As most folks here would know, the 12th Infantry Division, headquartered at Murree, is the largest division-sized formation in the army, with some 6 infantry brigades under it. The formation belongs to X Corps, and has a vital task of offense-defense in Azad Kashmir, with it's current AoR stretching from Kel to Tattapani (Poonch).
I wanted to propose an idea for creation of a new Div HQ by splitting this oversized formation, to improve division of labour and enhance the combat effectiveness of the X Corps.
The Div HQ can be at Muzaffarabad or Mansehra, while it's AoR can stretch along the line Leepa-Athmuqam-Kel. This is vital since IA has raised it's 28th Mountain Division, HQed at Gurez Valley, and IA has tactical advantage in this sector (along Neelum Valley). Hence a new Div HQ is crucial as the sector here is sensitive.
The 12th Div, now at normal numbers, can be adjusted along it's new AoR i.e. Hattian Bala/Chakothi - Bagh - Rawalakot axis.
The 34th Light Infantry Division should/is the Corps strategic reserve, it plugs in the gaps along the LoC during escalation/wartime.
@Signalian
@Gryphon
feel free for suggestions/objections.
Forming a new division means throwing in extra troops in a terrain which is already manned by required strength. 12th Division should be termed Mountain Division instead of Infantry Division. A new Division would require more Divisional formations for Supply, Engineers, Signals etc and also formation of new HQ's like a new Div HQ, a new Arty Bde HQ, new Air Defence Command etc. This would also mean that X-Corps would need to induct more units to give Corps to Divisional support, since during the war 12th Division and the newly raised Division will have different objectives to achieve and Corps HQ will need to ensure that both Divs get required support from it. If 12th Infantry Division was employed in plains or desert, it would have been convenient to split up for better mobility and also increase the AOR. X-Corps is also commanding FCNA way up north, whose AOR is even larger than that of 12th Inf Div, but the terrain becomes even worse there.
In mountain warfare, the unit size and strength could be lower than that of a unit operating in plains or desert. This is due to nature of terrain. In mountains, a company strength can defend an area twice the size that a company strength could do in plains. For advance, mobility is required, natural cover is already there in the form of trees, shrubs, bushes, rocks, reverse slopes etc which is not available in plains or desert.
12th Infantry Division has performed well in both 1965 and 1971 wars, there were set backs in 1999 but that was not Division's fault. This means formation structure is performing well in mountain terrain. If a need arises, an Ad-Hoc Divisional HQ can be set up and units from 12th Infantry Div put under its Command, just like the set up in 1971, 36 and 39 Ad Hoc Div HQ's but that only decreased the capacity to fight as an independent formation. Back in 1965, During Operation GrandSlam, the Division advanced a good margin into IOK against Indian Army, the 'fault' remained with its Commander's religion in eyes of GHQ, how can an Ahmadi General be hailed as a hero for leading a successful campaign into Kashmir, it had to be a pure Muslim, absurd, the pure Muslim General was found as Yahya Khan, who ruined the whole Operation. It was said that Commander 12th Infantry Division abandoned a few posts so he was replaced by Yahya Khan, where as Yahya Khan made blunder after blunder eventually failed the Ops. The combat effectiveness of the Division was again seen in 1971 war, where it advanced inside IOK yet again forcing Indian forces to retreat to rear HQ's. Elements of 12th Infantry Division then took part in Kargil war and made numerous advances into IOK and dogged resistance to IA's attacks, until the order for withdrawal arrived and the disaster began. I dont see how the combat effectiveness has been affected in any way due to its large size.
34th LID's main task is securing routes for CPEC, its is spread at different areas overlooking CPEC routes. It can only be shifted from its main task once its ensured that CPEC routes have become safe and the Paramilitary and Police can now look after CPEC routes satisfactorily. That is when the 9 x Regular Infantry Regiments can be pulled out from internal security duties and then wither of below:
1. Deployed to Over-look North Western border, as well as Swat
2. Attached with FCNA
3. Provide as Strategic Reserve for X-Corps in case of war. 7th Infantry Division has to be attached to X-Corps in case of war.
3 + 3 will still make 6 (brigades), unless number of brigades are raised i dont see any difference it can make or benfit of dividing it. As an example when FC balochistan and FC KP were divided into FC KP north/south and FC Balochistan north/south, dozens of new wings were also raised to cover gaps in western border.
Convert 34 LID 9 x battalions into Air assault battalions and attach an aviation Brigade to its permanently instead of creating more Brigades. Then in case of war, launch 34 LID air assault battalions across LOC 15-25 km into IOK ahead of 12th Infantry Division under air cover of PAF for upto 6 hours, with 12th Infantry Division launching an attack on same positions from routes on ground to relieve 34 LID air borne units with ETA of 24-36 hours. While the 34 LID's units entrench themselves on peaks inside IOK to stop any IA reinforcements from reaching the LOC making its easier for 12th Infantry to make gains and reach 34 LID's units positions.
