belonged to Krishna's American counterpart Hillary Clinton.

However, the salient that towers above all else is that Delhi is greatly worried at the latest turn to events and feels prompted to articulate its concerns in public. Indeed, Krishna spoke even as Clinton was arriving in Pakistan.

The fact is that the unthinkable seems to be happening. There is growing talk about a military conflict of some sort erupting on the Afghan-Pakistan border. With unprecedented candor, Pakistan's army chief Parvez Kiani admitted on Tuesday that he wouldn't rule out an attack by the United States on Pakistan. British newspaper the Independent quoted Pakistani army sources as saying the growing concentration of United States troops in the eastern sector of the Afghan-border signifies a "coordinated" move.

The core issue is what tangible gain could come out of a US military move against Pakistan. A military conflict with undefined, uncertain objective always carries the high risk of engendering unforeseen consequences. As a politician gearing up for a tough electoral battle, too, a military conflict involving US troops and likely war casualties wouldn't suit President Barack Obama. That being the case, what is the game plan?

Proxy war
The starting point is that the Afghan war cannot be won militarily. The budgetary environment in Washington and the opposition to the war in Western opinion compel the US to seek a political settlement, while the broader US regional strategies in Asia and the grand design for the advancement of the North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO) as a global force require the establishment of a long-term military presence in Afghanistan.

The US's doublespeak about the militant Haqqani network exposes its predicament. Hardly two months ago, US officials sat down with the Haqqani leadership in the presence of the head of Pakistan's Inter-Services Intelligence (ISI) Shuja Pasha. The back channel is at work even today between the US and the Haqqanis and, conceivably, ISI is continuing to provide its services as the facilitator. So, what happened all of a sudden?

Presumably, any US attack on Waziristan in Pakistan's tribal areas would be predicated on the faint hope of dividing the Pashtuns so that the latter's concerted opposition to the establishment of US military bases would dissipate. But the ground reality is that no matter the factionalism within the Taliban and the US's success - to a very limited extent, if any - to drive temporary wedges into that factionalism, Pashtuns have a great tradition of getting together whenever they come under attack by a foreigner.

These circumstances compel the US to lean on Pakistan to get the Taliban groups to fall in line with its strategic agreement with Kabul, which is all ready for signature. Washington is getting an optimal agreement with Kabul on its terms, finally, which despite his occasional bluster, Afghan President Hamid Karzai is simply unable to influence from his pitiably weak position on the Afghan political chessboard.

But the quicksands of Afghan (and regional politics) are treacherous and Washington would like to wrap up the agreement quickly. Time is running out since the agreement is expected to be signed against the diplomatic backdrop of the two upcoming international conferences on Afghanistan - in Istanbul on November 2 and in Bonn a month later.

What leverage does the US have on Pakistan to extract a shift in its Afghan policy? Plainly put, the US has been using the "Pakistani Taliban" for sometime already to create havoc within Pakistan and the "proxy war" has finally burst into the open with the factual allegation by the Pakistani military this week that the US-led coalition in eastern Afghanistan is ignoring Islamabad's requests to follow up on specific intelligence regarding the Pakistani Taliban leadership who operate out of the sanctuaries on Afghan territory and indulge in cross-border attacks.

Quite obviously, the Pakistani military understood the political message behind these attacks. But it still refuses to fall in line with the US's regional strategy. On the other hand, Taliban and the ISI have largely succeeded in thwarting or rolling back the US stratagem to split the insurgent groups.

The fashion in which the US's famous Taliban interlocutor Tayeb Agha has been "silenced"; the tragi-comic incident of NATO forces and the US talking in great earnestness with a Taliban "imposter" out of sheer innocence regarding his identity as a petty shopkeeper; or the sudden disappearance of Mullah Abdul Ghani Baradar from the playpen - all these only underscore the paradox that it actually suits Pakistan if the insurgent groups are scattered and kept under its control in various nooks and corners of the chessboard.

Asymmetrical response
Washington has carefully timed the decision to amass its troops on the Afghan-Pakistan border to coincide with the massive two-month long Indian military exercise currently under way on the India-Pakistan border region aimed at testing out the Indian doctrine to capture and hold territory deep inside the "enemy" lines.

But if Washington's calculation is to apply the maximum psychological pressure on the Pakistani military, it only betrays a lack of comprehension of what is prompting the Pakistani military leadership to resort to such "strategic defiance". (Pakistan, interestingly, is downplaying the Indian military exercise and the few instances of unwarranted rhetoric - and even Delhi's recent security pact with Karzai - and on the contrary, it is ostentatiously spreading petals of goodwill on India's path such as deciding to give India the most-favored-nation status in trade.)

What the US refuses to face up to is that rightly or wrongly, Pakistan no longer trusts Washington's intentions. The Pakistani military is convinced that the US is working on a strategy to "defang" Pakistan by seizing its nuclear-weapon stockpile. Obviously, there is no leeway for compromising its "strategic assets" in Afghanistan, as far as the Pakistani military is concerned. A long-term US military presence in the region is perceived as constituting a threat to Pakistan's sovereignty and territorial integrity.

The Pakistani military has also refused to fall into the trap of launching a full-fledged operation in North Waziristan, which, it knows fully well, can only become a quagmire of such proportions that the military juggernaut itself might ultimately disintegrate. The Pakistani civil and military leaderships are today agreed that the only means to pacify the tribal areas is through networking with the tribal chieftains and the various militant groups and that is going to be a long haul. In the meanwhile, Pakistan is not going to be hustled by the US into precipitate actions.

Some commentators have rushed to interpret Kiani's statement on Tuesday as "nuclear blackmail". But the decision to deploy regular troops on the border suggests that the Pakistani military will resist and make the US pay an intolerably high price in casualties that Obama simply cannot afford as a badly-battered politician gearing up for a crucial election campaign.

Therefore, any false step in the shadow boxing and high-pitched rhetoric that has been going on between the US and Pakistan ever since the Raymond Davis affair in January (when the ISI and the military leadership came to know the full extent of the US' covert operations inside Pakistan) can easily lead to a full-fledged "asymmetrical war" in the region - with "disastrous consequences" for regional security and stability, as Krishna put it.

A US attack on Pakistan would only ensure that the Taliban would have access to a seamless reservoir of manpower (and equipment and supplies) to carry on with the insurgency. In political terms, the insurgency will come to assume the nature of a war of "liberation".

How does that help the US? Given the current state of play on many attendant fronts - opposition to the war in Western public opinion, the American and eurozone economic crisis, countless failings of the Kabul set-up in governance, debilitating weaknesses of the Afghan armed forces, overall lawlessness and corruption swarming Afghanistan - an "asymmetrical" war can only work to Pakistan's advantage.

On the other hand, a US attack on Pakistan would conclusively shut the door to the avenue leading to a political settlement in Afghanistan. Pakistan's response will be to hunker down and to continue to defy the US diktat. In the process, something of fundamental significance with grave long-term implications may also be happening to Pakistan's political economy.

Suffice to say, if Nawaz Sharif was found to be an unsavory choice as Pervez Musharraf's potential successor and if Washington did everything possible to keep him from the corridors of power solely because of dubious "Islamist" baggage, the US may now have to learn to live with something far worse in Pakistan.

Pakistan is no Cambodia and it will not disintegrate into anarchy. By South Asian standards, the Pakistani state is strong enough to survive. But that will be small comfort since the US will have "lost" Pakistan - for a while at least. It is for Washington to judge how that, in turn, would serve the US in the highly-strategic region that forms the tri-junction of Central Asia, South Asia proper and the Persian Gulf. What happens to the New Silk Road project?

In sum, logically speaking, better sense should prevail in Washington than to launch a military strike against Pakistan. Yet, the unprecedented "joint" visit to Islamabad by Clinton, David Petraeus and Martin Dempsey underscores the brinkmanship that is going on.

Masks and masquerade
Indeed, Bruce Riedel, former Central Intelligence Agency officer who advised Obama on the Afghan war, espoused in a provocative article in the New York Times over the weekend that the United States should pursue a 'containment' policy toward Pakistan.

Riedel got the big picture absolutely right by estimating that the US needed a new policy toward Pakistan since the two countries' "strategic interests are in conflict, not in harmony." He also cannot be faulted for projecting the wish list that the US must "contain the Pakistani Army's ambitions" so that civilian supremacy got asserted in Islamabad and Pakistan's foreign policy took a "new direction."

Now, how can a "containment" strategy toward Pakistan be made to work? Most interestingly, Riedel recommends that the US needs to craft a "more hostile relationship" which will be "a focused hostility ... holding its [Pakistan's] army and intelligence branches accountable." Now, this can be achieved if there is a US military incursion into Pakistani territory which the Pakistani military fails to prevent.

Riedel concludes his voyeurism with the categorical affirmation that the US needs military bases in Afghanistan, if it is to pursue the "containment" strategy. All in all, his labored justification for the establishment of US military bases in Afghanistan happens to be masqueraded as the need to pursue a "containment" strategy toward Pakistan.

This blueprint seems to reflect the establishment thinking. But a "containment" strategy could only succeed if it is backed by a strong regional and international consensus to isolate the country in question. Ideally, it needs to be backed up by creating an alliance of nations that subscribes to a common strategy. In the case of Pakistan, these prerequisites are totally lacking. Pakistan does not face regional isolation.

On the contrary, it is networking actively with almost all regional players (with the exception of India) on the Afghan problem - Iran, Russia, Tajikistan, China, Uzbekistan, Turkmenistan, etc. The US would have an uphill task to get the countries in the region to fall in line with a containment strategy toward Pakistan.

Besides, a containment strategy takes a long time to work, if at all. (It has been in operation against Iran for over three decades with hopeless results.) Does Obama have that much time in hand? Indeed, if the "Occupy Wall Street" movement is any reflection of the public mood in the US, the Afghan war is a low priority in the national agenda.

In sum, the US's intention seems to be to create the political and security conditions in the "post-Osama bin Laden phase" in Afghanistan that would give raison d'etre to the long-term military presence. The maximum pressure is being brought to bear on the Pakistani military in this direction. Precipitating a crisis in the relationship with Pakistan at this juncture may become a geopolitical necessity for the US if Pakistan doesn't give in. But it is a dangerous game. Krishna's statement will find resonance in other regional capitals.

 

[jeypore]

Thank you Mr. Muse, I am surprised today that AGNO Thanked me, for what, I do not know....

The great battle field of the future is the economic one, if Pakistanies want to fight a battle with US it is only economically and if the desire is there, then they can actually beat them, but Desire are running rampant, in the wrong directions post OBL. So status quo with Pakistan. The water is still muddy..........

 

[Nothing]

Thank you Mr. Muse, I am surprised today that AGNO Thanked me, for what, I do not know....

The great battle field of the future is the economic one, if Pakistanies want to fight a battle with US it is only economically and if the desire is there, then they can actually beat them, but Desire are running rampant, in the wrong directions post OBL. So status quo with Pakistan. The water is still muddy..........

I totally agree with you friend.. and to fight economical battle with USA you need ample resources (Like Iran or some of South America countries) or you need very stable political force in you home so you can drive your growth in top gear. But unfortunately for us in South Asia to get stable political leadership we need to overcome many of ours social ills which are there in society from many of centuries or decades ..

 

[Developereo]

Pakistani and Indian readers should note that the Indian and Pakistani governments positions are actually much closer to each other than they are to the US position - it's quite incredible:

[...]
By M K Bhadrakumar
Two, it is the most clear-cut signal so far that India is not party to the US pressure tactic against Pakistan.

Nothing could be further from the truth. All this (fake) talk of harmony is being bandied about only because the penny has finally dropped in Kabul, New Delhi and Washington that Pakistan cannot be sidelined from Afghanistan.

Washington has all but given up on their goal to install India as their proxy powerbroker in Afghanistan against Pakistan and China. The US is now reduced to seeking a face saving exit from this mess.

Karzai is making his usual schizophrenic remarks making him even more irrelevant, if that was ever possible.

India, for its part, is playing its usual duplicitous games. Acutely aware that military subjugation of Pakistan is not an option, and mindful of America's implicit acknowledgement of defeat in Afghanistan, India is distancing itself from the exit-bound superpower and trying out a kinder, gentler track towards containing Pakistan. But only in public -- privately, India and the US share the common goal of containing China's rise. Despite overtures of Asian brotherhood, India's foreign policy is still dictated by two main objectives: China's containment and Pakistan's subjugation, and both objectives actually get stronger with India's rise.

Leaving China aside, the second objective -- Pakistan's subjugation -- is important as a milestone in India's rise. Until India subjugates Pakistan, nobody will take it seriously as a power, least of all South Asia. Once Pakistan falls, the rest of South Asia will be a cakewalk. Conversely, a defiant Pakistan will embolden the rest of South Asia to resist Indian hegemony and India will never make it out of its backyard onto the global stage.

 

[regular]

Nothing could be further from the truth. All this (fake) talk of harmony is being bandied about only because the penny has finally dropped in Kabul, New Delhi and Washington that Pakistan cannot be sidelined from Afghanistan.

Washington has all but given up on their goal to install India as their proxy powerbroker in Afghanistan against Pakistan and China. The US is now reduced to seeking a face saving exit from this mess.

Karzai is making his usual schizophrenic remarks making him even more irrelevant, if that was ever possible.

India, for its part, is playing its usual duplicitous games. Acutely aware that military subjugation of Pakistan is not an option, and mindful of America's implicit acknowledgement of defeat in Afghanistan, India is distancing itself from the exit-bound superpower and trying out a kinder, gentler track towards containing Pakistan. But only in public -- privately, India and the US share the common goal of containing China's rise. Despite overtures of Asian brotherhood, India's foreign policy is still dictated by two main objectives: China's containment and Pakistan's subjugation, and both objectives actually get stronger with India's rise.

Leaving China aside, the second objective -- Pakistan's subjugation -- is important as a milestone in India's rise. Until India subjugates Pakistan, nobody will take it seriously as a power, least of all South Asia. Once Pakistan falls, the rest of South Asia will be a cakewalk. Conversely, a defiant Pakistan will embolden the rest of South Asia to resist Indian hegemony and India will never make it out of its backyard onto the global stage.

Yes! Excellent analysis over the US-India relationship. Both the US and India are hell bent on containning China and subjugating Pakistan. But in no scenarios we are going to let it happen. I guess they will loose everything in attaining these goals. Evrything will be on stake for them. Looks like the game of death for both sides. Greed is taking too much part in it....

 

[Developereo]

Yes! Excellent analysis over the US-India relationship. Both the US and India are hell bent on containning China and subjugating Pakistan. But in no scenarios we are going to let it happen. I guess they will loose everything in attaining these goals. Evrything will be on stake for them. Looks like the game of death for both sides. Greed is taking too much part in it....

Exactly. India's game, America's game: it's the same thing. They share the same goals; there is no difference.


The Chinese leadership is smart. They are playing along overtly with India's game but they know exactly where to stick the "hindi chini bhai bhai" crap.

Let's hope the Pakistani establishment is similarly astute. Kayani and Pasha seem to see through the Indian game, but some idiot civilians like Nawaz Sharif are falling for it.

 

[muse]

Nothing could be further from the truth. All this (fake) talk of harmony is being bandied about only because the penny has finally dropped in Kabul, New Delhi and Washington that Pakistan cannot be sidelined from Afghanistan.

Washington has all but given up on their goal to install India as their proxy powerbroker in Afghanistan against Pakistan and China. The US is now reduced to seeking a face saving exit from this mess.

Quite possibly, however, the point Bhadrakumar is making is that US policy is now so desperate and reckless that the Indians understand that should things get out of control, they will suffer - it's pretty much in line with Pakistan's understanding that while the US may up and go home, Pakistan will have ot deal with consequences, as will India.

And while you point is taken that India and US share the desire and will to confront China (to differing abilities of each respectively), I think it would be a mistake to imagine that there is wide support for the notion that such confrontation be at the expense of the Indian economy --- and therefore it's ability to provide for strong defense.

There is a great deal of play between confronting and containing China and putting the Indian economy at risk to do so - Indian foreign policy makers and economists were not all born yesterday - there is as much competition, if not more, as there is cooperation with US policy makers and their ambitions.

 

[AgNoStiC MuSliM]

Thank you Mr. Muse, I am surprised today that AGNO Thanked me, for what, I do not know....

What arguments, in the article you posted, would I oppose, or have opposed in the past, in your opinion?