If the war against terrorism is Pakistan's war (and it most certainly is) then all the investment required to fight the war should come from within Pakistan. Many would argue that it already has. Even head-in-the-sand ostriches in Pakistan's political spectrum would not argue the facts. Over 8,000 innocent civilians and nearly 3,000 military personnel have been martyred in this Pakistani war.
The Pakistani parliament allows its military an unscrutinised budget, which is why it is difficult to estimate the actual cost of this war to Pakistan. In his unabashed enthusiasm for finding more money for parliament to blindly authorise for the military, Ambassador Husain Haqqani has been on record quoting the figure of $50 billion as the price Pakistan has paid in this war. That represents roughly 30 per cent of Pakistan's annual GDP. Perhaps the ambassador has access to budget analysts that other Pakistanis do not. But even head-in-the-sand ostriches in Pakistan's economic spectrum would not argue the facts. This war against terrorism has cost Pakistan's economy -- in terms of both domestic consumption, and foreign direct investment. It has cost the economy dearly.
So in blood and in treasure, Pakistan is fighting a war that is Pakistan's war to fight. When the prolific President Zardari pens op-ed after op-ed essentially attempting to convince western readers that his country owns the war that it is fighting, he is essentially telling the truth. Whether war-weary Pakistanis that mistrust the United States like it or not, terrorism is consuming Pakistani blood, and Pakistani rupees. It is not a matter of choice, the issue of whether this is Pakistan's war or not. It is an imposition upon the Pakistani people by terrorists.
Given that this is Pakistan's war then, the entire notion of the need for a strategic dialogue with the United States seems misplaced and disingenuous. This strategic dialogue, as Richard Holbrooke himself has stated, is about security as much as it is about other things. The Pakistani state makes no secret of its desire to link this dialogue to security, allowing its military chief to convene and interview civilian bureaucrats -- the heads of twelve ministries -- none of whom would have sought the permission of their ministers to go to the General Headquarters of the Pakistan army.
You can either have the cake, or you can eat it. Pakistan's military and political elite have a compulsive disorder in which they want to have the cake, and eat it too. No wonder the system is chock-full of symptoms of indigestion.
Let's look at a small part of the Pakistani 'strategy' for these strategic talks. Pakistan wants $400 million for Munda Dam, it wants $40 million for Gomal Zam Dam, it wants $70 million for the Natural Gas Production & Efficiency Project, it wants $10 million for Satpara Dam, it wants $27 million for the Wind Energy Project in Sindh, it wants $65 million to rehabilitate Mangla Dam, and it wants $35 million to upgrade Warsak Dam. Total cost of this dam wish-list? $647 million.
Of course, if there is a calculator on the desks of any of the over one dozen South Asia and ****** leads within the Obama administration, they could easily respond to these kinds of requests from Pakistan. At roughly $40 million a pop, the still-pending delivery of 18 F-16 aircraft (from 2006) is a deal worth about $720 million. Instead of actually delivering these aircraft in June this year, as it plans to, the US government could tell the Pakistani government that it can choose. Either it can have a bunch of dams that will resolve the energy crisis, and save many hundreds, maybe thousands of lives in hospitals and clinics around the country. Or it can have a bunch of airplanes that are designed to kill people rather indiscriminately (meaning that not all of the victims of Pakistan's F-16s will be terrorists that have been tried and convicted in a court of law).
As a Pakistani, my vote is for the dams. I suspect I wouldn't be alone. But of course, the people of Pakistan don't have very much say in the direction that Pakistan's strategic dialogue takes in Washington DC.
This is where the Obama administration's Unique Selling Proposition (USP) should have kicked in. Largely on the back of an historic advocacy effort, the compelling narrative of Pakistan that Ambassador Haqqani has become renowned for in Washington DC articulates a simple truth. Repeated American support for Pakistan's military leaders, rather than elected civilian leaders, undermines US interests in Pakistan. Under an embassy run by Haqqani, and an administration whose South Asia strategy was written by ex-CIA officer Bruce Riedel (who once called Haqqani a hero of Pakistani democracy), America was supposed to be standing by the Pakistani people, instead of Pakistani generals. The Obama administration's USP in Pakistan was that it was going to be unlike Reagan or Bush, supporting army generals, and unlike Bush Senior or Clinton, ignoring democratic governments. After the wake-up call provided by the election fiasco in Pakistan's co-joined twin brother, Afghanistan, it seems that plan might be on hold. Now, as in previous eras in which Pakistani territory is seen as vital to US interests, the Pakistani military elite are, once again, indispensable.
That is why when faced with the ridiculous dual-faced Pakistani narrative of "this is our war" and "we are fighting your war so give us your money" the Americans have no response other than to delay and defer the payments which Pakistan is legitimately entitled to, while investing in public diplomacy programmes to see if a few adverts and talk shows can't turn the tide of a decidedly cynical Pakistani public opinion.
The proper American response to a strategic dialogue with Pakistan should have been to ask Pakistan to develop an approach to the dialogue on the basis of a robust parliamentary debate. America could then have expected Pakistani parliamentarians, including both the coalition and the opposition, to own the dialogue. That dialogue may not have been qualitatively very different from what is being presented in Washington DC today. This is because of the generic lack of confidence of parliamentarians, and the resulting ownership of the policymaking function by bureaucrats, rather than politicians. Still, such a process would have had the same stamp of legitimacy that Secretary Clinton so desperately seemed to want to invest in when she visited Pakistan last year.
Instead, the agenda for Washington DC has been scripted by the geniuses that presided over eight-years of Gen Musharraf's authoring of history here since 1999. That the chief of army staff is a member of the touring party will perhaps raise a few eyebrows among those interested in the construction of a sustainable democracy.
This is the problem with the construction of a war narrative. Once constructed, we have no choice but to actually back it up with action. People must not be fooled by the smoke and mirrors of "energy, education and health". Those issues are strategically unrelated to the interests of both the US and the Pakistani state. The only instrument of war in Pakistan is the Pakistani military. As much as this is Pakistan's war, it happens to be America's too. You can't demonise a country's military and intelligence services, and then expect them to fight their war, like it was your war. So, of course, the Americans are going to engage with, egg on, subsidise and endorse whatever requirements the Pakistani military has in this Pak-American war against terrorism. This convergence of interests is the exact opposite of a synergetic confluence.
http://e.thenews.com.pk/details.asp?id=230529
The Pakistani parliament allows its military an unscrutinised budget, which is why it is difficult to estimate the actual cost of this war to Pakistan. In his unabashed enthusiasm for finding more money for parliament to blindly authorise for the military, Ambassador Husain Haqqani has been on record quoting the figure of $50 billion as the price Pakistan has paid in this war. That represents roughly 30 per cent of Pakistan's annual GDP. Perhaps the ambassador has access to budget analysts that other Pakistanis do not. But even head-in-the-sand ostriches in Pakistan's economic spectrum would not argue the facts. This war against terrorism has cost Pakistan's economy -- in terms of both domestic consumption, and foreign direct investment. It has cost the economy dearly.
So in blood and in treasure, Pakistan is fighting a war that is Pakistan's war to fight. When the prolific President Zardari pens op-ed after op-ed essentially attempting to convince western readers that his country owns the war that it is fighting, he is essentially telling the truth. Whether war-weary Pakistanis that mistrust the United States like it or not, terrorism is consuming Pakistani blood, and Pakistani rupees. It is not a matter of choice, the issue of whether this is Pakistan's war or not. It is an imposition upon the Pakistani people by terrorists.
Given that this is Pakistan's war then, the entire notion of the need for a strategic dialogue with the United States seems misplaced and disingenuous. This strategic dialogue, as Richard Holbrooke himself has stated, is about security as much as it is about other things. The Pakistani state makes no secret of its desire to link this dialogue to security, allowing its military chief to convene and interview civilian bureaucrats -- the heads of twelve ministries -- none of whom would have sought the permission of their ministers to go to the General Headquarters of the Pakistan army.
You can either have the cake, or you can eat it. Pakistan's military and political elite have a compulsive disorder in which they want to have the cake, and eat it too. No wonder the system is chock-full of symptoms of indigestion.
Let's look at a small part of the Pakistani 'strategy' for these strategic talks. Pakistan wants $400 million for Munda Dam, it wants $40 million for Gomal Zam Dam, it wants $70 million for the Natural Gas Production & Efficiency Project, it wants $10 million for Satpara Dam, it wants $27 million for the Wind Energy Project in Sindh, it wants $65 million to rehabilitate Mangla Dam, and it wants $35 million to upgrade Warsak Dam. Total cost of this dam wish-list? $647 million.
Of course, if there is a calculator on the desks of any of the over one dozen South Asia and ****** leads within the Obama administration, they could easily respond to these kinds of requests from Pakistan. At roughly $40 million a pop, the still-pending delivery of 18 F-16 aircraft (from 2006) is a deal worth about $720 million. Instead of actually delivering these aircraft in June this year, as it plans to, the US government could tell the Pakistani government that it can choose. Either it can have a bunch of dams that will resolve the energy crisis, and save many hundreds, maybe thousands of lives in hospitals and clinics around the country. Or it can have a bunch of airplanes that are designed to kill people rather indiscriminately (meaning that not all of the victims of Pakistan's F-16s will be terrorists that have been tried and convicted in a court of law).
As a Pakistani, my vote is for the dams. I suspect I wouldn't be alone. But of course, the people of Pakistan don't have very much say in the direction that Pakistan's strategic dialogue takes in Washington DC.
This is where the Obama administration's Unique Selling Proposition (USP) should have kicked in. Largely on the back of an historic advocacy effort, the compelling narrative of Pakistan that Ambassador Haqqani has become renowned for in Washington DC articulates a simple truth. Repeated American support for Pakistan's military leaders, rather than elected civilian leaders, undermines US interests in Pakistan. Under an embassy run by Haqqani, and an administration whose South Asia strategy was written by ex-CIA officer Bruce Riedel (who once called Haqqani a hero of Pakistani democracy), America was supposed to be standing by the Pakistani people, instead of Pakistani generals. The Obama administration's USP in Pakistan was that it was going to be unlike Reagan or Bush, supporting army generals, and unlike Bush Senior or Clinton, ignoring democratic governments. After the wake-up call provided by the election fiasco in Pakistan's co-joined twin brother, Afghanistan, it seems that plan might be on hold. Now, as in previous eras in which Pakistani territory is seen as vital to US interests, the Pakistani military elite are, once again, indispensable.
That is why when faced with the ridiculous dual-faced Pakistani narrative of "this is our war" and "we are fighting your war so give us your money" the Americans have no response other than to delay and defer the payments which Pakistan is legitimately entitled to, while investing in public diplomacy programmes to see if a few adverts and talk shows can't turn the tide of a decidedly cynical Pakistani public opinion.
The proper American response to a strategic dialogue with Pakistan should have been to ask Pakistan to develop an approach to the dialogue on the basis of a robust parliamentary debate. America could then have expected Pakistani parliamentarians, including both the coalition and the opposition, to own the dialogue. That dialogue may not have been qualitatively very different from what is being presented in Washington DC today. This is because of the generic lack of confidence of parliamentarians, and the resulting ownership of the policymaking function by bureaucrats, rather than politicians. Still, such a process would have had the same stamp of legitimacy that Secretary Clinton so desperately seemed to want to invest in when she visited Pakistan last year.
Instead, the agenda for Washington DC has been scripted by the geniuses that presided over eight-years of Gen Musharraf's authoring of history here since 1999. That the chief of army staff is a member of the touring party will perhaps raise a few eyebrows among those interested in the construction of a sustainable democracy.
This is the problem with the construction of a war narrative. Once constructed, we have no choice but to actually back it up with action. People must not be fooled by the smoke and mirrors of "energy, education and health". Those issues are strategically unrelated to the interests of both the US and the Pakistani state. The only instrument of war in Pakistan is the Pakistani military. As much as this is Pakistan's war, it happens to be America's too. You can't demonise a country's military and intelligence services, and then expect them to fight their war, like it was your war. So, of course, the Americans are going to engage with, egg on, subsidise and endorse whatever requirements the Pakistani military has in this Pak-American war against terrorism. This convergence of interests is the exact opposite of a synergetic confluence.
http://e.thenews.com.pk/details.asp?id=230529
