Pakistan widens counter-insurgency operation

[fatman17]

Jane's Intelligence Review

Pakistan widens counter-insurgency operation

Operation Zarb-e-Azb has led to a reduction in militant attacks in Pakistan. One year on, Asad Ali
assesses the continuing challenges to the government, military, and intelligence services to consolidate
the country's security gains and maintain public confidence.
Unusually for the Pakistani military, the anniversary of the beginning of its North Waziristan counter-
insurgency operation on 15 June was somewhat muted. Although highlighting the gains made, military and government officials stressed that the operation had not yet concluded and that the broader objective of eradicating militancy required much more work.

Designated with the name of the Prophet Muhammad's sword, Operation Zarb-e-Azb, translated as 'sharp strike', was initially focused on rooting out the remaining strongholds of the Tehrik-e-Taliban Pakistan (TTP) in the Federally Administered Tribal Areas (FATA), a semi-autonomous region on the border with Afghanistan dominated by conservative tribes that have supported Islamist militants since the Soviet occupation of Afghanistan (1979-89). One year on, the operation has widened in scope dramatically, setting it apart from six strategically unsuccessful offensives in FATA and the Swat Valley that the military
had undertaken since 2002.

 

[fatman17]

Changing dynamics

Before Operation Zarb-e-Azb, the Pakistani military had resisted US-led international calls for an offensive in North Waziristan, which was considered by the NATO leadership to be a staging ground for attacks against foreign troops in Afghanistan. The Pakistani military's reluctance fuelled a narrative that the military and its intelligence services were actively supporting certain militant groups, such as the Haqqani Network and the Afghan Taliban. This would have been with the intention of promoting Pakistani interests:

resisting Indian influence and maintaining a Pakistan-friendly power base in Afghanistan.

However, the freedom accorded to militants in North Waziristan also meant that the TTP, a separate
umbrella network of militant groups targeting the Pakistani state, had a base to organise and stage its own
attacks within Pakistan. This resulted in regular attacks in Peshawar, the provincial capital of Khyber Pakhtunkhwa; in Karachi, the financial hub and capital of Sindh Province; and in urban Punjab, which suffered a rising incidence of attacks despite traditionally lower levels of militancy. Overall militancy was
reaching an unacceptable level.

The 8 June 2014 attack on Jinnah International Airport in Karachi, in which 36 people were killed and the
airport's cargo terminal building sustained heavy damage, has generally been cited as the trigger for the operation. Although this is true to an extent, in reality momentum for the offensive had been building for much of the preceding year.

This was part of the changing strategic situation in South Asia. Within Pakistan, there were leadership transitions in the civilian government and the military, which affected counter-terrorism policy.

In February 2014, the Pakistan Muslim League-Nawaz (PML-N) government announced that it would seek peace talks with the TTP, despite an unprecedented escalation of attacks in January.

 

[fatman17]

Operational successes

The Pakistani military stresses that Operation Zarb-e-Azb is now entering a "final phase" after ground offensives actually spread to other FATA agencies in 2014 and 2015.

In October 2014, Pakistani soldiers
launched the Khyber-1 operation in Bara, Khyber Agency, followed by Khyber-2 in the Tirah Valley in March 2015.

According to Asim Bajwa, the director-general of the military's media division, the Inter-Services Public Relations (ISPR), more than 2,700 militants have been killed in Zarb-e-Azb, while in excess of 830 hideouts have been destroyed. This, according to the military, amounts to a 90% reduction of the militant presence in the area.

The numbers are difficult to verify as no journalists are allowed access to the area. The military claims to
have a systematic methodology to ascertain the impact of its operations, airstrikes, and artillery barrages, but IHS Jane's assesses that the accuracy of this system is doubtful. IHS Jane's sources from the FATA also report that the numbers of militants killed are routinely exaggerated by the military, and that civilian casualties are extremely common but receive no media attention.

 

[fatman17]

However, there is little doubt that the North Waziristan operation has achieved some major successes.

At the very least, it has denied the TTP space to organise, supply, and implement attacks. After capturing
North Waziristan's main town of Miranshah in July 2014, the military claimed to have discovered roadside shops that specialised in the sale of detonators, suicide vests, and ball bearings, underlining the ease with
which militants were able to equip for high-impact attacks.

The military also discovered mosques that doubled as suicide bomber training facilities. According to the military, candidates would require parental consent to attend, but upon joining would be trained in isolation for three months before being assigned to missions.

Progress made in the operation has also been recognised by the United States. In March 2015, General
Lloyd James Austin, Commander of United States Central Command (CENTCOM), told the House Armed
Services Committee, "The Pakistani military's recent operations to clear militant strongholds in North
Waziristan and other FATA regions and to prevent the militants' return have achieved near-term
successes."

The military has also successfully played upon rivalries within the TTP based on the disputed ascension of
Mullah Maulana Fazlullah as TTP leader in November 2013.

Ahead of the operation, the military negotiated with individual militias that favoured some sort of peace agreement with the government and with those who were disgruntled that someone from the Mehsud family was not assuming leadership of the TTP for the first time.

 

[fatman17]

New resolve

Although the on-the-ground successes against the TTP are important, arguably more important is the new military-led resolve to tackle extremism. The TTP attack on an army-run school in Peshawar in December 2014, which killed 132 children, triggered a national outcry.

Arguably, this forced the civilian government -which had previously lacked the resolve to tackle militancy comprehensively - to agree to widen Zarb-e-Azb's remit.

In January 2015, the government called an All-Party Conference and approved a 20-point National Action Plan (NAP), which can be seen as an extension of Zarb-e-Azb. The policy was designed to be a
comprehensive nationwide approach to countering militancy. Among several points, the plan allowed for the establishment of military courts, pledges to counter politically affiliated violence, and to target financing and foreign funding. The last point, in particular, is indicative of a renewed resolve, as it raised questions of funding from Saudi Arabia, one of Pakistan's key allies.

The Pakistani military's apparent abandonment of support for certain militant groups is a key part of its
renewed policy, which it has come to describe as an "indiscriminate approach". To a degree, these claims are probably disingenuous. The state establishment continues to have ties and/or contact with at least the Afghan Taliban, which it continues to view as a strategic asset.

This is evident by Pakistan taking a central role in pushing the Taliban to enter peace talks. Pakistan's
National Security and Foreign Affairs Adviser Sartaj Aziz, a key player in the formulation of Pakistani foreign policy, told a Senate committee in June 2015, "Pakistan is ready to play any possible role in the reopening of dialogue between Afghan Taliban and the Afghan government."

 

[fatman17]

Long-term gains?

A recalculation of Pakistan's security interests and strong resolve to tackle militancy mean that, with the North Waziristan operation concluding, the leadership is well placed to convert short-term successes into long-term gains.

This nevertheless remains a difficult task for the military, and one that it has failed to accomplish following previous operations.

As the JTIC data show, attacks remain common despite the overall reduction since 2014. The increased rate of attacks in May 2015 underlines that militant capability can be regained. In particular, there is an acute risk of militants returning to the "cleared" tribal areas once the operation concludes to re-establish their strongholds.

IHS Jane's sources from the FATA report that some locals believe militants have remained in the area, but have chosen not to attack security forces due to peace agreements with local militias. In particular, they claim that no operation has been conducted in areas such as Dosali, Garyum, Shewa, Spinwam, and parts
of Datta Khel tehsil (an administrative division), where there has been limited evacuation of locals.

 

[fatman17]

Outlook

Internally, there remain systematic challenges that the Pakistani military and government will have to overcome in consolidating the security gains achieved by Operation Zarb-e-Azb.

Pakistan will have to maintain the political and public consensus for sustained pressure on militancy, and attempts to tackle what has become systematic radicalism in society will also have to materialise, as promised by the NAP.

These are long-term challenges. In the near future after the conclusion of military operations, the military
and the government will have to manage the return of nearly two million internally displaced persons

 

[fatman17]

(IDPs) forced out of border agencies. Poor management of this would be likely to emerge as another source of extremism and opposition.

 

[fatman17]

Pakistan widens counter-insurgency operation

 

[FaujHistorian]

New resolve

Although the on-the-ground successes against the TTP are important, arguably more important is the new military-led resolve to tackle extremism. The TTP attack on an army-run school in Peshawar in December 2014, which killed 132 children, triggered a national outcry.

Arguably, this forced the civilian government -which had previously lacked the resolve to tackle militancy comprehensively - to agree to widen Zarb-e-Azb's remit.

In January 2015, the government called an All-Party Conference and approved a 20-point National Action Plan (NAP), which can be seen as an extension of Zarb-e-Azb. The policy was designed to be a
comprehensive nationwide approach to countering militancy. Among several points, the plan allowed for the establishment of military courts, pledges to counter politically affiliated violence, and to target financing and foreign funding. The last point, in particular, is indicative of a renewed resolve, as it raised questions of funding from Saudi Arabia, one of Pakistan's key allies.

The Pakistani military's apparent abandonment of support for certain militant groups is a key part of its
renewed policy, which it has come to describe as an "indiscriminate approach". To a degree, these claims are probably disingenuous. The state establishment continues to have ties and/or contact with at least the Afghan Taliban, which it continues to view as a strategic asset.

This is evident by Pakistan taking a central role in pushing the Taliban to enter peace talks. Pakistan's
National Security and Foreign Affairs Adviser Sartaj Aziz, a key player in the formulation of Pakistani foreign policy, told a Senate committee in June 2015, "Pakistan is ready to play any possible role in the reopening of dialogue between Afghan Taliban and the Afghan government."

One thing missed in this analysis?


Despicable role of our "sperm courts" and our "Islamist Liar Lawyers" who have successfully blocked the execution/hanging of terrorists.