‘Pak army more anti-American than radical’

[third eye]

Plain talking.... but a 100 yrs war is way out. this is not the 16th Century.


‘Pak army more anti-American than radical’ | | DAWN.COM


Dr. Stephen Philip Cohen, a senior fellow at the Brookings Institute, Washington DC, is a respected authority on the Pakistani army and the country’s politics. His book The Pakistan Army was published in 1998 and was translated into Urdu and Chinese. In 2004, he published another book The Idea of Pakistan. In an exclusive interview with Dawn.com, Dr. Cohen speaks about the Pakistan-US relationship and the future of South Asia after the Osama bin Laden crisis.

Q: Who do the Americans hold responsible for harbouring Osama bin Laden: The Pakistani civilian government or the army?

A: The US military respects the Pakistan army for its professionalism but they are angry with the Pakistani military for playing both sides against the middle. They are aware that if you’re an American soldier and the Afghan Taliban who are shooting at you are actually the ones being supported and trained in Pakistan. So, there is real anger with the Pakistan army over this double game. I can understand why they are playing this double game as the Taliban are an asset for Pakistan but the Americans do not like this. There is also deep resentment over some of the policies the army has imposed on the civilian government.

Q: How old is the history of collaboration in the Pakistan army with the Islamic radicals?

A: It dates back to the Bangladesh separatist movement when the army recruited people for al Badar and its death squads. It became more systematic during Zia’s government both in Kashmir and Afghanistan. Now, it is a full-fledged strategic alliance for the Pakistan military.

Q: The Pakistanis complain that dictatorship and Islamic radicalisation were actually gifted to them by the United States. What has compelled the US to support military rulers in Pakistan?

A: The US has needed Pakistan for strategic purposes. Our policies have done as much harm to Pakistan as they have helped the country. We could have supported them but put more pressure to liberalise and democratise the society. The Bush administration made a strategic mistake by supporting Pervez Musharraf and excluding the other politicians. We should have supported Benazir Bhutto or Nawaz Sharif. The US did support a deal between Musharraf and Bhutto but excluded Sharif. We should have come out and said publicly that we support all the legitimate politicians in Pakistan.

Q: Do you think the Pakistan army can ever overcome its obsession with India? How can the US help both the countries resolve this conflict?

A: I am writing a book about the India-Pakistan rivalry and calling it the “hundred-year old war”. My prediction is that the India-Pakistan conflict, which includes Kashmir besides many other problems, will last for one hundred years or even more.

I am very pessimistic about a solution between the two countries. They should cooperate over trade, for instance. Kashmir will eventually find its way. The United States should have only a silent role which should be limited to providing ideas and suggestions as we often do in the Middle East peace process.

Q: Does Osama bin Laden’s killing formally end the war on terror?

A: I don’t know if it was a murder or not but maybe it was an extrajudicial killing. Yet, it does not bring the war on terror to an end. Al Qaeda is a large global movement and it will continue to operate. It has diminished not only in terms of its organisational capability but also in terms of its symbolism. There will be major terrorist attacks on Pakistan, United States, India and other countries.

The notion of having a global Khalifat, where the whole world is united under one Khalifa is fanciful. That was not popular in Pakistan some years back. The anti-Americanism popular in Pakistan is based on the misunderstanding of American policies and some of the things that we have done in the past.

Q: Is it anti-Americanism or anti-Indianism that motivates radical elements in the Pakistan army?

A: I don’t have evidence of Pakistan army as radical in the extreme sense. However, it has become more anti-American. Some sections of the army are more anti-American than they are anti-India. The obsession with India, on the other hand, is weakening Pakistan rather than strengthening it. Pakistan has a huge list of reforms that it should have made.

In a talk at Quetta’s Staff College, I said Pakistan should take a lesson from South Korea and Japan which had their own way of taking revenge through economic productivity. Pakistan should struggle to beat India in the software industry, modern agriculture and exports.

Pakistan has had natural advantages over India in many areas but it has failed to capitalise on those advantages. I do not know if it is too late to reverse that process but if Pakistan continues to make India the center of its foreign policy, the country will go nowhere.

Q: There is a lot of resentment inside Pakistan over the drone strikes which many view as a violation of the country’s sovereignty. Can anti-Americanism subside if these attacks stop?

A: We know from the WikiLeaks that the Pakistanis themselves are helping us with the targets. It’s astonishing that the Pakistan government has not said this publicly. The government is too much of a coward to openly admit that some of the drone strikes have killed the enemies of Pakistan. If the Pakistani army and police had taken action against the terrorists, the drone strikes would probably not take place. Every state in the world has an obligation not to allow its territory to be used for terrorist attacks on other states. Pakistan has allowed groups to operate from its territory to launch attacks against the US, Afghanistan and of course India.

Q: How serious is the crisis in Pakistan and how can the world help Pakistan overcome this?

A: There are two things requiring attention: The State of Pakistan, which is mostly bureaucratic, and the idea of Pakistan. The United States can help the State of Pakistan in many ways by developing its organisational and budgetary procedures but we can’t do much about the idea of Pakistan. Pakistanis themselves have to discuss and debate what it means to be a Pakistani. If being anti-India is being a Pakistani then you are taking the crisis deeper but if you are looking for a modern Islamic state that rest of the world should look upon then that is a different definition of Pakistan.

Q: Do you think the Pakistan army will eventually move with another coup?

A: I don’t see a coup coming in Pakistan. There is this joke in America that when Obama got elected, some newspapers wrote: “Black man gets worst job in the US”. Who wants to be the president of Pakistan? Zardari is doing a mediocre job. I doubt if General Kayani can do a better job as the president. Pakistan is currently pressed and embarrassed with many issues. Another military coup will simply make things worse for that country.

Q: How do you predict the scenario once the US withdraws from Afghanistan?

A: The US will stay in Afghanistan to a limited degree to make sure that al Qaeda does not show up again. A significant development program is going on in Afghanistan which is more effective than our development work in Pakistan. There is no economic and strategic interest for the US in Afghanistan. It is important because it is having a contaminating effect on Pakistan.

Q: How serious is the tug of war between Pakistan and India to gain political and economic influence in Afghanistan?

A: The good news I have heard is that both the countries are going to talk about Afghanistan. If both the countries can work on an agreement as to what role they should play in Afghanistan to help the Afghan people then that will be a role model for the United States and Iran. The four countries — United States, Pakistan, Iran and India — are critical for the future of Afghanistan. They should agree to have a non-aligned democratic, but certainly not a radicalised, Afghanistan. I am optimistic that the Indians and Pakistanis will work together in Afghanistan.

Q: The right-wing opposition leaders are suggesting that Pakistan should stop getting aid from the United States. Is that going to help Pakistan attain more prosperity and self-reliance?

A: Pakistan should develop its own strategy to develop its industry and agriculture. It has to work out with India on the agreements over Indus waters and also work among its provinces. I want to see a business-like transactional relationship between the United States and Pakistan. The Pakistanis should tell the US what and why they need assistance in certain areas. Once we commit our aid, the US should work as if we are under a contract and if the Pakistanis perform effectively, we should provide them further aid on time.

 

[muse]

Thank you for posting this fascinating wide ranging interview - a couple of items of interest, 1. that the Pakistani armed forces now maintain what the US thinks constitutes a "strategic alliance" with Islamist radicals and curiously 2. that the US imagines that prescriptions such as "The Pakistanis should tell the US what and why they need assistance in certain areas. Once we commit our aid, the US should work as if we are under a contract and if the Pakistanis perform effectively, we should provide them further aid on time", will actually pass muster with the public --- not disputing that Pakistan needs the aid, but the public does not just despise the idea of aid from the US, it hates the idea and it has now caught the imagination of politicians.

It's really incredible how screwed up this so called relationship is --- it seems neither the Pakistanis nor the US are anywhere close to realizing how close to the precipice they both are with each other ---- and perhaps that's best for both of them. But will not Islamism take the day without the US? Quite the opposite, Islamism needs the US, without the US, Islamism will be unable to play on passion, and in fact, will have to moderate itself, to make sense, to survive.

On the notion of a neutral Afghanistan - this is in fact in the interest of all parties, especially the Afghans themselves, to my thinking the US is not relevant, as Dr. Cohen points out There is no economic and strategic interest for the US in Afghanistan. It is important because it is having a contaminating effect on Pakistan. --- Again , note the US optimism that it can be considered as "central" to Pakistanis - Dr.Cohen does have a valid point about the Afghan effort being in effect about Pakistan - but Pakistan is lost to the US, it is only through conspiracy and proxy force of arms through the oppression of the Pakistan armed forces on their own populace, that the US maintains a dominance in Pakistani affairs - how much longer will this last? My own take, not very long at all - and of course I say this because the public opinion is now such that the idea of the Eisenhower USA, is now no longer even imaginable - it will go from bad to worse for the US in Pakistan and really in other places as well ---- Dr, Cohen says that the Pakistan armed forces has played both sides against the middle, an echo of the pot calling the kettle black.

Is a neutral Afghanistan possible? not as long as the US sits in Afghanistan, no Sir, it's not. Isn't that arrogant to say?? No Sir, it's realistic - Pakistan do not now and will not in the future, find themselves in a position to trust US policy in Afghanistan or India or Iran - in fact, the counter revolutionaries of the so called Arab world, are united in the finding that while the US postures in anti-Iranian tirades and sanctions, it is Iran that is central to US policy of chaos and destabilization in the Middle East' and the counter revolutionaries now realize their time is limited and they have been betrayed, and only tributes of Billions of Dollars can save their thrones for a while longer -- all the while the populations of the so called Arab world find the ideas emanating from Iran to be compelling, all the while it's not just the political but the concept of Islam anchored in Modernity, in the upholding of the expression of Rights of God in the championing of universal Human Rights. The US policy makers imagine that Muslims anchored in Modernity means tethered to the US, these policy makers could not be wrong.

A new era is struggling to be born and it will suffer greatly, at the hands of armed forces supported by the US and alternately by radical Islamist literalists - Will that Muslim world be as antithetical to the US?? Depends whether they will be able to distinguish US from Israel --- and in Pakistan? India will never be a Israel, in Pakistan, it is only the armed forces and their Islamist allies who can use the bogey of India to define Pakistan, as merely "not India" and "arabized".

Will the Pakistan armed forces be able to devise their relevance to Pakistan and the region, as a cornerstone of public confidence, as an expression of the values and will of the Pakistani nation and state, whose territorial boundaries are fixed but whose moral and ethical appeal will know not boundaries?? After all, Pakistan ka Mutbal Kya, has multiplicity of answers seeking expression in an open universe.

100 years of war? The US should be so lucky -- The Pakistan armed forces, particularly the Army, have not exactly earned a reputation as visionaries -- but that does not mean they are ineducable -- Pakistan's chronic weaknesses, it's economy and it's political fragility are twins, the Pakistan army has been slow to realize this, but it's clear that it does realize this - so where's the disconnect? Pakistan is also know as the graveyard of economic experiments, if it's leftist, if it's Islamist, if it's Utopian, if it's welfare , if it's monopoly based market economy, Pakistan has has experimented and failed in these attempts, and the record is clear in the Ayub khan and Musharraf period, Pakistan experienced solid economic growth - Armed forces by training are conservative institutions, and 2 plus 2 equals 4, appeals to the sober, a a good number among them also military, perhaps something politicians with a populist bent may keep in mind, after all, 2 plus 2 equals 4, also appeals to the good sense of the common folk.

 

[Black Widow]

funny isn't it????? there are many Army generals who are on US payroll... During Russo-Afghan war, their kids use to fill there bags with American taxpayer money... (Based on Nazam Sethi and Imran khan interview on You-tube)

their Kids were funded by American taxpayer.. Its not apt to say that PAK army is anti american, or may be they hate america but love their taxpayer's dollars...

 

[Malik Usman]

Another Crap Artilce brought by some Indian against Pakistan.........................Who wrote this even don't have any khowlege.......How come Talibans can be Asset for Pakistan.............Taliban resides in Northern Areas of Pakistan and they are only 2% of Pakistani Population Which is 180 Million.......and then you can divide Talibans in two groups one is exterim and one is not and whichi is exterim that is around 0.2% out of that 2% and now tell me how they can be Asset for Pakistan.

 

[RazorMC]

Excerpts from the article:

1- It dates back to the Bangladesh separatist movement when the army recruited people for al Badar and its death squads. It became more systematic during Zia’s government both in Kashmir and Afghanistan. Now, it is a full-fledged strategic alliance for the Pakistan military.
2- The four countries — United States, Pakistan, Iran and India — are critical for the future of Afghanistan.

These are the two things that I don't agree with. In the first point, Cohen has conveniently forgotten to mention the American involvement with the Mujahideen and their dependence on the ISI for logistical support.

In the second, he wrongly points out that India is critical for Afghanistan's future. It does not share a border with Afghanistan, hardly speaks any of the languages and has a completely different social system. One is consevative while the other is more liberal.
The US will be critical till the war is completely over. After that Afghanistan might not be as important to the US, which is too large a country and with its own problems.
Iran may have some role to play in Afghanistan and obviously has interests in the region.

PS: wonderful post by muse.

 

[Conqueror]

For Pakistanis, American has taken the place which once India used to keep. Just like you cannot be a Pro-Pakistani and Pro-Indian at the same time, you cannot be Pro-American and Pro-Pakistan at once.

Pakistani Soldiers are Pro-Pakistan first and this defines they would be Anti-India, Anti-America and Anti-other-enemies of Pakistan.

 

[muse]

Friends:


It's important to keep in mind that Dr. Cohen is a distinguished scholar, and that as serious people, we need to review his comments with certainly a critical frame of mind but also with sobriety and civility - emotional posts take the quality of "venting" and prevent readers from appreciating your important perspective.

Dr. Cohen suggests that when it comes to Pakistan and India, that the US play a the kind of role it plays between Israel and the Arabs, that is to say, that the US actively discourage the possibility of a peaceful, mutually agreed upon, solution --- Can the US do this successfully, that is to say, can the US ensure that Pakistan and India do not arrive at any resolution to their problem ?

To my reading, yes it can - allow me to expand on this - Pakistan needs a resolution, so that it can more easily move past, to put the conflicts with India in the past and unless it can do that, it will find her resources and political will misdirected, away from development and human capital development, into expensive pursuits that will contribute to disequilibrium in domestic politics and more dangerously, justification for dangerous social phenomena (read, Islamists)

India, need resolution for very different reasons - given the stellar performance of the Indian economy, given the will to craft legislation that removes roadblocks from the domestic private sector and holds the socialist (read populist) imperative at bay - India can afford to maintain an incredibly large number of soldiers in captive Kashmir and along the Pakistan border - however, Indian ambitions are focused on regional and global roles, the on going struggle, diminish Indian credentials and whether Islamism is finally defeated in Pakistan or not, the affinity and call to action will not lose their malignant character, unless there is mutually acceptable resolution.

So How can the US play spoiler, even as it makes noises to suggest that it is working towards mutually acceptable resolution (need evidence: See US role in bringing peace between Israel and the Arabs and yolu may begin to understand Dr. Cohen's "100 years of war") - Because Pakistan and India cannot establish normalcy, this allows outside powers to play a role, for good or bad, between them --- and reality is that calculations in India suggest to them that time is on their side, that Pakistan is rotten from the inside and will ultimately come to the Indian, on bended knee -- this calculation may be right, but there is little in precedence to suggest we should take it seriously.

So, What can Pakistan and India do to move past these problems? and in doing so, liberate themselves of the US?

 

[Respect4Respect01]

oh its this same anti-Pakistani indian, im outta here

 

[GUNS-N- ROSES]

Friends:


It's important to keep in mind that Dr. Cohen is a distinguished scholar, and that as serious people, we need to review his comments with certainly a critical frame of mind but also with sobriety and civility - emotional posts take the quality of "venting" and prevent readers from appreciating your important perspective.

Dr. Cohen suggests that when it comes to Pakistan and India, that the US play a the kind of role it plays between Israel and the Arabs, that is to say, that the US actively discourage the possibility of a peaceful, mutually agreed upon, solution --- Can the US do this successfully, that is to say, can the US ensure that Pakistan and India do not arrive at any resolution to their problem ?

To my reading, yes it can - allow me to expand on this - Pakistan needs a resolution, so that it can more easily move past, to put the conflicts with India in the past and unless it can do that, it will find her resources and political will misdirected, away from development and human capital development, into expensive pursuits that will contribute to disequilibrium in domestic politics and more dangerously, justification for dangerous social phenomena (read, Islamists)

India, need resolution for very different reasons - given the stellar performance of the Indian economy, given the will to craft legislation that removes roadblocks from the domestic private sector and holds the socialist (read populist) imperative at bay - India can afford to maintain an incredibly large number of soldiers in captive Kashmir and along the Pakistan border - however, Indian ambitions are focused on regional and global roles, the on going struggle, diminish Indian credentials and whether Islamism is finally defeated in Pakistan or not, the affinity and call to action will not lose their malignant character, unless there is mutually acceptable resolution.

So How can the US play spoiler, even as it makes noises to suggest that it is working towards mutually acceptable resolution (need evidence: See US role in bringing peace between Israel and the Arabs and yolu may begin to understand Dr. Cohen's "100 years of war") - Because Pakistan and India cannot establish normalcy, this allows outside powers to play a role, for good or bad, between them --- and reality is that calculations in India suggest to them that time is on their side, that Pakistan is rotten from the inside and will ultimately come to the Indian, on bended knee -- this calculation may be right, but there is little in precedence to suggest we should take it seriously.

So, What can Pakistan and India do to move past these problems? and in doing so, liberate themselves of the US?

let me congratulate u sir on a wonderfull post. u have raised several important points.

wat is the interest of US in solving indo pak conflict? i think none. US only wants to keep the animosity between india and pakistan to an acceptable level.

under the present scenariao, Is indian leadership strong enough to stand rigours of domestic politics and make peace with pakistan by solving all disputes including kashmir? yes, it will be difficult but i think indian leadership is strong enough to do it.

can pakistani leadership take the same decision? no.

can india and pakistan solve their problems by themselves. i think they can but for that some confidence building measures need to be taken.

The following steps can be taken by india :

Assure pakistan that consulates in Afganistan wont be used against pakistan and back up that claim with some hard work.
Share samjhauta blasts findings (already being done).
cut down verbal attacks on PA and ISI.
Propose Mutual troop reduction along border so PA can concentrate on internal operations
Discuss all issues including Kashmir and find out a solution acceptable to all three parties.

The following steps can be taken by Pak :

Close down terror support networks.
Faster prosecution of 26/11 culprits.
Stop thinking india is enemy number 1. its the terrorism which is taking its toll.

 

[muse]

wat is the interest of US in solving indo pak conflict? i think none. US only wants to keep the animosity between india and pakistan to an acceptable level.

under the present scenariao, Is indian leadership strong enough to stand rigours of domestic politics and make peace with pakistan by solving all disputes including kashmir? yes, it will be difficult but i think indian leadership is strong enough to do it.

can pakistani leadership take the same decision? no.

I hope more and more people will come to the realization that it's important to see what the US does not what it says -- and when the US says it's working for "peace" between Pakistan and India, it's time to go seriously conservative on choices for your portfolio --

Now with regard to political will -- well, that's really complicated, because many Pakistanis and Indians, let alone foreigners, do not allow for the realization that there are a multiplicity of stake holders in these two societies - unlike some of the societies in the neighborhood, these two societies are very complex, it's not just politicians, bureaucrats, media, armed forces but also the varieties of stake holders in the general public, be they ethnic, religious, linguistic -- so I am circumspect when looking at the subject of political will --- we know now that peace between Pakistan and India was possible in the last year of the Musharraf regime only to be waylaid, deprived of political oxygen, given the lawyers movement.

 

[muse]

Indian friends - what's the messages in the piece below, published in the Hindu -- it should allow readers to consider the degree to which the US is working for "peace" , after all, whose interests are being served aqnd just exactly what are those interests and why do India and Pakistan and now even Afghanistan, need to serve them:




India and the U.S. moving closer on Afghanistan?


The U.S. and India are getting more interested in negotiations with the Afghan Taliban. Their evolving policies could benefit from closer U.S.-India consultations, and from backchannel India-Pakistan talks on Afghanistan.

In the weeks since the dramatic U.S. raid on Abbottabad that killed Osama bin Laden, the signs point to a subtle shift in the way both India and the United States are looking at Afghanistan's future. The U.S. interest in negotiations that include the Afghan Taliban grows steadily stronger; India's willingness to work with an Afghanistan where Taliban share in power has also grown. The Afghan dance India has initiated cannot be completed without some additional Pakistan steps.

U.S. interest in negotiations with the Taliban has been taking shape for the past six months at least. The late Richard Holbrooke championed a “reintegration” programme to bring Taliban foot soldiers into the government's tent. He spoke of the U.S. preference for “Afghan-led reconciliation,” focussing on Taliban figures who were prepared to eschew violence and break with al-Qaeda. His successor, Marc Grossman, a less flamboyant but more systematic diplomat, has made creating a real negotiating option his priority. The first crisis of his tenure, the Ray Davis affair that convulsed U.S.-Pakistan relations from January through March 2011, nearly closed down communications between the United States and Pakistan. The U.S. administration has long believed that it cannot achieve a satisfactory outcome in Afghanistan without Pakistani cooperation. The poisonous relations between the U.S. and Pakistani security establishments over the Davis affair made that goal much harder to achieve — but arguably more important.

The adjustments in India's policy toward Afghanistan were on public display when Prime Minister Manmohan Singh visited Kabul on May 12-13. Two key points stood out. One struck a familiar note: his commitment to an additional $500 million in civilian aid, with a broad portfolio of humanitarian, infrastructure, and institutional development projects. He also renewed India's commitment to provide training for Afghanistan's police, an important potential contribution to security.

The new feature of Manmohan Singh's visit to Kabul lay in his good wishes for Afghanistan's “process of national reconciliation,” code for negotiations with the Taliban. He stressed India's commitment to seeing Afghanistan at peace with its neighbours. This is the most authoritative and explicit statement to date that India will accept a negotiating process in which Taliban participate. The Prime Minister's declaration that Osama's death created a “new situation” further evidenced India's interest in helping shape a peaceful future with Afghanistan.

The United States, trying to rescue a working relationship with Pakistan from the wreckage of the Davis and Osama episodes, received Manmohan Singh's Kabul message warmly. Washington has long supported India's economic contribution to Afghanistan. Now, Washington is looking more warmly on India's broader training offers — not just for new parliamentarians and the Afghan election commission, but also in the more sensitive area of policing. The U.S. is gingerly moving toward a greater consciousness of the regional dimension in shaping Afghanistan's future.

But the most difficult piece of this regional puzzle is Pakistan. Like it or not, geography and history make it an essential participant in working out the future modus vivendi among the major Afghan players. Pakistan's goal is to freeze India out. India's new message treats Pakistan with more care and subtlety than the old one: Manmohan Singh's Kabul speeches referred repeatedly to the importance of peace with all Afghanistan's neighbours, and the latest statements come against the background of some modest progress in economic talks between India and Pakistan. But the Pakistani press, especially its more nationalist members, zeroed in on Indian statements in Kabul that appeared to be code words for keeping Pakistan at arm's length.

India's Afghan dance has had a promising beginning, though there will be difficult passages ahead. Two moves could improve its chances of success over the long term. The first is a significant deepening of U.S.-Indian dialogue on Afghanistan, including not just economics but also politics and security. This is especially important at a time when the U.S. and Pakistan are trying to recalibrate their relationship, with Secretary of State Hillary Clinton's just-concluded visit to Islamabad.

The second would be to add Afghanistan to the agenda for backchannel talks with Pakistan, should that channel reopen. This is a tough assignment. Pakistanis, deeply suspicious about Indian activities in Afghanistan, question the value of such talks without a general improvement in Indo-Pakistan relations. They spurned the suggestion the Indian Foreign Secretary made earlier this year that the issue be added to the resumed India-Pakistan dialogue. But a back channel effort, out of public view, might in time strengthen prospects for peace among all three countries.

(Teresita and Howard Schaffer are former U.S. ambassadors, with long years of service in South Asia. They are co-founders of southasiahand.com. Howard Schaffer teaches at Georgetown University; Teresita Schaffer is a nonresident senior fellow at Brookings Institution.)