LeGenD
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I have been reading a book on Soviet-Afghan war (1979 - 1989) by M. Yousaf and it has startling revelations about the condition of Soviet Union and its military forces during this time period.
___________________________The original invasion force:
When the Soviets invaded they did not expect to have to mount a full-scale counter-insurgency campaign themselves. They had gone in with only four motor rifle divisions (MRDs), and one and a half air assault divisions (AADs) of paratroopers. These MRDs had been understrength cadre formations, fleshed out with hastily recalled reservists. They were composed of troops ill-trained for any war, let alone an anti-guerrilla one, and they arrived with obsolescent weapons and equipment, some dating back to WW2.
The posture:
First, the Soviets were by and large content to hold a series of major military bases or strategic towns, and the routes between them, which indicated a mainly static, defensive posture.
The quality of regular troops:
The Soviet soldier in Afghanistan proved to be a different man from his father in the 'Great Patriotic War', as they called World War 2. Then, the Soviets were defending their motherland, the Germans had killed or captured millions, overrun vast stretches of Russia and driven to the gates of Moscow. The Soviet troops fought with the ferocity and determination of cornered animals. They had no other option, theirs was a battle for personal and national survival; there is no greater cause. In Afghanistan things were completely different.
The modern Soviet soldier is a conscript; even his sergeants are the same. He is compelled to enlist at eighteen for two years. As a conscript recruit his life is normally miserable, often degrading.
Exceptions:
Soviet Union special forces and Air Assault Units were actually good.
Economy of the Soviet Union:
Economically the war was an enormous drain. Gorbachev was later to call it a 'bleeding wound'. Not only were the Soviets funding their own forces, but with the local economy in ruins they had to fund the Afghan government and army as well. Then, as their scorched-earth strategy took effect and refugees swarmed into Kabul and other large cities, they had to provide food for thousands of civilians. Billions of roubles were needed from an already flawed Soviet economy.
The typical level of effectiveness:
On examining the figures, I doubted whether more than 10-12,000 Soviet troops from their 85,000 inside Afghanistan could have been committed to active operations at any one time. Even these men were in scattered formations, not all concentrated in one area for a major offensive.
Questionable tactics?
Road-bound units, bristling with guns, moved tortuously along the roads and tracks in broad daylight. There was no discernible attempt at surprise; the entire effort was slow-moving and ponderous, enabling the Mujahideen either to fight or disappear at their will. No serious attempt had been made to block the heads of the valleys other than by bombs, and there was not much evidence of Coordinating the air strikes with a swift approach by the ground forces There was bombing, there was shelling, then there was a ground advance to find out what was left, a search and destroy mission with not much searching but a lot of destruction of buildings. No effort was made to position a proper cordon by using helicopters. The Soviets seemed content to stay in their vehicles for the most part, and when they did dismount it was usually only to sift through the debris wrought by high explosive on mud and brick After a few days of this everybody had gone back, chalking up another victory for official reports. It reminded me of the boxer with his punchbag just so long as the boxer keeps his fist on the bag after making his punch an impression is maintained. When he removes his fist to strike again elsewhere the bag resumes its original shape.
___________________________
With passage of time, Soviet Union leadership learned some lessons from this war and provided better equipment to its military forces deployed in Afghanistan. However, the importance of innovation in combat tactics was not properly realized.
I am surprised that why Soviet Union chose to fight a war in such a state of decay?
No wonder, Soviet Union got slapped in the face. However, terrain also played a important role in its defeat as it favored guerrilla warfare.
In addition, Pakistani General Akhtar Abdur Rahman proved to be a brilliant tactician. I wonder that why he is not given much recognition at international level.
The key lessons in my opinion are:
1. Never go ill-prepared.
2. Never underestimate your enemies.
3. Importance of innovation.
Comments from other members would be appreciated.
___________________________The original invasion force:
When the Soviets invaded they did not expect to have to mount a full-scale counter-insurgency campaign themselves. They had gone in with only four motor rifle divisions (MRDs), and one and a half air assault divisions (AADs) of paratroopers. These MRDs had been understrength cadre formations, fleshed out with hastily recalled reservists. They were composed of troops ill-trained for any war, let alone an anti-guerrilla one, and they arrived with obsolescent weapons and equipment, some dating back to WW2.
The posture:
First, the Soviets were by and large content to hold a series of major military bases or strategic towns, and the routes between them, which indicated a mainly static, defensive posture.
The quality of regular troops:
The Soviet soldier in Afghanistan proved to be a different man from his father in the 'Great Patriotic War', as they called World War 2. Then, the Soviets were defending their motherland, the Germans had killed or captured millions, overrun vast stretches of Russia and driven to the gates of Moscow. The Soviet troops fought with the ferocity and determination of cornered animals. They had no other option, theirs was a battle for personal and national survival; there is no greater cause. In Afghanistan things were completely different.
The modern Soviet soldier is a conscript; even his sergeants are the same. He is compelled to enlist at eighteen for two years. As a conscript recruit his life is normally miserable, often degrading.
Exceptions:
Soviet Union special forces and Air Assault Units were actually good.
Economy of the Soviet Union:
Economically the war was an enormous drain. Gorbachev was later to call it a 'bleeding wound'. Not only were the Soviets funding their own forces, but with the local economy in ruins they had to fund the Afghan government and army as well. Then, as their scorched-earth strategy took effect and refugees swarmed into Kabul and other large cities, they had to provide food for thousands of civilians. Billions of roubles were needed from an already flawed Soviet economy.
The typical level of effectiveness:
On examining the figures, I doubted whether more than 10-12,000 Soviet troops from their 85,000 inside Afghanistan could have been committed to active operations at any one time. Even these men were in scattered formations, not all concentrated in one area for a major offensive.
Questionable tactics?
Road-bound units, bristling with guns, moved tortuously along the roads and tracks in broad daylight. There was no discernible attempt at surprise; the entire effort was slow-moving and ponderous, enabling the Mujahideen either to fight or disappear at their will. No serious attempt had been made to block the heads of the valleys other than by bombs, and there was not much evidence of Coordinating the air strikes with a swift approach by the ground forces There was bombing, there was shelling, then there was a ground advance to find out what was left, a search and destroy mission with not much searching but a lot of destruction of buildings. No effort was made to position a proper cordon by using helicopters. The Soviets seemed content to stay in their vehicles for the most part, and when they did dismount it was usually only to sift through the debris wrought by high explosive on mud and brick After a few days of this everybody had gone back, chalking up another victory for official reports. It reminded me of the boxer with his punchbag just so long as the boxer keeps his fist on the bag after making his punch an impression is maintained. When he removes his fist to strike again elsewhere the bag resumes its original shape.
___________________________
With passage of time, Soviet Union leadership learned some lessons from this war and provided better equipment to its military forces deployed in Afghanistan. However, the importance of innovation in combat tactics was not properly realized.
I am surprised that why Soviet Union chose to fight a war in such a state of decay?
No wonder, Soviet Union got slapped in the face. However, terrain also played a important role in its defeat as it favored guerrilla warfare.
In addition, Pakistani General Akhtar Abdur Rahman proved to be a brilliant tactician. I wonder that why he is not given much recognition at international level.
The key lessons in my opinion are:
1. Never go ill-prepared.
2. Never underestimate your enemies.
3. Importance of innovation.
Comments from other members would be appreciated.
