OP-ED: The near future direction of the armed forces

[Armchair]

A good read about the future would be Alvin Toffler's "The Third Wave". The IT revolution will forever change warfare and society as we know it. Those that stay behind will lose big. Quoting a book that touches upon the same:

"If this is true and keeping in mind the drastic changes that took place with the industrial revolution, the world seems ripe for another major perhaps cataclysmic event. What this implies for warfare: just as war drastically changed from the agricultural to the industrial age, and those who were unable to progress to the new wave (including the Muslim world) were defeated, humiliated and consigned to subservience, a new Third Wave will again drastically change the social, political, economic and military structure of the world.

Those countries that are unable to adapt, to progress, to the new circumstances will suffer just as the Red Indians, Muslims, Indians, Chinese and much of the non-Western world suffered from the Second Wave. Let us consider the implication of this Third Wave to warfare, but before that, we define the importance of air defense within defense policy to better grasp the vital implication of air defense in the future."

Airpower is of course critical to all kinds of future war endeavors. Yet, the direction of air power is reaching a breaking point, a period of instability, both because of technological development, and in terms of the life cycle of weapon systems:

"
In a seminal book titled The Future of War: Power, Technology, and American World Dominance in the 21st Century, the authors George and Meredith Friedman argued that each category of strategic weapon systems have a life-cycle and noted that stealth manned aircraft, the pinnacle today of combat aircraft, represented a point of decline and senility for combat aircraft. The Friedmans argue that strategic weapons systems can be considered on the basis of a list of eight points. These eight points determine what stage a weapon system is in its lifecycle between strategically significant and “senile” or obsolete systems. They define a strategically significant weapon as “one that brings force to bear in such a way that it decisively erodes the war-making capability of the enemy,” while a senile weapon is defined as “the primary strategic function of the weapon has been obscured by the need to construct expensive defenses against threats to the weapons platform.” They conclusively show through the historical record that strategic weapons systems have this lifecycle. They conclude that stealth manned aircraft along with aircraft carriers have reached a point of senility. Augustine’s Law Number 16 also suggests that there must be a peak and then eventually a break in aircraft acquisition costs.

Norman Augustine is one of the most respected thinkers in the US defense industry. He came up with a list of tongue-in-cheek laws based on his life-long experience in the US defense industry in some of the top positions. In Law 16 he suggests that the cost of combat aircraft increase exponentially while the budget for them increases linearly. He expresses this in a humorous manner:
In the year 2054, the entire defense budget will purchase just one aircraft. This aircraft will have to be shared by the Air Force and Navy 3½ days each per week except for leap year, when it will be made available to the Marines for the extra day.

He also notes in Law Number 12 that “It costs a lot to build bad products.
And:

“It is very expensive to achieve high unreliability. It is not uncommon to increase the cost of an item by a factor of ten for each factor of ten degradation accomplished.” (#18)

The sum total of what he is suggesting is that the manned combat aircraft evolutionary path is not sustainable. This supports the thesis earlier by the Friedmans that stealth manned combat aircraft are reaching obsolescence and a new technology and military strategy paradigm is ripe to take advantage.

What that future will look like has been glimpsed and illustrated by a small number of highly influential authors; perhaps prime among them is Peter Singer in Wired for War. In this seminal work – I realize I have been using the term seminal all too frequently in this section, but the reason for this is that the information coming out in this new territory of knowledge is as critical to the field as Adam Smith’s The Wealth of Nations to economics. We are at the threshold of a revolution and the names you read now with amused curiosity will someday be written in gold in the pages of history, in fact they already are in those that are involved in this field. Continuing – in his seminal work, Singer shows that what we believe to be science fiction and a distant future is already here and in fact, some of this equipment is already manufactured and being used by the US military. Others are waiting to be operationalized. Yet others are hiding in secret black projects that are waiting to reveal themselves to the world. He describes this new world of breakaway military technology as built on information technology and particularly a world of automated robotics. Such robotics already in use by the US and Israeli militaries are revolutionizing warfare.”

Quotes from here for reference.

 

[VCheng]

He describes this new world of breakaway military technology as built on information technology and particularly a world of automated robotics. Such robotics already in use by the US and Israeli militaries are revolutionizing warfare.

I have mentioned the coming wave of autonomously functioning robot swarms in previous posts.

 

[jaibi]

That's still further off; my post was the near future but interesting read nonetheless.

A good read about the future would be Alvin Toffler's "The Third Wave". The IT revolution will forever change warfare and society as we know it. Those that stay behind will lose big. Quoting a book that touches upon the same:

"If this is true and keeping in mind the drastic changes that took place with the industrial revolution, the world seems ripe for another major perhaps cataclysmic event. What this implies for warfare: just as war drastically changed from the agricultural to the industrial age, and those who were unable to progress to the new wave (including the Muslim world) were defeated, humiliated and consigned to subservience, a new Third Wave will again drastically change the social, political, economic and military structure of the world.

Those countries that are unable to adapt, to progress, to the new circumstances will suffer just as the Red Indians, Muslims, Indians, Chinese and much of the non-Western world suffered from the Second Wave. Let us consider the implication of this Third Wave to warfare, but before that, we define the importance of air defense within defense policy to better grasp the vital implication of air defense in the future."

Airpower is of course critical to all kinds of future war endeavors. Yet, the direction of air power is reaching a breaking point, a period of instability, both because of technological development, and in terms of the life cycle of weapon systems:

"
In a seminal book titled The Future of War: Power, Technology, and American World Dominance in the 21st Century, the authors George and Meredith Friedman argued that each category of strategic weapon systems have a life-cycle and noted that stealth manned aircraft, the pinnacle today of combat aircraft, represented a point of decline and senility for combat aircraft. The Friedmans argue that strategic weapons systems can be considered on the basis of a list of eight points. These eight points determine what stage a weapon system is in its lifecycle between strategically significant and “senile” or obsolete systems. They define a strategically significant weapon as “one that brings force to bear in such a way that it decisively erodes the war-making capability of the enemy,” while a senile weapon is defined as “the primary strategic function of the weapon has been obscured by the need to construct expensive defenses against threats to the weapons platform.” They conclusively show through the historical record that strategic weapons systems have this lifecycle. They conclude that stealth manned aircraft along with aircraft carriers have reached a point of senility. Augustine’s Law Number 16 also suggests that there must be a peak and then eventually a break in aircraft acquisition costs.

Norman Augustine is one of the most respected thinkers in the US defense industry. He came up with a list of tongue-in-cheek laws based on his life-long experience in the US defense industry in some of the top positions. In Law 16 he suggests that the cost of combat aircraft increase exponentially while the budget for them increases linearly. He expresses this in a humorous manner:
In the year 2054, the entire defense budget will purchase just one aircraft. This aircraft will have to be shared by the Air Force and Navy 3½ days each per week except for leap year, when it will be made available to the Marines for the extra day.

He also notes in Law Number 12 that “It costs a lot to build bad products.
And:

“It is very expensive to achieve high unreliability. It is not uncommon to increase the cost of an item by a factor of ten for each factor of ten degradation accomplished.” (#18)

The sum total of what he is suggesting is that the manned combat aircraft evolutionary path is not sustainable. This supports the thesis earlier by the Friedmans that stealth manned combat aircraft are reaching obsolescence and a new technology and military strategy paradigm is ripe to take advantage.

What that future will look like has been glimpsed and illustrated by a small number of highly influential authors; perhaps prime among them is Peter Singer in Wired for War. In this seminal work – I realize I have been using the term seminal all too frequently in this section, but the reason for this is that the information coming out in this new territory of knowledge is as critical to the field as Adam Smith’s The Wealth of Nations to economics. We are at the threshold of a revolution and the names you read now with amused curiosity will someday be written in gold in the pages of history, in fact they already are in those that are involved in this field. Continuing – in his seminal work, Singer shows that what we believe to be science fiction and a distant future is already here and in fact, some of this equipment is already manufactured and being used by the US military. Others are waiting to be operationalized. Yet others are hiding in secret black projects that are waiting to reveal themselves to the world. He describes this new world of breakaway military technology as built on information technology and particularly a world of automated robotics. Such robotics already in use by the US and Israeli militaries are revolutionizing warfare.”

Quotes from here for reference.

 

[Joe Shearer]

I have mentioned the coming wave of autonomously functioning robot swarms in previous posts.

@saiyan0321 never fails to set people thinking.

In this instance, I have the other side of his concerns as well. He has illustrated the case where (implied but not stated by him) a set of customs and norms among people, individuals, are converted into laws, or into customary laws, over time. At a higher level, these customs and habits are consecrated to the care of a sovereign, an individual in earlier times, and a body corporate in later times. He has spent his time in representing to us two aspects of the development of that status in jurisprudence - the laws relating to war (=the law relating to war), and international law among sovereign nations, each insistent that its constitution is sufficient to handle any moral breaches of conduct that occur. Even any event commonly recognised as moral misconduct has gradually been drawn one step at a time, one treatise or judgement at a time towards the body of the law that is enforceable law.

In passing, this gradual understanding will have its effect on the near future of warfare as well; we will find that not everything that we can do for our enemy to be vanquished is likely to find favour with the increasing circle of the legally aware, or even with our own citizens.

However, on a new thread, to allow this discussion to go freely about its task, the question of quis custodiet ipsos custodes recurs.

Here, there is a lot still to be said about the technical side and the ramifications on formations and processes of such technical developments.

 

[_NOBODY_]

What about private militaries like blackwater? How much of this international law do they have to follow?

 

[saiyan0321]

What about private militaries like blackwater? How much of this international law do they have to follow?

Technically speaking, the entire conflict must run on the values of IHL and international law and the major issue in the UNHCR and with the ICRC is the usage of mercenaries to commit rights violations or even if the state is not complicit then the mercenaries themselves commit them is also a major problem. A mercenary is defined in the Additional Protocol I 1977 and before that there was no definition for a mercenary. Although treaties did exist but such stark difference between a military combatant and a mercenary was never highlighted before. This was done in 1977 however the definition itself is very restrictive in its nature as it states 6 requirements for a mercenary to be declared mercenary and even if one requirement is missing, he cannot be a mercenary. This part is very important because a combatant in the international armed conflict is either your army or the other army and a person who is not a mercenary, his presence in the field would mean that he is part of your army and if he is not then what is he? a lone combatant committing war crimes? or a lone combatant fighting? the difference between private military and locally raised force? where do these come under international law?

first let me highlight a few things. According to Geneva convention, a mercenary does not have a status of a combatant and does not have the right of treatment as prisoner of war. They are not offered such protections. Under international humanitarian law, being a mercenary does not constitute a specific crime and the same holds true for the Statute of the International Criminal Court. If arrested, mercenaries are not entitled to the status of prisoners of war, but the detaining power can decide to treat them according to this status. They must always be treated humanely according to the fundamental guarantees of humanitarian law, as defined by Article 75 of API. They can be prosecuted for being a mercenary only under the national law of the detaining power if it contains such provisions designating mercenarism as a distinct crime. He cannot be punished without previous trial but you see he does not have the status of a prisoner of war. He is not protected by the Geneva rules so basically the country that captured him can easily prosecute him in accordance to their law. They are not given the protection of International law.
The US has resisted this vigorously and as i stated that the US does not see international law as the supreme law but their own law as the supreme governing law for themselves. They resisted the 1977 Protocol and this is stated in their Military Manual book as well as their Air commander's hand book. In both it is stated that mercenaries, is US eyes deserve Prisoner of War status. So their legal handbook stated that any mercenary must be given prisoner of war status and this book is given to soldiers and officers. They have argued for decades that the article is of political usage and not humanitarian.
Law, even international law needs time to be eradicated and needs time to be evolved. In 1972 the organization of African countries was held under the convention for elimination of mercenaries which has 30 signatories i think and the very important 'International Convention against the recruitment, use and financing and training of mercenaries whose meeting on 4th december 1989, concluded the meeting with the resolution of 44/34. This has been ratified by 35 countries. These are huge landmarks even if they look small however this progress is not alone without problems itself. The definition used in these conventions is the one used in 1977 Protocol I and well, that is a very restrictive definition which has loopholes and those loopholes have been abused by the international law. I highlighted above the limitations of international law and how those limitations are found in all international organization formed from international law and the definition and any possible attempt to amend it, is also home to those limitations. This was also the movement of collective liability in international law, seen as the basis of international law, to private criminal liability.
The supporters of mercenaries repeatedly argue that mercenaries are not illegal in international law and thus should not be discriminated so but the problem with this is that in conflict where human right violations take place, you can penalize the country or the army. They are there however how can you catch a mercenary? This limitation and the fact that the principle of 'Parin parem non habitimperium' makes it very hard for international law to investigate within the country ( although in the ongoing case of American violations in Afghanistan in the ICC highlights the evolution of international law and the principle of Parin parem non habitimperium itself). It was this limitation that prompted the international community to declare them a lesser status of greed as a stigma rather than of honor and patriotism which is associated with a soldier in an armed conflict.

Now Let me highlight the affect of the above conventions. The OAU one, was primarily to stop european mercenaries to be involved in African national liberation movements. There was a capture and subsequent trial of thirteen mercenaries in Angola in 1976 which again focused international attention on mercenary activity. All the accused were charged with the crime of being a mercenary. Of the thirteen accused, four were sentenced to death, and the others to long prison sentences. As a result of the trial, the Luanda Draft Convention on the Prevention and Suppression of Mercenaries (1976) was issued. The Luanda Draft Convention again stressed the responsibility of individual states to prevent their nationals from taking part in mercenary activities, as well as those individual persons defined as mercenaries. State responsibility, as such, is conveyed in Article 3 that makes government officials who undertake to employ, aid, or recruit mercenaries liable for criminal prosecution. Thus, failure by a State to carry out the prosecution of officials who had undertaken such activities would, create international responsibility on the part of the offending State’. Article 5 represents the attitude of the members of the Popular Revolutionary Tribunal who presided over the trial, in that, ‘a mercenary bears responsibility both for being a mercenary and for any other crime committed by him as such’. Possibly the most important Article was Article 4, which deprived mercenaries of the status of being a lawful combatant. Captured mercenaries were, as such, not given the protected status of prisoners-of-war. This, as Hampson explains, ‘violated the principle of equality of belligerents and confused the jus ad bellum and jus in bello’. This provision was later incorporated into the 1977 Geneva Additional Protocol I. However, the definition of mercenary as decided upon by the Geneva conferees is more limited in scope than that expressed in the Luanda Draft Convention. At the same time, Additional Protocol I does allow for States to offer to mercenaries prisoner-of-war status if they so wish. What is clearly understood, and addressed in Additional Protocol II, is that mercenaries are entitled to the basic humanitarian treatment and protections provided for persons in the power of a party to the conflict who are not otherwise entitled to more favourable treatment.

Now as i stated above that one of the biggest problem in international law of mercenaries is the definition. The thing about a legal definition is that it must be precise otherwise its vagueness may prosecute those that are not mercenaries. Mockler defined a mercenary as 'Devotion to war for its own sake' and he declared that such a definition would distinguish between a soldier who is professional and a mercenary. However this is a very general definition, one that wouldnt make it to the conventions. International community formulated the Additional Protocol I definition after balancing state interests and concept of state separatism. The problem with a rigorous and rigid definition is that it is too rigid and cannot accommodate the changing circumstances of the ever-growing world landscape. The definition must not be general but must be accommodating to such. A brief definition and an overly explained and rigid definition. They both have loopholes for abuse and good jurists find a balance between the two. It was this failure that prompted other conventions that came to be.
Abraham highlighted that the motivation of mercenary must be based on financial form of definition since a mercenary is devoted to financial gain. Diplock in 1976 indeed spoke the absolute truth
"any definition of mercenaries which require positive proof of motivation would either be unworkable, or so haphazard in its application as between comparable individuals as to be unacceptable. Mercenaries, we think, can only be defined by reference to what they do, and not by reference to why they do it."

In the end the ICRC has highlighted that they must adhere to humanitarian law however the problem is the weakness in the definition which is very intentional and the absence of Private military complex in international law, however they came to international stages a recently, in comparison so eventually ICC trials and conventions will bring them under the cover of law albeit under great resistance.


@jaibi i think i may have played a very leading role in taking this topic a bit off so apologies from my end.

 

[SQ8]

Regarding the role of the military professional and in retrospect the state functionary in general may be affected by the following reality.
https://www-cnbc-com.cdn.ampproject...-a-specific-skill-its-a-type-of-thinking.html

In reality it is no longer about one subject expertise but a grasp of all and expertise in one. On an individual levels and then perhaps on a state level as well although the expertise then becomes widespread.

So while Pakistan cannot and will not become an entirely just state with Islamic ideals and be a oil producer with a great military and an agrarian powerhouse whilst maintaining an excellent population ratio and look like Bali.

But it can excel in certain areas and maintain sufficient knowledge of the rest.

That has already been translated on an armed forces level in this thread, but it requires a national education and character refocus to really make in impact in true state will during a conflict.

 

[jaibi]

Go ahead, love these ideas stemming from ideas, brother.

Technically speaking, the entire conflict must run on the values of IHL and international law and the major issue in the UNHCR and with the ICRC is the usage of mercenaries to commit rights violations or even if the state is not complicit then the mercenaries themselves commit them is also a major problem. A mercenary is defined in the Additional Protocol I 1977 and before that there was no definition for a mercenary. Although treaties did exist but such stark difference between a military combatant and a mercenary was never highlighted before. This was done in 1977 however the definition itself is very restrictive in its nature as it states 6 requirements for a mercenary to be declared mercenary and even if one requirement is missing, he cannot be a mercenary. This part is very important because a combatant in the international armed conflict is either your army or the other army and a person who is not a mercenary, his presence in the field would mean that he is part of your army and if he is not then what is he? a lone combatant committing war crimes? or a lone combatant fighting? the difference between private military and locally raised force? where do these come under international law?

first let me highlight a few things. According to Geneva convention, a mercenary does not have a status of a combatant and does not have the right of treatment as prisoner of war. They are not offered such protections. Under international humanitarian law, being a mercenary does not constitute a specific crime and the same holds true for the Statute of the International Criminal Court. If arrested, mercenaries are not entitled to the status of prisoners of war, but the detaining power can decide to treat them according to this status. They must always be treated humanely according to the fundamental guarantees of humanitarian law, as defined by Article 75 of API. They can be prosecuted for being a mercenary only under the national law of the detaining power if it contains such provisions designating mercenarism as a distinct crime. He cannot be punished without previous trial but you see he does not have the status of a prisoner of war. He is not protected by the Geneva rules so basically the country that captured him can easily prosecute him in accordance to their law. They are not given the protection of International law.
The US has resisted this vigorously and as i stated that the US does not see international law as the supreme law but their own law as the supreme governing law for themselves. They resisted the 1977 Protocol and this is stated in their Military Manual book as well as their Air commander's hand book. In both it is stated that mercenaries, is US eyes deserve Prisoner of War status. So their legal handbook stated that any mercenary must be given prisoner of war status and this book is given to soldiers and officers. They have argued for decades that the article is of political usage and not humanitarian.
Law, even international law needs time to be eradicated and needs time to be evolved. In 1972 the organization of African countries was held under the convention for elimination of mercenaries which has 30 signatories i think and the very important 'International Convention against the recruitment, use and financing and training of mercenaries whose meeting on 4th december 1989, concluded the meeting with the resolution of 44/34. This has been ratified by 35 countries. These are huge landmarks even if they look small however this progress is not alone without problems itself. The definition used in these conventions is the one used in 1977 Protocol I and well, that is a very restrictive definition which has loopholes and those loopholes have been abused by the international law. I highlighted above the limitations of international law and how those limitations are found in all international organization formed from international law and the definition and any possible attempt to amend it, is also home to those limitations. This was also the movement of collective liability in international law, seen as the basis of international law, to private criminal liability.
The supporters of mercenaries repeatedly argue that mercenaries are not illegal in international law and thus should not be discriminated so but the problem with this is that in conflict where human right violations take place, you can penalize the country or the army. They are there however how can you catch a mercenary? This limitation and the fact that the principle of 'Parin parem non habitimperium' makes it very hard for international law to investigate within the country ( although in the ongoing case of American violations in Afghanistan in the ICC highlights the evolution of international law and the principle of Parin parem non habitimperium itself). It was this limitation that prompted the international community to declare them a lesser status of greed as a stigma rather than of honor and patriotism which is associated with a soldier in an armed conflict.

Now Let me highlight the affect of the above conventions. The OAU one, was primarily to stop european mercenaries to be involved in African national liberation movements. There was a capture and subsequent trial of thirteen mercenaries in Angola in 1976 which again focused international attention on mercenary activity. All the accused were charged with the crime of being a mercenary. Of the thirteen accused, four were sentenced to death, and the others to long prison sentences. As a result of the trial, the Luanda Draft Convention on the Prevention and Suppression of Mercenaries (1976) was issued. The Luanda Draft Convention again stressed the responsibility of individual states to prevent their nationals from taking part in mercenary activities, as well as those individual persons defined as mercenaries. State responsibility, as such, is conveyed in Article 3 that makes government officials who undertake to employ, aid, or recruit mercenaries liable for criminal prosecution. Thus, failure by a State to carry out the prosecution of officials who had undertaken such activities would, create international responsibility on the part of the offending State’. Article 5 represents the attitude of the members of the Popular Revolutionary Tribunal who presided over the trial, in that, ‘a mercenary bears responsibility both for being a mercenary and for any other crime committed by him as such’. Possibly the most important Article was Article 4, which deprived mercenaries of the status of being a lawful combatant. Captured mercenaries were, as such, not given the protected status of prisoners-of-war. This, as Hampson explains, ‘violated the principle of equality of belligerents and confused the jus ad bellum and jus in bello’. This provision was later incorporated into the 1977 Geneva Additional Protocol I. However, the definition of mercenary as decided upon by the Geneva conferees is more limited in scope than that expressed in the Luanda Draft Convention. At the same time, Additional Protocol I does allow for States to offer to mercenaries prisoner-of-war status if they so wish. What is clearly understood, and addressed in Additional Protocol II, is that mercenaries are entitled to the basic humanitarian treatment and protections provided for persons in the power of a party to the conflict who are not otherwise entitled to more favourable treatment.

Now as i stated above that one of the biggest problem in international law of mercenaries is the definition. The thing about a legal definition is that it must be precise otherwise its vagueness may prosecute those that are not mercenaries. Mockler defined a mercenary as 'Devotion to war for its own sake' and he declared that such a definition would distinguish between a soldier who is professional and a mercenary. However this is a very general definition, one that wouldnt make it to the conventions. International community formulated the Additional Protocol I definition after balancing state interests and concept of state separatism. The problem with a rigorous and rigid definition is that it is too rigid and cannot accommodate the changing circumstances of the ever-growing world landscape. The definition must not be general but must be accommodating to such. A brief definition and an overly explained and rigid definition. They both have loopholes for abuse and good jurists find a balance between the two. It was this failure that prompted other conventions that came to be.
Abraham highlighted that the motivation of mercenary must be based on financial form of definition since a mercenary is devoted to financial gain. Diplock in 1976 indeed spoke the absolute truth
"any definition of mercenaries which require positive proof of motivation would either be unworkable, or so haphazard in its application as between comparable individuals as to be unacceptable. Mercenaries, we think, can only be defined by reference to what they do, and not by reference to why they do it."

In the end the ICRC has highlighted that they must adhere to humanitarian law however the problem is the weakness in the definition which is very intentional and the absence of Private military complex in international law, however they came to international stages a recently, in comparison so eventually ICC trials and conventions will bring them under the cover of law albeit under great resistance.


@jaibi i think i may have played a very leading role in taking this topic a bit off so apologies from my end.

 

[niaz]

Honorable Joe Shearer,

My sincere thanks for your very incisive analysis of the future of armed services. I would not dare to argue with military professionals on military matters. I would instead seek your indulgence to share my thoughts about the shape of the armed services of the latter half of the 21st century.

Undeniably, there would always be a need for the armed forces, either to forcibly acquire/control something that another nation/ country covets or thinks that it is rightfully theirs and or to stop other nations/countries from forcibly taking it. It, therefore, follows that for the foreseeable future army, navy, air force, and possibly also ‘Space force’ would be needed. The only question is in what form?

Need for a good land force has always been paramount because, at the end of the day, you must have ‘Boots on the ground’ or use surrogate soldiers to physically occupy a territory and /or impose your will on the adversary.

It is however understood that large battles involving hundreds of thousands from each side such as at Kursk are a thing of the past. Most future wars are likely to involve smaller rapidly mobile & flexible formations with technically advanced weaponry as well as an air support element. The firepower available with the individual soldier would be far greater than a WW2 buck private could even dream of.

British planners have come up with a flexible ‘Strike Brigades’ of about 6,500 men (understand now reduced to 5,000) reporting directly to the Corp HQ. India has the IBGs, these integrated battle groups are self-contained fighting units of 6 to 7 battalion strength with elements of airpower, artillery & armor.

In addition to the rifle & ammo, a 21st-century infantryman would also be carrying radio communication, body armor, night-vision goggles, and protection against IEDs; hence need for the fitter and physically stronger soldiers. All this equipment also translates into the extra cost; making it extremely onerous to have armies of million men; implying that except for a very few, most of the future armed forces would be fewer in number but lean, mean & deadly.

No army can be expected to win a war without control of the air, at the very least enemy should be denied air superiority, thus air force would remain relevant. Admittedly, people have talked about the manned fighter aircraft being obsolete since Israel started using drones/ UAVs in the aftermath of the Yom Kippur war. Undoubtedly UAV’s would play a major role in all future wars, but the role of the UAV such as the Predator & RQ-4 Global Hawk is limited to reconnaissance & intelligence; besides UAVs are also flown by controllers who are ‘Virtual pilots’.

I have read about the US Unmanned Combat Air Vehicle (UCAV) the Boeing X-45, but in the foreseeable future, X-45 is only likely to be used in SEAD operations before the manned aircraft go in. It is therefore likely that later half of the 21st century Air force would be a mix of UAVs, UCAV & stealthy aircraft, albeit manned aircraft would be fewer in number; probably a dozen of so squadrons of F-22 or something similar.

On the naval side, aircraft carriers could become obsolete before anything else. Primarily because the carriers cost too much to build, can't hide from the satellites and UAV’s with advanced sensors, and can't move quickly enough to avoid missiles. The Naval Carriers would probably be replaced by the cruise missile carrying destroyers. Navy's mission has always been one of force projection, safeguarding the sea lanes and disrupting enemy’s supply lines. Future navies are likely to consist mainly of heavily armed stealthy destroyers and submarines supported by a fleet of anti-sub frigates for the blue water & mine countermeasure vessels supported by corvettes for patrolling the economic zone.

With the rise of the Chinese, the resurgence of Russia, and in addition to having the capability of launching satellite India joining the Space Club with the successful test of the anti-satellite missile in March 2019; a new dimension has been added to future military power. In my opinion, all the regional powers would in the future, also need anti-satellite missiles in their arsenal.