Pakistan Army 19th-century mindset

[sonicboom]

19th-century mindset

Thursday, September 24, 2009
Ikram Sehgal

The structure of an Army unit in the fighting arms, at the battalion level in the case of infantry and engineers, and regiments in the case of armour and artillery, is a case study in “corporate governance.” The commanding officer (CO) of lieutenant colonel’s rank is supported by a second-in-command who is a major (a field officer). Companies (and equivalent in other arms) are supposed to have majors in command in the Tables of Organisation and Equipment, company officers can be lieutenants or captains. Two staff officers exist in the rank of captain, adjutant (executive officer of the unit) and quartermaster. The CO’s aide who helps him in conveying his operational instructions, maps, etc, is a junior subaltern called the intelligence officer. Each platoon (and equivalent) has a subaltern (lieutenant or second lieutenant) or a junior commissioned officer (JCO) in command.

This “cabinet” of officers headed by the CO provides the governance of a unit. In higher “formations,” the same structure exists. This has been more or less the British pattern in vogue for nearly two centuries. To improve command and control in the modern context anomalies and deficiencies need to be corrected. Presently an infantry unit of about 800 men depends upon an accounts clerk: there is need of a full-fledged accounts officer. A full fledged IT officer must look after the computer needs of the unit.

For the British armies running their colonies the experience of senior officers who could not be promoted past the rank of major was considered an asset. We must shed colonial practices! While it is the CO’s discretion to appoint the 2IC, and he could very well pass over a superseded officer and appoint another senior Field Officer, this is essentially wrong as is the practice to saddle him administrative tasks. The Americans have the second-in-command instead of an adjutant as the “executive officer” to assist the CO in running the unit on a day-to-day basis. This provides a good practical test of a major aspiring for promotion to the next rank.

For every serving officer, aspiration for promotion acts as a motivation. In the brigades, the colonels aspiring for promotion to brigadier’s rank should be the “executive officers” and commensurately brigades and major generals should be deputy commanders at the division and corps level. With a motivation for promotion, their performance will increase substantially, commensurately so will that of their commands. Ashfaq Kayani has broken a lot of taboos (changing the term of “other ranks” to “soldiers” was an excellent one, so were the decisions to have a “subedar major” at the army level and have a meaningful “Year of the Soldier”), he must ensure that no man in the fighting arms who does not have combat experience should be promoted past the rank of major. This army has fought many battles, and is still fighting them. Why should those who manipulated avoiding combat be considered for promotion? This will also ensure that braggarts who ”thrill” unknowing civilians by telling blatant lies about their so-called “combat experience” do not rise to critical senior positions.

Officers permanently superseded should be posted out of units and formations up the line as well as other key posts in the army structure. With nothing to lose and nothing to look forward to, the man has no motivation and unless made of extraordinary mettle and/or integrity, he actually becomes a liability. Invariably (and unfortunately) frustration at not being promoted could even become a focal point of dissent. If this arrangement can be fatal for command structure and morale at the unit level, consider what it must be further up the line?

Some majors are “considered” for promotion but some are not. Those not even being “considered” should be retired forthwith. If despite being “considered” a major is unlucky not to be promoted, the army can benefit by sending him on “leave pending retirement” (LPR) three years after permanent supersession. The present adverse security environment requires first class executive management in both administration and operations, slotting of superseded officers is contrary to good management practice. Above the rank field officer this same analogy must be applied with a lot more emphasis. Superseded lieutenant colonels should be treated similarly, but above that rank should immediately be sent on LPR, with full benefits for the period remaining in their mandated service. No officer permanently superseded in any rank should stay in the army, getting the full benefits that would normally accrue to them for their full service as mandated under the Army Rules and Regulations. All, except for specialist categories—for example, doctors, engineers and aviators—their services being retained for a specific period depending upon the exigencies of service.

Officers in senior positions should not be “marking time” till retirement. Why do lieutenant generals who are superseded immediately opt for retirement when their colleague becomes CJSC or COAS? lieutenant general (i.e., with two year’s service left) who have no chance of being promoted to the next rank when their senior colleague gets promoted to CJSC or COAS rank should also retire immediately. With slots opening for many down the line the “logjam” on promotions would not become a source of frustration. Their pride and self-respect prevents them from serving under someone junior to them. Do brigadiers and major generals lack in pride and self-respect? Till fairly recently superseded major generals stayed in the army even after their course-mates promoted to lieutenant general’s rank eventually retired. This travesty has only been corrected partially by having major generals retire simultaneously with their lieutenant general course-mates.

The present system is an inheritance of two centuries ago, it is not only illogical and incorrect, why subscribe to something that militates against human nature? Unless we abandon the practices of the 19th century, choosing pragmatism over tradition, how does one hope to create the military mindset necessary for the coming battles of the 21st century?

The writer is a defence and political

analyst. Email: isehgal@pathfinder9.com

19th-century mindset

 

[third eye]

A well analysed article.

There are however a few contentious issues. Such as why should an officer who gets superseded automatically be asked / expected to retire ? He like all others too has liabilities & family responsibilities. Unless a suitable opening is provided for him to shift laterally it is unlikely he will move.

Next, is the issue of how objective the selection processes are ? Human failings do & will come in the way of fair assessments. There will be undeserving cases who make it. Reporting in the armed forces like everywhere else depends on a No of things - all of them are not necessarily professional.

The point raised of not going past a Major's rank without combat experience is well taken.

 

[All-Green]

A bit too much really, not everyone can be promoted and experience does matter.
As long as someone is performing at the required level for his designation, his services can be availed without compromising on the quality...
In practical life there are many jobs where the chances for promotion are not that great, does not mean the people simply resign or are terminated...

The criteria can be made more strict so that people who cannot be promoted further are scrutinized for further retention, letting go of all such cases is not something that would magically improve the performance of Army...

Another thing to note is what the other leading professional armies are doing in this regards...

 

[Gin ka Pakistan]

You have pass the staff college course else be rtd as major

 

[All-Green]

Soldiering is not easy, my father is a war veteran who was a superb athlete and a very tough soldier...he has multiple complications as a result of overstaying in Siachin area for 2 years and extended tours of duty in the mountainous areas...his lungs were weakened due to overexposure and a lot more things have happened over time...his old age is full of complications...still no complaints from him and i know he would do it all over again because many soldiers remain soldiers even after retirement...and that to me is admirable...this bond of a soldier with the Army should always be made stronger and not weaker...

Such a step of letting go of all such officers without regard for their contribution is cold and absolutely counter productive in its blanket form...

There are those who have passed staff course and did not get promoted to colonel rank...means they have the right stuff but due to some reason are not promoted...what to do?

Bottom line is that you cannot fire a person who is doing his job well but does not have all what you deem necessary to go to the next level...

The Morale of the officers will be extremely low if such things are implemented and instead of a dramatic increase in efficiency i think there will be much more lax attitude since the officers will not feel emotionally attached to an institution which does not give a damn about its officers...it is a natural reaction...

I have seen such rightsizing and shuffling on a corporate level and mostly it causes a severe dent to the loyalty and morale which in turn results in lower functionality...

A major or a colonel level officer still has lots of years to serve unlike a senior general who has much less time left...a lieutenant General has had a full run and all the facilities and perks that come with the job...his graceful exit is also facilitated by these value additions and the feeling that his future is absolutely secure even without a job...which he lands anyways due to the connections and most important position in the society...

Now compare this to the Major level officer who will have a major problem when he retires to find a suitable job to support his family ...which he cannot do otherwise...this coupled with the fact that he would have been active in field all his life and would have many complications as well...makes it quite tough as it is...
To add salt to the wounds by forced retirement is something very cruel to do to a person who has served the nation well...

 

[third eye]

All Green,

Very valid points ..all. Armchair soloutions do not always work for uniformed bodies.

 

[Xeric]

As an appetizer i would say that though the article is generally guud but most of it can be termed as an ill-researched piece and to some extent can also be taken as a propaganda move.

i'll comment on (almost) every paragraph later, as i have to go somewhere now.

 

[muse]

Reform recognizing that technology and organization are keys to taking the armed forces to the next level of efficiency and lethality, the piece is timely.

The armed forces must begin thinking about schools which enable movement into defense production and research - all men and women will not rise to the highest rank, but that does not mean that they can no longer contribute, cannot serve. As the armed forces organizational structure becomes more complex, the talent to maintain the organizations within the armed forces will have to be developed and new competencies created.

 

[Xeric]

19th-century mindset

Thursday, September 24, 2009
Ikram Sehgal

The structure of an Army unit in the fighting arms, at the battalion level in the case of infantry and engineers, and regiments in the case of armour and artillery, is a case study in “corporate governance.” The commanding officer (CO) of lieutenant colonel’s rank is supported by a second-in-command who is a major (a field officer). Companies (and equivalent in other arms) are supposed to have majors in command in the Tables of Organisation and Equipment, company officers can be lieutenants or captains. Two staff officers exist in the rank of captain, adjutant (executive officer of the unit) and quartermaster. The CO’s aide who helps him in conveying his operational instructions, maps, etc, is a junior subaltern called the intelligence officer. Each platoon (and equivalent) has a subaltern (lieutenant or second lieutenant) or a junior commissioned officer (JCO) in command.

What that has been written above may or may not be correct. i would not acknowledge, negate or alter that has been said by Mr Ikram as discussing the TO&E online is not a very legit thing to do.

This “cabinet” of officers headed by the CO provides the governance of a unit. In higher “formations,” the same structure exists. This has been more or less the British pattern in vogue for nearly two centuries. To improve command and control in the modern context anomalies and deficiencies need to be corrected. Presently an infantry unit of about 800 men depends upon an accounts clerk: there is need of a full-fledged accounts officer. A full fledged IT officer must look after the computer needs of the unit.

Now for the concern raised as regards to the handling of military accounts, Mr Ikram has missed certain details in his writeup. This shows that his article is ill-researched and needs some more deliberation. Here, let me help him out:

He said that there in this account clerk to deal with the accounts and there should be dedicated Officer for the said job, but the writer failed to mention that there is this another dude namely Unit Accountant (UA) who is a grade 16 civilian posted by the Controller of Military Accounts (CMA) with the sole job to manage a unit's Pay and Allowances!

The dude is a civilian and is available in EVERY unit for this sole purpose. He is not supposed to get the military training and undergo the various military courses as he would not be fighting in an event of war. He is qualified in his job as he has done something to this (accounts) effect. And this accounts handling business is his only task for which he is paid.

Moreover, Mr Ikram also failed to mention/find out that there is a clerk in every company/squadron/battery who also is also responsible for looking after the accounts at the company level and he directly responsible/answerable to the UA and accounts clerk in accounts matters.

One more thing that Mr Ikram didnt mention was that the 2ic of any unit is usually the dedicated Accounts Officer of the unit and he is answerable to the CO when it comes to unit accounts!

So as the writer has missed these facets of accounts handling (either deliberately or due to ignorance), we need to read the remainder of the article carefully.

And oh yes, as for the concern regarding a dedicated Accounts Officer, i would like to inform our readers that the Army do employ Accounts Officers at various installations all over the Army. i am skipping the names of those installations for the obvious reasons, but to clarify further these officer can are mostly in the rank of Lt Col.

The unit level accounts handling is not that complicated so there is no need to 'waste' an officer for the purpose.

The Army knows how to man manage its Officers and is doing it very well.

As for the IT Officer there isnt of computers at a unit level. We would require a dedicated IT OIC at the unit level if there would be an elaborate LAN system being utilized at the unit level. Though today the units do employ/rely over IT and computers but that are perfectly being handled by the clerks as they undergo various computer related course and officers. It is a norm that units do task computer savvy officers as the incharge of computers to make them efficient.

The Army has taken various ventures as regards to IT and mass data transfer and they are being taken care by experts at various levels. Many formations, installations and HQ have been employing networking and video conferencing etc and they do have IT Officers incharge to look after the stuff. Moreover, there are Data Processing Cells (DPCs) functional at various levels which are looked after by the OIC DPC who is an officer from the Signal Corps and is a degree holder in computers.

For the British armies running their colonies the experience of senior officers who could not be promoted past the rank of major was considered an asset. We must shed colonial practices! While it is the CO’s discretion to appoint the 2IC, and he could very well pass over a superseded officer and appoint another senior Field Officer, this is essentially wrong as is the practice to saddle him administrative tasks. The Americans have the second-in-command instead of an adjutant as the “executive officer” to assist the CO in running the unit on a day-to-day basis. This provides a good practical test of a major aspiring for promotion to the next rank.

For every serving officer, aspiration for promotion acts as a motivation. In the brigades, the colonels aspiring for promotion to brigadier’s rank should be the “executive officers” and commensurately brigades and major generals should be deputy commanders at the division and corps level. With a motivation for promotion, their performance will increase substantially, commensurately so will that of their commands. Ashfaq Kayani has broken a lot of taboos (changing the term of “other ranks” to “soldiers” was an excellent one, so were the decisions to have a “subedar major” at the army level and have a meaningful “Year of the Soldier”),

Officers permanently superseded should be posted out of units and formations up the line as well as other key posts in the army structure. With nothing to lose and nothing to look forward to, the man has no motivation and unless made of extraordinary mettle and/or integrity, he actually becomes a liability. Invariably (and unfortunately) frustration at not being promoted could even become a focal point of dissent. If this arrangement can be fatal for command structure and morale at the unit level, consider what it must be further up the line?

Some majors are “considered” for promotion but some are not. Those not even being “considered” should be retired forthwith. If despite being “considered” a major is unlucky not to be promoted, the army can benefit by sending him on “leave pending retirement” (LPR) three years after permanent supersession. The present adverse security environment requires first class executive management in both administration and operations, slotting of superseded officers is contrary to good management practice. Above the rank field officer this same analogy must be applied with a lot more emphasis. Superseded lieutenant colonels should be treated similarly, but above that rank should immediately be sent on LPR, with full benefits for the period remaining in their mandated service. No officer permanently superseded in any rank should stay in the army, getting the full benefits that would normally accrue to them for their full service as mandated under the Army Rules and Regulations. All, except for specialist categories—for example, doctors, engineers and aviators—their services being retained for a specific period depending upon the exigencies of service.

Officers in senior positions should not be “marking time” till retirement. Why do lieutenant generals who are superseded immediately opt for retirement when their colleague becomes CJSC or COAS? lieutenant general (i.e., with two year’s service left) who have no chance of being promoted to the next rank when their senior colleague gets promoted to CJSC or COAS rank should also retire immediately. With slots opening for many down the line the “logjam” on promotions would not become a source of frustration. Their pride and self-respect prevents them from serving under someone junior to them. Do brigadiers and major generals lack in pride and self-respect? Till fairly recently superseded major generals stayed in the army even after their course-mates promoted to lieutenant general’s rank eventually retired. This travesty has only been corrected partially by having major generals retire simultaneously with their lieutenant general course-mates.

Now i dont know why senior officers like to retire when they are superseded, i think Mr Ikram should ask them the question himself, but then if go by this definition every Lieutenant or Captain who is superseded as he did not cleared him promotion exam should also leave the Army?!

Yes superseded officers may not be the shining stars of the Army but we should not forget that a Major was not promoted because he was considered unsuitable to take up the responsibilities that a Lt Col has to shoulder, but then he very well knows his job-the tasjs a major is supposed to execute. In the military due attention is given to "trained" personnel as the military has spent lots of money, time and effort on their training and would not like to lose them just like that. i hope people here can make the difference between a Soldier and a Trained Soldier!

We retire all superseded men at a certain point without taking what they could have deliver, ok, who is going to fill the void so created? People would say induct new officers, but they should keep in mind that there is hell of a difference between a 2/lt and a superseded Major Saab.


The military rely mostly on 'On Job' training. It sends its men through the rigors of experience by putting them against the odds at every step, rank and point of service. An officer who has not seen the work of an IO cant check/correct his junior IO, an officer who has not been an adjutant or quartermaster cant be guud company officer as he wouldnt know what an adjutant is supposed to do, hence he would know what to ask from the adjutant when he would be commanding a company at the frontline and the adjutant would be sitting away at the HQ, how would a company commander become a guud 2ic if has not spent time in a company roughing it out with his troops? An how guud would be that CO who became a CO without experiencing the responsibilities of the unit appointment?


Now as for giving executive powers to the 2ic, i must say that Mr Ikram has contradicted himself as he initially said that the 2ic helps the CO with his duties, meaning thereby that it is the 2ic who has the executive powers after the CO and not the adjutant. Though adjutant being the principle staff officer is fairly independent but he has to take blessings of the 2ic or for that matter the CO himself before he takes big decisions.

Yes, the CO appoints the 2ic but it is most of the time the senior most (field) officer in unit. i have yet to see a junior officer being appointed as a 2ic in the presence of a senior officer. In this way the officer is compelled to work even if he dont want to. BTW, speaking strictly, the Army recognized this problem of superseded officers not putting in their best because of the fact that they had nothing at stake and had taken measures to correct this phenomenon. Now what are those steps i would not be talking about them for the obvious reasons, but what i can tell you is that they have been quite effective. These methods are to provoke a superseded officer and make him work due to his self-motivation as opposed to ordering him to work. You may term it by 'showing a carrot' for better assimilation. Only those officers who have crossed this line for guud and now has burnt all of their ships can be termed as superseded and let me tell you that these are quite few in numbers. Various 'prized' slots have been made available for these (superseded) officers to reach where these officers are required to work harder, not only this but incentives in terms of postings, belated promotions, foreign tours and courses have been opened so that NO officer must think that he has been done with. Officers are rotated, posted and employed by the MS branch in such a manner that if they want to survive they have to work above the average or else they are penalized, but still if they are able to deliver as per the Army's requirements they are incentivised over those officers who are dheet enough not work even when they are being given a second chance. The Army has employed ways and means,both guud and bad to make 'lack of intrest' officers work above the average threshold and i am happy that it works, otherwise we used to see officers not quite behaving like officers in the past.

Mr Ikram also says that at brigade level officers aspiring for the brigadier rank should be the executive officers, i think i missed that fact that Division level the executive officer is the 'Colonel Staff' who is very much aspiring for the rank of brigadier and as an un written rule mostly makes a brigadier because the amount of responsibility that he shoulders during this appointment definitely needs to be 'rewarded' A similar system is in vogue at brigade level where a BM who is very much aspiring for the rank of a Lt Col is the next executive officer after the Brigade Commander.

he must ensure that no man in the fighting arms who does not have combat experience should be promoted past the rank of major. This army has fought many battles, and is still fighting them. Why should those who manipulated avoiding combat be considered for promotion? This will also ensure that braggarts who ”thrill” unknowing civilians by telling blatant lies about their so-called “combat experience” do not rise to critical senior positions.

Now this is a strange observation!!

i wonder what made Mr Ikram think like this?

Either Mr Ikram has not correctly analyzed the working of the Army or he was upto some mischief.

Officers who have served in battle prone areas have always been graded above than an officer who has not seen a battle. Why do you think there is a huge incentive in the Officers' OEI (Officer's Efficiency Index) for those who have served in Siachen, Wana, Swat, Kashmr, Balochistan etc etc??

It is only because of this fact that an officer who has not seen combat should be stopped from reaching the top slots that a hell lots of marks are added in the OEI of that officer who have fought wars and battle actively!! You dont even know what kind of incentives are being given to the Officers and Men who have participated in Op RR!! i would keep quite on this tll the time it hits the public domain.

BTW, speaking very frankly no officer can hoodwink the system and escape his employment from hard area and war zones (there are declared war zones in our country-make use of your imagination to find out where they are). It is mandatory for every officer, (with an emphasis of Every) that he has to serve in the hard area/war zone in almost every rank!! No one can escape this employment, only those get past this who are either Low Medical Category or are considered unfit! And then these officers also have to pay the price for it, because the promotion criteria in the Army is such that any officer who has not seen combat losses enough points that when he is pitch against another officer who has been in a war zone, he is simply dropped/superseded/not promoted because there is hell lot of a difference between the point of the two officers.

So let it not be the case where people should think that the Army is chariting promotions to just any officer!

This norm is there in the Army since the very start, i wonder how could the writer miss it? There is a specific section in every officer's bio data and dossier where he has to mention his battle record! And guess what who have seen combat feel very proud when they fill in that section. i wish i could tell you, in terms of points, the benefit that an officer who has fought and the loss that the other officer suffers, but i am not sure if i am crossing the line here.

This will also ensure that braggarts who ”thrill” unknowing civilians by telling blatant lies about their so-called “combat experience” do not rise to critical senior positions.

Lolz...how this be known to the officers sitting in the promotion board? And how on earth can this affect his promotion? Hats off to the writer!!

Some majors are “considered” for promotion but some are not. Those not even being “considered” should be retired forthwith.

Now this is new!!

i never knew that 'certain' officers are not even 'considered' for promotions!

Every officer is considered for promotion despite his standing in the Army, whether he makes it or not depends on his career record!

And guess what, Mr Ikarm failed to mention the weeding out procedure of the Army!

He failed to mention the Review Boards where the Officers are happily handed over LoTs (Letter of Thanks) because they are no more required in the Army! Officers who are considered a liability are kicked out ASAP with a THANKS!!

The present system is an inheritance of two centuries ago, it is not only illogical and incorrect, why subscribe to something that militates against human nature? Unless we abandon the practices of the 19th century, choosing pragmatism over tradition, how does one hope to create the military mindset necessary for the coming battles of the 21st century?

The writer is a defence and political

analyst. Email: isehgal@pathfinder9.com

19th-century mindset

The Army should be keeping up the pace to meet the challenges of the century and though the measures being taken might not be perfect and wholesome due to the obvious reasons but they are potent enough to cater for the eventualities of the future!

i for one would love to have a dedicated Accounts and IT Officer at every level but before this 'luxury' i would like to have officers on those slots which are of Operational Values and can be termed as priority ONE!

i hope you people know that our Army and the indian army is short of officers but they do maintain an hefty level to keep the military efficeint and war worthy.

You would definitely be surprised if you people can find out the number of officer authorized in a Unit as it is quite huge and each officer has its own dedicated job/task and responsibility, but then being a poor Nation we cant afford such 'luxuries' (which infact is not a luxury). We work double time to over come this shortage and are quite guud at it.

It sometimes make me wonder that at one side we cry over the expenditures and talk about luxuries and dream of a 25th century military but when we ask them to fulfill our basic requirement they shamelessly duck it out!!

They talk about Tiger Helis and UCAVs, (small) Recce Drones and GPS fitted wrist watches but when we ask for F-16s and HIMADS they start talking Greek!

Strange!

 

[fatman17]

xeric has alluded to many things but IMO, the heading of this article is "Misleading" - 19th century mindset - i mean what does this mean really? just because the army org. structure still uses words like ADC and 2IC instead of "executive officer XO", it is considered a 19th century mind-set!!!. these officers may be handling the exact work of a XO now-a-days, and i am quite sure they are doing other field/ops related matters other than just the accounts of the unit.

the other issues with officers who get superseded is the age factor!. take a major for example - generally if for whatever reason he does not get promoted by the time he is 40-45, he will get his LoT. i mean which army can afford "old unfit field officers". all-green has given example of his father who had medical issues and had to leave the army. there are many cases like him. being medicaly fit is very important.

now IMO opinion, i disagree with most as to what to do with "superseded" officers. the very word should give the officer a "hint" that he better pull his socks or else!

we should be grateful that in the PA, there is a Lt.Col as the CO with one 2IC, one Adjutant and his company commanders - compare that to the IA, where for many of the same reasons discussed here their unit commander is a Full Col and his 2IC is a LT.Col !!! - now i am not making a who's better comparison but the mere fact that the PA is doing its best to ensure that the "best officers" get the promotions esp in the strike corps which are the "core of the army".

officers need to be weeded out - its a fact of life - to the para-military, POF, NLC etc.

my father remained in the army till he felt that he was "fit enough" to command. he was wounded in the knee and lost some movement but he rehablitated himself to ensure he met the required criteria as long as he could. then he retired after 35 years of service (SSC).

 

[TaimiKhan]

People who have no knowledge of how army works or is structured, such kind of BS article & suggestions can be expected out of them. In the old days the army was all about practicality but now its studies & studies, course after course & the performance in these courses with practical soldiering gives you the chance to go up, if a Major or a Lt Col can't excel in every course or field it does not makes him to be outed or should quit the army. Many times these officers perform best & even excel their superior officers in the practical performance required in the field. Many times a young Lt Col isn't able to handle a situation on a unit level & he has to get the help or advice of the superseded older 2IC to resolve the situation. Many of these superseded officers are sent to the rangers or FC on deputations, where they perform exceptionally. These same officers are leading the FC & fighting with the army shoulder to shoulder. In my experience seen many superior officers doing blunders making them unfit or unworthy to be commanding brigades or divisions, but it does not means that all of them are incompetent.

Similarly, all the officers at junior levels having been not promoted does not make them incompetent or useless, these same officer perform exceptionally when time comes upon them.

 

[fatman17]

^every posting requires a different skill-set - some postings / jobs are more demanding then others - they require more thinking, others are physically demanding - it depends on the officers strength and weakness in these areas to excel or fail - all humans are not alike - introvert may prefer the thinking hat, extrovert may prefer the leading hat and so on - it dosnt mean one is superior to the other - its just the way we are!

 

[sonicboom]

People who have no knowledge of how army works or is structured, such kind of BS article & suggestions can be expected out of them.

The author of this article:

Mr. Ikram Sehgal, a graduate of the Pakistan Military Academy, served as a Major in the Pakistan Army before retiring in 1974. He is a prominent writer, a columnist, a defense analyst, author of several books (Recently ‘Power Play: Everything Under The Moon’, a set of seven books by Ikram Sehgal, were published), and Publisher and Managing Editor of Defence Journal (Pakistan).

Brig (retd) Mohammad Taj, SJ & Bar, who was Ikram Sehgal's Commanding Officer (44 Punjab, now 4 Sindh) during the 1971 war, is one of the most outstanding and brave soldiers that the Pakistan Army has ever produced, as well as of its most decorated officers. This gallant soldier praised Ikram Sehgal's bravery and velour as a soldier during battle. Brig Taj said that it was Sehgal and two other officers, Maj Gen (retd) Fahim Akhtar Khan and Maj (retd) Naseer Tariq, who saved the Sonohi Bridge near Chor which had almost fallen to India. That loss would have threatened Mirpurkhas and Hyderabad. In appreciation, Brig Taj said he had obtained permission from the GOC to grant battlefield promotion to Ikram Sehgal to the rank of Major on 13 Dec, 1971 and renamed the Delta Company as Sehgal Company. He said 38 years later this company still bears the name.

Brig (r) Saeed Ismat said he had known Sehgal since the beginning of his military career. He said Sehgal was the first military man to have a Company named after him, and was also a prisoner of war in 1971.

 

[blain2]

Folks,

Ikram sahib has earned his right to critique trends in the Army (which is different from criticizing the Army). He does so out of his passion for the Army having served in it.

 

[TaimiKhan]

The author of this article:

Mr. Ikram Sehgal, a graduate of the Pakistan Military Academy, served as a Major in the Pakistan Army before retiring in 1974. He is a prominent writer, a columnist, a defense analyst, author of several books (Recently ‘Power Play: Everything Under The Moon’, a set of seven books by Ikram Sehgal, were published), and Publisher and Managing Editor of Defence Journal (Pakistan).

Brig (retd) Mohammad Taj, SJ & Bar, who was Ikram Sehgal's Commanding Officer (44 Punjab, now 4 Sindh) during the 1971 war, is one of the most outstanding and brave soldiers that the Pakistan Army has ever produced, as well as of its most decorated officers. This gallant soldier praised Ikram Sehgal's bravery and velour as a soldier during battle. Brig Taj said that it was Sehgal and two other officers, Maj Gen (retd) Fahim Akhtar Khan and Maj (retd) Naseer Tariq, who saved the Sonohi Bridge near Chor which had almost fallen to India. That loss would have threatened Mirpurkhas and Hyderabad. In appreciation, Brig Taj said he had obtained permission from the GOC to grant battlefield promotion to Ikram Sehgal to the rank of Major on 13 Dec, 1971 and renamed the Delta Company as Sehgal Company. He said 38 years later this company still bears the name.

Brig (r) Saeed Ismat said he had known Sehgal since the beginning of his military career. He said Sehgal was the first military man to have a Company named after him, and was also a prisoner of war in 1971.

Well, that would be my bad as i should have remember Ikram Sb, as at one time i used to read his managed Defence Journal Magazine very keenly which many times contained his bio-data, i guess am getting old now

But still, such kind of suggestion & criticism coming from a person of such stature is shocking as everyone on this planet knows that no organization in the world can have just the best & filter out the rest. Becoz once an org gets filled up of the best, then what ?? All can't become the head of organization, all can't become generals or brigadiers. Sword of Honor is won by one not by many. Organizations have a pyramid structure where one or just few reach the top. If you fill all with the best, they all won't go up, again people left out will become dishearted & their efficiency to do work will go down, then what kick them out too ?? Who is then gonna do the dirty jobs not liked by everyone ??