Pokhran-II thermonuclear test, a failure

[Maarkhoor]

A critical analysis of the technical facts can lead to no other conclusion. BARC must learn to tell the nation the truth.
Several inaccuracies in the claims made by BARC and in the articles published in the press, including The Hindu, on Pokhran-II need to be corrected. We have hard evidence on a purely factual basis, to inform the nation that not only was the yield of the second fusion (H-bomb) stage of the thermonuclear (TN) device tested in May 1998 was not only far below the design prediction made by the Bhabha Atomic Research Centre (BARC), but that it actually failed.

All the five nuclear tests conducted in May 1998 were undertaken through a joint BARC and Defence Research and Development Organisation (DRDO) team. A.P.J. Abdul Kalam and R. Chidambaram assigned the DRDO team the critical responsibility for all the field instrumentation to record seismic data from all the tests: this was vital in estimating the yields. The seismic sensors were placed at many points in the device shafts and out to a radius of 2.5 km. The sensors and instrumentation were calibrated several hundred times and perfected. They fully met international standards and were acknowledged to be so by BARC.

The DRDO was thus deeply involved in all the seismic measurements and was fully aware of the BARC-projected readings vis-À-vis its own measurements. One of the authors, Dr. Santhanam, was personally aware in detail from key BARC scientists of the core designs and hence the projected yields. Consequently, the reference in a report published by The Hindu on August 28 (headlined “’Fizzle’ claim for thermonuclear test refuted”) attributed to a “former senior official of the Vajpayee government” that I was “not privy to the actual weapon designs which are highly classified,” was incorrect.

The DRDO also designed and conducted numerous tests of the High Explosive (HE) Trigger of the TN test. BARC scientists witnessed these tests, took copies of test records, and expressed satisfaction with the DRDO’s work.

Over May-October 1998, DRDO produced a comprehensive report of actual seismic readings vis-À-vis values predicted by BARC, mentioning why the former showed considerably lower yields than the latter.

The DRDO report was discussed at a meeting called by National Security Adviser Brajesh Mishra in late 1998. The meeting was attended by Dr. Chidambaram and Dr. S.K. Sikka, the scientific head of the BARC team; Mr. Kalam, the Director-General of the DRDO; Dr. V.K. Aatre, the Chief Controller of the DRDO, Dr. Santhanam, and the Chiefs of the Defence Services. Despite a long discussion, largely between the DRDO and BARC, both stuck to their positions on the TN device yield. Thereafter, the NSA took a ‘voice vote’! This was highly unusual because the matter was technically very complex and the services were ill equipped to give an opinion on yields. Most surprisingly, NSA concluded saying government would stand by Dr. Chidambaram’s opinion.

Dr. Chidambaram’s claims and those in Atomic Energy Commission statement reported on September 16 under headline “No reason to doubt the yield of 1998 nuclear test: AEC” are wrong.

BARC basically argued that the geological structure of Pokhran was different from test sites elsewhere. However, the DRDO and BARC utilised the same published information in their calculations of TN device yield. BARC accepted the DRDO’s yield estimates of the fission (A) bomb, but not of the TN device, although the latter’s shaft was situated only a few hundred metres from the former’s shaft. Globally, geological structures do not change dramatically at such small separations. So BARC’s argument to “explain” a lower TN yield is untenable.

Dr. Chidambaram’s statement that “the post-shot radioactivity measurements on samples extracted from the test site showed significant activity [levels] of radioisotopes Sodium 22 and Manganese 54, both of which are byproducts of a fusion reaction rather than a pure fission [device]” is incorrect. He should indicate the exact level of activity instead of merely saying “significant activity” as the activity level determines whether a fusion reaction of the magnitude claimed by BARC actually occurred.

Dr. P.K. Iyengar, a former Chairman of the Atomic Energy Commission and a former Director of BARC, informed me that trace levels of these same isotopes were detected in Apsara, a pure fission reactor not involving any fusion at all. This is the exact opposite of Dr. Chidambaram’s claim.

Dr. Chidambaram’s statement that “from a study of this radioactivity and an estimate of the crater radius confirmed by drilling operations at positions away from the shaft, location, total yield and break-up of fission and fusion components, could be calculated” is extremely surprising. First, after the TN test, its shaft remained totally undamaged: if the fusion stage had worked, the shaft would have been totally destroyed. Secondly, the A-frame sitting astride the mouth of the shaft, with winches to lower and raise personnel, materials and so on, also remained completely intact. If the fusion stage had worked, the ‘A’ frame would also have been totally destroyed.

As for radioactivity levels, senior BARC radiochemists who undertook radio-assay of fission products in samples similarly drilled at Pokhran-I (of May 1974) told Santhanam that the yield announced to the media was substantially higher than what they had submitted to Dr. Raja Ramanna. Dr. Chidambaram must publicly substantiate any claim that it did not occur in the TN test along with justification data.

Dr. Chidambaram states: “BARC scientists worked out total yield of TN device as 50 +10 kt — consistent with design yield and seismic estimates.” However, he subsequently asserts: “BARC experts established DRDO had under-estimated yield due to faulty seismic instrumentation.” BARC cannot eat the cake and have it too.

The fission bomb yield from the DRDO’s seismic instrumentation was 25 +2 kiloton and left a crater 25 metres in diameter. If the TN device had really worked with a yield of 50 +2 kt, it should have left a crater almost 70 metres in diameter. Instead, all that happened was that sand and mud from the shaft were thrown several metres into the air and then fell back, forming a small depression in the shaft mouth. There was no crater.

This factual analysis reveals India’s decade-long, grim predicament regarding the failed TN bomb and so our Credible Minimum Deterrent (CMD). No country having undertaken only two weapon related tests of which the core TN device failed, can claim to have a CMD. This is corroborated by fact that even after 11 years the TN device has not been weaponised by BARC while the 25 kiloton fission device has been fully weaponised and operationally deployed on multiplate weapon platforms. It would be farcical to use a 3500-km range Agni-3 missile with a 25 kiloton fission warhead as the core of our CMD. Only a 150 – 350 kiloton if not megaton TN bomb can do so which we do not have.

(K. Santhanam was Project Leader, Pokhran-II. He worked as a physicist at BARC for 15 years. Later he was Chief Adviser (Technologies) in DRDO for 14 years and was then also Director General, Institute for Defence Studies and Analyses, New Delhi. Ashok Parthasarathi, the co-author of this article, was S&T Adviser to Prime Minister Indira Gandhi and deeply involved in Pokhran-I, of May.)

 

[Maarkhoor]

Damaging fallout: 'Dud' Pokhran II blows up 11 years later

MUMBAI: Eleven years after India tested nuclear bombs in the deserts of Pokhran, embarrassing details about the test fizzling out have exploded into a full blown controversy with top nuclear scientists on Thursday demanding that the government institute an inquiry to determine whether the test failed. Former nuclear czars said they were ashamed that information had been hidden.

Three former nuclear leaders -- M R Srinivasan, P K Iyengar and A N Prasad -- said in the wake of revelations by K Santhanam, project leader for Pokhran II, the government must order a peer review into the yield of the thermonuclear test of May 1998.

Santhanam went public first on August 26, saying that the yield from the test was far lower than what prime minister Atal Bihari Vajpayee's government claimed. On Thursday, in a newspaper article he disclosed embarrassing details saying the test was a failure because the yield was only 25 kilotons, nearly half of what the scientists had then claimed. He said that a meeting of scientists discussed the failure soon after the test and decided to hide it. He also pointed out that the failure meant that India now did not possess a credible nuclear deterrent, indicating that warheads on India's long-range missile could have far less punch than expected.

R Chidambaram, former chairman of Atomic Energy Commission and the architect of the nuke tests; Anil Kakodkar, then director of Bhabha Atomic Research Centre, and APJ Abdul Kalam who led the team from Defence Research and Development Organisation, have insisted the device operated according to its design specifications and the yield was 45 kilotons.

At a meeting on September 5, the AEC dismissed the first statements made by Santhanam, saying through different types of analysis it was established that the yield of the thermonuclear test was 45 KT. Now, even scientists in Barc, the nation's top nuclear weapon establishment, doubt the claim.

While saying he was surprised by Santhanam's article, M R Srinivasan, former AEC chairman, told TOI it was time for both Chidambaram and Kakodkar to clarify the situation. ``In such circumstances I think a peer review is certainly warranted,'' he said.

At the same time he said he still stood by the official position and would support Chidambaram and Kakodkar regarding the yield of the thermonuclear test. ``A lot of information has been published and is on record. So I have really no reason to disbelieve at this stage either Chidambaram or Kakodkar on this issue. However, because of the current controversy, I think the best recourse would be for both of them to clarify the position through a peer review,'' he added.

Former Barc director, A N Prasad, who has all along maintained that the thermonuclear test was anything but a success, said, ``The painful fallout of this episode is that the credibility of the nuclear scientific community and the respectable name of Barc is being damaged by a few at the top.''

In a direct attack on Kalam and Chidambaram, Prasad said: ``If all that Santhanam has written is true, then people occupying high places have misled the country. If all the data about the thermonuclear test has been held by one man (Chidambaram), then how can it be scientifically contested or debated? He has kept it under wraps.''

Stressing that there should be a probe by a committee constituted by the government, Prasad said that the team should comprise those having serious doubts about the yield of the test as well as experts who can include former nuclear scientists who have been raising their voices. ``It should not consist of only yes men. It should consist of those who are knowledgeable, who have the capacity to investigate such a serious matter,'' he said.

``If this committee concludes that the thermonuclear test had completely failed then the government has played a major fraud on the people of this country,'' he said. Asked if the AEC itself can investigate, he replied: ``It has credibility, but no expertise.''

Another former AEC chief, P K Iyengar said, ``The government should undertake an active investigation immediately following the statements made by Santhanam in the article. I am feeling really ashamed.''

Regarding a revelation in Santhanam's article that the thermonuclear device had not yet been weaponised like the fission devices, he said: ``How will they do it if they are doubtful about the yield? This itself is a clear indication that the test was not a complete success.''

Both Iyengar and Prasad said the disclosures by Santhanam, that there was no disturbance to the shafts at ground zero, was also proof that the test was unsuccessful.

 

[Indus Falcon]

Any links..............?

 

[Maarkhoor]

@GURU DUTT @SrNair @Shamain @fakhre mirpur @Imran Khan @nForce

Any links..............?

since i am new member i can't post links
one is from the hindu

 

[gslv mk3]

Damaging fallout: 'Dud' Pokhran II blows up 11 years later

We have thermonuclear bombs for deterrence: Kakodkar

The results of India's thermonuclear tests in 1998 were examined by different groups of experts and confirmed as fully successful, and the weaponisation based on these tests have been accomplished to full satisfaction, Anil Kakodkar, former chairman of the Atomic Energy Commission, tells Karan Thapar on CNN-IBN'sDevil's Advocate programme, in a firm rebuttal of the insistence from various involved scientists that this was not so. Edited excerpts:


Dr Kakodkar, four leading scientists -- Dr Santhanam, Dr Iyengar, Dr Sethna and Dr Prasad -- have raised serious doubts about the thermonuclear tests of 1998. Dr Santhanam says "we have hard evidence on a purely factual basis that not only was the yield of the thermo-nuclear device far below the design prediction, but that it actually failed".

The yield of the tests was verified by several methods based on different principles, done by different groups. These have been reviewed in detail. I had described the tests in 1998 as perfect and I stand by that.

Dr Santhanam says the Defence Research and Development Organisation seismic instruments measured the yield as something between 20-25 kilotonnes (kt), hugely different from the claim put out by the Atomic Energy Commission that it was 45 kt.

DRDO did deploy some instruments for measurements but these did not work. I myself had reviewed all the results immediately after the tests and we concluded that the instruments did not work.

Do you have proof that the yield of the test was 45 kt?

Yes. No country has given so much scientific details on their tests as we have given and this we have published with the maximum clarity which could be done.

Even in 1998, foreign monitors questioned the yield of the tests. At that time, Indian doubts were only expressed in private. Now, Indian doubts have burst out into the open and they are being heard in public. Does it not worry you that these doubts have continued for 11 years?

Facts are facts. The measurements were done by different groups, different methods. And, all these groups have come to their own conclusions, which match with each other.

All these five or six different ways of measuring the yield have concluded the yield was 45 kt for the thermonuclear device?

Right. Absolutely no doubt.

Dr Santhanam, in addition to disputing the yield, has other reasons. He says the fission device, which produced a yield of 25 kt, created a crater of 25 metres in diameter. Then, if the fusion bomb had been successful and produced 45 kt, it should have created a crater of 70 metres in diameter. He says there was no crater at all.

The fission device yield was 15 kt, not 25 kt. And, though the two devices were 1.5 km apart, the geology within that distance changed quite a bit, partly because of the layers that exist and their slopes, but more important, because their depths were different. So, the placement of the device of the fission kind is in one medium and of the thermonuclear kind in another.

And, we have gone through detailed simulation. In simulation, you can locate the thermonuclear device where the fission device was placed and you can locate the fission device where the thermonuclear device was placed. And you get a much bigger crater now because the yield is higher.

Dr Santhanam says if the thermo-nuclear device had succeeded, both the shaft and the a-frame would have been destroyed. Instead, he says, the shaft "remained totally undamaged" and as for the a-frame, he says, it "remained completely intact".

You must understand the ground motion when a nuclear test takes place. Depending on the depth of burial and the medium in which it is buried, you could get several manifestations on the surface. You could get different kinds of craters. You can just get a mound. And, it can vent out. In the case of the thermonuclear device, the placement was in hard rock -- granite --- and with the depth and the yield for 45 kt, one expects only a mound to rise, which is what happened.

What about the shaft and the a-frame?

There was a cracking of the ground for a fairly large distance. But the phenomena was that it rises as a mound, then comes down slightly but it still remains a mound. So, there is no question of damage to the a-frame. it has been seen in detailed simulations. And, this simulation is done on codes which have been actually verified in 3-D situations on the test data available from abroad and validated, and these have been published in international journals.

One of your predecessors -- former chairman of the Atomic Energy Commission P K Iyenger -- said: "The recent revelations by Dr Santhanam are the clincher. He was one of the four leaders associated with Pokhran II, the team leader from the DRDO side, and he must certainly have known many of the details, particularly with regard to the seismic measurements."

Dr Iyenger was nowhere involved in the 1998 tests. He was, of course, a key figure in the 1974 tests. Before the 1998 tests, all work was done under cover and we required a lot of logistical support and that all was being provided by DRDO. But things were still being done on a need-to-know basis. So, to assume Dr Santhanam knew everything is not true.

He knew everything within his realm of responsibility.

Everything that he needed to know but not more?

That's right.

Dr Santhanam says these doubts were formally raised by the DRDO with the government as far back as 1998 itself. And in a meeting arranged by the then national security advisor Brajesh Mishra, they were brushed aside.

Immediately after the tests, we carried out a review with both teams present -- the Bhabha Atomic Research Centre team as well as the DRDO team. We looked at the measurements done by both and I told you the conclusions and what instruments we could go by and what conclusions we could draw. If the instruments didn't work, where is the question of going by any assertions based on (that)?

In an article that Dr Santhanam has written recently, he says the Department of Atomic Energy is hiding facts from successive Indian governments, from Parliament and from the Indian people.

As I said earlier, we are perhaps unique in giving out (the volume of) information and that, too, immediately after the tests. There is no hiding. There are limits to what can be revealed. These have been discussed in the Atomic Energy Commission, in not one but four meetings, after the 1998 tests. And there are people who are knowledgeable. Dr Ramanna was a member of the commission at that time. So, where is the hiding?

To repeat, there are methods through which one has assessed the test results. Each one of them is a specialisation in itself and there are different groups --- not just individuals but groups -- which have looked at these. This is also on a need-to-know basis. Now, if all of them come to conclusions which are by-and-large similar, what other things can you do in terms of forming a peer group of scientists?

The matter is conclusively sorted out?

That's right. And after this controversy has been raised and it was again reviewed by the Atomic Energy Commission, we had gone through the records and the commission has come out with an authoritative statement.

Given that these are doubts about India's one and only thermo-nuclear test, do we need more tests?

The thermo-nuclear test, the fission test and the sub-kilotonne test all worked as designed. They are diverse. In terms of detailed design, their content is quite different. So, we think the design done is validated and within this configuration which has been tested, one can build devices ranging from low kt all the way to 200 kt. And that fully assures the deterrence.

The truth is that all the established thermonuclear powers needed more than one test. Can India be the exception?

Dil Maange More, that's another story. But we are talking about a time where the knowledge base has expanded, the capability has expanded and you carry out a design and prove you are confident that on the basis of that design and that test, one can build a range of systems right up to 200 kt.

We have a credible thermonuclear bomb?

Why are you using singular? Make that plural.

We have thermonuclear bombs in the plural? With a yield of at least 45 kt each?

Much more than that. I told you we have the possibility of a deterrence of low kt to 200 kt.

So, when people like General Malik, the former army chief, say the army wants assurance of the yield and the efficacy of India's thermonuclear bomb, what is your answer?

I think that is guaranteed. The army should be fully confident and defend the country. There is no issue about the arsenal at their command.

 

[Chanakya's_Chant]

@GURU DUTT @SrNair @Shamain @fakhre mirpur @Imran Khan @nForce


since i am new member i can't post links
one is from the hindu

The trouble with the dispute around the yield of Pokhran-II is that it can only be settled by subject-matter-experts and there are still 2 groups among those. The skeptics and the supporters (in the Indian scientific community) both use extensive scientific analysis to support their claims and it's impossible for a layman to know. Page on tribuneindia.com, Pokhran-II,Yields.

Where there is some consensus - it's that the thermonuclear test which was scaled down from a theoretical 200kT to it's actual claimed yield, was still just borderline to prove a true thermonuclear design (not just boosted fission), but it may not even be necessary to test it in full. Nuclear Weapons Program

Even if it was done to protect nearby villages (barely 5km) away - the claimed yield dwarfs in comparison to the 3+ megaton tests done by China and Russia, and there have been questions as to why India tested small devices in the fist place.

Going by all the news reports I've read over time - the conclusion would be this:

Even if the yield of the test was a bit lower - then India still got enough scientific data for simulation to master thermonuclear technology from the test's partial success. It was a thermonuclear design but its possible that a few tell-tale signs of such a design were perhaps missing in the seismic data.

The argument against this by the scientists like Santhanam and Iyengar is that no country has mastered thermonuclear tech in their first attempt - and India needs a total of 2 or 3 tests to be entirely sure of it's ability of putting it on a warhead on a missile.

But this goes against India's idea of a minimum deterrence which is "strategically active and militarily dormant" and it believes that one test and it's data was enough to serve as a deterrence. Weapons designers have endless requests for testing and scaling up and the whistle-blowers are yet to explain the timeline of their revelation (after 11 years).

The fact that it came out around the time of the Indo-US nuclear deal after which they felt US pressure for the CTBT would be highest, and that their conclusions effectively renew calls for another test before that window disappears - tends to diminish their claims.

There's also the fact that Vajpayee is rumored to have been inclined towards signing the CTBT after Pokhran-2 which indicates that the relevant members of the Indian defense and scientific community were indeed convinced of the results and India's abilities (that it was a success and India has the H-bomb that can theoretically scale by a large factor). Vajpayee makes conditional offer on signing CTBT, 'Vajpayee's offer to sign CTBT is contingent on America being equally conciliatory' : EDITOR'S NOTE

 

[Maarkhoor]

Thermonuclear Weapon woh b India sub kilo ton tu bana nahien sakey Pokhran II ka tu lulwa ho gaya..

 

[gslv mk3]

Thermonuclear Weapon woh b India sub kilo ton tu bana nahien sakey Pokhran II ka tu lulwa ho gaya..

Hey dimwitt,even India's FBF warheads have an yield of 200kt..Now STFU

 

[Maarkhoor]

Hey dimwitt,even India's FBF warheads have an yield of 200kt..Now STFU

OOh bhai usko chalanay se pehley dhoop mien rakho jab garm ho jaye tu zoor se dewar per maro phir shayed chal jaye gha

 

[gslv mk3]

OOh bhai usko chalanay se pehley dhoop mien rakho jab garm ho jaye tu zoor se dewar per maro phir shayed chal jaye gha

Should I remind you of the rules,again ?

 

[Soumitra]

Should I remind you of the rules,again ?

You are a senior member. Dont waste time on an obvious troll.

@VARCHASVE theek hai bhai agar hamara thermonuclear bomb kaam nahi kar raha to tere varchasva ko koi khatra nahi hai

 

[SrNair]

Hey dimwitt,even India's FBF warheads have an yield of 200kt..Now STFU

You dont need to consider them .bro.
Why should we need their certificate.We already have enough operation TNW.

 

[Rocky25]

Good for Pakistan.... India does not have a credible nuclear weapon. But India has Kashmir. So we are sleeping well!

Topic which was discussed dozen times!

@mods, Please close the thread!

 

[Shamain]

Thermonuclear Weapon woh b India sub kilo ton tu bana nahien sakey Pokhran II ka tu lulwa ho gaya..

Ouch!!

----------

"This factual analysis reveals India’s decade-long, grim predicament regarding the failed TN bomb and so our Credible Minimum Deterrent (CMD). No country having undertaken only two weapon related tests of which the core TN device failed, can claim to have a CMD"


I dont understand why?? If fission test was successful then why hydrogen bomb failure would stop a country from making cmd claim. Y?

 

[gslv mk3]

----------

"This factual analysis reveals India’s decade-long, grim predicament regarding the failed TN bomb and so our Credible Minimum Deterrent (CMD). No country having undertaken only two weapon related tests of which the core TN device failed, can claim to have a CMD"


I dont understand why?? If fission test was successful then why hydrogen bomb failure would stop a country from making cmd claim. Y?

Its a lie.The TNW were successful and India also posses fusion boosted fission warheads