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Pakistan's Special Operations Forces: SSG | SSGN | SSW | SOW | SOG

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OMG, not this pre-2016 commando camo again. The grey tone was fine yawr.....
Grey tone was phased out by the USN as well. It was found to be impractical in operational scenarios. Think about cost of having yet another uniform.
Whats wrong with SF and regs having same camo? Its honestly much more beneficial and practical for both. You shouldnt be able to recognize special forces soldiers
100% Agree. The SF should wear exactly the same uniform as the rest of the force and just a single SSG wing should differentiate the service members from other formations.
 
Grey tone was phased out by the USN as well. It was found to be impractical in operational scenarios. Think about cost of having yet another uniform.
Why does the camo tone matter anyway for the Air force or Navy?? It is not like they are involved in direct ground combat or something....
 
Why does the camo tone matter anyway for the Air force or Navy?? It is not like they are involved in direct ground combat or something....
Air force security, QRF and they also have limited ground force capabilities, also can come in handy when constructing and managing improvised airstrips (highways, strips of dirt etc.). With navy personnel will still need camo that can break their shape up at ground installations and at sea
 
I would like to share something because there is a tendency to put more emphasis on new gear, new uniforms, how the special forces look etc.

Even for a first world special forces like the ones in the United States, the core tenet or "truths" as they call them in US SOF community, starts with "Humans are more important than hardware." I.e. people, not equipment, make the difference. This is so cardinally true because a highly trained and motivated individual working in a team can accomplish any mission even with equipment limitations, but untrained units with all the gear in the world cannot.

So the expectation with SSG should be that they get and hold on to the best possible human resource available within the Pakistan Army and never let up on training standards, equipment be damned. As long as this remains the guiding principle, we will have a solid SF capability.

Keep in mind we have Taliban conducting effective special operations against first world militaries with what? Sandals on, chadar on, rusted/beaten up AK-47s and RPG-7s, and even though the western world won't admit, the Taliban have carried out some spectacular special missions against ISAF and I hate to say, even against our border forces (or their raids against Pakistani air bases).

The key is that the operator has to be solid in his craft. He has to be motivated and the rest falls into place. So what if I have an AK-47 and the other chap a SCAR or better equipment or he "looks" more tactical than our boys?
 
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I would like to share something because there is a tendency to put more emphasis on new gear, new uniforms, how the special forces look etc.

Even for a first world special forces like the ones in the United States, the core tenet or "truths" as they call them in US SOF community, starts with "Humans are more important than hardware." I.e. people, not equipment, make the difference. This is so cardinally true because a highly trained and motivated individual working in a team can accomplish any mission even with equipment limitations, but untrained units with all the gear in the world cannot.

So the expectation with SSG should be that they get and hold on to the best possible human resource available within the Pakistan Army and never let up on training standards, equipment be damned. As long as this remains the guiding principle, we will have a solid SF capability.

Keep in mind we have Taliban conducting effective special operations against first world militaries with what? Sandals on, chadar on, rusted/beaten up AK-47s and RPG-7s, and even though the western world won't admit, the Taliban have carried out some spectacular special missions against ISAF and I hate to say, even against our border forces (or their raids against Pakistani air bases).

The key is that the operator has to be solid in his craft. He has to be motivated and the rest falls into place. So what if I have an AK-47 and the other chap a SCAR or better equipment or he "looks" more tactical than our boys?

Almost every special operator I've talked to, especially those who have been in the business for 15+ years, feel that standards have slipped with the addition of several formations and (I believe) a shorter course...?

I would like to share something because there is a tendency to put more emphasis on new gear, new uniforms, how the special forces look etc.

Even for a first world special forces like the ones in the United States, the core tenet or "truths" as they call them in US SOF community, starts with "Humans are more important than hardware." I.e. people, not equipment, make the difference. This is so cardinally true because a highly trained and motivated individual working in a team can accomplish any mission even with equipment limitations, but untrained units with all the gear in the world cannot.

So the expectation with SSG should be that they get and hold on to the best possible human resource available within the Pakistan Army and never let up on training standards, equipment be damned. As long as this remains the guiding principle, we will have a solid SF capability.

Keep in mind we have Taliban conducting effective special operations against first world militaries with what? Sandals on, chadar on, rusted/beaten up AK-47s and RPG-7s, and even though the western world won't admit, the Taliban have carried out some spectacular special missions against ISAF and I hate to say, even against our border forces (or their raids against Pakistani air bases).

The key is that the operator has to be solid in his craft. He has to be motivated and the rest falls into place. So what if I have an AK-47 and the other chap a SCAR or better equipment or he "looks" more tactical than our boys?

Secondly, we certainly can afford the best hardware for our special mission units, like Zarrar (ATU), yet they are using what can be described as the kit of a regular infantryman in the US Army. A few hundred super soldiers with the best kit isn't hard to achieve. Replicating it across all special operators is, of course, a much bigger financial decision.
 
Almost every special operator I've talked to, especially those who have been in the business for 15+ years, feel that standards have slipped with the addition of several formations and (I believe) a shorter course...?



Secondly, we certainly can afford the best hardware for our special mission units, like Zarrar (ATU), yet they are using what can be described as the kit of a regular infantryman in the US Army. A few hundred super soldiers with the best kit isn't hard to achieve. Replicating it across all special operators is, of course, a much bigger financial decision.
Am not aware that OBCC and OACC have been reduced in time. There is also a time tested culture in the military of putting down successors with "hamara standard bada achaa thaa, ab log dheelay ho gai hain" ;-) Proof of the putting is in the eating. Has the performance of the SSG on missions gone down? Hard to tell that.

The third US SF truth in general is also very applicable here: "Special-operations forces cannot be mass-produced."

Perhaps some standards have slipped as we have tried to go from a brigade level composition to a division and also attrition in COIN requiring more manpower to be inducted. This is part of evolution.

A recent case/study revealed that almost 60% of the US Navy SEALs were taking performance enhancing drugs during selection. Given this fact, can you imagine how many USN seals in that outfit are not up to standard?

Zarrar ATU has tools that it needs for the job. Please keep in mind that an average US infantryman has equipment worth $17,000 in his kit. We would be lucky if our specialist troops were given a kit like this. We do what we can with the resources available to us. As it is, people have a problem with the standing defense budget.
 
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I would like to share something because there is a tendency to put more emphasis on new gear, new uniforms, how the special forces look etc.

Even for a first world special forces like the ones in the United States, the core tenet or "truths" as they call them in US SOF community, starts with "Humans are more important than hardware." I.e. people, not equipment, make the difference. This is so cardinally true because a highly trained and motivated individual working in a team can accomplish any mission even with equipment limitations, but untrained units with all the gear in the world cannot.

So the expectation with SSG should be that they get and hold on to the best possible human resource available within the Pakistan Army and never let up on training standards, equipment be damned. As long as this remains the guiding principle, we will have a solid SF capability.

Keep in mind we have Taliban conducting effective special operations against first world militaries with what? Sandals on, chadar on, rusted/beaten up AK-47s and RPG-7s, and even though the western world won't admit, the Taliban have carried out some spectacular special missions against ISAF and I hate to say, even against our border forces (or their raids against Pakistani air bases).

The key is that the operator has to be solid in his craft. He has to be motivated and the rest falls into place. So what if I have an AK-47 and the other chap a SCAR or better equipment or he "looks" more tactical than our boys?
Of course, training is always going to be way more important but the gap between training and technology is shorteninv up real fast. Now we have compact devices to manage and organize coordination between different military elements (such as the ATAK), thermal and NV devices that are becoming more important than ever, and new scopes that now calculate trajectory. These are vital assets that dictate military engagements. A bunch of very well trained chaps are going to be in trouble when facing an enemy with cutting edge Thermal and NV optics at night
 
Am not aware that OBCC and OACC have been reduced in time. There is also a time tested culture in the military of putting down successors with "hamara standard bada achaa thaa, ab log dheelay ho gai hain" ;-) Proof of the putting is in the eating. Has the performance of the SSG on missions gone down? Hard to tell that.

The third US SF truth in general is also very applicable here: "Special-operations forces cannot be mass-produced."

Perhaps some standards have slipped as we have tried to go from a brigade level composition to a division and also attrition in COIN requiring more manpower to be inducted. This is part of evolution.

A recent case/study revealed that almost 60% of the US Navy SEALs were taking performance enhancing drugs during selection. Given this fact, can you imagine how many USN seals in that outfit are not up to standard?

Zarrar ATU has tools that it needs for the job. Please keep in mind that an average US infantryman has equipment worth $17,000 in his kit. We would be lucky if our specialist troops were given a kit like this. We do what we can with the resources available to us. As it is, people have a problem with the standing defense budget.

Great points. Allow me to address each.

1) The time-tested putting down culture is definitely true. But the increase in size, the urgency due to attrition and a large number of ops, and the (supposed) decrease in the duration of the course has to take some toll, somewhere.

2) PEDs are common, and the lines among legit supplements and PEDs are legally clear but there's a bit of a grey area in practice. I wonder what sort of testing for trace amounts of PEDs is conducted at induction and via random checks among our special operator community...?

3) There is no question that Zarrar has some sexy toys. But we can drop $2M on better kit for Zarrar. This money can literally be raised by selling a small plot somewhere, once a decade or so (and through a hundred other sources). The second we are satisfied and use self-justificatory rhetoric, improvement becomes elusive.
 
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