Windjammer
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Pakistan Army Aviation Corps - Updated
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Irfan Baloch
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fatman17
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Thursday, November 1, 2007
Helicopter Heroism: HOGE Sling Rescue at 18,040 FtJames T. McKenna
IT WAS MIDDAY ON AUG. 8, 2005 when Lt. Col. Rashid Ullah Beg got the call to rescue a mountaineer from an elevation of 20,670 ft (6,300 m) on Nanga Parbat.
The Pakistan army aviator at once made a few calculations and concluded it was impossible to hover his SA315B Lama at that altitude at the prevailing temperatures. He recommended the mountaineer be brought down to, say, 18,000 ft, where a rescue attempt could be made. He heard nothing more and assumed his advice had been heeded.
That was until late that evening, when his corps commander told him he must undertake the mission. (The climber, Tomaz Humar of Slovenia, was a world-renowned mountaineer, and notorious for making solitary ascents by the most difficult and dangerous routes.) From that point, Beg considered it a military mission. "We had to attempt to accomplish it," he said, "even at the cost us of grave danger to our lives."
Beg contacted the famous Pakistani mountaineer Nazir Sabir, who had arranged Humar’s expedition. He painted a bleak picture. Humar was on the Rupal Face, a near-vertical wall more than 14,760 ft high. No one could climb to rescue him, Sabir said, and for him to attempt a descent would be suicidal.
The weather forecast for the next two days was favorable. After that, it would worsen for several days. Humar might not last that long.
Beg quickly ruled out a hoist operation for weight, center-of-gravity and power considerations. The density altitude would be nearly 23,000 ft. Hovering, even in ground effect, was impossible with his aircraft’s weight, he thought, let alone hovering out of ground effect (HOGE) and picking up a 150-lb (70-kg) man. The only hope was a sling rescue, he concluded.
The Lama was the right helicopter for the mission; it still holds the absolute altitude record of almost 42,000 ft. But Jean Boulet had stripped his Lama to an empty weight of 1,870 lb for the record flight. Beg’s Lama weighed more than 2,640 lb.
Beg drafted a plan that, he said later, "had very bleak chances of success, but was the only thing we could do." They would fly the mission with two Lamas and one Mi-17 in a support role. Beg and Maj. Khalid Amir Rana would fly one Lama from Qasim army aviation base in Rawalpindi to Astore, a village about 15 nm northeast of the climber’s base camp. Lt. Col. Ubaid ur Rehman and Maj. Mueen ud Din would fly the Lama from Skardu (along with the Mi-17 crew) at Astore.
From there, the three helicopters would fly to the base camp at 11,150 ft, where they would strip the Lamas of excess weight and rig the sling rope below the helicopter.
At 1415, they got word that the clouds had lifted and the Rupal Face was partially visible. Within 45 min, they landed at the base camp.
A day earlier, an Alouette from the private company Askari Aviation had photographed Humar’s position on the Rupal Face.
"When we saw the position on a photo and correlated it with the ground," Beg said, "our worries magnified a thousand fold."
In addition to the sheer face, there was a mushroom of snow on an outcropping 100 ft above Humar’s position. The only foothold was where he was clinging to the mountain by a small rope and an ice screw. Fresh snowfall made that mushroom an avalanche waiting for a triggering action, such as the wash or noise from a helicopter’s rotor.
While the helicopter needed to be light enough for HOGE, it had to be heavy enough to descend almost 10,000 ft in 10 min to keep Humar from freezing to death on the sling. The crews stripped the Lamas to bare essentials to reduce the weight, then prepared the sling rope.
They took off at about 1630. At 17,400 ft, they encountered clouds. Climbing further, they were almost in whiteout conditions. They finally decided to call off the effort for the day.
The next day, they could depart as early in the morning as possible. The air then would be denser. But the heavier air creates the downward flow of katabatic wind, which could be a big disadvantage. As the sun shines over a slope, the reverse happens and anabatic winds start blowing up the slope. The disadvantage there is the rising temperature would loosen the snow and increase the risk of an avalanche. The crews decided 30 min to 1 hr after sunrise would give them the maximum advantage. They planned to be in position when the sun had been below Humar’s position for almost half an hour.
On Aug. 10, they reached the base camp at 0545. A layer of clouds still hid Humar, but the sun was shining below him. The Lamas took off, the crews expecting the anabatic wind to push the cloud layer up as they climbed.
Beg and Rana did a last hover check at 20,000 ft pressure altitude while Rehman and Din in the other Lama took the lead in searching for Humar. Beg’s helicopter was stable enough, but the power pedal went to the limit. The lead helicopter spotted Humar, then cleared out for Beg and Rana, who initiated the approach to a spot slightly off the point where Humar was. They kept the wind on their power pedal, since a headwind approach was impossible. They saw the area from a close angle and executed a go-around to come in again. Now they were committed.
They hovered again, stopping the helicopter with Humar at 9 o’clock, the power pedal fully in. Beg said it was becoming extremely hard to maintain heading as they were running out of tail-rotor authority. They began inching to the left. Beg said the collective pitch indicator was reading.98 (or 98 percent power being consumed), barely enough to pick up 150 lb.
As they inched in, the force of the anabatic wind grew. They stopped to keep the rotor tips from hitting the rock. The collective pitch indication had dropped to.95-.96, Beg said, and a bit of power pedal was still available. Beg saw through his sling mirror that Humar was trying to grab the sling rope by reaching out with his ice axe as far as he could, but it was too far.
At this point, Beg and Rana were taking quick turns, alternating with one on the controls and the other breathing oxygen to avoid hypoxia.
They didn’t want to wear their oxygen masks for fear of the facepiece fogging up. Beg would hand the control to Rana and go on oxygen for about a minute, then Rana would do the same.
Rana, on the left side, had a better view of the rock face, and would tell Beg to stop movement when the snow started to blow just below the rotor disc. The outside air temperature was -8C (18F).
Beg pulled back, then moved back in and stopped short of the rock to swing the rope toward Humar. It was high-risk maneuver, but it worked. Humar grabbed the rope and clipped himself on. Rana, who then had the controls, said he felt a load on the collective. Humar gave the pilots a thumbs-up. Beg asked Rana to pull up.
Humar’s weight should have equaled a collective pitch rise of.02-.03, but the pilots saw it rise almost twice as much. Now the helicopter was hovering with 100 percent power and still not lifting up.
"Sir it is not pulling out," Rana said.
Suddenly, the helicopter started to sink and vibrate. Beg thought they’d entered vortex ring state and soon they’d all be dead. Beg looked into the mirror and saw the sling rope in full tension.
"Oh God," he thought, "he probably has not been able to cut his rope."
When the aircraft sank again, Beg took the controls and moved the helicopter to the right to the rotor tips hitting the rock. He then felt "a pronounced jerk" and the helicopter felt light.
"Sir," Rana shouted, "I think he has dropped." That sent a cold wave down Beg’s spine, but just then he saw Humar swing to the right on the sling rope. He immediately moved the helicopter further right so Humar would not swing back and hit the rock face.
They were clear of the mountain, but Humar was swinging badly below. It took Beg awhile to stabilize him. He then asked Rehman in the other Lama to close in and see if Humar was all right. To Beg and Rana’s relief, Rehman said Humar was fine and waving to him.
Beg established the required rate of descent and airspeed, then turned over the controls to Rana. Beg felt drained; Rana looked like he felt.
Source: www.aviationtoday.com
Helicopter Heroism: HOGE Sling Rescue at 18,040 FtJames T. McKenna
IT WAS MIDDAY ON AUG. 8, 2005 when Lt. Col. Rashid Ullah Beg got the call to rescue a mountaineer from an elevation of 20,670 ft (6,300 m) on Nanga Parbat.
The Pakistan army aviator at once made a few calculations and concluded it was impossible to hover his SA315B Lama at that altitude at the prevailing temperatures. He recommended the mountaineer be brought down to, say, 18,000 ft, where a rescue attempt could be made. He heard nothing more and assumed his advice had been heeded.
That was until late that evening, when his corps commander told him he must undertake the mission. (The climber, Tomaz Humar of Slovenia, was a world-renowned mountaineer, and notorious for making solitary ascents by the most difficult and dangerous routes.) From that point, Beg considered it a military mission. "We had to attempt to accomplish it," he said, "even at the cost us of grave danger to our lives."
Beg contacted the famous Pakistani mountaineer Nazir Sabir, who had arranged Humar’s expedition. He painted a bleak picture. Humar was on the Rupal Face, a near-vertical wall more than 14,760 ft high. No one could climb to rescue him, Sabir said, and for him to attempt a descent would be suicidal.
The weather forecast for the next two days was favorable. After that, it would worsen for several days. Humar might not last that long.
Beg quickly ruled out a hoist operation for weight, center-of-gravity and power considerations. The density altitude would be nearly 23,000 ft. Hovering, even in ground effect, was impossible with his aircraft’s weight, he thought, let alone hovering out of ground effect (HOGE) and picking up a 150-lb (70-kg) man. The only hope was a sling rescue, he concluded.
The Lama was the right helicopter for the mission; it still holds the absolute altitude record of almost 42,000 ft. But Jean Boulet had stripped his Lama to an empty weight of 1,870 lb for the record flight. Beg’s Lama weighed more than 2,640 lb.
Beg drafted a plan that, he said later, "had very bleak chances of success, but was the only thing we could do." They would fly the mission with two Lamas and one Mi-17 in a support role. Beg and Maj. Khalid Amir Rana would fly one Lama from Qasim army aviation base in Rawalpindi to Astore, a village about 15 nm northeast of the climber’s base camp. Lt. Col. Ubaid ur Rehman and Maj. Mueen ud Din would fly the Lama from Skardu (along with the Mi-17 crew) at Astore.
From there, the three helicopters would fly to the base camp at 11,150 ft, where they would strip the Lamas of excess weight and rig the sling rope below the helicopter.
At 1415, they got word that the clouds had lifted and the Rupal Face was partially visible. Within 45 min, they landed at the base camp.
A day earlier, an Alouette from the private company Askari Aviation had photographed Humar’s position on the Rupal Face.
"When we saw the position on a photo and correlated it with the ground," Beg said, "our worries magnified a thousand fold."
In addition to the sheer face, there was a mushroom of snow on an outcropping 100 ft above Humar’s position. The only foothold was where he was clinging to the mountain by a small rope and an ice screw. Fresh snowfall made that mushroom an avalanche waiting for a triggering action, such as the wash or noise from a helicopter’s rotor.
While the helicopter needed to be light enough for HOGE, it had to be heavy enough to descend almost 10,000 ft in 10 min to keep Humar from freezing to death on the sling. The crews stripped the Lamas to bare essentials to reduce the weight, then prepared the sling rope.
They took off at about 1630. At 17,400 ft, they encountered clouds. Climbing further, they were almost in whiteout conditions. They finally decided to call off the effort for the day.
The next day, they could depart as early in the morning as possible. The air then would be denser. But the heavier air creates the downward flow of katabatic wind, which could be a big disadvantage. As the sun shines over a slope, the reverse happens and anabatic winds start blowing up the slope. The disadvantage there is the rising temperature would loosen the snow and increase the risk of an avalanche. The crews decided 30 min to 1 hr after sunrise would give them the maximum advantage. They planned to be in position when the sun had been below Humar’s position for almost half an hour.
On Aug. 10, they reached the base camp at 0545. A layer of clouds still hid Humar, but the sun was shining below him. The Lamas took off, the crews expecting the anabatic wind to push the cloud layer up as they climbed.
Beg and Rana did a last hover check at 20,000 ft pressure altitude while Rehman and Din in the other Lama took the lead in searching for Humar. Beg’s helicopter was stable enough, but the power pedal went to the limit. The lead helicopter spotted Humar, then cleared out for Beg and Rana, who initiated the approach to a spot slightly off the point where Humar was. They kept the wind on their power pedal, since a headwind approach was impossible. They saw the area from a close angle and executed a go-around to come in again. Now they were committed.
They hovered again, stopping the helicopter with Humar at 9 o’clock, the power pedal fully in. Beg said it was becoming extremely hard to maintain heading as they were running out of tail-rotor authority. They began inching to the left. Beg said the collective pitch indicator was reading.98 (or 98 percent power being consumed), barely enough to pick up 150 lb.
As they inched in, the force of the anabatic wind grew. They stopped to keep the rotor tips from hitting the rock. The collective pitch indication had dropped to.95-.96, Beg said, and a bit of power pedal was still available. Beg saw through his sling mirror that Humar was trying to grab the sling rope by reaching out with his ice axe as far as he could, but it was too far.
At this point, Beg and Rana were taking quick turns, alternating with one on the controls and the other breathing oxygen to avoid hypoxia.
They didn’t want to wear their oxygen masks for fear of the facepiece fogging up. Beg would hand the control to Rana and go on oxygen for about a minute, then Rana would do the same.
Rana, on the left side, had a better view of the rock face, and would tell Beg to stop movement when the snow started to blow just below the rotor disc. The outside air temperature was -8C (18F).
Beg pulled back, then moved back in and stopped short of the rock to swing the rope toward Humar. It was high-risk maneuver, but it worked. Humar grabbed the rope and clipped himself on. Rana, who then had the controls, said he felt a load on the collective. Humar gave the pilots a thumbs-up. Beg asked Rana to pull up.
Humar’s weight should have equaled a collective pitch rise of.02-.03, but the pilots saw it rise almost twice as much. Now the helicopter was hovering with 100 percent power and still not lifting up.
"Sir it is not pulling out," Rana said.
Suddenly, the helicopter started to sink and vibrate. Beg thought they’d entered vortex ring state and soon they’d all be dead. Beg looked into the mirror and saw the sling rope in full tension.
"Oh God," he thought, "he probably has not been able to cut his rope."
When the aircraft sank again, Beg took the controls and moved the helicopter to the right to the rotor tips hitting the rock. He then felt "a pronounced jerk" and the helicopter felt light.
"Sir," Rana shouted, "I think he has dropped." That sent a cold wave down Beg’s spine, but just then he saw Humar swing to the right on the sling rope. He immediately moved the helicopter further right so Humar would not swing back and hit the rock face.
They were clear of the mountain, but Humar was swinging badly below. It took Beg awhile to stabilize him. He then asked Rehman in the other Lama to close in and see if Humar was all right. To Beg and Rana’s relief, Rehman said Humar was fine and waving to him.
Beg established the required rate of descent and airspeed, then turned over the controls to Rana. Beg felt drained; Rana looked like he felt.
Source: www.aviationtoday.com
fjavaid
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"Sir it is not pulling out," Rana said.
Suddenly, the helicopter started to sink and vibrate. Beg thought they’d entered vortex ring state and soon they’d all be dead. Beg looked into the mirror and saw the sling rope in full tension.
"Oh God," he thought, "he probably has not been able to cut his rope."
When the aircraft sank again, Beg took the controls and moved the helicopter to the right to the rotor tips hitting the rock. He then felt "a pronounced jerk" and the helicopter felt light.
"Sir," Rana shouted, "I think he has dropped." That sent a cold wave down Beg’s spine, but just then he saw Humar swing to the right on the sling rope. He immediately moved the helicopter further right so Humar would not swing back and hit the rock face.
They were clear of the mountain, but Humar was swinging badly below. It took Beg awhile to stabilize him. He then asked Rehman in the other Lama to close in and see if Humar was all right. To Beg and Rana’s relief, Rehman said Humar was fine and waving to him.
Beg established the required rate of descent and airspeed, then turned over the controls to Rana. Beg felt drained; Rana looked like he felt.
Source: www.aviationtoday.com[/QUOTE]
Can somebody shed some light on this about Heli becoming light again once it could not hv lift anymore ?
Suddenly, the helicopter started to sink and vibrate. Beg thought they’d entered vortex ring state and soon they’d all be dead. Beg looked into the mirror and saw the sling rope in full tension.
"Oh God," he thought, "he probably has not been able to cut his rope."
When the aircraft sank again, Beg took the controls and moved the helicopter to the right to the rotor tips hitting the rock. He then felt "a pronounced jerk" and the helicopter felt light.
"Sir," Rana shouted, "I think he has dropped." That sent a cold wave down Beg’s spine, but just then he saw Humar swing to the right on the sling rope. He immediately moved the helicopter further right so Humar would not swing back and hit the rock face.
They were clear of the mountain, but Humar was swinging badly below. It took Beg awhile to stabilize him. He then asked Rehman in the other Lama to close in and see if Humar was all right. To Beg and Rana’s relief, Rehman said Humar was fine and waving to him.
Beg established the required rate of descent and airspeed, then turned over the controls to Rana. Beg felt drained; Rana looked like he felt.
Source: www.aviationtoday.com[/QUOTE]
Can somebody shed some light on this about Heli becoming light again once it could not hv lift anymore ?
fatman17
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Short History of PAA
Army Aviation Corps
Pakistan Army Aviation gained autonomy from Pakistan Air Force in 1958, and gained full corps status in 1977. Auster Mk 5 and Mk 6 were used at first. In 1957 60 O-1 Bird Dogs were delivered from US which mostly replaced the Austers, making two frontline Air Observation Post (AOP) squadrons possible. More O-1s were later assembled at Army's 503 Workshop at Dhaimal, eventualy producing 60 percent of the components locally. The Army also started maintaining its own aircraft as well after the aquisition of these aircraft. Army Aviation School opened in 1959. Some 18 Bell 47/ OH-13s joined the Army in 1964 after the helicopter trained Pakistan pilots returned from the USA. These aircraft allowed the formation of several composite units. These units were used during the 1965 Indo-Pakistan war for spotting, liason, and FAC. The Bell 47 is a grand old helicopter but it went out of production in 1973 and they have all but disappeared in the commercial world.
After the war Pakistan aquired 24 Alouette IIIs from Aerospatiale of France, some of them were assembled by the Army itself. These Alouettes have been joined by several others from different sources, including sixSA 315B Lamas from Romania in 1987. The Lamas are used for high-altitute operations in Siachin and Karakoram.
Medium-lift capability came with the procurement of 12 Mil Mi-8s. These were used in rescue and disaster operations in East Pakistan along with Alouette IIIs. Both of the types also saw some action during the War of 1971 in East Pakistan and were withdrawn from the theatre through Burma (Myanmar).
The US supplied six UH-1Hs as a gift for future disaster relief operations in 1973. In 1974 Iran donated 10 AB 205As. The same year Saab MFI-17s were inducted for training and liason. The initial batch numbered 115, of them 23 were delivered as complete aircraft the rest in kit form to be assembled at Risalpur. These aircraft are locally called Mushshak. The production of this type was transferred from Sweden to Kamra, Pakistan. In 1975 12 Bell 206Bs were aquired from USA, and few JetRangers III joined them a few years later.
In 1976 the Army aquired 32 Aerospatiale SA 330J Pumas, which formed two new squadrons, and boosted the assault and medium-lift capability. Pakistan Army's requirement for armed attack helicopter was fulfilled in 1985. Two squadrons with ten AH-1S Cobras each were formed. These squadrons also operate a few Bell 206s as scouts. In 1997 Pakistan doubled its Mil Mi-8 inventory by aquiring 12 more in the form of Mil Mi-17 from CIS, half of these are seems to be located at Quetta. The location of the rest is unknown. The Army also operates Rockwell Turbo Commander 690s, a sigle Commander MA Jetprop 840 for surveys. And a single McDonnell Douglas MD-500E for Inter-Service Intelligence.
The force services of Pakistan made a choice of Mi-171 helicopter for a long time as a principal helicopter of middle / heavy class in its fleet. Pakistan purchased the first batch of Mi-171 helicopters from Ulan-Ude Aviation Plant in 2001 to fulfil the needs of its army aviation and air forces. The helicopters has proven to be adequate in operation and got a high valuation from Pakistani users. Pakistan Anti-Narcotics Force (ANF) enriched its fleet with two Mi-171 helicopters of Ulan-Ude Aviation Plant in 2008. The UK agreed to donate two Mi-17 helicopters and a spares packageto the value of up to £6 million to the Pakistan Anti-Narcotics Force (ANF) tobe used for counter narcotics activity on the Pakistan/Afghan border. Funding for the gift was made available from Home Office capital budget for the Financial Year ending 31 March 2006. The helicopters provide the ANF with much needed independent aircapacity to help them conduct both operational and eradication related tasks. The UK had previously gifted Ml 17 helicopters to the Pakistan ANF in 1995. Both are out of service: one unfortunately crashed during the autumn 2005 earthquake, and the other was awaiting a major airframe overhaul. Without air assets, the ANF's ability to deploy effectively, and in a timely way is compromised.
On 24 September 2003, the Defense Security Cooperation Agency notified Congress of a possible Foreign Military Sale to Pakistan of Bell 407 Helicopters as well as associated equipment and services. The total value, if all options are exercised, could be as high as $97 million. The Government of Pakistan requested a possible sale of 40 Bell 407 helicopters with commercial avionics package, support equipment, spare/repair parts, publications/technical data, personnel training/equipment, and U.S. Government and contractor engineering and logistics support services, and other related elements of logistics support.
The proposed sale of Bell helicopters will have a significant impact on Pakistan's ability to secure its borders. At the same time, this technology poses no threat to the balance of power in the region. This proposed sale will have a dramatic impact on Pakistan's ability to support U.S. objectives in the Global War on Terror. The terrain along Pakistan's border is extremely rugged and difficult to secure. Its dense mountainous regions, rugged terrain and vast borders make it virtually impossible to secure without the mobility provided by aviation assets. Vehicle support is limited to utility trucks, and there is limited cross-country capability. The lack of mobility for observation, transportation and interdiction seriously limits Pakistan's ability to stop border-crossing violations. The addition of U.S. provided helicopters would add the following capabilities required for anti-terrorist and border security operations: (1) observation platforms to better patrol the mountainous border region, and (2) transportation platforms to move personnel to areas of suspected infiltrations.
In 2004, Pakistan and the US embarked on a long-term $235 million project to help build Army Aviation's capability. During the first phase of the project, Pakistan leased the helicopters while the US provided the resources, funding, training and support to help Pakistan establish a strong and reliable helicopter fleet. On 24 October 2007 the US formally handed over 26 Bell-412 helicopters and four completely refurbished Cobra helicopters to the Pakistan Army. US Ambassador Anne Patterson handed the helicopters over to Defence Secretary Kamran Rasool. Rasool thanked the US government and said that the induction of these helicopters into the army would significantly enhance their operational capabilities. Speaking at the formalising ceremony of the final acceptance and transfer of 25 Bell-412 helicopters to the army at Qasim Airbase, Patterson praised Pakistan Army Aviation and said that the induction of these helicopters would strengthen their efforts to fight extremism and bring peace and stability to the region. She said the day marked a new chapter in Army Aviation's history. "This event demonstrates the continued commitment of the US to cooperation with Pakistan," Patterson said. "Our military assistance program are for the long term. They are the foundation for cooperation and engagement, and a way to strengthen our bonds as partners and allies."
On October 8, 2005, at about 8:35 am, worst ever earthquake in this region, measuring 7.6 on Richter scale, hit Islamabad, remote and mountainous areas of Kashmir and Pakistan's North West Frontier Province. It was estimated that more than 74,000 people died and about were 100,000 severely injured. All Aviation assets of the Pakistan Army Aviation were mobilized for relief and rescue operations. It was one of the biggest rescue operation which was undertaken by air due to badly damaged and almost non-existence of the road links. During the month of October 2005, Army Aviation and other Pilots flew over 4,000 hours to evacuate more than 1,00,000 victims of earthquake. More than 141 helicopters including those from allied friendly countries joined the rescue effort to shift more than 12,00,000 injured people to the hospitals. Till April, 2005, the entire Aviation fleet of helicopters had flown for 12,500 hours in affected areas for delivery of relief goods and rescue of injured persons.
On September 26, 2008 the Defense Security Cooperation Agency notified Congress of a possible Foreign Military Sale to Pakistan of AH-1F Cobra helicopter refurbishment as well as associated equipment and services. The total value, if all options are exercised, could be as high as $115 million. The Government of Pakistan requested a possible sale of refurbishment and maintenance of eight AH-1F Cobra Helicopters. The Government of Pakistan has also requested warranties, system integration, spare and repairs parts, including transportation for the parts, support equipment, personnel training and training equipment, publications and technical data, U.S. Government and contractor engineering and logistics support services, and other related elements of logistics support. The estimated cost is $115 million.
Army Aviation Corps
Pakistan Army Aviation gained autonomy from Pakistan Air Force in 1958, and gained full corps status in 1977. Auster Mk 5 and Mk 6 were used at first. In 1957 60 O-1 Bird Dogs were delivered from US which mostly replaced the Austers, making two frontline Air Observation Post (AOP) squadrons possible. More O-1s were later assembled at Army's 503 Workshop at Dhaimal, eventualy producing 60 percent of the components locally. The Army also started maintaining its own aircraft as well after the aquisition of these aircraft. Army Aviation School opened in 1959. Some 18 Bell 47/ OH-13s joined the Army in 1964 after the helicopter trained Pakistan pilots returned from the USA. These aircraft allowed the formation of several composite units. These units were used during the 1965 Indo-Pakistan war for spotting, liason, and FAC. The Bell 47 is a grand old helicopter but it went out of production in 1973 and they have all but disappeared in the commercial world.
After the war Pakistan aquired 24 Alouette IIIs from Aerospatiale of France, some of them were assembled by the Army itself. These Alouettes have been joined by several others from different sources, including sixSA 315B Lamas from Romania in 1987. The Lamas are used for high-altitute operations in Siachin and Karakoram.
Medium-lift capability came with the procurement of 12 Mil Mi-8s. These were used in rescue and disaster operations in East Pakistan along with Alouette IIIs. Both of the types also saw some action during the War of 1971 in East Pakistan and were withdrawn from the theatre through Burma (Myanmar).
The US supplied six UH-1Hs as a gift for future disaster relief operations in 1973. In 1974 Iran donated 10 AB 205As. The same year Saab MFI-17s were inducted for training and liason. The initial batch numbered 115, of them 23 were delivered as complete aircraft the rest in kit form to be assembled at Risalpur. These aircraft are locally called Mushshak. The production of this type was transferred from Sweden to Kamra, Pakistan. In 1975 12 Bell 206Bs were aquired from USA, and few JetRangers III joined them a few years later.
In 1976 the Army aquired 32 Aerospatiale SA 330J Pumas, which formed two new squadrons, and boosted the assault and medium-lift capability. Pakistan Army's requirement for armed attack helicopter was fulfilled in 1985. Two squadrons with ten AH-1S Cobras each were formed. These squadrons also operate a few Bell 206s as scouts. In 1997 Pakistan doubled its Mil Mi-8 inventory by aquiring 12 more in the form of Mil Mi-17 from CIS, half of these are seems to be located at Quetta. The location of the rest is unknown. The Army also operates Rockwell Turbo Commander 690s, a sigle Commander MA Jetprop 840 for surveys. And a single McDonnell Douglas MD-500E for Inter-Service Intelligence.
The force services of Pakistan made a choice of Mi-171 helicopter for a long time as a principal helicopter of middle / heavy class in its fleet. Pakistan purchased the first batch of Mi-171 helicopters from Ulan-Ude Aviation Plant in 2001 to fulfil the needs of its army aviation and air forces. The helicopters has proven to be adequate in operation and got a high valuation from Pakistani users. Pakistan Anti-Narcotics Force (ANF) enriched its fleet with two Mi-171 helicopters of Ulan-Ude Aviation Plant in 2008. The UK agreed to donate two Mi-17 helicopters and a spares packageto the value of up to £6 million to the Pakistan Anti-Narcotics Force (ANF) tobe used for counter narcotics activity on the Pakistan/Afghan border. Funding for the gift was made available from Home Office capital budget for the Financial Year ending 31 March 2006. The helicopters provide the ANF with much needed independent aircapacity to help them conduct both operational and eradication related tasks. The UK had previously gifted Ml 17 helicopters to the Pakistan ANF in 1995. Both are out of service: one unfortunately crashed during the autumn 2005 earthquake, and the other was awaiting a major airframe overhaul. Without air assets, the ANF's ability to deploy effectively, and in a timely way is compromised.
On 24 September 2003, the Defense Security Cooperation Agency notified Congress of a possible Foreign Military Sale to Pakistan of Bell 407 Helicopters as well as associated equipment and services. The total value, if all options are exercised, could be as high as $97 million. The Government of Pakistan requested a possible sale of 40 Bell 407 helicopters with commercial avionics package, support equipment, spare/repair parts, publications/technical data, personnel training/equipment, and U.S. Government and contractor engineering and logistics support services, and other related elements of logistics support.
The proposed sale of Bell helicopters will have a significant impact on Pakistan's ability to secure its borders. At the same time, this technology poses no threat to the balance of power in the region. This proposed sale will have a dramatic impact on Pakistan's ability to support U.S. objectives in the Global War on Terror. The terrain along Pakistan's border is extremely rugged and difficult to secure. Its dense mountainous regions, rugged terrain and vast borders make it virtually impossible to secure without the mobility provided by aviation assets. Vehicle support is limited to utility trucks, and there is limited cross-country capability. The lack of mobility for observation, transportation and interdiction seriously limits Pakistan's ability to stop border-crossing violations. The addition of U.S. provided helicopters would add the following capabilities required for anti-terrorist and border security operations: (1) observation platforms to better patrol the mountainous border region, and (2) transportation platforms to move personnel to areas of suspected infiltrations.
In 2004, Pakistan and the US embarked on a long-term $235 million project to help build Army Aviation's capability. During the first phase of the project, Pakistan leased the helicopters while the US provided the resources, funding, training and support to help Pakistan establish a strong and reliable helicopter fleet. On 24 October 2007 the US formally handed over 26 Bell-412 helicopters and four completely refurbished Cobra helicopters to the Pakistan Army. US Ambassador Anne Patterson handed the helicopters over to Defence Secretary Kamran Rasool. Rasool thanked the US government and said that the induction of these helicopters into the army would significantly enhance their operational capabilities. Speaking at the formalising ceremony of the final acceptance and transfer of 25 Bell-412 helicopters to the army at Qasim Airbase, Patterson praised Pakistan Army Aviation and said that the induction of these helicopters would strengthen their efforts to fight extremism and bring peace and stability to the region. She said the day marked a new chapter in Army Aviation's history. "This event demonstrates the continued commitment of the US to cooperation with Pakistan," Patterson said. "Our military assistance program are for the long term. They are the foundation for cooperation and engagement, and a way to strengthen our bonds as partners and allies."
On October 8, 2005, at about 8:35 am, worst ever earthquake in this region, measuring 7.6 on Richter scale, hit Islamabad, remote and mountainous areas of Kashmir and Pakistan's North West Frontier Province. It was estimated that more than 74,000 people died and about were 100,000 severely injured. All Aviation assets of the Pakistan Army Aviation were mobilized for relief and rescue operations. It was one of the biggest rescue operation which was undertaken by air due to badly damaged and almost non-existence of the road links. During the month of October 2005, Army Aviation and other Pilots flew over 4,000 hours to evacuate more than 1,00,000 victims of earthquake. More than 141 helicopters including those from allied friendly countries joined the rescue effort to shift more than 12,00,000 injured people to the hospitals. Till April, 2005, the entire Aviation fleet of helicopters had flown for 12,500 hours in affected areas for delivery of relief goods and rescue of injured persons.
On September 26, 2008 the Defense Security Cooperation Agency notified Congress of a possible Foreign Military Sale to Pakistan of AH-1F Cobra helicopter refurbishment as well as associated equipment and services. The total value, if all options are exercised, could be as high as $115 million. The Government of Pakistan requested a possible sale of refurbishment and maintenance of eight AH-1F Cobra Helicopters. The Government of Pakistan has also requested warranties, system integration, spare and repairs parts, including transportation for the parts, support equipment, personnel training and training equipment, publications and technical data, U.S. Government and contractor engineering and logistics support services, and other related elements of logistics support. The estimated cost is $115 million.
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