dBSPL
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Western militaries developed post-Cold War security paradigms based entirely on US cost-bearing. The US developed the technology, doctrine and equipment at the troop level to solve the initial system problems. In addition to training, doctrine and design, the creation of common military standards and standardization is largely a US gift to western militaries. It has positioned its domestic industry as a global supplier of subsystems and standardization.
Of course, this benefit relationship works both ways. In return, an Atlanticist structure has emerged in almost every western (or westernist) military bureaucracy. In addition to Europe and Far Asia, the United States has also become involved in the security policies of countries in Africa and Asia Minor through non-alliance cooperation outside its joint military alliances.
Leaving aside the bureaucracy and all the technical details that most people would not be interested in, as a more popular example, even the new generation of fighter jets, which are offered for joint use by allied powers, cannot be loaded with ammunition or update missions without US knowledge.
This creates a dependency-based paradigm for western militaries based on the US security umbrella. Perhaps France is a bit of an exception, but otherwise the armed forces of these countries, including the UK, have shifted their resources to non-security public spheres with low personnel and inventory levels. Until 2022, the most important agenda item at NATO meetings was the refusal of European countries to increase their defense budgets even to 2% of GDP. In this sense, the Ukraine war had a cold shower effect.
It is also important to recognize that inventory-based benchmarks, no matter how many quality-based sub-formulations they may have, are not a professional valuation method.
What you really need to examine in armies is their training and doctrine capabilities, and technically, their combat readiness. An army with state-of-the-art technology, according to its own parliamentary research commission, the combat readiness rate of its military helicopters is below 40%, and the rate for combat jets is around 60%. It is one of the world's industrial giants, it has a good military inventory, but when it comes to comparisons with real factors, it cannot hide the extent to which this country's US-based security policies have rendered its military inert.
In countries like Germany, the UK and Japan, which have a high capacity for technology development, these deficiencies can be completely covered in a 6-10 year projection. These countries can also make more independent strides in the field of military technology by reducing the Atlanticist bureaucracy within their bureaucracies. Whether this is politically possible or not is another debate, but technically they have the infrastructure. (In that case, we cannot even imagine the extent of the political turmoil in the countries, maybe the increasing risks and the fact that the world is being dragged into an increasingly serious global conflict is an advantage if used carefully)
For the Tier-B (big army and budget but direct dependence on supplier countries) countries that do not have this capability, the second major weakness emerges. No matter how many of the latest weapon systems you have in your inventory, no matter how good a military tradition and technical infrastructure you have, if you have military logistics based on foreign procurement, the deterrence of your armed forces is limited by the limits set by your main military suppliers.
Of course, even if all these are taken into account, it would be an incomplete study without the inclusion of dozens of other issues that are at least as important as the military inventory, such as the balance of nuclear weaponary or asymetric warfare etc.
In short, looking at the capability of an army, especially if it has logistics that are 60-70% dependent on foreign logistics, by looking only at its military inventory will produce extremely erroneous results. If an army does not have its own doctrines, does not have systems and systematics designed in accordance with this doctrine, and even if it does not have experience in coordinating even the imported systems in military exercises above the level of small units, then it is of no importance to talk about inventory.
Technology powerhouse countries can solve this weakness by austerity in other public areas. In other countries, defense enthusiasts will boast about their country's inventories, but in reality the only purpose of those inventories will be to import diplomatic support.
TL DR: Don't waste your time on these childish sites.
Of course, this benefit relationship works both ways. In return, an Atlanticist structure has emerged in almost every western (or westernist) military bureaucracy. In addition to Europe and Far Asia, the United States has also become involved in the security policies of countries in Africa and Asia Minor through non-alliance cooperation outside its joint military alliances.
Leaving aside the bureaucracy and all the technical details that most people would not be interested in, as a more popular example, even the new generation of fighter jets, which are offered for joint use by allied powers, cannot be loaded with ammunition or update missions without US knowledge.
This creates a dependency-based paradigm for western militaries based on the US security umbrella. Perhaps France is a bit of an exception, but otherwise the armed forces of these countries, including the UK, have shifted their resources to non-security public spheres with low personnel and inventory levels. Until 2022, the most important agenda item at NATO meetings was the refusal of European countries to increase their defense budgets even to 2% of GDP. In this sense, the Ukraine war had a cold shower effect.
It is also important to recognize that inventory-based benchmarks, no matter how many quality-based sub-formulations they may have, are not a professional valuation method.
What you really need to examine in armies is their training and doctrine capabilities, and technically, their combat readiness. An army with state-of-the-art technology, according to its own parliamentary research commission, the combat readiness rate of its military helicopters is below 40%, and the rate for combat jets is around 60%. It is one of the world's industrial giants, it has a good military inventory, but when it comes to comparisons with real factors, it cannot hide the extent to which this country's US-based security policies have rendered its military inert.
In countries like Germany, the UK and Japan, which have a high capacity for technology development, these deficiencies can be completely covered in a 6-10 year projection. These countries can also make more independent strides in the field of military technology by reducing the Atlanticist bureaucracy within their bureaucracies. Whether this is politically possible or not is another debate, but technically they have the infrastructure. (In that case, we cannot even imagine the extent of the political turmoil in the countries, maybe the increasing risks and the fact that the world is being dragged into an increasingly serious global conflict is an advantage if used carefully)
For the Tier-B (big army and budget but direct dependence on supplier countries) countries that do not have this capability, the second major weakness emerges. No matter how many of the latest weapon systems you have in your inventory, no matter how good a military tradition and technical infrastructure you have, if you have military logistics based on foreign procurement, the deterrence of your armed forces is limited by the limits set by your main military suppliers.
Of course, even if all these are taken into account, it would be an incomplete study without the inclusion of dozens of other issues that are at least as important as the military inventory, such as the balance of nuclear weaponary or asymetric warfare etc.
In short, looking at the capability of an army, especially if it has logistics that are 60-70% dependent on foreign logistics, by looking only at its military inventory will produce extremely erroneous results. If an army does not have its own doctrines, does not have systems and systematics designed in accordance with this doctrine, and even if it does not have experience in coordinating even the imported systems in military exercises above the level of small units, then it is of no importance to talk about inventory.
Technology powerhouse countries can solve this weakness by austerity in other public areas. In other countries, defense enthusiasts will boast about their country's inventories, but in reality the only purpose of those inventories will be to import diplomatic support.
TL DR: Don't waste your time on these childish sites.
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