Bhutto in the Forn' Ministry, Gen Musa as the Chief and his senior staff at GHQ should have planned and advised the President on the pros and cons. It is mindboggling to learn that Gen Musa had not kept NHQ and AHQ posted. GHQ was feeling rather too bold after the success in the Rann of Kutch. Bhutoo definitely misled all about the diplomatic front, US support and support under CENTO and SEATO.
Air Marshall Sharbat Ali Changezi was the liaison officer for during that time, He is a witness that General Musa did keep the AHQ posted. One of Ayub Khans biggest mistakes was to remove the Air-force chief Asgher Khan and replace him with Nur Khan, who was not the right man for the job. These false acquisitions were made by a specific somewhat "self-promoting" officer...
Let me write down the exact reason: (This is from his book)
"The then Foreign Minister, Zulfiqar Ali Bhutto and Foreign Secretary, Aziz Ahmed. spurred on by Major Akhtar Hussain Malik (Commander of the troops in Azad Kashmir), pressed the Government to take advantage of the disturbed situation in the Kashmir Valley and direct the Army to send raiders into Indian held Kashmir for conducting guerrilla activities there to help, on a long-term basis, the locals in organizing a movement with a view to eventually start an movement with a view to eventually start an uprising against the occupying power."
"I had this proposal examined by my staff in the GHQ, We agreed that something positive should be done to de-freeze the Kashmir issue and that, with this aim in view, the people of Kashmir could feasibly be helped to keep up the agitation to the extent they could be by themselves. Morally and legally, it was justifiable. But they should not be encouraged to step it up beyond their capacity to sustain it on their own, nor embark on any other provocative move in a hurry."
Followup post inbound:
"In the first place, adequate preperations had not been made in the valley to star guerrilla activity, We had not even apprised the local Pro-Pakistan leaders of our intention and plan of action, nor ascertained from them whether they would be willing to, and could, help us in any way. Despite the unrest there, they wouldn't be able to co-operate with the freedom fighters sent from Azad-Kashmir to the extent necessary due to the deployment, in strategic ares, of nearly 5 Indian Infantry divisions and strong civil armed forces. Without their assistance, the proposed raids by the Foreign office would very likely fizzle out, since we would not be able to maintain the raiding parties logistically from the West, or Azad Kashmir, particularly if they succeeded in penetrating their target ares in the interior, north and south of Srinagar.
Secondly, our intervention in Kashmir would lead to a general war. In complete disregard of international law and moral scruples, India would go to the extreme limit against Pakistan in order to save Kashmir, besides fighting for every inch of the disputed State itself, It would be idle to nurse the illusion that she would not embark on that course, The armed forces would, ofcourse fight to the bitter end, if needed, but it was not prudent to reply, too heavily, on their qualitative superiority in an all-out conflict with a numerically superior enemy. Quantitatively too, they should be augmented so as to give them a fair chance of taking on the adversary under those conditions. We didn't have even half of what India had in Military strength, which was the minimum requirement to defend Pakistan, in a full-scale war successfully and press on with our commitments in Kashmir, simultaneously, taking into account the great likely hood of getting deeply involved in Kashmir at that time, due to the proposed guerrilla activity than might be necessary in the event of open hostilities breaking out between the two countries in other circumstances."
"It might be known that, after the Rann of Kutch battle, the GHQ had proposed that the Army be augmented by two Infantry divisions, to improve the unfavourable military equation between the two opposing land forces. We should have waited atleast till these formations were raised. First, the Ministry of Finance spurned our proposal to raise new divisions. Then those who controlled the Ministry of Foreign Affairs were not convince that Preliminary preparations for starting an insurgent movement were unavoidable, and did not believe that India would use deep raids in disputed territory as a reason for escalating a wider war for the sake of Kashmir. The statement in the Government White Paper, on Jammu and Kashmir published by Bhutto's Government, that on 12 March, 1965, the Foreign Minister addressed a letter to the President saying "India is not at present in a position to risk a general war of unlimited duration for the annihilation of Pakistan" also throws light on their thinking on this matter.
The policy makers thwarted the professional assessment and advice on a matter having grave Military implications because of their miscalculation of the Politicio-Strategic situation and the over ambitiousness of a few individuals involved in decision making who were prompted by their desire to achieve some quick and spectacular results in Kashmir by clandestine Operations."
I do not understand why people think that the Military proposed Operation Gibraltar and Grand-slam. This should be very clear to you all now.
Strategically, yes.
But a force which was not even half the size nor military might of the enemy achieving a stalemate is something to be proud of. In this way, I think that the 65 war was a Victory.
Bhutto underestimated India's reaction, and was over ambitious.
But then again, that is what happens when you give Military decisions to a bunch of incompetent Politicians.
Gen Musa as the Chief and his senior staff at GHQ should have planned and advised the President on the pros and cons
"I asked Mister Farooqi, Principal Secretary to the President, who was also present that he should also breif the President on the stand we had taken in the discussions. Further, to ensure that the President knew our views, I sent him a note, the following morning, which I gave a summary of the points we had raised the previous evening . He returned it with a remark in his own handwriting, that he agreed with the GHQ".
Nope, "WAJIDALIS".
I'd strongly recommend you read it to find out what really happened in the 1965 war.
