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Return to Relevance: The Philippine-U.S. Alliance
By Renato Cruz De Castro, on 09 Jul 2013, Feature
Prior to 1992, Philippine-U.S. security relations were framed by several bilateral defense arrangements. The two countries became formal allies in 1951 upon signing the Philippines-U.S. Mutual Defense Treaty. Both countries also became members of the Southeast Asia Treaty Organization in 1956. However, the most important of these bilateral defense arrangements predated the collective defense treaties binding the two countries: the 1947 Philippines-U.S. Military Bases Agreement, which facilitated the hosting of major American naval and air facilities in Philippine territory. The U.S. military bases in the Philippines, including the Subic Bay Naval Base and Clark Air Base, extended vital logistical support to American forward-deployed forces operating in Southeast Asia, the Indian Ocean and even in the Persian Gulf during the Cold War. Furthermore, U.S. air and naval assets acted as de facto armed forces against external threats to the Philippines, since the Philippine military was primarily involved in internal security operations.
In September 1991, the Philippine Senate failed to ratify the Philippine-American Cooperation and Friendship Treaty of 1991 (PACT). PACT provided the legal basis for extending the stay of the U.S. military facilities on Philippine territory beyond 1992. Motivated either by simple anti-Americanism or disgust over the low base-related economic and military compensation, the majority of the senators voted down the treaty. With the withdrawal of these American military facilities from the country in 1992, the alliance assumed a form different from the previous configuration. Philippine-U.S security relations became dormant as the Philippines focused its attention on the Association of Southeast Asian Nations (ASEAN). Meanwhile, the U.S shifted its strategic priorities away from Southeast Asia to Northeast Asia.
Starting in 2001, the U.S. global war on terror, and later the tension in U.S.-China relations after 2008, helped restore the U.S.-Philippines strategic partnership. Security relations were revitalized, and the alliance achieved two political and strategic objectives. First, Manila received U.S. support for the Philippine government’s counterterrorism and counterinsurgency campaign in the country’s south. Second, Washington deepened its alliance with Manila, not only to neutralize terrorist groups, but also to counter Beijing’s political and economic influence in the country. The U.S. now regularly extends technical training and defense assistance to the armed forces of the Philippines (AFP) to firm up the U.S.-Philippines security partnership in the face of growing Chinese military power and assertiveness in the South China Sea.
Most recently, the standoff between the Philippines and China over the Scarborough Shoal in April 2012 underscored an international reality—Chinese naval power casts a long shadow over the Philippines, which, along with Vietnam, is at the forefront of the South China Sea dispute with China. Clearly, China is specifically targeting the Philippines in a brinkmanship game. Given the dismal state of the Philippine military, the administration of President Benigno Aquino III has acknowledged the need for U.S. diplomatic support and military assistance in the Philippines’ territorial row with China.
Southeast Asia’s Military Laggard
Since its independence in 1946, the Philippines has been plagued by domestic insurgency. For more than six decades, the government has concentrated its efforts and resources on containing rebel and secessionist groups, including a nation-wide Maoist insurgency and Islamist separatists in Mindanao. This preoccupation with internal security was most evident during the Arroyo administration. In January 2002, the AFP released an internal security plan called “Bantay Laya” (Freedom Watch), which envisioned the AFP decisively defeating the armed component of the Philippines’ communist insurgency within five years. However, the strategic focus on the domestic insurgents left the AFP with no time or funds to develop credible air and maritime capabilities that could modestly deter China’s creeping occupation of the Spratly Islands.
The September 2007 AFP Capability Assessment indicated that the poor condition of AFP equipment adversely affected the military’s effectiveness and efficiency in counterinsurgency operations. Worse still, the report noted that the emphasis on low-intensity conflicts had diverted the military’s attention and resources away from external defense-related modernization projects. Regarding the AFP’s conventional military capabilities, it noted that the Philippine navy “lacks the assets for conduct of maritime patrols over territorial waters, since it does not have any anti-air capability and is incapable of conducting anti-submarine and mine warfare operations.” The assessment likewise underscored the inadequacies of the Philippine air force’s air defense, surveillance, airlift and ground attack capabilities. The report candidly acknowledged: “This situation [of limited combat capabilities] is nowhere more manifest than in the Kalayaan Island Group [in the Spratlys] wherein the AFP is unable to prevent and respond to intrusion into our [exclusive economic zone] or show our resolve in defending areas we are claiming.”
Thus, the Philippine government simply had no choice but to propose diplomatic and security measures with China and other claimant states to foster confidence-building, and to forge bilateral military cooperation agreements for joint patrols and exercises.
Confronting the China Challenge
Since assuming office in July 2010, Aquino has articulated the need to modernize the AFP in the face of new security challenges. Taking the cue from the new president, a joint Department of National Defense-AFP task force has formulated the AFP Long-Term Capability Development Plan. The plan calls for the AFP’s immediate shift from internal security to territorial defense. The plan also pushes for the immediate development of a modest deterrent capability to protect the country’s vast maritime borders and its territorial claim over some islands in the Spratlys. Specifically, the plan calls for the development of maritime surveillance and intelligence capabilities and the upgrade of the Philippine navy’s capabilities for joint maritime surveillance, defense and interdiction operations in the South China Sea.
The urgency of the AFP’s shift from internal to external security was underscored in March 2011, when two Chinese patrol vessels harassed a survey ship from the Department of Energy in the Reed Bank—now called Recto Bank by the Philippine government—about 150 miles east of the Spratly Islands and 40 miles west of the Philippine island of Palawan.
In response to Beijing’s subsequent rejection of Manila’s official protest, the Philippine government increased its military presence on its western border, which faces the South China Sea. Manila likewise allocated $18.4 million for the repair of its existing runway on one of the islands it occupies in the Spratlys, and for the acquisition of naval and air equipment to monitor movements along the country’s vast maritime borders. During a joint Philippine-U.S. military exercise in Luzon, Aquino ordered the release of an estimated $22.5 million in addition to the annual defense appropriation for the immediate purchase of patrol craft, helicopters and modern rifles for the AFP.
The Aquino administration’s 2011-2016 national security policy (.pdf) requires a defensive capability extending from the country’s maritime territory to its contiguous waters and exclusive economic zone (EEZ). Hence, the Philippine military needs to develop a comprehensive territorial and maritime protection system based on its surveillance, modest deterrence and border patrol capabilities. This goal became policy when the Philippine government announced in September 2011 that it would allocate roughly $1.1 billion from the annual national budget for base support and logistic systems, as well as the acquisition of high-endurance cutters and six helicopters for the navy and air force, so that the Philippine military can establish a strong security perimeter in the Reed Bank, Kalayaan Island Group and Palawan.
Bringing in the Philippine-U.S. Alliance
Manila’s turn to the U.S. for assistance in addressing the China threat was facilitated by the fact that the Philippine-U.S. alliance had been revitalized on the heels of the Sept. 11 attacks. For the past decade, Manila and Washington have cooperated in containing the various insurgent and terrorist groups in the Philippines. In 2002, the U.S. Joint Special Operations Task Force-Philippines (JSTOF-P) was established as a separate and new stream of U.S. troops to counter transnational terrorists located in the Philippines.
Through the JSTOF-P, the Pentagon trained three light reaction companies that eventually constituted the AFP’s 1st Special Forces Group. The JSTOF-P operates alongside the AFP to improve the latter’s operational capacity in counterterrorism and counterinsurgency warfare (.pdf). It is also training and equipping two more light reaction companies and four light infantry battalions for the Philippine army, while enhancing the night-flying mission capabilities of the UH-1 pilots of the Philippine air force. The U.S. Navy also provided the AFP with another refurbished Cyclone-class special operations mother ship for smaller patrol craft, in order to bolster the interdiction and reconnaissance capabilities of the Philippine navy along the country’s coastal areas and territorial waters.
In addition to supporting the AFP’s programs to improve its internal security capabilities, the Pentagon Has supplied the Philippine military with essential materiel such as spare parts for V-150 and V-300 armored fighting vehicles and UH-1 helicopters, assorted rifles and squad machine guns, combat life-saver kits, communication equipment, ammunition for small arms and artillery pieces, night-vision devices and armored vests, as well as training manuals for combat operations.
The Pentagon has also enhanced its access arrangements with the Philippine government. For example, in 2007, the allies renewed the Military Logistic Support Arrangement originally signed in 2002. This agreement allows American forces to source logistics such as food, fuel, ammunition and equipment from the host state on a reimbursement basis. It lowers the cost of alliance cooperation by minimizing administrative outlays and developing the interoperability of the allies during joint activities, peacekeeping missions and other multilateral military deployments under the United Nations. Interestingly, the Pentagon has also established temporary and small forward operating bases in the southern Philippines and potential cooperative security locations in strategic parts of the country that can be used by American forces in any crisis situation in East Asia. A current “big ticket” security undertaking between the allies is the Coast Watch South project in southern Philippines. This project involves the installation of listening and communication stations along the coast of Mindanao linked to Philippine air force aircraft and naval patrol craft operating in the Sulu and Sulawesi Seas.
Since 2009, however, China’s assertiveness in the South China Sea has been an increasing concern of the U.S.-Philippine Mutual Defense Board, the liaison and consultative body that oversees the Philippine-U.S. defense posture against external threats. The Mutual Defense Board’s annual meeting in August 2010 discussed the security challenges the allies face, such as terrorism, domestic insurgency and maritime security concerns, as well as potential flashpoints like the contentious territorial dispute in the South China Sea. The U.S. and the Philippines decided to complement each other’s military capabilities, to enhance interoperability between their armed services and to strengthen the AFP’s territorial defense capabilities with tangible U.S. security assistance.
Consequently, during the height of the Philippines’ territorial row with China in mid-June 2011, the Aquino administration acknowledged the need for U.S. diplomatic support and military assistance. The U.S. ambassador to the Philippines, Harry Thomas, readily pledged U.S. support to the Philippines. Further expression of support came from then-U.S. Secretary of State Hillary Clinton. During her meeting in Washington with Philippine Foreign Secretary Albert Del Rosario, she expressed U.S. wariness about China’s intrusion into the Philippines’ EEZ and declared that the U.S. would honor the 1951 Mutual Defense Treaty and strategic alliance with its Southeast Asian ally. She also reaffirmed American support to the Philippines, even if it meant providing “affordable” material and equipment to enable the AFP to defend the country.
The Role of Philippine-U.S. Alliance
Undoubtedly, the Philippine military needs new arms and equipment to develop its territorial defense capability. Current U.S. assistance includes the transfer of three former U.S. Coast Guard Hamilton-class cutters to the Philippine navy through the Foreign Military Sales credit. Once transferred to the Philippines, these cutters will be the largest vessels in the country’s inventory and will replace vintage World War II-era destroyer escorts (.pdf) still used by the Philippine navy for patrolling the high seas.
Likewise, the AFP will require pressing reforms before it can devote its attention and resources to territorial defense. These reforms will prepare the organization for its evolving function of territorial defense in its medium-term defense program. Decades of internal security operations have bred a bureaucratic inertia within the AFP that prevents it from undertaking a territorial defense function. Indeed, a crucial task at hand is for the U.S. and the Philippines to discuss how the latter can reorient its present security outlook and restructure its defense expenditures.
No amount of American material and technical assistance, however, will enable the Philippines to confront an assertive China in the South China Sea. Given its limited military capabilities, Manila has asked for an unequivocal U.S. commitment to Philippine defense and security as provided by the 1951 Mutual Defense Treaty. This U.S. commitment to assist its ally was indeed tested during the 2012 Scarborough Shoal standoff between the Philippines and China.
During the standoff, the Philippines appealed for diplomatic and military support from the United States. In response, Washington sent the USS North Carolina, a Virginia-class fast attack submarine, on a port call to Subic Bay on May 13, 2012. A month later, another nuclear-powered attack submarine, the USS Louisville, made a port call to Subic Bay. Though formally routine port calls, the fact that the much-publicized visits were made during the standoff intimated that the U.S. would not stand idly by if its treaty ally were threatened by any form of armed aggression.
After the standoff, Aquino asked for a definite security guarantee when he met President Barack Obama in the Oval Office in June 2012. Obama answered that the U.S. would abide by its treaty obligation under the 1951 Mutual Defense Treaty. The United States’ ability to guarantee the Philippines’ external defense, however, actually depends on whether American forces are physically pre-positioned to provide immediate and timely assistance. The U.S. can effectively defend its ally only if it has access to facilities near the South China Sea from which it can respond in a timely manner in case of an armed confrontation.
To this end, during the August 2011 meeting of the Philippine-U.S. Mutual Defense Board and Security Engagement Board, the allies agreed to develop a framework for heightened bilateral and multilateral security and domain awareness. The board considered the following measures: rotational presence of U.S. maritime defense assets in the Philippines to support Mutual Defense Board and Security Engagement Board activities while the AFP develops its own capability for territorial defense; increased joint bilateral maritime security activities in the South China Sea; development of joint-use maritime security support facilities; improved information-sharing between U.S. and Philippine forces; and the conduct of integrated maritime security initiatives involving the U.S. Pacific Command and the AFP. Washington has also expressed its commitment to strengthening Manila’s capability to monitor and defend its maritime territory through an increase in military exercises and capacity-building efforts.
In January 2012, the Philippine-U.S. Bilateral Security Dialogue was held in Washington, where Philippine foreign and defense officials emphasized the need for an expanded U.S. military presence in the Philippines. This presence was proposed in the face of China’s naval capabilities and assertiveness in East Asia, and in line with the Obama administration’s strategic guidance, which provides for a rebalancing of the U.S. force structure and investments to meet persistent and potential threats in the Asia-Pacific and the Middle East, and to advance capabilities for maintaining access and projecting power globally.
The two allies are also currently developing the concept of an increased rotational presence of American forces in the Philippines. This might involve the stationing of a squadron of U.S. Marine fighter planes in a Philippine air force base for six months, after which it would be replaced by a U.S. Navy fighter-bomber squadron that would be stationed in another Philippine base for another six months. Currently, the Pentagon is implementing a three-year program that aims to enhance credible U.S. maritime presence in Philippine archipelagic waters through rotational presence. The program entails improving Philippine port infrastructure, upgrading equipment, developing secure communication to allow greater interoperability between the U.S. military and the AFP and assisting in Philippine interagency planning and coordination at the ministerial and operational levels.
However, greater U.S. strategic access to the Philippines will surely be opposed by nationalist political figures and militant left-wing organizations in the Philippines. The Aquino administration will also face widespread public discomfort with relying too much on the Philippines’ only strategic ally. Closer security ties with the U.S. will also limit the Philippines’ room for diplomatic maneuver in negotiating with China for an amicable settlement of the territorial row as well as adversely affecting vibrant Philippine-China trade relations. As a result, the Aquino administration will have to muster enough political capital to weather the massive protest and economic fallout that a ubiquitous U.S. strategic footprint in the Philippines could generate.
Conclusion
Notwithstanding the dismal state of the Philippine military, the Aquino administration has adopted a delicate balancing policy toward China. In mid-2011, it decided to pursue a substantial modernization of the AFP, which at the time was still focused on internal security operations against domestic insurgent groups. Preoccupied with internal security and devoid of U.S. military assistance after the withdrawal of the American forces from the country in 1992, the AFP found itself with no military capability to confront China’s heavy-handed behavior in the South China Sea.
The post-Sept. 11 revitalization of the Philippine-U.S. alliance has now created the opportunity for the U.S. to assist its ally in facing up to the China challenge. Currently, the U.S. extends technical, material and financial assistance to develop the AFP’s capabilities for maritime surveillance and patrols. In the long run, the U.S. must also help rid the Philippine defense establishment of the bureaucratic inertia that inhibits it from assuming the function of territorial defense.
Such assistance demands that the AFP incorporate external defense in its security planning and revamp its defense spending, which prioritizes personnel expenditures over capital outlay. Furthermore, the U.S. must also assure the Philippines that it will abide by its treaty obligations under the 1951 Mutual Defense Treaty in the face of China’s assertive moves in the South China Sea. Finally, these assurances must also be buttressed by U.S. resolve to remain the foremost Pacific power far into the second decade of the 21st century. Both sides have an abiding interest in seeing that their security partnership continues to expand, in the context of a stable Asia-Pacific region.
WPR Article | Return to Relevance: The Philippine-U.S. Alliance
By Renato Cruz De Castro, on 09 Jul 2013, Feature
Prior to 1992, Philippine-U.S. security relations were framed by several bilateral defense arrangements. The two countries became formal allies in 1951 upon signing the Philippines-U.S. Mutual Defense Treaty. Both countries also became members of the Southeast Asia Treaty Organization in 1956. However, the most important of these bilateral defense arrangements predated the collective defense treaties binding the two countries: the 1947 Philippines-U.S. Military Bases Agreement, which facilitated the hosting of major American naval and air facilities in Philippine territory. The U.S. military bases in the Philippines, including the Subic Bay Naval Base and Clark Air Base, extended vital logistical support to American forward-deployed forces operating in Southeast Asia, the Indian Ocean and even in the Persian Gulf during the Cold War. Furthermore, U.S. air and naval assets acted as de facto armed forces against external threats to the Philippines, since the Philippine military was primarily involved in internal security operations.
In September 1991, the Philippine Senate failed to ratify the Philippine-American Cooperation and Friendship Treaty of 1991 (PACT). PACT provided the legal basis for extending the stay of the U.S. military facilities on Philippine territory beyond 1992. Motivated either by simple anti-Americanism or disgust over the low base-related economic and military compensation, the majority of the senators voted down the treaty. With the withdrawal of these American military facilities from the country in 1992, the alliance assumed a form different from the previous configuration. Philippine-U.S security relations became dormant as the Philippines focused its attention on the Association of Southeast Asian Nations (ASEAN). Meanwhile, the U.S shifted its strategic priorities away from Southeast Asia to Northeast Asia.
Starting in 2001, the U.S. global war on terror, and later the tension in U.S.-China relations after 2008, helped restore the U.S.-Philippines strategic partnership. Security relations were revitalized, and the alliance achieved two political and strategic objectives. First, Manila received U.S. support for the Philippine government’s counterterrorism and counterinsurgency campaign in the country’s south. Second, Washington deepened its alliance with Manila, not only to neutralize terrorist groups, but also to counter Beijing’s political and economic influence in the country. The U.S. now regularly extends technical training and defense assistance to the armed forces of the Philippines (AFP) to firm up the U.S.-Philippines security partnership in the face of growing Chinese military power and assertiveness in the South China Sea.
Most recently, the standoff between the Philippines and China over the Scarborough Shoal in April 2012 underscored an international reality—Chinese naval power casts a long shadow over the Philippines, which, along with Vietnam, is at the forefront of the South China Sea dispute with China. Clearly, China is specifically targeting the Philippines in a brinkmanship game. Given the dismal state of the Philippine military, the administration of President Benigno Aquino III has acknowledged the need for U.S. diplomatic support and military assistance in the Philippines’ territorial row with China.
Southeast Asia’s Military Laggard
Since its independence in 1946, the Philippines has been plagued by domestic insurgency. For more than six decades, the government has concentrated its efforts and resources on containing rebel and secessionist groups, including a nation-wide Maoist insurgency and Islamist separatists in Mindanao. This preoccupation with internal security was most evident during the Arroyo administration. In January 2002, the AFP released an internal security plan called “Bantay Laya” (Freedom Watch), which envisioned the AFP decisively defeating the armed component of the Philippines’ communist insurgency within five years. However, the strategic focus on the domestic insurgents left the AFP with no time or funds to develop credible air and maritime capabilities that could modestly deter China’s creeping occupation of the Spratly Islands.
The September 2007 AFP Capability Assessment indicated that the poor condition of AFP equipment adversely affected the military’s effectiveness and efficiency in counterinsurgency operations. Worse still, the report noted that the emphasis on low-intensity conflicts had diverted the military’s attention and resources away from external defense-related modernization projects. Regarding the AFP’s conventional military capabilities, it noted that the Philippine navy “lacks the assets for conduct of maritime patrols over territorial waters, since it does not have any anti-air capability and is incapable of conducting anti-submarine and mine warfare operations.” The assessment likewise underscored the inadequacies of the Philippine air force’s air defense, surveillance, airlift and ground attack capabilities. The report candidly acknowledged: “This situation [of limited combat capabilities] is nowhere more manifest than in the Kalayaan Island Group [in the Spratlys] wherein the AFP is unable to prevent and respond to intrusion into our [exclusive economic zone] or show our resolve in defending areas we are claiming.”
Thus, the Philippine government simply had no choice but to propose diplomatic and security measures with China and other claimant states to foster confidence-building, and to forge bilateral military cooperation agreements for joint patrols and exercises.
Confronting the China Challenge
Since assuming office in July 2010, Aquino has articulated the need to modernize the AFP in the face of new security challenges. Taking the cue from the new president, a joint Department of National Defense-AFP task force has formulated the AFP Long-Term Capability Development Plan. The plan calls for the AFP’s immediate shift from internal security to territorial defense. The plan also pushes for the immediate development of a modest deterrent capability to protect the country’s vast maritime borders and its territorial claim over some islands in the Spratlys. Specifically, the plan calls for the development of maritime surveillance and intelligence capabilities and the upgrade of the Philippine navy’s capabilities for joint maritime surveillance, defense and interdiction operations in the South China Sea.
The urgency of the AFP’s shift from internal to external security was underscored in March 2011, when two Chinese patrol vessels harassed a survey ship from the Department of Energy in the Reed Bank—now called Recto Bank by the Philippine government—about 150 miles east of the Spratly Islands and 40 miles west of the Philippine island of Palawan.
In response to Beijing’s subsequent rejection of Manila’s official protest, the Philippine government increased its military presence on its western border, which faces the South China Sea. Manila likewise allocated $18.4 million for the repair of its existing runway on one of the islands it occupies in the Spratlys, and for the acquisition of naval and air equipment to monitor movements along the country’s vast maritime borders. During a joint Philippine-U.S. military exercise in Luzon, Aquino ordered the release of an estimated $22.5 million in addition to the annual defense appropriation for the immediate purchase of patrol craft, helicopters and modern rifles for the AFP.
The Aquino administration’s 2011-2016 national security policy (.pdf) requires a defensive capability extending from the country’s maritime territory to its contiguous waters and exclusive economic zone (EEZ). Hence, the Philippine military needs to develop a comprehensive territorial and maritime protection system based on its surveillance, modest deterrence and border patrol capabilities. This goal became policy when the Philippine government announced in September 2011 that it would allocate roughly $1.1 billion from the annual national budget for base support and logistic systems, as well as the acquisition of high-endurance cutters and six helicopters for the navy and air force, so that the Philippine military can establish a strong security perimeter in the Reed Bank, Kalayaan Island Group and Palawan.
Bringing in the Philippine-U.S. Alliance
Manila’s turn to the U.S. for assistance in addressing the China threat was facilitated by the fact that the Philippine-U.S. alliance had been revitalized on the heels of the Sept. 11 attacks. For the past decade, Manila and Washington have cooperated in containing the various insurgent and terrorist groups in the Philippines. In 2002, the U.S. Joint Special Operations Task Force-Philippines (JSTOF-P) was established as a separate and new stream of U.S. troops to counter transnational terrorists located in the Philippines.
Through the JSTOF-P, the Pentagon trained three light reaction companies that eventually constituted the AFP’s 1st Special Forces Group. The JSTOF-P operates alongside the AFP to improve the latter’s operational capacity in counterterrorism and counterinsurgency warfare (.pdf). It is also training and equipping two more light reaction companies and four light infantry battalions for the Philippine army, while enhancing the night-flying mission capabilities of the UH-1 pilots of the Philippine air force. The U.S. Navy also provided the AFP with another refurbished Cyclone-class special operations mother ship for smaller patrol craft, in order to bolster the interdiction and reconnaissance capabilities of the Philippine navy along the country’s coastal areas and territorial waters.
In addition to supporting the AFP’s programs to improve its internal security capabilities, the Pentagon Has supplied the Philippine military with essential materiel such as spare parts for V-150 and V-300 armored fighting vehicles and UH-1 helicopters, assorted rifles and squad machine guns, combat life-saver kits, communication equipment, ammunition for small arms and artillery pieces, night-vision devices and armored vests, as well as training manuals for combat operations.
The Pentagon has also enhanced its access arrangements with the Philippine government. For example, in 2007, the allies renewed the Military Logistic Support Arrangement originally signed in 2002. This agreement allows American forces to source logistics such as food, fuel, ammunition and equipment from the host state on a reimbursement basis. It lowers the cost of alliance cooperation by minimizing administrative outlays and developing the interoperability of the allies during joint activities, peacekeeping missions and other multilateral military deployments under the United Nations. Interestingly, the Pentagon has also established temporary and small forward operating bases in the southern Philippines and potential cooperative security locations in strategic parts of the country that can be used by American forces in any crisis situation in East Asia. A current “big ticket” security undertaking between the allies is the Coast Watch South project in southern Philippines. This project involves the installation of listening and communication stations along the coast of Mindanao linked to Philippine air force aircraft and naval patrol craft operating in the Sulu and Sulawesi Seas.
Since 2009, however, China’s assertiveness in the South China Sea has been an increasing concern of the U.S.-Philippine Mutual Defense Board, the liaison and consultative body that oversees the Philippine-U.S. defense posture against external threats. The Mutual Defense Board’s annual meeting in August 2010 discussed the security challenges the allies face, such as terrorism, domestic insurgency and maritime security concerns, as well as potential flashpoints like the contentious territorial dispute in the South China Sea. The U.S. and the Philippines decided to complement each other’s military capabilities, to enhance interoperability between their armed services and to strengthen the AFP’s territorial defense capabilities with tangible U.S. security assistance.
Consequently, during the height of the Philippines’ territorial row with China in mid-June 2011, the Aquino administration acknowledged the need for U.S. diplomatic support and military assistance. The U.S. ambassador to the Philippines, Harry Thomas, readily pledged U.S. support to the Philippines. Further expression of support came from then-U.S. Secretary of State Hillary Clinton. During her meeting in Washington with Philippine Foreign Secretary Albert Del Rosario, she expressed U.S. wariness about China’s intrusion into the Philippines’ EEZ and declared that the U.S. would honor the 1951 Mutual Defense Treaty and strategic alliance with its Southeast Asian ally. She also reaffirmed American support to the Philippines, even if it meant providing “affordable” material and equipment to enable the AFP to defend the country.
The Role of Philippine-U.S. Alliance
Undoubtedly, the Philippine military needs new arms and equipment to develop its territorial defense capability. Current U.S. assistance includes the transfer of three former U.S. Coast Guard Hamilton-class cutters to the Philippine navy through the Foreign Military Sales credit. Once transferred to the Philippines, these cutters will be the largest vessels in the country’s inventory and will replace vintage World War II-era destroyer escorts (.pdf) still used by the Philippine navy for patrolling the high seas.
Likewise, the AFP will require pressing reforms before it can devote its attention and resources to territorial defense. These reforms will prepare the organization for its evolving function of territorial defense in its medium-term defense program. Decades of internal security operations have bred a bureaucratic inertia within the AFP that prevents it from undertaking a territorial defense function. Indeed, a crucial task at hand is for the U.S. and the Philippines to discuss how the latter can reorient its present security outlook and restructure its defense expenditures.
No amount of American material and technical assistance, however, will enable the Philippines to confront an assertive China in the South China Sea. Given its limited military capabilities, Manila has asked for an unequivocal U.S. commitment to Philippine defense and security as provided by the 1951 Mutual Defense Treaty. This U.S. commitment to assist its ally was indeed tested during the 2012 Scarborough Shoal standoff between the Philippines and China.
During the standoff, the Philippines appealed for diplomatic and military support from the United States. In response, Washington sent the USS North Carolina, a Virginia-class fast attack submarine, on a port call to Subic Bay on May 13, 2012. A month later, another nuclear-powered attack submarine, the USS Louisville, made a port call to Subic Bay. Though formally routine port calls, the fact that the much-publicized visits were made during the standoff intimated that the U.S. would not stand idly by if its treaty ally were threatened by any form of armed aggression.
After the standoff, Aquino asked for a definite security guarantee when he met President Barack Obama in the Oval Office in June 2012. Obama answered that the U.S. would abide by its treaty obligation under the 1951 Mutual Defense Treaty. The United States’ ability to guarantee the Philippines’ external defense, however, actually depends on whether American forces are physically pre-positioned to provide immediate and timely assistance. The U.S. can effectively defend its ally only if it has access to facilities near the South China Sea from which it can respond in a timely manner in case of an armed confrontation.
To this end, during the August 2011 meeting of the Philippine-U.S. Mutual Defense Board and Security Engagement Board, the allies agreed to develop a framework for heightened bilateral and multilateral security and domain awareness. The board considered the following measures: rotational presence of U.S. maritime defense assets in the Philippines to support Mutual Defense Board and Security Engagement Board activities while the AFP develops its own capability for territorial defense; increased joint bilateral maritime security activities in the South China Sea; development of joint-use maritime security support facilities; improved information-sharing between U.S. and Philippine forces; and the conduct of integrated maritime security initiatives involving the U.S. Pacific Command and the AFP. Washington has also expressed its commitment to strengthening Manila’s capability to monitor and defend its maritime territory through an increase in military exercises and capacity-building efforts.
In January 2012, the Philippine-U.S. Bilateral Security Dialogue was held in Washington, where Philippine foreign and defense officials emphasized the need for an expanded U.S. military presence in the Philippines. This presence was proposed in the face of China’s naval capabilities and assertiveness in East Asia, and in line with the Obama administration’s strategic guidance, which provides for a rebalancing of the U.S. force structure and investments to meet persistent and potential threats in the Asia-Pacific and the Middle East, and to advance capabilities for maintaining access and projecting power globally.
The two allies are also currently developing the concept of an increased rotational presence of American forces in the Philippines. This might involve the stationing of a squadron of U.S. Marine fighter planes in a Philippine air force base for six months, after which it would be replaced by a U.S. Navy fighter-bomber squadron that would be stationed in another Philippine base for another six months. Currently, the Pentagon is implementing a three-year program that aims to enhance credible U.S. maritime presence in Philippine archipelagic waters through rotational presence. The program entails improving Philippine port infrastructure, upgrading equipment, developing secure communication to allow greater interoperability between the U.S. military and the AFP and assisting in Philippine interagency planning and coordination at the ministerial and operational levels.
However, greater U.S. strategic access to the Philippines will surely be opposed by nationalist political figures and militant left-wing organizations in the Philippines. The Aquino administration will also face widespread public discomfort with relying too much on the Philippines’ only strategic ally. Closer security ties with the U.S. will also limit the Philippines’ room for diplomatic maneuver in negotiating with China for an amicable settlement of the territorial row as well as adversely affecting vibrant Philippine-China trade relations. As a result, the Aquino administration will have to muster enough political capital to weather the massive protest and economic fallout that a ubiquitous U.S. strategic footprint in the Philippines could generate.
Conclusion
Notwithstanding the dismal state of the Philippine military, the Aquino administration has adopted a delicate balancing policy toward China. In mid-2011, it decided to pursue a substantial modernization of the AFP, which at the time was still focused on internal security operations against domestic insurgent groups. Preoccupied with internal security and devoid of U.S. military assistance after the withdrawal of the American forces from the country in 1992, the AFP found itself with no military capability to confront China’s heavy-handed behavior in the South China Sea.
The post-Sept. 11 revitalization of the Philippine-U.S. alliance has now created the opportunity for the U.S. to assist its ally in facing up to the China challenge. Currently, the U.S. extends technical, material and financial assistance to develop the AFP’s capabilities for maritime surveillance and patrols. In the long run, the U.S. must also help rid the Philippine defense establishment of the bureaucratic inertia that inhibits it from assuming the function of territorial defense.
Such assistance demands that the AFP incorporate external defense in its security planning and revamp its defense spending, which prioritizes personnel expenditures over capital outlay. Furthermore, the U.S. must also assure the Philippines that it will abide by its treaty obligations under the 1951 Mutual Defense Treaty in the face of China’s assertive moves in the South China Sea. Finally, these assurances must also be buttressed by U.S. resolve to remain the foremost Pacific power far into the second decade of the 21st century. Both sides have an abiding interest in seeing that their security partnership continues to expand, in the context of a stable Asia-Pacific region.
WPR Article | Return to Relevance: The Philippine-U.S. Alliance
