Pakistan trying to broker Afghan deal

[Devil Soul]

personally i see no harm if India wants to talk to PAK, but frankly there will be no outcome

 

[Spring Onion]

Pakistan will definitely have most important role in Afghanistan after US.
but it is also true that any country could take intrest in any other country if ther ar business oppurtunity in offering
ANd thats what India is doing

Agreed. every country has the right to work for its interests. But then when some idiots come and ask Pakistan to stay away from Afghanistan despite the fact that we have immediate border with Afghanistan NOT just in one province but two, and that we are the most affected neighbours due to Afghanistan.

So in such a situation when some idiots ask us to stay away and ask for Indian interests as legitimate than well my two cent if that is justified

 

[Fighter488]

Negotiation with Afghan Taliban not easy, even with Pakistan's help ​

English.news.cn 2010-06-30 20:13:47 edbackPrintRSS

by Imdad Hussain

ISLAMABAD, June 30 (Xinhua) -- Despite Pakistan's involvement in reconciliation within Afghanistan, the war will continue if conditions are imposed on Taliban who have upper hand, experts said Wednesday.

News regarding negotiations with armed groups and Taliban in Afghanistan with the help of Pakistan is again making rounds in recent media reports.

Responsible U.S. officials revealed in interviews that they were aware of the cooperation of Pakistan with the Afghan government in connection to peace in the country.

U.S. CENTCOM Gen David Petraeus said Tuesday Pakistan's involvement in a reconciliation agreement in Afghanistan is essential and the United States needs to further developing partnership between the two neighboring countries (Afghanistan and Pakistan).​

Britain has been long stressing that Pakistan's concerns regarding Afghanistan should be addressed and a political solution should be sought out.

Assessing the situation, the United States also felt need of engaging Pakistan in the reconciliation process within Afghanistan. U.S. officials always urge Pakistan to play its role in this connection.

The Afghan government has also come to the conclusion that Pakistan role in resolving militancy issue in the region and Afghanistan is important. So it accepted that negotiation with the opposite elements is crucial for peace, observers maintained.​

At present, there were three major opponents in Afghanistan: Hizb-e-Islami led by Gulbadin Hikmat Yaar, Taliban led by former ruler Mullah Omar and Haqqani network, reportedly based in Pakistan's North Waziristan, Afghanistan's Paktia, Paktika and Khost along bordering areas.

However, Haqqani and Mullah Omar are the strongest opponents operating in Afghanistan.

Rahimullah Yousafzai, expert on militancy and regional affairs, told Xinhua that Haqqani network is an extension of Afghan Taliban and they are not different.

Demands of U.S. as well as its backed Afghan government and that of anti-government forces in Afghanistan (Taliban and Haqqani) are absolutely opposite to each other.

Why should Taliban accept negotiation like a defeated force if it is not losing at least currently, experts maintained.​

Taliban traditional stance demands that there will be no negotiations until foreign forces quit Afghanistan and they always reject any talks before accepting their stance. On the other side, U.S. is not ready to leave Afghanistan till some stability in the country.

Afghan officials offer negotiation coupled with conditions like laying the arms down, accepting constitution of Afghanistan and cutting relations with foreign militants specifically Al-Qaeda, to armed groups in their country.

At the backdrop of this situation, the Afghan government, the United States and its allies like Britain stress Pakistan's help or role for reconciliation in Afghanistan.

Yousafzai said, "Pakistan's connections with Taliban leadership are not something new. Pakistan supported them in 1994 and accepted their government in Afghanistan."

After the former Soviet Union aggression against Afghanistan, U. S.supported Jalaludin Haqqani, founder of the network and elderly father of Sirajuddin, through Pakistan, experts said.

Taliban would reject reconciliation if Pakistan goes beyond a limit as it is clear that they are at least not controlled by Pakistan, Yousafzai said, adding that the newly appointed U.S. General Patreaus is talking of fight to cut bargaining power of the resistance forces. "So peace or success of negotiation is not possible at this stage," he said.

The U.S. administration believes that bringing close Afghanistan and Pakistan is essential, so they want to assign a role to the later to keep peace in the region even if coalition forces quit Afghanistan, observers said.

Pakistani Prime Minister Syed Yusuf Raza Gilani announced Friday Pakistan's support for the process of reconciliation and integration in the neighboring war-shattered Afghanistan and promised its help in the plan.

To keep stability in its tribal areas and a stable Afghanistan is also in the interest of Pakistan, seasoned defense analyst and retired Lieutenant General Talat Masood told Xinhua.

But he rejected the claim that a meeting between Haqani and Afghan President Hamid Karzai has taken place. "Though negotiation and contacts are going on," he added.

U.S. intelligence officials also accept that contacts may be going on but ruled out any such meeting.

The bid for negotiation with Taliban is going on for the last two years. But if no direct meeting has taken place so far then it means that conditions for negotiations are either not acceptable to Taliban or to the coalition partners and the Afghan government.

Yousafzai, while rejecting any such meetings, said that Haqqani is a member of Taliban Shura, so he cannot take a step without consulting Mullah Omar, the Taliban chief in Afghanistan. "Nor is it possible that Haqqani went to Kabul, why should he go there," he concluded.

Analysts agreed that war is prevailing and continuing and peace process has not yet started. Peace on the foundations of conditions is not possible if Taliban are not weakened, they said.


Negotiation with Afghan Taliban not easy, even with Pakistan's help

 

[Fighter488]

Explosive mood in Pakistan ​

By Syed Saleem Shahzad

ISLAMABAD - Pakistani security agencies over the past few days have seized 28,000 kilograms of explosives in the city of Lahore, as well as anti-aircraft guns, rocket-propelled grenades, small arms and ammunition and suicide vests, a well-placed senior security official has told Asia Times Online.

The crackdown in the capital of Punjab province undoubtedly prevented another attack by al-Qaeda - there have been several over the past few years - and the opening up of a battle front in the city. However, the security official warned that al-Qaeda-linked militant attacks were still expected "from the southern port city of Karachi to the tribal areas".

Pakistan is regularly a victim of militant attacks, but the focus of al-Qaeda and its allies until now has primarily been on the supply lines of the North Atlantic Treaty Organization that pass through Pakistan and on the Taliban-led insurgency across the border in Afghanistan.

A possible intensification of attacks across Pakistan comes at a critical time for the United States as it struggles to find a breakthrough in the nearly nine-year-old war in Afghanistan, especially ahead of mid-term elections in November in the US, where the war is becoming increasingly unpopular.

Pakistan is a crucial factor in any decision Washington makes over Afghanistan. Any US efforts to engage the Taliban and get them to join a reconciliation process with the Afghan government will require Pakistani assistance. Similarly, the US needs Pakistan to crack down on militant bases that feed into the insurgency, notably in the North Waziristan tribal area that borders Afghanistan, which also serves as the global headquarter of al-Qaeda's operations.

The key figure in Pakistan in terms of the US's war efforts is Chief of Army Staff General Ashfaq Parvez Kiani, who is scheduled to retire this November. To date Pakistan's Washington-backed government has shown no sign of seeking an extension for him. Under Kiani the military apparatus has worked hard to solicit the Afghan Taliban for a basic level of reconciliation. Plans are in place for an operation in North Waziristan, but Kiani has indicated that he will decide when to go ahead, if at all.

Western media have exaggerated apparent relations between Afghan commander Sirajuddin Haqqani and the Pakistan military. For once, however, the military is pleased as this is the kind of influential role that Pakistan wants to play in Afghanistan in the future. Sirajuddin Haqqani is the son of Jalaluddin Haqqani, the famed mujahideen commander who fought against the Soviets. The Haqqani network, which has a base in North Waziristan, is one of the most powerful insurgent groups in Afghanistan.

Sirajuddin Haqqani has acquired huge influence over the past few years in the Afghan provinces of Ghazni, Khost, Paktia and Paktika. He has also fully supported attacks co-ordinated and facilitated by al-Qaeda, such as the ones in Kabul and on Bagram air base this year.

While he travels extensively in Afghanistan, North Waziristan is still his strategic backyard, and here he is completely dependent on al-Qaeda or al-Qaeda-inspired groups. For this reason he contributed to the anti-Shi'ite attacks in Kurram Agency in 2007 and he has sent his men to support local Sunni militias. During the military offensive in 2009 against militants in South Waziristan, Sirajuddin Haqqani provided sanctuary to escaping Mehsud militants.

However, while Sirajuddin Haqqani is al-Qaeda's asset, his ailing father Jalaluddin is somewhat different as he has long-standing friendships with several Pashtu-speaking officers who are now high-ranking.

After September 11, 2001, when Pakistan had joined the US's "war on terror", Jalaluddin was invited a few times to Islamabad to get him to separate from the Taliban. He was not a part of the original Taliban movement but he unconditionally surrendered and supported the Taliban when they emerged in the mid-1990s and then took power in Kabul in 1996. He led his own faction as a "moderate" Taliban.

Pakistani officials assured Jalaluddin that he could become prime minister - or even president - in the new Afghanistan following the Taliban's ouster in late 2001. He refused outright, saying he was still loyal to Taliban leader Mullah Omar. If Jalaluddin were to separate from Mullah Omar, it would jolt the Taliban movement, but it would also cost him his command in several Afghan provinces. Further, he would lose his al-Qaeda-supported base in North Waziristan and within months he would be yesterday's man.
In the year 2010, Jalaluddin's stance remains the same, as does the position of his son Sirajuddin.

As it scrambles for solutions, Washington has encouraged Afghan President Hamid Karzai in his dealings with the Pakistani security apparatus to strike deals with the Taliban in Pashtun-dominated southern Afghanistan.

Karzai has called for the delisting of some Taliban from a United Nations terror list and has released hundreds of Taliban and people linked to the Hezb-e-Islami of Gulbuddin Hekmatyar. He also booted out two prominent anti-Pakistan figures, including the head of the National Directorate of Security, Amrullah Saleh. He was a senior figure in the anti-Taliban Northern Alliance that helped the US oust the Taliban regime in 2001. Also sacked was interior minister Hanif Atmar, who as a young man served in Afghanistan's communist-era intelligence agency and fought mujahideen opposed to the Soviet occupation.

"This decision leaves Hamid Karzai under a serious security threat," a former Afghan general who served with the communists as well as with the mujahideen against the Soviets told Asia Times Online on the condition of anonymity. "His overtures with Pakistan are unlikely to bear fruit in terms of a breakthrough with the Taliban, but now he keeps up the hostility level with the northern Afghan militant factions who have encircled him deeply inside Kabul."​

In the mean time, a large terror attack could once again change the dynamics of the region, whether it took place in Afghanistan, Pakistan or even India.​

Syed Saleem Shahzad is Asia Times Online's Pakistan Bureau Chief. He can be reached at saleem_shahzad2002@yahoo.com

(Copyright 2010 Asia Times Online (Holdings) Ltd. All rights reserved. Please contact us about sales, syndication and republishing.)

Asia Times Online :: South Asia news, business and economy from India and Pakistan

 

[GUNNER]

WASHINGTON, June 30, 2010 (AFP) - British defense minister Liam Fox appealed Wednesday for patience and resolve in the Afghan war, warning of the risks of a premature withdrawal of NATO troops.

Fox, stressing that Britain stood "shoulder to shoulder" with the United States during a visit to Washington, said that "this is a testing time in Afghanistan."

"The price being paid is high, the mission complex, and progress not always obvious to the eye," he said in a speech at the Heritage Foundation, a conservative think-tank.

"We must hold our nerve, maintain our resolve, and have the resilience to see the job through."

He said pulling out troops from Afghanistan too soon would allow the country to serve as a sanctuary for Islamist extremists plotting attacks against the West, damage NATO's credibility and potentially foment a crisis in neighboring Pakistan.

"Were we to leave prematurely, without degrading the insurgency and increasing the capability of the Afghan National Security Forces, we could see the return of the destructive forces of trans-national terror," he said.

The departure of NATO troops would create a security vacuum that could cause "the destabilization of Pakistan with potentially unthinkable regional, and possibly nuclear, consequences."

While Fox emphasized the need to stay the course, British Prime Minister David Cameron last week said his country's military presence in Afghanistan could not drag on indefinitely.

On the sidelines of a Group of Eight summit in Canada, Cameron said he wanted troops home from Afghanistan within five years, conceding the war-torn country would not be "perfect" before that happened.

While he would not outline a "strict timetable" for a withdrawal, Cameron said he wanted to see British troops leave before the next British general elections due by 2015.

With British, US and other NATO-led forces pushing back Taliban insurgents across the southern Helmand province, Fox said he was "cautiously optimistic" about signs of progress so far.

But he added that "the tough times are by no means over."

His visit coincided with a spike in casualties for the NATO-led force and a rising death toll for British troops. A total of 309 British soldiers have been killed in Afghanistan since the war began in 2001.

Fox said allied leaders had to prepare their countries for more casualties as coalition forces take the fight to the Taliban, toppled in a US-led invasion after the September 11 attacks.

 

[GUNNER]

• Pakistan's Gambit in Afghanistan


Interviewee: Daniel Markey, Senior Fellow for India, Pakistan, and South Asia, Council on Foreign Relations
Interviewer: Bernard Gwertzman, Consulting Editor, CFR.org

• June 30, 2010


• The recent replacement of General Stanley McChrystal, the U.S. commander in Afghanistan, has led to increased criticism of the war in Afghanistan and concerns about whether the White House is looking for an exit strategy. There's also a sense that Afghans are losing confidence in the allied operations, and Pakistan is looking to "exploit that advantage," says CFR South Asia expert Daniel Markey. Pakistan would like an Afghan government that's sympathetic to Pakistan and committed to not allowing much Indian influence in Afghanistan, says Markey. He says that President Barack Obama's stated July 2011 starting point for a U.S. withdrawal from Afghanistan has posed problems for U.S. policies in the region. "That date remained fixed in peoples' minds," says Markey. "Afghans are concerned that that date means that that will be the end of U.S. commitment. Pakistanis see an opportunity in that. Indians have been very worried."


• General McChrystal's replacement and recent efforts by the Pakistani leadership to enter into serious discussions with Afghan leaders have led to speculation that the United States is on its way out of Afghanistan next year, and the Pakistanis and Afghans are looking to secure their future. How do you see the situation?

• The Pakistanis have for a long time anticipated the United States would eventually be looking for an exit strategy from Afghanistan. If the Pakistanis could provide that strategy and provide the opportunity to bring back Pakistani proxies, including the Haqqani network, the head of the Quetta Shura Taliban [headed by Mullah Omar], and others, then Pakistan would come out ahead. They've been looking for a way to deploy that strategy ever since 2002, and now that they've sensed there's a question in American minds about whether we will stay the course--and certainly a sense in Kabul of deteriorating confidence in U.S. and NATO operations there--the Pakistanis are looking to exploit that advantage.

• What would the Pakistanis like to see, ideally?

• The Pakistanis would want to see an Afghanistan run by a collection of individuals who are at least sympathetic to Pakistan and who are committed to not seeing much in the way of Indian influence in Afghanistan. You really do have to trace this back to Pakistani concerns about being confronted on both eastern and western borders by India. Some of that is a bit obsessive, but that's certainly the way the Pakistanis have perceived developments in Afghanistan. They have seen a rising amount of Indian influence and a potential that they would be squeezed by both sides. So they want to make sure that they have preponderant and certainly dominant interests and influence in Kabul into the future. They will probably not be satisfied with anything short of that. The challenge, from the U.S. side, is to find a strategy or an outcome that would suit Pakistan's political interests without rewarding militant groups like the Haqqani network with clearly established ties and close relationships with international terrorists like al-Qaeda.

• The Haqqani network is giving sanctuary to al-Qaeda and Osama bin Laden?

• That's exactly right. And of the various groups based inside of Pakistan, that network is seen as one of the most dangerous and one of the ones that has done the most to increase violence inside of Afghanistan, targeting especially Indian interests there, in particular the Indian Embassy.


• President Obama has seemed annoyed at people asking him about the July 2011 withdrawal date. But it was he who first mentioned this date in his West Point speech last December. Are the Afghans wary of what the United States is going to do?

• Everybody in the region has keyed on that date since Obama's West Point speech. There's no question that that was the headline--for Afghans, for Pakistanis, for Indians, really for everyone. The rest of that speech got washed away, and that date remained fixed in people's minds. Afghans are concerned that that date means that will be the end of U.S. commitment. Pakistanis see an opportunity in that. Indians have been very worried. I'm told that the Indian government has been reassured that July 2011 doesn't have a fixed and firm quality to it, and the United States will remain engaged in Afghanistan well after that date. But they still are very concerned, because all of them would much prefer to see the United States depart Afghanistan, but on a more gradual path, except for perhaps the Pakistanis. But even they would rather not see a precipitous withdrawal of the United States, even though they see themselves, maybe wrongly, as being able to pick up the pieces better than some of the other regional players.


• The Pakistani military chief, General Ashfaq Parvez Kayani, and the intelligence chief were in Kabul this week. What were they trying to persuade Afghan President Hamid Karzai to do?


• It's not entirely clear what either the Pakistani army chief or the head of the Inter Services Intelligence [ISI], Lieutenant General Ahmed Shuja Pasha, are trying to do. There are stories in al-Jazeera that they're directly brokering talks between the Haqqani network and Karzai; that they can bring these folks to the table. Some of this is probably an overstatement, but they're trying to square Pakistan's interests in having influence in Afghanistan with Karzai's interests in reaching out to members of the Taliban. It wasn't so long ago that Karzai had his jirga in Kabul and brought together all sorts of representatives from Afghan society who essentially endorsed the idea of outreach to members of the former Taliban. So in some ways, Karzai is simply following up on that, and the real question is just how much further he's going, and what exactly the Pakistanis can put on the table.


• Talk about the connection between al-Qaeda, the Haqqani network, and the Taliban.

• The Haqqani network is loosely affiliated with the Afghan Taliban leadership, which was formerly under Mullah Omar, and is often referred to as the Quetta Shura Taliban. So that would be the core of what used to run Afghanistan before 9/11 and before the United States and NATO came into Afghanistan. Haqqani shares their interests in large part of seeing international forces out of Afghanistan, and yet doesn't really come under them in a formal sense.

• The Haqqani network, though based primarily in North Waziristan inside of Pakistan, has by most accounts forged ever-closer ties with international terrorists, both the Central Asian terrorists as well as the al-Qaeda core. It has also reportedly had ties, whether passive or active, with the Pakistani Intelligence Services. Like the rest of the Afghan Taliban, it appears to have been given a freer hand inside of Pakistan as long as they directed their violence into Afghanistan and against international forces and Indian forces or Indian facilities there.

• None of these groups that the Pakistanis are talking about making a deal with are the kinds of groups that we could easily find our interests protected by. The Haqqanis are the first example.

• But the Pakistani Taliban are those Pakistanis who have taken up a sworn allegiance to the broader Taliban and have directed their violence primarily toward the Pakistani state. They are who the Pakistani military has primarily targeted for violence in South Waziristan.


• There are divisions between these groups, but there are also linkages, and the linkages are perhaps more troubling. One other troubling link is to groups that are now commonly called the Punjabi Taliban, distinct from the Pakistani Taliban. These are groups who are not primarily ethnically Pashtun and have bases of support in the rest of Pakistan, in Punjab, the most dominant and populous of the provinces of Pakistan. They include groups like Lashkar-e-Taiba, that was responsible for the attacks on Mumbai in November 2008, and which of all the groups in Pakistan is believed to have the closest connections historically to the Pakistani state and intelligence services. It is widely believed by many Pakistanis, as well as others, [that the group continues] to enjoy at least passive support and a great deal of influence that allows it to operate in the tribal areas alongside some of the other groups. This is of great concern to the United States, as you see these groups targeting U.S. interests in India, and potentially in Western Europe, and eventually possibly in the United States as well.


• If President Obama asked you for advice, what would you give him?

• Among other things, that Lashkar-e-Taiba in particular is of enormous concern. We haven't seen concrete, firm action by the Pakistanis. That's an area which some people say is a ticking time bomb in South Asia. That needs to be a focus even more than, for instance, the Pakistani Taliban, who are more of a local, inwardly directed group despite the fact that Times Square bomber Faisal Shahzad claims to have been affiliated with the Pakistani Taliban. We shouldn't lose sight of Lashkar-e-Taiba and its links to all of these other groups. One other thing I'd say, as the Pakistanis look to give us what they would suggest are easy and honorable ways out of Afghanistan, is that we shouldn't see these as actually quite so easy. None of these groups that the Pakistanis are talking about making a deal with are the kinds of groups that we could easily find our interests protected by. The Haqqanis are the first example. Our primary concern is to avoid seeing another safe haven in Afghanistan, one that would serve as a base for al-Qaeda operations and similar types of groups. The Haqqanis have very clearly demonstrated that they're willing to facilitate that. The idea that we would make a deal with them that would serve our basic interests, I find highly questionable.

• I assume you think it's important for General Petraeus to continue the planned offensive in Kandahar, to crack down on the Afghan Taliban?

• Petraeus has said several times that we're just beginning to get the inputs right in Afghanistan--meaning resources, troops, strategy, and leadership. The question is whether Washington and the American people more broadly will have the patience to see this through and to see through what's already been the bloodiest time that we've been in Afghanistan and that's something where in some ways Petraeus will be in a better position than McChrystal was to make that case. It's the right case to make now. This was the right strategy when it was decided last fall, after a very exhaustive review, but we actually have to see it through to judge whether it's working.

• By the end of the summer we'll finally have the resources in place, and it will take at least six months to really make a serious assessment whether it's starting to work. You've seen these stories about Special Forces operations that are beginning to really get plugged in and take down the number of mid-to-senior level Taliban operatives inside of southern Afghanistan and put some pressure on them. That's one side of things. The other side is the political side, and that's less encouraging, trying to bring some sort of adequate governance to parts of the country where they perceive the Afghan government as being more predatory than helpful.

 

[GUNNER]

Rawalpindi - July 1, 2010: While commenting upon recent reports of his meetings in Afghanistan, the Chief of Army Staff General Ashfaq Parvez Kayani has said that during his last two visits to Kabul, he has met President Karzai to discuss issues of mutual interests. On both these occasions, ex-commander ISAF General Stanley McChrystal was also present. This transparent trilateral engagement augurs well for the comfort level of the leadership of all prime stake holders and strengthens the existing relationship

 

[GUNNER]

Pakistan's role in Afghanistan

Ganging up on India

Rumours fly as Karzai talks to Pakistan

Jul 1st 2010 | KANDAHAR

THE view from Pranav Ganesh’s office was never spectacular, even before a very high wall started going up right through his garden. Behind it, another high wall protects India’s consulate in Kandahar. Mr Ganesh’s job, issuing Indian visas to Afghans, often for medical treatment, sounds humdrum. But an Indian diplomat could not work in a more dangerous spot.

This tiny diplomatic mission in the heart of Kandahar sends Pakistani officials into paroxysms of rage. They see the consulate, and three others in Jalalabad, Mazar-e-Sharif and Herat, as fronts for anti-Pakistani activities, including support for Baluch insurgents inside Pakistan. Mr Ganesh scoffs at the suggestion that he is up to anything more than the day job.

Pakistan’s long-held ambition for Afghanistan has been for it to provide “strategic depth” in the event of all-out war with India. So it resents the presence of the historic foe in places such as Kandahar, as well as India’s aid programme, which has included building a road towards the Iranian border, to weaken Pakistan’s grip over landlocked Afghanistan’s trade.

Pakistan, says Mr Ganesh, “won’t be happy until we have no diplomatic presence, including in Kabul.” A recent tilt to Pakistan by the Afghan government has sparked fears of just such an outcome. Mr Karzai seems to have stopped lambasting Pakistan for tolerating sanctuaries within its borders for Taliban insurgents. He refrained from doing so even when he was presented with strong evidence that an attack on a tribal gathering he convened in Kabul in June was carried out by the Haqqani network, one of the three leading insurgent groups, which has close links to Pakistan’s intelligence service.

Even more surprising is an outbreak of shuttle diplomacy. Generals Ashfaq Kayani, the head of the Pakistani army, and Ahmed Pasha, the intelligence chief, pop in on Mr Karzai. They want Pakistan to be central to any peace deal Mr Karzai may strike with insurgent groups, including Hizb-e-Islami and the Haqqani network. One unconfirmed report even had the two generals on one visit bringing Sirajuddin Haqqani, one of the network’s leaders, who is on America’s most-wanted list.

The Americans themselves do not believe the Pakistanis have as much control over the Haqqani network as they would like Afghanistan to believe. Nor do they set much store by a reported Haqqani-network promise to sever links with al-Qaeda. But, in the light of Mr Karzai’s serial snubs to his American paymasters, some worry he might be preparing to ditch them for the sake of a deal with Islamabad.

Even before the dismissal of Stanley McChrystal, the American commander in Afghanistan, intense gloom had set in about America’s military strategy. So peace deals could be seen as good news. But the risks are great. Already the Northern Alliance, the main anti-Taliban force in the country, is alarmed.

Pakistan has made clear that it wants India out of Afghanistan, including in a 56-page document given earlier this year to senior American officials. Even those Western diplomats who are keenest on early talks with the Taliban balk at giving Pakistan all it wants. Other countries, too, if excluded from any deal, are just as capable of meddling in Afghanistan.

A comprehensive solution that accommodates all the interests of a complicated region, and keeps Mr Ganesh in his vista-less office in Kandahar, is hard to imagine.
---------------------------

 

[GUNNER]

Talks with Taliban

Dawn Editorial

Thursday, 01 Jul, 2010

To talk or not to talk. That is the question that the US appears to be facing now when it comes to the Taliban, at least if the media narrative is to be believed. Gen Petraeus was asked on Monday by members of the US Senate Armed Services Committee about the issue, particularly Pakistan’s role in trying to reconcile the Taliban and the Afghan government led by Hamid Karzai. His answer was the stock one American officials from President Obama downwards have been giving of late: it’s too early to talk about reconciliation.

Outwardly, the Obama administration remains committed to its strategy in Afghanistan whereby the Taliban insurgency has to be dented to an extent that when reconciliation is pursued, the Americans can do so from a position of strength. The problem is that the first part of that strategy — denting the Taliban insurgency — is not going anywhere nearly as well as the Americans had hoped. The operation in Marja is widely believed to be a failure; June was the most lethal month for foreign troops in Afghanistan; the operation in Kandahar has been postponed, seemingly indefinitely — the trajectory of the American effort is looking rather dismal.

True, these are early days, the full complement of American forces promised by President Obama as part of his Afghan ‘surge’ has yet to arrive and the American brain trust should not be underestimated. Nevertheless, it is telling that in the wake of the McChrystal debacle, the American media has focused on the modalities of a withdrawal, sooner rather than later, from Afghanistan.

Given this background, the Pakistan Army appears to think that the way ahead is to broker a quick deal between President Karzai, who is aggressively pushing for reconciliation with seemingly anyone and everyone, and the various factions of the Taliban. Yet, it’s not clear if that is such a sensible idea. The easy route in Afghanistan, picking up where we left off from in the mid to late ’90s with necessary adjustments for the present realities, may be tempting for Pakistan’s security architects, but it wholly misses the point. Even before 9/11, the writing was on the wall when it came to the use of the so-called ‘non-state actors’. Re-imagining Afghanistan as something other than a zero-sum game will take courage, but it is necessary.

The army’s response to any perceived threat, whether from India or Pakhtun nationalism, need not automatically be a defensive crouch. A peaceful, stable and friendly Afghanistan, the army’s avowed goal, is a good idea. The problem is that it is hard to square the choices made here with that eventual goal, objectively assessed.

 

[AgNoStiC MuSliM]

The Road to Kabul Runs Through Islamabad​

Pakistani leaders are desperate to broker a deal with Karzai and the Haqqani network. Petraeus understands why.


By NAJAM SETHI

Lahore, Pakistan

Last weekend at the G-20 meeting in Toronto, President Barack Obama said that "conversations between the Afghan government and the Pakistan government" that might promote a political settlement in Afghanistan "are a useful step." He added that such conservations should be viewed "with skepticism, but also with openness." So it's official: The road to Kabul likely runs through Islamabad.

The first thing Americans need to understand is that Pakistan is deeply committed to the outcome in Afghanistan. That's because from the perspective of military leaders in Islamabad, India's expanding military capability and regional influence in Afghanistan is a constant threat. Even though India professes to have peaceful intentions, Pakistan's senior military officials believe that "intentions could change at any time."

According to a top military official, Pakistan needs a "stable, peaceful and friendly" Afghanistan—not neutral, but "friendly." This is because India, which is seen as a destabilizing force in Pakistan's Baluchistan province and towards whom the Karzai regime is heavily tilted, cannot be allowed to establish a hegemonic foothold in Kabul. In the past, secular-communist or pro-India regimes in Kabul like Mr. Karzai's have refused to accept the Durand Line as the international border between Afghanistan and Pakistan, and have coveted Pakistan's Pashtun areas. This doesn't sit well with Pakistanis.

The country's most recent concern—and it was only a matter of time under President Obama—is that public opinion in America is swinging against the war. President Obama's midterm review signaled a deadline for the beginning of a troop withdrawal at the end of 2011, without committing a commensurate number of troops for its success. This, coupled with the Pakistan Taliban's relentless attacks on the Pakistan army in Swat Valley and adjoining tribal areas of the northwest, has alarmed leaders in Islamabad.

It's no wonder that Pakistan's army chief, Gen. Ashfaq Kayani, and head of Interservices Intelligence Directorate, Gen. Shuja Pasha, have been flitting in and out of Kabul recently. They're desperate to broker a deal between beleaguered Afghan President Hamid Karzai and the Haqqani Taliban network that straddles the border between Pakistan's north Waziristan tribal region and Afghanistan.

American leaders are well aware of Pakistan's concerns. Last February, Gen. David Petraeus, the man now in charge of Afghanistan, signaled a new policy toward "******" when he acknowledged Pakistan's "constructive involvement in reaching out to the Afghan Taliban to encourage reconciliation on the basis of its past ties to the militants."

By making a distinction between moderate Taliban (those who want to negotiate) and extremist Taliban (those who are bent on fighting), he repudiated the earlier American view that the only good Talib was a dead Talib. Gen. Petraeus also admitted that the prospects for reconciliation among senior Afghan leaders were slight because despite the 30,000 troop surge, NATO and the International Security Assistance Force (ISAF) were still thin on the ground. They couldn't guarantee security for those Taliban leaders who wanted to come in from the cold.

Most importantly for those in Pakistan, Gen. Petraeus played down the possibility of any new, large-scale Pakistani military offensive against insurgents like the Haqqani group. He acknowledged that the Pakistan army was already stretched trying to consolidate gains from fighting the Pakistani Taliban in Swat Valley and South Waziristan. And he chided critics for not appreciating the Pakistani military's effort: 140,000 troops on the ground in the tribal areas (significantly more than the 100,000 troops committed by 43 countries in Afghanistan), over 2,300 soldiers killed, and two million internally displaced people from operations in Swat and South Waziristan (most of whom have now returned home, thanks to successful rehabilitation programs).

Gen. Petraeus also advised against "poking more short sticks into hornets' nests." This was a marked departure from the earlier U.S. position that insisted Pakistan should "do more" to flush out all Taliban from "safe havens" in North Waziristan.

Why has the Pentagon's position shifted so dramatically? The most obvious reason is the failure of NATO and the ISAF to achieve short- or long-term goals in Afghanistan over the past eight years. But the articulation of a doable strategic policy by Gen. Kayani was also an impetus for the shift.

The fundamental principle behind his strategic policy is that Afghanistan is Pakistan's past, present and future. Thus, Pakistan must be part of its solution, beginning with a reconciliation of its own interests and those of the international community in the region.

Even with the best training resources, Gen. Kayani argues that NATO's goal of raising an Afghan army of 140,000 cannot be achieved in less than four years. Nor can militias be raised without changing the deep-rooted perception that the Taliban are winning the long-term war. Thus Gen. Kayani argues that the solution lies in bringing elements of the Taliban back into government, isolating al Qaeda, and allowing Pakistan to help train Afghani intelligence and security personnel to assist with that country's state-building efforts.

Nothing less than a friendly Afghanistan will please Islamabad.

Can Pakistan deliver? The clock is ticking for both Gen. Kayani and Gen. Petraeus. The former is scheduled to retire in October. The latter has to urgently contend with President Obama's skepticism of military solutions to the war, and the American public's rising disquiet with the effort. Stay tuned.

Mr. Sethi is editor-in-chief of the Friday Times and Dunya TV in Lahore Pakistan.

Najam Sethi: The Road to Kabul Runs Through Islamabad - WSJ.com

 

[AgNoStiC MuSliM]

Gen Kayani denies secret Karzai-Haqqani meets​

Thursday, 01 Jul, 2010

ISLAMABAD: Pakistan's army chief General Ashfaq Pervez Kayani Wednesday denied organising secret meetings in Kabul between Afghan President Hamid Karzai and a senior Al-Qaeda-linked militant.

Kayani's brief statement came days after a media report claimed that he and the head of Pakistani intelligence services facilitated a meeting between Karzai and Sirajuddin Haqqani, who heads the Haqqani network.

“General Ashfaq Kayani has said that during his last two visits to Kabul, he met President Karzai to discuss issues of mutual interest,” the military said in a statement.

It quoted Kayani as saying that on both these occasions, recently-sacked Nato commander General Stanley McChrystal was also present.

The statement, however, did not specify when the meetings took place.

“This transparent trilateral engagement augurs well for the comfort level of the leadership of all prime stake holders and strengthens the existing relationship,” Kayani said.

Relations between Kabul and Islamabad have been marked by distrust, but there have been growing signs of rapprochement and Karzai in March welcomed an offer from Pakistan to help with peace efforts.

Karzai's spokesman Waheed Omar had also dismissed the report that the Afghan president had a face-to-face with Haqqani in Kabul.

Haqqani network leaders are based in North Waziristan. Created by Afghan warlord Jalaluddin Haqqani and run by his son Sirajuddin the group is one of the toughest foes for foreign forces in Afghanistan, particularly in the east of the country.—AFP

DAWN.COM | Pakistan | Gen Kayani denies secret Karzai-Haqqani meets

 

[peacekeeper]

Agreed. every country has the right to work for its interests. But then when some idiots come and ask Pakistan to stay away from Afghanistan despite the fact that we have immediate border with Afghanistan NOT just in one province but two, and that we are the most affected neighbours due to Afghanistan.

So in such a situation when some idiots ask us to stay away and ask for Indian interests as legitimate than well my two cent if that is justified

Well not justifiable at all that anyone is telling u to stay aside (but i donut think any one is telling you)

But every time a lethal attack happen on Pakistani soil you make it as a case of pernicious attempt from the belligerent neighborhood.

But u should think noetically in this matter and consider that can India is capable of working in Afghanistan for destabilizing Pakistan and that to under the surveillance of NATO and other international agencies
That is at all not possible

Your apprehensions against India are highly illegitimate in the case of Afghanistan

 

[RescueRanger]

But u should think noetically in this matter and consider that can India is capable of working in Afghanistan for destabilizing Pakistan and that to under the surveillance of NATO and other international agencies
That is at all not possible

Your apprehensions against India are highly illegitimate in the case of Afghanistan

You have much to learn about international affairs, especially when it comes to Afghanistan.

 

[GUNNER]

Sharif urges Pakistan neutrality on Afghanistan

By ASIF SHAHZAD (AP)

ISLAMABAD — Pakistan should stop trying to influence affairs in Afghanistan, the opposition leader said Tuesday, while admitting that the pro-Afghan Taliban policy he pursued when he was prime minister in the 1990s was a failure.

Nawaz Sharif's comments come as he tries to gain political traction and deflect criticism that his party is beholden to extremist elements. Just last week, he pushed the government to open talks with elements of the Pakistani Taliban, and the ruling party agreed to his proposal to hold a national conference on stopping terrorism.

The remarks also come as Pakistan tries to weigh in on reconciliation efforts between Afghanistan's government, the U.S. and the Afghan Taliban. Pakistan's historical interest in Afghanistan is largely a result of its desire to assert itself in the region and attain a strategic advantage over archrival India.

In an interview with Pakistan's Dunya TV that aired Monday and Tuesday, Sharif appeared to renounce a policy he pursued with vigor while twice prime minister in the 1990s. Back then, Pakistan openly supported the Afghan Taliban movement as it pushed out other armed factions such as the Northern Alliance and gained control of Kabul.

"Pakistan should abandon this thinking that Pakistan has to keep influence in Afghanistan," said Sharif, who heads the Pakistan Muslim League-N party. "Neither will they accept influence, nor should the pro-influence-minded people here insist on it."

"Our policy in the past has failed. Neither will such a policy work in future. We have a centuries-old relationship, and we can maintain this relationship only when we remain neutral and support the government elected there with the desire of the Afghan people."

It was unclear where Sharif would stand on the reconciliation efforts in Afghanistan. The role Pakistan would play will likely fall primarily to its military, which operates largely independent of the civilian government anyway and which could be instrumental in bringing some armed Afghan factions to the table.

Sharif's party, which controls the government of Punjab province but sits in opposition in the federal government, is considered more conservative and aligned with pro-Taliban parties than the national ruling Pakistan People's Party.

The PML-N has been criticized in recent months for not going after militant outfits in Punjab, a stance analysts say is driven by its reliance on banned militant groups to deliver key votes during elections. The frustration over the party's dawdling has grown more acute since a bombing at a popular Sufi shrine in Punjab's capital, Lahore, last week killed 47 people.

During Sharif's tenure as prime minister, he not only supported the Taliban regime in Afghanistan but also tried to vastly increase the powers of his office while pushing aside Pakistan's penal code in favor of an Islamic justice system. Many saw these ill-fated moves as an attempt to "Talibanize" Pakistan, and they eroded his popularity further.

Sharif was overthrown in a 1999 coup by then-Gen. Pervez Musharraf. As the leader of the opposition now, Sharif has tried to walk a careful line, making it hard to pin him down as being either pro- or anti-Taliban or pro- or anti-American.

While proposing Saturday for peace talks with militants in Pakistan, Sharif said Islamabad should take the initiative instead of waiting for directives from Washington. But he also said the negotiations should be with militants "who are ready to talk and ready to listen."

 

[Justin Joseph]

"Pakistan should abandon this thinking that Pakistan has to keep influence in Afghanistan," said Sharif, who heads the Pakistan Muslim League-N party.

"Neither will they accept influence, nor should the pro-influence-minded people here insist on it."

"Our policy in the past has failed. Neither will such a policy work in future. We have a centuries-old relationship, and we can maintain this relationship only when we remain neutral and support the government elected there with the desire of the Afghan people."

The Associated Press: Sharif urges Pakistan neutrality on Afghanistan