Bilal Khan (Quwa)
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IMO the entire paramilitary thing is inefficient.The Pakistan coast guard isn’t our coast guard force, it’s the PMSA, it’s not a burden on anything but a very necessary force. The PCG (which FYI is a branch of another force and not an independent, this means it doesn’t have its own budget either) is just a coast guard in name, all the usual tasks of the coast guard of a nation fall under our PMSA. Please look up their roles and legal position. Bottom line is, there is only one coast guard force in Pakistan, and that’s the PMSA. It is and will remain significantly more important for us than The marines and the coast guard and it makes a lot of sense to put money into it.
And why exactly should we take funding away from the army, which is trained and equipped to do exactly all of this, and give it to the marines, which will not only be less effective in fully land based ops in Sindh than the army, but will also need significantly more money to train and plan for what the army already has been doing for decades.
That’s why this proposal makes absolutely no sense. If anything disbanding the marines and giving their funding to the navy makes more sense in our case because we have no amphibious assaults or invasions planned (simply because they’re impossible).
Not to mention it’ll just create another force that’ll have zero synergy with all the other forces and just get in their way. Why make two forces both of which will now do a half assed job instead of investing properly in one? Who’ll give us the money to give the marines tanks, APCs and IFVs when the army itself struggles to afford them?
Be realistic for once, the marines are perfectly fine as they are, covering their limited AOR near Sir creek and the Arabian region. They’ve already been significantly expanded and re-equipped recently anyways, and that process is continuing further as the navy grows.
I think the right model is to collapse the Rangers, FC, etc, into a 'National Guard' that operates as a reserve of the Army. Basically, an appendage to the Army that reports under GHQ, but with very specific mandates. These mandates can include COIN/CT, internal security, border control, etc.
I understand that the MoI's role on this is basically on paper and that, functionally speaking, the paramilitary forces operate under GHQ. However, the bureaucracy on paper is still creating an unnecessary mess. If we follow the US model of placing a united National Guard under the Army directly, we could achieve a lot of synergy -- e.g. COs, JCOs and NCOs can transition back-and-forth; common equipment (including MRAPs, helicopters, etc); tighter coordination when involving artillery and armour, drone use and so on.
My suspicion is that if we take the "efficient" approach, it results in fewer socio-economic opportunities for the less well-off. For our leaders, stuffing people into various public sector jobs (be it bureaucracy or paramilitary) is easier than worrying about developing the economy. If done right, you wouldn't need more than 100,000 well-equipped and trained soldiers in the National Guard, for example. You couple that with an 'Air Reserve Force' under the PAF with turboprop COIN/CT aircraft, drones, airlifters, etc, then it's a wrap IMO.
We technically have a precedent for this approach: the Maritime Security Agency. It basically is an appendage to the Pakistan Navy but carries out specific functions related to policing waters and so on. The Marines are another branch within that overall framework. The PN is likely still learning or grasping the value of their Marines would be, so it'll be a while before we see it "click" and roll them with the exact right equipment.