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PENSIEVE: Why does the army take over? Farrukh Khan Pitafi
Granted that the politicians often exhibit an inability to govern properly or to govern at all. But how does this justify the role of the army in the political system? And the politicians, too, have an excellent excuse to justify their failure in delivering. They complain that the army hands them government when things become unmanageable
Twice in my life did the army take over and both times it was not a question of saving the federation. But, astonishingly enough, both takeovers were followed shortly by serious regional crises in which Pakistan was to play a critical role. Conspiracy theorists at this point would have a field day, but this question is not a matter that can be taken lightly, hence no conspiracy theories please. Being brought up in an army family, I have developed an uncanny obsession with the question, and here I am taking the liberty to contribute my two cents to the debate.
I distinctly recall a day before the 2002 elections when in Lahore an NGO organised a seminar on electoral reforms. Shah Mahmood Qureshi and several other notables were invited to the event. The emphasis of more than one speaker was that there was something awfully wrong with the constitution and the electoral laws, which made army interventions unavoidable. Hence, in order to keep the army out, it was critical that the rules be amended. Another emphasis was on the need for an independent and powerful Election Commission (EC). When I got a chance to speak, I pointed out that it was not the first time that the constitution was being amended to avoid martial law but somehow military interventions continue unabated. So who needs reform, the constitution or the army? I am thankful that during Musharrafs early days there was enough tolerance that such questions could be asked publicly without any serious repercussions. Taking advantage of the mood, I also pointed out that the talk of an autonomous/potent election commission and the courts was irrelevant because those imposing martial law were armed to the teeth with weapons, so unless we were ready to provide the courts and the EC with armoured personnel carriers and other weapons, no breakthrough could be expected. My bravado was seen as an outburst of youthful ignorance and the show continued.
Later, the constitution was amended and now those amendments have been replaced with new ones, but somehow the army still is an important political power, even when it chooses to stay behind the scenes. Curiously, when today the Bangladesh model is eulogised and trust me someday its perpetuators will get away with it, we often forget Musharrafs days. In those days, everyone used to talk of the Turkish model. Why? Because the Turkish army then had a constitutional role in power politics and a strategic upper hand. Today, when that role is being reversed, our media and intellectuals have developed a blind spot for it. I do not want to talk much about the cheerleaders of dictatorship in Pakistan, for their careers depend on it. I just want to remind you that there is a culture of opportunism that celebrates each intervention and lays down a narrative for its approval.
But the bigger issue is that constitutional reforms have always failed to block the way of a marauding dictatorship. There is something innate in our political culture that makes the talk of reforms absolutely childish. And so is the talk of politicians providing an excuse to the army. Granted that the politicians often exhibit an inability to govern properly or to govern at all. But how in the name of sanity does it justify the role of the army in the political system? And the politicians, too, have an excellent excuse to justify their failure in delivering. They complain that the army hands them government when things become unmanageable and that too with a million shackles. If you recall, at the start of the current PPP rule, President Zardari (of course before his becoming president) said that he wanted a transfer of power and not a shackled government. Since then, his party maintains that it enjoys full power, albeit circumstances point in the opposite direction.
It is an obnoxiously onerous task to defend what politicians do and that is why I have stopped bothering. And it is not the hidden agenda of this piece either. However, there is plenty of evidence that this government could have served its term better had it not been burdened by Musharrafs legacy. Had Musharraf still not been the president with considerable clout over the army, the present government would have restored the chief justice much earlier, thereby avoiding the friction that has culminated into the current stalemate. It is clear that a lot more is included in the secret deals tailored by our military establishment than is ever confessed publicly.
The army then emerges as part of our political problem rather than the solution. I say it again that it does not justify the bad practices of the politicians nor their invitations to the generals. But it is impossible to accept that the generals are so gullible that they accept such invitations at face value. If such takeovers are still not ruled out, there must be something wrong with the way things are in this country.
It is my belief that the reason why our army, the army my late father once served, takes over is because it failed to effect a transformation from the colonial mould. Each army is taught by its own culture to think and behave in a supremacist fashion when it comes to civilians. However, each army is also taught to respect the system and restrain itself from crossing the thin line that separates it from the power corridors. I would not know who first introduced politics to the generals but with Ayub Khans takeover, a sad and dangerous precedent was created and every military ruler has seen it as a justification for his rule. Where there are none, excuses are invented and our political narrative duly amended. And it must not be forgotten that the army comes into power not because it has some magic wand to solve all our problems or knows how to govern better but because it has the brute force and weaponry to match.
The solution, then, is perhaps to appeal to the better sense of the powerful and request them to impose an embargo on their interventions. No matter how noble his intentions are, no individual can provide an alternative to the institution building that evolves out of the democratic process. The army that my father served was capable of understanding these requests.
(The above column was written on the 11th anniversary of the October 12, 1999 military takeover.)
The writer is an independent columnist and a talk show host. He can be reached at farrukh.khan@pitafi.com
Granted that the politicians often exhibit an inability to govern properly or to govern at all. But how does this justify the role of the army in the political system? And the politicians, too, have an excellent excuse to justify their failure in delivering. They complain that the army hands them government when things become unmanageable
Twice in my life did the army take over and both times it was not a question of saving the federation. But, astonishingly enough, both takeovers were followed shortly by serious regional crises in which Pakistan was to play a critical role. Conspiracy theorists at this point would have a field day, but this question is not a matter that can be taken lightly, hence no conspiracy theories please. Being brought up in an army family, I have developed an uncanny obsession with the question, and here I am taking the liberty to contribute my two cents to the debate.
I distinctly recall a day before the 2002 elections when in Lahore an NGO organised a seminar on electoral reforms. Shah Mahmood Qureshi and several other notables were invited to the event. The emphasis of more than one speaker was that there was something awfully wrong with the constitution and the electoral laws, which made army interventions unavoidable. Hence, in order to keep the army out, it was critical that the rules be amended. Another emphasis was on the need for an independent and powerful Election Commission (EC). When I got a chance to speak, I pointed out that it was not the first time that the constitution was being amended to avoid martial law but somehow military interventions continue unabated. So who needs reform, the constitution or the army? I am thankful that during Musharrafs early days there was enough tolerance that such questions could be asked publicly without any serious repercussions. Taking advantage of the mood, I also pointed out that the talk of an autonomous/potent election commission and the courts was irrelevant because those imposing martial law were armed to the teeth with weapons, so unless we were ready to provide the courts and the EC with armoured personnel carriers and other weapons, no breakthrough could be expected. My bravado was seen as an outburst of youthful ignorance and the show continued.
Later, the constitution was amended and now those amendments have been replaced with new ones, but somehow the army still is an important political power, even when it chooses to stay behind the scenes. Curiously, when today the Bangladesh model is eulogised and trust me someday its perpetuators will get away with it, we often forget Musharrafs days. In those days, everyone used to talk of the Turkish model. Why? Because the Turkish army then had a constitutional role in power politics and a strategic upper hand. Today, when that role is being reversed, our media and intellectuals have developed a blind spot for it. I do not want to talk much about the cheerleaders of dictatorship in Pakistan, for their careers depend on it. I just want to remind you that there is a culture of opportunism that celebrates each intervention and lays down a narrative for its approval.
But the bigger issue is that constitutional reforms have always failed to block the way of a marauding dictatorship. There is something innate in our political culture that makes the talk of reforms absolutely childish. And so is the talk of politicians providing an excuse to the army. Granted that the politicians often exhibit an inability to govern properly or to govern at all. But how in the name of sanity does it justify the role of the army in the political system? And the politicians, too, have an excellent excuse to justify their failure in delivering. They complain that the army hands them government when things become unmanageable and that too with a million shackles. If you recall, at the start of the current PPP rule, President Zardari (of course before his becoming president) said that he wanted a transfer of power and not a shackled government. Since then, his party maintains that it enjoys full power, albeit circumstances point in the opposite direction.
It is an obnoxiously onerous task to defend what politicians do and that is why I have stopped bothering. And it is not the hidden agenda of this piece either. However, there is plenty of evidence that this government could have served its term better had it not been burdened by Musharrafs legacy. Had Musharraf still not been the president with considerable clout over the army, the present government would have restored the chief justice much earlier, thereby avoiding the friction that has culminated into the current stalemate. It is clear that a lot more is included in the secret deals tailored by our military establishment than is ever confessed publicly.
The army then emerges as part of our political problem rather than the solution. I say it again that it does not justify the bad practices of the politicians nor their invitations to the generals. But it is impossible to accept that the generals are so gullible that they accept such invitations at face value. If such takeovers are still not ruled out, there must be something wrong with the way things are in this country.
It is my belief that the reason why our army, the army my late father once served, takes over is because it failed to effect a transformation from the colonial mould. Each army is taught by its own culture to think and behave in a supremacist fashion when it comes to civilians. However, each army is also taught to respect the system and restrain itself from crossing the thin line that separates it from the power corridors. I would not know who first introduced politics to the generals but with Ayub Khans takeover, a sad and dangerous precedent was created and every military ruler has seen it as a justification for his rule. Where there are none, excuses are invented and our political narrative duly amended. And it must not be forgotten that the army comes into power not because it has some magic wand to solve all our problems or knows how to govern better but because it has the brute force and weaponry to match.
The solution, then, is perhaps to appeal to the better sense of the powerful and request them to impose an embargo on their interventions. No matter how noble his intentions are, no individual can provide an alternative to the institution building that evolves out of the democratic process. The army that my father served was capable of understanding these requests.
(The above column was written on the 11th anniversary of the October 12, 1999 military takeover.)
The writer is an independent columnist and a talk show host. He can be reached at farrukh.khan@pitafi.com
