You mean sources that you like.
There is no consensus on how engineering/manufacturing concurrency is any more/less efficient than the traditional path. If anything, given the stress manufacturers routinely sufferers to deliver products faster than competitors, engineering/manufacturing concurrency is the trend aided by computerized manufacturing, and with the advent of 3D printing, engineering/manufacturing concurrency will cross over the 50% threshold for widespread acceptance.
I was on two aircrafts during my time in the USAF: F-111 and F-16. I lived through the F-16 KAPTON wire fiasco...
Falcon Wire: F-16 Rewiring Program
The F-18 develop structural vibration issues, specifically affecting the vertical stabs, after it was the deployed to the fleet.
Are you going to condemn both fighters as failures for the traditional method of manufacturing ?
If you want a much more personal relationship with engineering/manufacturing concurrency and does not endanger your life, unlike my F-16 experience, look no further than your PC, specifically the OS. Updates for patches for bug fixes. Windows, Linux, and even Apple.
That's your opinion, but other opinions exist, and then there are facts. I provided sources with a US Navy admiral and Pentagon official saying that concurrency was a mistake due to unnecessary and huge costs. Anyone with basic intelligence could find a lot more articles about the lousy, nonessential, and expensive concurrency of the F-35 JSF.
Your straw man argument is a failure like the concurrency of the F-35 JSF. I never said the F-35, F-16, or F/A-18 is a failure; that's your insecurity leaking out. I never mentioned the F-16 and F/A-18 at all in this discussion, but you brought them into the discussion about the F-35.
There is a huge difference between the incredibly stupid concurrency of the F-35 JSF (which is allegedly the most expensive weapons program of all time, but far from being the most capable) and the F-16 and F/A-18.
The F-16 and F/A-18 had traditional sequences in which they completed their R&D stage with a few prototype parts and a few prototype aircrafts, and then they were mass produced. Because R&D is imperfect, the mass produced F-16 and F/A-18 had relatively minor problems in regard to the cost of repair, ease of repair, and dangers of the problems.
That's the major difference between concurrency versus a software patch or a product recall. Concurrency increases the probability and significance of problems, while the traditional sequence decreases the probability and significance of problems.
I distrust your personal opinions and other similar opinions, because you have a history of cherry picking information to promote your propaganda and stupidity.
It's obvious for anyone intelligent that you should finish the R&D on the component or the entire device, and then build the component or the entire device. You should not mass produce a part or an entire device while the R&D is in process, then the R&D demands a major or a difficult change to the mass produced parts or entire devices, then you make the changes to the mass produced parts or entire devices, and then you keep repeating this process. The re-manufacturing process or the constant fixes on the incompletely designed and mass produced parts or entire devices increase the problems and costs of the entire program. It gets worse when you put the unfinished parts together, then take them apart, then fix them, then put them back together, and then repeat this mess.
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Canada’s second thoughts on F-35 Lightning show concerns about plane’s high cost
Canada’s second thoughts on F-35 Lightning show concerns about plane’s high cost - The Washington Post
. . . .
But as Canada shows, not everyone is sold on what has become the most expensive weapons system in U.S. history. In addition to being a symbol of power, might and mind-bending technology,
the next-generation Joint Strike Fighter has, to some, come to represent waste and unwieldiness — in the United States and abroad.
. . . .
Still, the
Government Accountability Office recently said that
affordability “remains a significant concern” and that “the program is likely to be challenged” to meet cost reduction goals.
While ramping up production would bring the per-plane cost down,
it would be unwise to build too many too soon because not all of the necessary testing has been done on the aircraft, said Todd Harrison, director of defense budget studies at the
Center for Strategic and Budgetary Assessments.
. . . .
Additional testing will inevitably reveal problems that need to be fixed, which then cost money to repair, he said. For years, critics of the program, including Sen. John McCain (R-Ariz.), have said that the United States should never have committed to buying the plane while it was still being developed, saying it violated one of the basic rules of airplane acquisition: “fly before you buy.”
“It gets to the fundamental tension within the JSF — you want to buy more of them because the quicker we buy them, the cost will come down,” Harrison said. “But the faster we buy them, that just increases the concurrency in the program. We’re buying planes that haven’t completed testing and are going to require modifications.”
. . . .
It initially appeared as if Canada was definitely going to buy. Defense officials praised the F-35’s speed and stealth. At a news conference announcing the purchase to buy 65 F-35s in 2010, then-Defense Minister Peter MacKay called it “the best that we can provide our men and women in uniform.”
But two years later, the government put the acquisition on hold after an auditor general’s report suggested the government misled Parliament, saying that
key costs over the course of the fleet’s life were much higher than previously stated.
Liberals attacked the conservative government.
John McKay, a member of Parliament, called it “deceit and incompetence at the highest levels.” Another member,
Ralph Goodale, wrote that the “
F-35 fiasco exposes dishonesty and incompetence.”
As a result, the Harper administration, while denying it misled Parliament, put the purchase on hold and appointed a
National Fighter Procurement Secretariat to ensure the Canadian military acquires the right plane.
. . . .
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Opinion: Missing Shows Points To Bigger JSF Problems
Opinion: Missing Shows Points To Bigger JSF Problems | Defense content from Aviation Week
Jul 28, 2014
. . . .
The failure was part of a record that program office director Lt. Gen. Chris Bogdan complained about a few months back (
AW&ST March 31, p. 29). “
Parts that we didn’t think were going to break are breaking quicker than we thought,” Bogdan said, characterizing the problem as a “
monumental fix—we are not going to see results quickly.” He added that
JSF reliability was “woefully below the curve” compared with where it should be at this stage and that already scary operations and support costs would “skyrocket” if reliability problems could not be fixed.
The history of such
problems includes four engine-related groundings—two this June, and in January and February last year. After a limited flight release on July 15 ended the latest episode, a Senate panel recommended a reassessment of the 2011 decision to scrap
General Electric’s
F136, which had been developed as an alternate engine to the F-35.
. . . .
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A Big Week for the F-35?
A Big Week for the F-35?
July 11, 2014
. . . .
As major
British media has been reporting for some time, the
F-35 Joint Strike Fighter may be facing a major international marketing embarrassment: It has failed to show up for two of three scheduled (and much ballyhooed) public demonstrations in the United Kingdom. Now, it may miss the main event, a flying demonstration before the world’s aviation community at the Farnborough International Airshow, starting Monday. You see, the F-35 is grounded—again. An engine blew up on take-off at Eglin Air Force Base on June 23 and reportedly burned up much of the plane’s flammable, plastic composite rear fuselage and tail. No F-35s are flying until inspectors know what the problem is and can say it’s safe to fly—at least in the very limited regimes the F-35 has been cleared for. Moreover, even if the F-35 is released to participate at Farnborough, there may be a new problem: weather predictions for next week in England are not good, and the F-35
has real issues flying near thunder- and rainstorms; it even has problems with wet runways.
. . . .
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Air Force Maps Out Strategy For Upgrading All Early-Lot F-35As To Block 3F
Air Force Maps Out Strategy For Upgrading All Early-Lot F-35As To Block 3F
February 13, 2014
. . . .
Similar to past aircraft acquisition programs, F-35s have been delivered to the Air Force and other users with increasing capability as time has passed. But
the unprecedented level of concurrency built into the JSF acquisition construct means that the first 100 aircraft or so will need to be upgraded -- some on the margins, others more significantly -- to even be considered for operational deployments. The first software load deemed to have limited combat capability is called Block 2B and should be available late next year, while the block expected to contain vastly more combat options, Block 3F, is scheduled to complete flight test in late 2017.
. . . .
The currently confirmed figure, 83 aircraft, represents around 5 percent of the Air Force's F-35A program of record.
In a recent interview, Air Force Col. Sam Shaneyfelt and Lt. Col. David Chace told
Inside the Air Force the
service is committed to bringing all of its jets up to Block 3F, budget-permitting, as opposed to essentially cutting its losses on the early aircraft and leaving them in a role capable only of basic flight and training operations. Shaneyfelt and Chace are the chief and deputy chief, respectively, of the F-35 system management office at Air Combat Command, which will be responsible for operating the F-35A in the Air Force.
ITAF traveled to Langley Air Force Base, VA, to meet with them.
. . . .
The decision to upgrade the fleet in some ways plays into
the worst aspect of concurrency, the simultaneous development and production of aircraft, which has led and will lead to costly modifications to already-delivered products just to make them operationally relevant. Those expenses would have been minimized had the Pentagon waited until the program was more mature before beginning procurement. On the other hand, Shaneyfelt and Chace made the case that leaving F-35s the Air Force has already bought in a substandard configuration unwisely limits their utility, creates logistical challenges, increases sustainment costs and probably necessitates funding to upgrade legacy aircraft.
. . . .
Moving from one version of a block to another -- from 1A to 1B, for instance -- is supposed to involve only software refreshes, which cost less, take less time and make aircraft available to the fleet more quickly than hardware work. But Chace said the Air Force had to perform some hardware changes when it modified its Block 1A jets to a 1B configuration, and the same is likely to occur as production F-35s start to move up from Block 2A to Block 2B.
Upgrading from one block to its successor is more significant and more costly.
Chace acknowledged that moving aircraft from Block 1B to Block 2A will require hardware and software changes, and the jump from Block 2B to Block 3i will be even more demanding. The contents of Block 2B and 3i software are nearly identical, but they run on different hardware, including a new core processor that is critical for Block 3 capabilities.
. . . .
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JSF - GAO Report
Navy Matters: JSF - GAO Report
Friday, March 15, 2013
The GAO [Government Accountability Office] has published its latest report on the F-35 JSF. It’s grim reading. The only thing keeping this program going is that it’s the definition of too-big-to-fail. Well, let’s plunge in and see what’s happening.
. . . .
Moving on, let’s look at the
scheduling overruns. As a reminder, in 2001 the JSF was predicted to achieve Initial Operational Capability (IOC) in 2010 after nine years of development. Subsequently, the IOC slipped to 2012 then 2013 then 2015 and now the military has rescinded that estimate and declined to provide a new projected IOC date citing the still too immature level of development. I think it’s safe to say that 2017 would be an optimistic guess and 2018 or beyond would be more likely. That’s pushing two decades to achieve IOC!!!!
Here’s an interesting
tidbit demonstrating the problem with concurrency (the practice of building production aircraft before design and testing are finalized).
“Over time, testing has discovered bulkhead and rib cracks. The program is testing some redesigned structures and planning other modifications. Officials plan to retrofit test and production aircraft already built and make changes to the production line for subsequent aircraft.”
. . . .
GAO comments on the effect of concurrency.
“In addition to contract cost overruns, the program is incurring substantial costs to retrofit (rework) produced aircraft needed to fix deficiencies discovered in testing. These costs are largely attributable to the substantial concurrency, or overlap, between testing and manufacturing activities.”
. . . .
(1) Government Accountability Office, F-35 Joint Strike Fighter, Mar 2013, GAO-13-309
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US Weapons Man: F-35 Fighter Plan Was 'Acquisition Malpractice'
F-35 Fighter Plan Was 'Acquisition Malpractice', Pentagon Official Says - ABC News
Feb. 7, 2012
. . . .
"I can spend quite a few minutes on the F-35, but I don't want to,"
Frank Kendall, the Pentagon's Acting Undersecretary of Defense for Acquisition, Technology and Logistics, said Monday. "Putting the F-35 into production years before the first test flight was acquisition malpractice. It should not have been done, OK? But we did it, OK?"
Kendall, who was speaking at an event hosted by the
Center for Strategic and International Studies, said that the early production decision was due to "optimistic predictions" based on design tools, simulations and modeling. But he said the design tools weren't perfect, the models weren't precise enough and now the military has found problems in all three variants of the F-35.
"Now we're paying the price for being wrong about that," he said. Kendall was not with the Defense Department's acquisitions office when the F-35 deal was inked with defense contracting giant Lockheed Martin in 2001.
. . . .
When planning the F-35 program, the Pentagon's acquisitions department took a
"concurrent" strategy with the F-35 production, meaning the government, along with Lockheed Martin, planned to test the planes as production was ongoing, fixing problems on the assembly line as they're found and getting more planes in the air faster. Production on the F-35 began in 2003, three years before the first official test flight was completed.
The problem, a Department of Defense official told ABC News, is that sometimes critical issues with the jets were found after several of the planes had already been delivered to their military customers. The Pentagon already has nine non-test production jets in its hangers, but the first ever F-35 night flight test was completed just last month.
In fact, the planes are only 20 percent through testing and aren't expected to complete it until 2016, the official said.
Kendall called the errant strategy an "extreme example" of the Pentagon's tendency to put a program into production too early.
Still, both the Defense official and Kendall said the Pentagon remains committed to the F-35 program and that it has been making progress. The F-35 team
recently celebrated the program exceeding flight test goals for 2011, according to Lockheed Martin.
. . . .
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F-35 fighter jet struggles to take off
F-35 fighter jet struggles to take off - LA Times
June 12, 2013
. . . .
Pressure intensified on the test teams last week when the Marines Corps said it wanted its F-35s to be ready for combat by the end of 2015 — one year earlier than planned. The Air Force also moved up its date, to 2016. The Navy plans to see its F-35s aboard U.S. aircraft carriers by early-2019.
This is an ambitious plan, considering the Government Accountability Office estimated that F-35 flight testing, which has repeatedly fallen behind schedule, is only about one-third complete.
On more than one occasion the Pentagon's director of operational test and evaluation has lowered the plane's performance specifications by reducing turn performance and slowing the acceleration rate.
The most demanding testing still lies years ahead.
. . . .
The
GAO estimated the program would cost an unprecedented $12.6 billion a year on average through 2037 — that's an average of about $1.4 million an hour for the next two and a half decades.
The
per-plane cost estimates have climbed to $161 million today from $81 million in 2001, the GAO said.
. . . .
Test pilots say some of the F-35's delays can be traced to the concept that computer simulation and modeling would recognize many of the F-35 design problems right away, instead of the old-fashioned method of testing: in the air.
Under this premise, the Pentagon approved a plan to manufacture F-35s while simultaneously testing them. The plan, called concurrency, calls for scores of F-35s to be sent back to Lockheed for rework after testing is done.
Frank Kendall, the undersecretary of defense for acquisition, called this approach "acquisition malpractice" last year and said that predictions were too optimistic.
"Now we're paying the price for being wrong," Kendall said.
There are 61 F-35s already delivered, 81 completely built and others still being assembled at Lockheed's facility in Ft. Worth, Texas.
The Pentagon estimated that retrofit costs for the first 90 aircraft will amount to $1.2 billion.
Winslow T. Wheeler, a military budget specialist and frequent Pentagon critic at the Project for Government Oversight,
said the decision to test and build the F-35 at the same time was a political move to get federal funding flowing to congressional districts before actual performance of the weapon system was shown.
Lockheed has long had political muscle — the company donated to 425 of 535 Congressional members in the 2012 cycle, according to OpenSecrets.org — and has garnered bipartisan support around the F-35 program.
The
company promotes the fact that the F-35 provides 127,000 direct and indirect jobs in 47 states and Puerto Rico. It expects to pump an estimated $6 billion into California's economy this year involving 298 companies and resulting in 28,000 jobs.
"It's a way for the contractor to get the hooks in Congress," he said. "For a contractor, the measure of success in a program is getting it started. Once you get that money rolling in, it doesn't matter whether or not the thing you built works."
. . . .
Two decades ago,
officials wanted 648 F-22 fighter jets for $149 million per plane. Eventually, the military ended up with only 188 at a price tag of $412 million each. Before that, the Pentagon
wanted 132 new B-2 stealth bombers at about $500 million per plane. It ultimately bought 21 at $2.1 billion each.
. . . .
Steve O'Bryan, a Lockheed vice president, admits the "early effects of concurrency were more disruptive" than the company had initially thought, but that the program is back on track. He said the F-35 will have completed 50% of testing by year's end.
"We're now at a tipping point with this program," O'Bryan said. "We've figured things out, brought costs down, increased orders from international partners."
. . . .
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Flight Maneuver Hints at Cause of F-35 Fire
Flight Maneuver Hints at Cause of F-35 Fire | Defense Tech
September 3, 2014
. . . .
Speaking during a defense conference Wednesday at the National Press Club, Air Force Lt. Gen. Christopher Bogdan said three weeks before
an F-35A made by Lockheed Martin Corp. caught fire during takeoff June 23 at Eglin Air Force Base, Florida, it was flown in a manner designed to test the performance of its g-force, roll and yaw characteristics within designed limits known as the flight envelope.
While the maneuver only last two seconds or so, it caused excessive rubbing between the titanium blade in the fan section of the F135 engine made by United Technologies Corp.‘s Pratt & Whitney unit and the surrounding material, Bogdan said. The
metal reached temperatures of as high as 1,900 degrees Fahrenheit — compared to the normal level of about 1,000 degrees — and resulted in micro-cracking, he said.
A few weeks later, during the fateful takeoff, the blade came apart and actually pierced the left aft fuel tank, engulfing the rear of the plane in flames, Bogdan said. “It was the fuel tank that caught fire,” he said.
. . . .
The
Joint Strike Fighter is the Pentagon’s most expensive weapons acquisition program, estimated to cost a total of $398.6 billion for a total of 2,457 aircraft. That breaks down to a
per-plane cost of $162 million, including research and development.
. . . .
There are currently about 100 F-35s in the U.S. fleet, Bogdan said.
Pratt & Whitney has delivered roughly 150 F135 engines, he said.
Bogdan said Pratt & Whitney officials have
vowed to cover the cost of the engine fix, which will probably include
redesigning that part of the propulsion system to create more space in the so-called trench area. He declined to specify how much it will cost until the program office completes a root-cause analysis, expected later this month.
. . . .
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