fatman17
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Pakistan Presents A Murky Picture
The Current Discussion: Will Pakistan be better or worse off after Musharraf?
A forecast of Pakistan's political future can be best framed in the memorable words of former Defense Secretary Donald Rumsfeld: It is a mix of "known unknowns" and "unknown unknowns," this being a predictable pattern ever since the inception of Pakistan.
Since 1960s, the pattern of political cycles in Pakistan's leadership changes have been mere reflections of forthcoming elections in America, although Pakistan's changes of the guard are usually mired in violence, coups, assassinations or arbitrary, extra-judicial decrees.
Change of leaders, and styles of leadership, in Pakistan follow a predictable pattern. About 6-10 months before American elections, and when change is pending (from Democrat to Republican or vice versa) the storms start to blow in Pakistan and usually remain suspended until a signal is received from America. General Zia-ul-Haq and his coup arrived a few months before Ronald Reagan was elected. Then cries for democracy led to the election of Benazir Bhutto when Bill Clinton was due in Washington (and thus began a musical chair game with Nawaz Sharrif over the riddle of who was less corrupt). Then General Musharraf arrived on scene some 9 years ago -- one of the earliest policy signals of the "neo-conservative" politicians and their forthcoming, retro-1950s approach of the next administration in the White House.
These days the stakes are much higher and the scene in Pakistan much more complex and brittle. Pakistan is entangled in, or perhaps serves as the epicentre of, a series of confused, opaque and self-defeating policies, programs and experiments that at times are Faustian farcical trial-and-error schemes: Support for the Taliban by one main political party (The Awami Party) in northwestern areas and the Balochistan territory, being suspected of hosting al-Qaeda and its sympathizers in North-West Frontier Province, a half-hearted partnership in the global fight against terrorism, the black hole of about $11 billion of American aid money, and maintaining a zone of influence for Saudi Arabia to keep opposition to its regime in check (al-Qaeda's original plan was, and remains, a violent change of the Saudi regime). Add to it the fact that Pakistan is a nuclear state outside the Non-proliferation Treaty and a prime concern for its American masters, a hub or conduit territory for ever-increasing shipments of drugs from southern Afghanistan and party to a four-decade old dispute with India about Kashmir, where UN peacekeepers have been in a holding pattern.
Since the murder of Bhutto and the domestic dispute with its Supreme Court judges, Pakistan's foreign reserves have dwindled at the rate of about $1 billion a month and the stock exchange has lost about a third of its value. Pakistani trade debt obligations are now traded at very deep discounts and the country is under inflationary pressures due to higher energy costs that are not offset with higher exports. These economic signals of uncertainty add to a crisis of confidence.
Overall, Pakistan is in a tough and confusing fix. The way ahead is not clear as the long search for direction and a national identity in a country of 170 million people continues. I argued in November 2007 that Pakistan is on the cusp of internal strife and polarization of diverse internal groups and ripe for a breakup.
Nothing has changed over the last nine months to show that the chaotic course has reversed and the fog has been lifted. In fact, disputes amongst the anti-Musharraf political coalition are just beginning to boil to the surface, while intensified fighting in southern Afghanistan and NATO's rudderless approach to its far away war have added more cause for worry in the overall murky picture. It seems that a stable and transparent (nuclear armed) Pakistan is as much of a priority as shutting down the criminal enterprise of al-Qaeda.
http://www.newsweek.washingtonpost.com
The Current Discussion: Will Pakistan be better or worse off after Musharraf?
A forecast of Pakistan's political future can be best framed in the memorable words of former Defense Secretary Donald Rumsfeld: It is a mix of "known unknowns" and "unknown unknowns," this being a predictable pattern ever since the inception of Pakistan.
Since 1960s, the pattern of political cycles in Pakistan's leadership changes have been mere reflections of forthcoming elections in America, although Pakistan's changes of the guard are usually mired in violence, coups, assassinations or arbitrary, extra-judicial decrees.
Change of leaders, and styles of leadership, in Pakistan follow a predictable pattern. About 6-10 months before American elections, and when change is pending (from Democrat to Republican or vice versa) the storms start to blow in Pakistan and usually remain suspended until a signal is received from America. General Zia-ul-Haq and his coup arrived a few months before Ronald Reagan was elected. Then cries for democracy led to the election of Benazir Bhutto when Bill Clinton was due in Washington (and thus began a musical chair game with Nawaz Sharrif over the riddle of who was less corrupt). Then General Musharraf arrived on scene some 9 years ago -- one of the earliest policy signals of the "neo-conservative" politicians and their forthcoming, retro-1950s approach of the next administration in the White House.
These days the stakes are much higher and the scene in Pakistan much more complex and brittle. Pakistan is entangled in, or perhaps serves as the epicentre of, a series of confused, opaque and self-defeating policies, programs and experiments that at times are Faustian farcical trial-and-error schemes: Support for the Taliban by one main political party (The Awami Party) in northwestern areas and the Balochistan territory, being suspected of hosting al-Qaeda and its sympathizers in North-West Frontier Province, a half-hearted partnership in the global fight against terrorism, the black hole of about $11 billion of American aid money, and maintaining a zone of influence for Saudi Arabia to keep opposition to its regime in check (al-Qaeda's original plan was, and remains, a violent change of the Saudi regime). Add to it the fact that Pakistan is a nuclear state outside the Non-proliferation Treaty and a prime concern for its American masters, a hub or conduit territory for ever-increasing shipments of drugs from southern Afghanistan and party to a four-decade old dispute with India about Kashmir, where UN peacekeepers have been in a holding pattern.
Since the murder of Bhutto and the domestic dispute with its Supreme Court judges, Pakistan's foreign reserves have dwindled at the rate of about $1 billion a month and the stock exchange has lost about a third of its value. Pakistani trade debt obligations are now traded at very deep discounts and the country is under inflationary pressures due to higher energy costs that are not offset with higher exports. These economic signals of uncertainty add to a crisis of confidence.
Overall, Pakistan is in a tough and confusing fix. The way ahead is not clear as the long search for direction and a national identity in a country of 170 million people continues. I argued in November 2007 that Pakistan is on the cusp of internal strife and polarization of diverse internal groups and ripe for a breakup.
Nothing has changed over the last nine months to show that the chaotic course has reversed and the fog has been lifted. In fact, disputes amongst the anti-Musharraf political coalition are just beginning to boil to the surface, while intensified fighting in southern Afghanistan and NATO's rudderless approach to its far away war have added more cause for worry in the overall murky picture. It seems that a stable and transparent (nuclear armed) Pakistan is as much of a priority as shutting down the criminal enterprise of al-Qaeda.
http://www.newsweek.washingtonpost.com
