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Nuclear Navy

SvenSvensonov

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Nuclear-Powered Ships - Submarines and Icebreakers
  • Nuclear power is particularly suitable for vessels which need to be at sea for long periods without refuelling, or for powerful submarine propulsion.
  • Over 140 ships are powered by more than 180 small nuclear reactors and more than 12,000 reactor years of marine operation has been accumulated.
  • Most are submarines, but they range from icebreakers to aircraft carriers.
  • In future, constraints on fossil fuel use in transport may bring marine nuclear propulsion into more widespread use. So far, exaggerated fears about safety have caused political restriction on port access.

Work on nuclear marine propulsion started in the 1940s, and the first test reactor started up in USA in 1953. The first nuclear-powered submarine, USS Nautilus, put to sea in 1955.

This marked the transition of submarines from slow underwater vessels to warships capable of sustaining 20-25 knots submerged for weeks on end. The submarine had come into its own.

Nautilus led to the parallel development of further (Skate-class) submarines, powered by single pressurised water reactors, and an aircraft carrier, USS Enterprise, powered by eight reactor units in 1960. A cruiser, USS Long Beach, followed in 1961 and was powered by two of these early units. Remarkably, the Enterprise remained in service to the end of 2012.

By 1962 the US Navy had 26 nuclear submarines operational and 30 under construction. Nuclear power had revolutionised the Navy.

The technology was shared with Britain, while French, Russian and Chinese developments proceeded separately.

After the Skate-class vessels, reactor development proceeded and in the USA a single series of standardised designs was built by both Westinghouse and GE, one reactor powering each vessel. Rolls Royce built similar units for Royal Navy submarines and then developed the design further to the PWR-2.

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Russia developed both PWR and lead-bismuth cooled reactor designs, the latter not persisting. Eventually four generations* of submarine PWRs were utilised, the last entering service in 1995 in the Severodvinsk class.

* 1955-66, 1963-92, 1976-2003, 1995 on, according to Bellona.

The largest submarines are the 26,500 tonne (34,000 t submerged) Russian Typhoon-class, powered by twin 190 MWt PWR reactors, though these were superseded by the 24,000 t Oscar-II class (eg Kursk) with the same power plant.

The safety record of the US nuclear navy is excellent, this being attributed to a high level of standardisation in naval power plants and their maintenance, and the high quality of the Navy's training program. However, early Soviet endeavours resulted in a number of serious accidents – five where the reactor was irreparably damaged, and more resulting in radiation leaks. There were more than 20 radiation fatalities.* Nevertheless, by Russia’s third generation of marine PWRs in the late 1970s safety and reliability had become a high priority. (Apart from reactor accidents, fires and accidents have resulted in the loss of two US and about 4 Soviet submarines, another four of which had fires resulting in loss of life.)

* The K-19 accident at sea in 1961 due to cooling failure in an early PWR resulted in 8 deaths from acute radiation syndrome (ARS) in repairing it (doses 7.5 to 54 Sv) and possibly more later as well as many high doses. The K-27 accident at sea in 1968 also involved coolant failure, this time in an experimental lead-bismuth cooled reactor, and 9 deaths from ARS as well as high exposure by other crew. In 1985 the K-431 was being refuelled in Vladivostok when a criticality occurred causing a major steam explosion which killed 10 workers. Over 200 PBq of fission products was released causing high radiation exposure of about 50 others, including ten with ARS.

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Lloyd's Register shows about 200 nuclear reactors at sea, and that some 700 have been used at sea since the 1950s.

Nuclear Naval Fleets
Russia built 248 nuclear submarines and five naval surface vessels (plus 9 icebreakers) powered by 468 reactors between 1950 and 2003, and was then operating about 60 nuclear naval vessels. (Bellona gives 247 subs with 456 reactors 1958-95.) For operational vessels in 1997, Bellona lists 109 Russian submarines (plus 4 naval surface ships) and 108 attack submarines (SSN) and 25 ballistic missile ones apart from Russia.

At the end of the Cold War, in 1989, there were over 400 nuclear-powered submarines operational or being built. At least 300 of these submarines have now been scrapped and some on order cancelled, due to weapons reduction programs*. Russia and USA had over one hundred each in service, with UK and France less than twenty each and China six. The total today is understood to be about 120, including new ones commissioned. Most or all are fuelled by high-enriched uranium (HEU).

* In 2007 Russia had about 40 retired subs from its Pacific fleet alone awaiting scrapping. In November 2008 it was reported that Russia intended to scrap all decommissioned nuclear submarines by 2012, the total being more than 200 of the 250 built to date. Most Northern Fleet submarines had been dismantled at Severodvinsk, and most remaining to be scrapped were with the Pacific Fleet.

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India launched its first nuclear submarine in 2009, the 6000 dwt Arihant SSBN, with a single 85 MW PWR fuelled by HEU driving a 70 MW steam turbine. It is reported to have cost US$ 2.9 billion. The INS Aridaman SSBN is under construction at the Ship Building Centre in Visakhapatnam, and due to be launched in 2015. Another SSBN and six nuclear SSNs are planned. India is also leasing an almost-new 7900 dwt (12,770 tonne submerged) Russian Akula-II class nuclear attack submarine for ten years from 2010, at a cost of US$ 650 million: the INS Chakra, formerly Nerpa. It has a single 190 MWt VM-5/ OK-659B PWR driving a 32 MW steam turbine and two 2 MWe turbogenerators.

The USA has the main navy with nuclear-powered aircraft carriers, while both it and Russia have had nuclear-powered cruisers (USA: 9, Russia 4). The USA had built 219 nuclear-powered vessels to mid 2010, and then had five submarines and an aircraft carrier under construction. All US aircraft carriers and submarines are nuclear-powered.

The US Navy has accumulated over 6200 reactor-years of accident-free experience involving 526 nuclear reactor cores over the course of 240 million kilometres, without a single radiological incident, over a period of more than 50 years. It operated 82 nuclear-powered ships (11 aircraft carriers, 71 submarines – 18 SSBN/SSGN, 53 SSN) with 103 reactors as of March 2010. In 2013 it had 10 Nimitz-class carriers in service (CVN 68-77), each designed for 50-year service life with one mid-life refuelling and complex overhaul of their two A4W Westinghouse reactors. The forthcoming Gerald Ford-class (CVN 78 on) will have some 800 fewer crew and two more powerful Bechtel A1B reactors driving four shafts. Late in 2014 the US Navy had 86 nuclear-powered vessels including 75 submarines.

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The Russian Navy has logged over 6000 nautical reactor-years. It appears to have eight strategic submarines (SSBN/SSGN) in operation and 13 nuclear-powered attack submarines (SSN), plus some diesel subs. Russia has announced that it will build eight new nuclear SSBN submarines in its plan to 2015. Its only nuclear-powered carrier project was cancelled in 1992. It has one nuclear-powered cruiser in operation and three others being overhauled. In 2012 it announced that its third-generation strategic subs would have extended service lives, from 25 to 35 years.

In 2012 construction of a nuclear-powered deep-sea submersible was announced. This is based on the Oscar-class naval submarine and is apparently designed for research and rescue missions. It will be built by the Sevmash shipyard at Severodvinsk, which builds Russian naval submarines.

China has about 12 nuclear-powered submarines (7 SSN, 4-5 SSBN), and in February 2013 China Shipbuilding Industry Corp received state approval and funding to begin research on core technologies and safety for nuclear-powered ships, with polar vessels being mentioned but aircraft carriers being considered a more likely purpose for the new development. Its first nuclear powered submarine was decommissioned in 2013 after almost 40 years service.

France has a nuclear-powered aircraft carrier and ten nuclear submarines (4 SSBN, 6 Rubis class SSN). The UK has 12 submarines, all nuclear powered (4 SSBN, 8 SSN).

The occupational radiation doses to crew of nuclear vessels in very small. US Naval Reactors’ average annual occupational exposure was 0.06 mSv per person in 2013, and no personnel have exceeded 20 mSv in any year in the 34 years to then. The average occupational exposure of each person monitored at US Naval Reactors' facilities since 1958 is 1.03 mSv per year.

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Civil Vessels
Nuclear propulsion has proven technically and economically essential in the Russian Arctic where operating conditions are beyond the capability of conventional icebreakers. The power levels required for breaking ice up to 3 metres thick, coupled with refuelling difficulties for other types of vessels, are significant factors. The nuclear fleet, with six nuclear icebreakers and a nuclear freighter, has increased Arctic navigation from 2 to 10 months per year, and in the Western Arctic, to year-round.

The icebreaker Lenin was the world's first nuclear-powered surface vessel (20,000 dwt), commissioned in 1959. It remained in service for 30 years to 1989, and was retired due to the hull being worn thin from ice abrasion. It initially had three 90 MWt OK-150 reactors, but these were badly damaged during refueling in 1965 and 1967. In 1970 they were replaced by two 171 MWt OK-900 reactors providing steam for turbines which generated electricity to deliver 34 MW at the propellers. Lenin is now a museum.

It led to a series of larger icebreakers, the six 23,500 dwt Arktika class, launched from 1975. These powerful vessels have two 171 MWt OK-900A reactors delivering 54 MW at the propellers and are used in deep Arctic waters. The Arktika was the first surface vessel to reach the North Pole, in 1977. Rossija, Sovetskiy Soyuz and Yamal are in service (launched 1985, 1990, 1992 respectively), with Sibir and Arktika decommissioned in 1992 and 2008. Soyuz has been in reserve but is being restored for service from 2017. Nominal service life is 25 years, but Atomflot commissioned a study on Yamal, and confirmed 30-year life for it. Atomflot has a service life extension program to take them up to 175,000 - 200,000 hours. Arktika class are 148 m long and 30 m wide, and designed to break 2 metres of ice.

The seventh and largest Arktika class icebreaker – 50 Years of Victory (50 Let Pobedy) – was built by the Baltic shipyard at St Petersburg and after delays during construction it entered service in 2007 (twelve years later than the 50-year anniversary of 1945 it was to commemorate). It is 25,800 dwt, 160 m long and 20m wide, and is designed to break through ice up to 2.8 metres thick. Its propulsive power is about 54 MW. Its performance in service has been impressive.

For use in shallow waters such as estuaries and rivers, two shallow-draft Taymyr-class icebreakers of 18,260 dwt with one 171 MWt KLT-40M reactor delivering 35 MW propulsive were built in Finland and then fitted with their nuclear steam supply system in Russia. They – Taymyr and Vaygach – are built to conform with international safety standards for nuclear vessels and were launched in 1989 and 1990 respectively. They are 152 m long and 19 m wide, will break 1.77 metres of ice, and are expected to operate for at least 30 years.



Tenders were called for building the first of a new LK-60 series series of Russian icebreakers in mid-2012, and the contract was awarded to Baltijsky Zavod Shipbuildingin St Petersburg. The keel of Arctica was laid in November 2013 and it is to be delivered to Atomflot by the end of 2017 at a cost of RUR 37 billion. A RUR 84.4 billion contract for two more vessels was let in May 2014 to the same shipyard. The LK-60 (project 22220) vessel is to be dual-draught (10.5m with full ballast tanks, minimum 8.55m at 25,540 t), displacing up to 33,530 t, 173 m long, 34 m wide, and designed to break through 3 m thick ice at up to 2 knots. The wider 33 m beam at waterline is to match the 70,000 tonne ships it is designed to clear a path for, though a few of these with reinforced hulls are already using the Northern Sea Route. There is scope for more use: in 2011, 19,000 ships used the Suez Canal and only about 40 traversed the northern route. This increased in 2013 – see below.

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The LK-60 will be powered by two RITM-200 reactors of 175 MWt each using low-enriched fuel (<20%), which together deliver 60 MW at the three propellers via twin turbine-generators and three motors. At 65% capacity factor refuelling is every 7-10 years, overhaul at 20 years, service life 40 years. It is designed to operate in the Western Arctic – in the Barents, Pechora and Kara Seas, as well as in shallow water of the Yenissei River and Ob Bay, for year-round pilotage (also as tug) of tankers, dry-cargo ships and vessels with special equipment to mineral resource development sites on the Arctic shelf. The Yamal LNG project is expected to need 200 shipping movements per year from Sabetta at the mouth of the Ob River. The vessel will have a smaller crew than its predecessors – only 62.

In January 2013 Rosatom called for bids to build two more of these universal icebreaker vessels, for delivery in 2019 and 2020, but closing of the tender was delayed to April 2014.

A more powerful Russian LK-110 icebreaker of 110 MW net and 55,600 dwt is planned.

Development of nuclear merchant ships began in the 1950s but on the whole has not been commercially successful. The 22,000 tonne US-built NS Savannah, was commissioned in 1962 and decommissioned eight years later. The reactor used 4.2% and 4.6% enriched uranium. It was a technical success, but not economically viable. It had a 74 MWt reactor delivering 16.4 MW to the propeller, but the reactor was uprated to 80 MWt in 1964. The German-built 15,000 tonne Otto Hahn cargo ship and research facility sailed some 650,000 nautical miles on 126 voyages in 10 years without any technical problems. It had a 36 MWt reactor delivering 8 MW to the propeller. However, it proved too expensive to operate and in 1982 it was converted to diesel.

The 8000 tonne Japanese Mutsu was the third civil vessel, put into service in 1970. It had a 36 MWt reactor delivering 8 MW to the propeller. It was dogged by technical and political problems and was an embarrassing failure. These three vessels used reactors with low-enriched uranium fuel (3.7-4.4% U-235).

In 1988 the NS Sevmorput was commissioned in Russia, mainly to serve northern Siberian ports. It is a 61,900 tonne 260 m long LASH-carrier (taking lighters to ports with shallow water) and container ship with ice-breaking bow capable of breaking 1.5 metres of ice. It is powered by a KLT-40 reactor similar to the OK-900As used in larger icebreakers, but with only 135 MWt power delivering 32.5 propeller MW. It needed refuelling only once to 2003. The reactor was to be decommissioned about 2014, but Rosatom has approved overhauling it so that the ship is returned to service in 2016.

Russian experience with nuclear powered Arctic ships totals about 300 reactor-years in 2009. In 2008 the Arctic fleet was transferred from the Murmansk Shipping Company under the Ministry of Transport to Atomflot, under Rosatom. This is progressively becoming a commercial enterprise, with the 40% state subsidy of RUR 1262 million in 2011 due to phase out in 2014.

In August 2010 two Arktika-class icebreakers escorted the 100,000 dwt tanker Baltika, carrying 70,000 tonnes of gas condensate, from Murmansk to China via the Arctic Northern Sea Route (NSR), saving some 8000 km compared with the Suez Canal route. In November 2012 the Ob River LNG tanker with 150,000 cubic metres of gas as LNG, chartered by Russia's Gazprom, traversed the northern sea route from Norway to Japan accompanied by nuclear-powered icebreakers, the route cutting 20 days off the normal journey and resulting in less loss of cargo. It has a strengthened hull to cope with the Arctic ice. There are plans to ship iron ore and base metals on the northern sea route also.

In 2013 the Atomflot icebreakers supported freight transportation and emergency rescue operations along the Northern Sea Route (NSR), and freezing northern seas and estuaries of rivers. In the framework of the regulated activity paid for as per rates established by the Federal Tariff Service of Russia (FST), 151 steering operations were carried out for ships with cargo and in ballast to and from ports in the aquatic area of the NSR, including steering of ships with cargo for building Sabetta Port of JSC Yamal SPG to Okskaya Bay and steering of a convoy of Navy ships under a contract with the Ministry of Defence. Over the 2013 summer-autumn navigation season, 71 transit steering operations were carried out, including 25 foreign-flag ships. A total of 1,356,000 tonnes of various cargoes was shipped east and west through the aquatic area of the NSR.

Nuclear propulsion systems
Naval reactors (with the exception of the ill-fated Russian Alfa class described below) have been pressurised water types, which differ from commercial reactors producing electricity in that:

  • They deliver a lot of power from a very small volume and therefore run on highly-enriched uranium (>20% U-235, originally c 97% but apparently now 93% in latest US submarines, c 20-25% in some western vessels, 20% in the first and second generation Russian reactors (1957-81)*, then 21% to 45% in 3rd generation Russian units (40% in India's Arihant).
  • The fuel is not UO2 but a uranium-zirconium or uranium-aluminium alloy (c15%U with 93% enrichment, or more U with less – eg 20% – U-235) or a metal-ceramic (Kursk: U-Al zoned 20-45% enriched, clad in zircaloy, with c 200kg U-235 in each 200 MW core).
  • They have long core lives, so that refuelling is needed only after 10 or more years, and new cores are designed to last 50 years in carriers and 30-40 years (over 1.5 million kilometres) in most submarines.
  • The design enables a compact pressure vessel while maintaining safety. The Sevmorput pressure vessel for a relatively large marine reactor is 4.6 m high and 1.8 m diameter, enclosing a core 1 m high and 1.2 m diameter.
  • Thermal efficiency is less than in civil nuclear power plants due to the need for flexible power output, and space constraints for the steam system.
  • There is no soluble boron used in naval reactors (at least US ones).
* An IAEA Tecdoc reports discharge assay of early submarine used fuel reprocessed at Mayak being 17% U-235.

The long core life is enabled by the relatively high enrichment of the uranium and by incorporating a "burnable poison" such as gadolinium – which is progressively depleted as fission products and actinides accumulate. These accumulating poisons would normally cause reduced fuel efficiency, but the two effects cancel one another out.

However, the enrichment level for newer French naval fuel has been dropped to 7.5% U-235, the fuel being known as 'caramel', which needs to be changed every ten years or so. This avoids the need for a specific military enrichment line, and some reactors will be smaller versions of those on the Charles de Gaulle. In 2006 the Defence Ministry announced that Barracuda class subs would use fuel with "civilian enrichment, identical to that of EdF power plants," which may be an exaggeration but certainly marks a major change there.

Long-term integrity of the compact reactor pressure vessel is maintained by providing an internal neutron shield. (This is in contrast to early Soviet civil PWR designs where embrittlement occurs due to neutron bombardment of a very narrow pressure vessel.)

The Russian, US, and British navies rely on steam turbine propulsion, the French and Chinese in submarines use the turbine to generate electricity for propulsion.

Russian ballistic missile submarines as well as all surface ships since the Enterprise are powered by two reactors. Other submarines (except some Russian attack subs) are powered by one. A new Russian test-bed submarine is diesel-powered but has a very small nuclear reactor for auxiliary power.

The Russian Alfa-class submarines had a single liquid metal cooled reactor (LMR) of 155 MWt and using very highly enriched uranium – 90% enriched U-Be fuel. These were very fast, but had operational problems in ensuring that the lead-bismuth coolant did not freeze when the reactor was shut down. Reactors had to be kept running, even in harbour, since the external heating provision did not work. The design was unsuccessful and used in only eight trouble-plagued vessels, which were retired early.

The US Navy's second nuclear submarine had a sodium-cooled power plant (S2G). The USS Seawolf, SSN-575, operated for nearly two years 1957-58 with this. The intermediate-spectrum reactor raised its incoming coolant temperature over ten times as much as the Nautilus' water-cooled plant, providing superheated steam, and it offered an outlet temperature of 454°C, compared with the Nautilus’ 305°C. It was highly efficient, but offsetting this, the plant had serious operational disadvantages. Large electric heaters were required to keep the plant warm when the reactor was down to avoid the sodium freezing. The biggest problem was that the sodium became highly radioactive, with a half-life of 15 hours, so that the whole reactor system had to be more heavily shielded than a water-cooled plant, and the reactor compartment couldn’t be entered for many days after shutdown. The reactor was replaced with a PWR type (S2Wa) similar to Nautilus.

For many years the Los Angeles class submarines formed the backbone of the US SSN (attack) fleet, and 62 were built. They are 6900 dwt submerged, and have a 165 MW GE S6G reactor driving two 26 MW steam turbines. Refueling interval is 30 years. The US Virginia class SSN submarine has pump-jet propulsion built by BAE Systems and is powered by a PWR reactor (GE S9G) which does not need refueling for 33 years. They are about 7900 dwt, and ten were in operation as of late 2013, with more on order.

Unlike PWRs, boiling water reactors (BWRs) circulate water which is radioactive* outside the reactor compartment, and are also considered too noisy for submarine use.

* Radioactivity in the cooling water flowing through the core is mainly the activation product nitrogen-16, formed by neutron capture from oxygen. N-16 has a half-life on only 7 seconds but produces high-energy gamma radiation during decay.

Reactor power ranges from 10 MWt (in a prototype) up to 200 MWt in the larger submarines and 300 MWt in surface ships such as the Kirov-class battle cruisers. The two A4W units in US Nimitz class aircraft carriers are unofficially quoted at 104 shaft MW each (USS Enterprise had eight A2W units of 26 shaft MW and was refuelled three times). The Gerald Ford-class carriers have A1B reactors reported to be 240-300 MW each, but running a ship which is entirely electrical, including an electromagnetic aircraft launch system. The reactors are two to three times as powerful as the A4W units in Nimitz-class.

The smallest nuclear submarines are the French Rubis-class attack subs (2600 dwt) in service since 1983, and these have a 48 MW integrated PWR reactor from Technicatome which is variously reported as needing no refuelling for 30 years, or requiring refuelling every seven years. The French aircraft carrier Charles de Gaulle(38,000 dwt), commissioned in 2000, has two K15 integrated PWR units driving 61 MW Alstom turbines and the system can provide 5 years running at 25 knots before refuelling. The Le Triomphant class of ballistic missile submarines (14,335 dwt submerged – the last launched in 2008) uses these K15 naval PWRs of 150 MWt and 32 shaft MW with pump-jet propulsion. The Barracuda class (4765 dwt) attack submarines, will have hybrid propulsion: electric for normal use and pump-jet for higher speeds. Areva TA (formerly Technicatome) will provide six reactors apparently of only 50 MWt and based on the K15 for the Barracuda submarines, the first to be commissioned in 2017. As noted above, they will use low-enriched fuel.

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British Vanguard class ballistic missile submarines (SSBN) of 15,900 dwt submerged have a single PWR2 reactor with two steam turbines driving a single pump jet of 20.5 MW. New versions of this with "Core H" will require no refuelling over the life of the vessel*. UK Astute class attack subs of 7400 dwt submerged have a modified (smaller) PWR2 reactor driving two steam turbines and a single pump jet reported as 11.5 MW, and are being commissioned from 2010. In March 2011 a safety assessment of the PWR2 design was released showing the need for safety improvement, though they have capacity for passive cooling to effect decay heat removal. The PWR3 for the Vanguard replacement will be largely a US design.

* Rolls Royce claims that the Core H PWR2 has six times the (undisclosed) power of its original PWR1 and runs four times as long. The Core H is Rolls Royce's sixth-generation submarine reactor core.

Since 1959 Russia has used five types of PWRs in its civil; fleet: OK-150 in the Lenin until 1966 (3x90 MW), OK-900 subsequently in the Lenin (2x159 MW), OK-900A in the main Arktika class icebreaker fleet (2x171 MW), KLT-40M in two Tamyr class icebreakers (1x171 MW), and KLT-40 in the Sevmorput (1x135 MW).

Russia's main submarine power plant is the OK-650 PWR. It uses 20-45% enriched fuel to produce 190 MW. The 19,400 tonne Oscar II-class and 34,000 tonne Typhoon-class (NATO name, Akula-class in Russia) ballistic missile subs (SSBN) have two of these reactors with steam turbines together delivering 74 MW, and its new 24,000 t Borei-class ballistic missile sub along with Akula-(Russia: Shchuka-class), Mike- and Sierra-class attack subs (SSN) have a single OK-650 unit powering a 32 MW steam turbine. The Borei-class is the first Russian design to use pump-jet propulsion. (displacements: submerged). A 5th generation naval reactor is reported to be a super-critical type (SCWR) with single steam circuit and expected to run 30 years without refuelling. A full-scale prototype was being tested early in 2013.

Russia's large Arktika class icebreakers use two OK-900A (essentially KLT-40M) nuclear reactors of 171 MW each with 241 or 274 fuel assemblies of 45-75% enriched fuel and 3-4 year refuelling interval. They drive steam turbines and each produces up to 33 MW at the propellers, though overall propulsive power is about 54 MW. The two Tamyr class icebreakers have a single 171 MW KLT-40 reactor giving 35 MW propulsive power. Sevmorput uses one 135 MW KLT-40 unit producing 32.5 MW propulsive, and all those use 90% enriched fuel. (The now-retired Lenin's first OK-150 reactors used 5% enriched fuel but were replaced by OK-900 units with 45-75% enriched fuel.) Most of the Arktika-class vessels have had operating life extensions based on engineering knowledge built up from experience with Arktika itself. It was originally designed for 100,000 hours of reactor life, but this was extended first to 150,000 hours, then to 175,000 hours. In practice this equated to a lifespan of eight extra years of operation on top of the design period of 25. In that time, Arkitka covered more than 1 million nautical miles.

For the next LK-60 generation of Russian icebreakers, OKBM Afrikantov is developing a new reactor – RITM-200 – to replace the current KLT design. Under Project 22220 this is an integral 175 MWt PWR with inherent safety features and using low-enriched uranium fuel. Refueling is every seven years, over a 40-year lifespan. Two reactors drive two turbine generators and then three electric motors powering the propellers, producing 60 MW propulsive power. The first icebreaker to be equipped with these is due to start construction in 2013. For floating nuclear power plants (FNPP, see below) a single RITM-200 would replace twin KLT-40S (but yield less power).

The KLT-40S is a 4-loop version of the icebreaker reactor for floating nuclear power plants which runs on low-enriched uranium (<20%) and has a bigger core (1.3 m high instead of 1.0 m) and shorter refueling interval: 3 to 4.5 years. A variant of this is the KLT-20, specifically designed for FNPP. It is a 2-loop version with same enrichment but 10-year refueling interval.

OKBM has supplied 460 nuclear reactors for the Russian navy, and these have operated more than 6500 reactor-years.

India's Arihant (6000 dwt) has an 85 MWe PWR using 40% enriched uranium driving one or two 35 MW steam turbines. It has 13 fuel assemblies each with 348 fuel rods, and was built indigenously. The reactor went critical in August 2013. A 20 MW prototype unit had operated for several years from 2003.

Brazil's navy is proposing to build an 11 MW prototype reactor by 2014 to operate for about eight years, with a view to a full-sized version using low-enriched uranium being in its 6000 tonne, 100 m long SNBR submarine to be launched by 2025.

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UK nuclear submarine layout

Dismantling decommissioned nuclear-powered submarines has become a major task for US and Russian navies. After defuelling, normal practice is to cut the reactor section from the vessel for disposal in shallow land burial as low-level waste (the rest being recycled normally). In Russia the whole vessels, or the sealed reactor sections, sometimes remain stored afloat indefinitely, though western-funded programs are addressing this and all decommissioned submarines are due to be dismantled by 2012. In 2009 Rosatom said that by late 2010, 191 out of 198 decommissioned Russian submarines would be dismantled.

Marine reactors used for power supply, Floating Nuclear Power Plants




A marine reactor was used to supply power (1.5 MWe) to a US Antarctic base for ten years to 1972, testing the feasibility of such air-portable units for remote locations.

Between 1967 and 1976 an ex-army US Liberty ship of about 12,000 tonnes built in 1945, the Sturgis (originally Charles H. Cugle) functioned as a floating nuclear power plant, designation MH-1A, 
moored on Gatun Lake, Panama Canal Zone. It had a 45 MWt/10 MWe (net) PWR which provided power to the Canal Zone for nine years at a capacity factor of 54%. The propulsion unit of the original ship was removed and the entire midsection replaced with a 350 t steel containment vessel and concrete collision barriers, making it about 2.5 m wider than the rest of the ship, now essentially a barge. The containment vessel contained not only the reactor unit itself but the primary and secondary coolant circuits and electrical systems for the reactor.

In the 1970s Westinghouse in alliance with Newport News shipyard developed an Offshore Power Systems (OPS) concept, with series production envisaged at Jacksonville, Florida. In 1972 two 1210 MWe units were ordered by utility PSEG for offshore Atlantic City or Brigantine, New Jersey, but the order was cancelled in 1978. By the time NRC approval was granted in 1982 for building up to eight plants, there were no customers and Westinghouse closed down its OPS division. Two blogs hereand here on the NRC website describe the saga. Westinghouse and Babcock & Wilcox are reported to be revisiting the concept.

Russia has under construction at St Petersburg the first of a series of floating power plants for their northern and far eastern territories. Two OKBM KLT-40S reactors derived from those in icebreakers, but with low-enriched fuel (less than 20% U-235), are mounted on a 21,500 tonne, 144 m long barge. Refuelling interval is 3-4 years on site, and at the end of a 12-year operating cycle the whole plant is returned to a shipyard for a two-year overhaul and storage of used fuel, before being returned to service. See also Russia NP paper.

China has a project with SNERDI in Shanghai designing a CAP-FNPP reactor. This is to be 200 MWt and relatively low-temperature (250°C), so only about 40 MWe with two external steam generators and five-year refueling

Future prospects
With increasing attention being given to greenhouse gas emissions arising from burning fossil fuels for international air and marine transport, particularly dirty bunker fuel for the latter, and the excellent safety record of nuclear powered ships, it is quite conceivable that renewed attention will be given to marine nuclear powered ships, it is likely that there will be renewed interest in marine nuclear propulsion. The world's merchant shipping is reported to have a total power capacity of 410 GWt, about one third that of world nuclear power plants.

The head of the large Chinese shipping company Cosco suggested in December 2009 that container ships should be powered by nuclear reactors in order to reduce greenhouse gas emissions from shipping. He said that Cosco was in talks with China's nuclear authority to develop nuclear powered freight vessels. However, in 2011 Cosco aborted the study after three years, following the Fukushima accident.

In 2010 Babcock International's marine division completed a study on developing a nuclear-powered LNG tanker (which requires considerable auxiliary power as well as propulsion). The study indicated that particular routes and cargoes lent themselves well to the nuclear propulsion option, and that technological advances in reactor design and manufacture had made the option more appealing.

In November 2010 the British maritime classification society Lloyd's Register embarked upon a two-year study with US-based Hyperion Power Generation (now Gen4 Energy), British vessel designer BMT Group, and Greek ship operator Enterprises Shipping and Trading SA "to investigate the practical maritime applications for small modular reactors." The research was to produce a concept tanker-ship design, based on a 70 MWt reactor such as Hyperion's. Hyperion (Gen4 Energy) had a three-year contract with the other parties in the consortium, which planned to have the tanker design certified in as many countries as possible. The project included research on a comprehensive regulatory framework led by the International Maritime Organisation (IMO), and supported by the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) and regulators in countries involved.

In response to its members' interest in nuclear propulsion, Lloyd's Register has rewritten its 'rules' for nuclear ships, which concern the integration of a reactor certified by a land-based regulator with the rest of the ship. The overall rationale of the rule-making process assumes that in contrast to the current marine industry practice where the designer/builder typically demonstrates compliance with regulatory requirements, in the future the nuclear regulators will wish to ensure that it is the operator of the nuclear plant that demonstrates safety in operation, in addition to the safety through design and construction. Nuclear ships are currently the responsibility of their own countries, but none are involved in international trade. Lloyd's Register said it expected to "see nuclear ships on specific trade routes sooner than many people currently anticipate."

In 2014 two papers on commercial nuclear marine propulsion were published* arising from this international industry project led by Lloyd's Register. They review past and recent work in the area of marine nuclear propulsion and describe a preliminary concept design study for a 155,000 dwt Suezmax tanker that is based on a conventional hull form with alternative arrangements for accommodating a 70 MWt nuclear propulsion plant delivering up to 23.5 MW shaft power at maximum continuous rating (average: 9.75 MW). The Gen4Energy power module is considered. This is a small fast-neutron reactor using lead-bismuth eutectic cooling and able to operate for ten full-power years before refueling, and in service last for a 25-year operational life of the vessel. They conclude that the concept is feasible, but further maturity of nuclear technology and the development and harmonisation of the regulatory framework would be necessary before the concept would be viable.

* Hirdaris et al, 2014.

The UN's IMO adopted a code of safety for nuclear merchant ships, Resolution A.491(XII), in 1981, which is still extant and could be updated. Also Lloyd's Register has maintained a set of provisional rules for nuclear-propelled merchant ships, which it has recently revised.

Apart from naval use, where frequency of refueling is a major consideration, nuclear power seems most immediately promising for the following:

  • Large bulk carriers that go back and forth constantly on few routes between dedicated ports – eg China to South America and NW Australia. They could be powered by a reactor delivering 100 MW thrust.
  • Cruise liners, which have demand curves like a small town. A 70 MWe unit could give base-load and charge batteries, with a smaller diesel unit supplying the peaks. (The largest afloat today – Oasis class, with 100,000 t displacement – has about 60 MW shaft power derived from almost 100 MW total power plant.)
  • Nuclear tugs, to take conventional ships across oceans
  • Some kinds of bulk shipping, where speed is essential.
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US Nuclear Navy - Cruisers and Destroyers

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As the price of oil skyrocketed in 2008, some in Congress argued that it was pointless to keep building oil-powered warships. Surely the future lay with a return to the vision of the 1960s, when it seemed that nuclear power would soon dominate. A congressionally mandated study by the Congressional Research Service concluded that once oil was $70 per barrel, “the total life-cycle costs of a nuclear-powered medium-size surface combatant would equal that of a conventionally powered medium-size surface combatant.” It seems likely that the future cruiser, (CG[X]), at one time seen as a variant of the Zumwalt-class destroyer, will be nuclear powered. Therefore it appears to be a good time to take stock of the current nuclear program, to ask what has changed since the rush toward nuclear power stopped in the 1970s, and also to look at foreign nuclear-powered surface warships.

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Excluding carriers, the Navy commissioned nine nuclear surface ships between 1961 and 1980.

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In the late 1950s, it was assumed by some observers that at some point the U.S. Navy would build only nuclear warships. About 1955, the Bureau of Ships (the ancestor of the current Naval Sea Systems Command [NAVSEA]) produced a booklet of futuristic surface combatants, down to the level of frigates (then called destroyer escorts), all of them nuclear. The nuclear power organization within the bureau developed a range of reactor designs, including ones suitable for a cruiser(Long Beach) and, what was considered remarkable at the time, a large destroyer (Bainbridge), as well as for the carrier Enterprise. Excluding carriers, the Navy commissioned nine nuclear surface ships between 1961 and 1980. Long Beach(CGN 9), Bainbridge (CGN 25), and Truxtun (CGN 35) were each unique, the only ships of their class. These were followed by the two cruisers of the California class – California (CGN 36) and South Carolina (CGN 37) – and the four cruisers of the Virginia class – Virginia (CGN 38), Texas (CGN 39), Mississippi (CGN 40), and Arkansas (CGN 41). All of these ships were attractive because they could operate at maximum speed on a sustained basis. They were no faster than conventionally powered ships, but a ship using oil fuel cannot maintain high speed for very long. Particularly before the Soviets had nuclear submarines, speed itself offered considerable immunity to submarine attack. Even after the Soviets had submarines as fast as U.S. aircraft carriers, they could not hope to intercept such fast ships unless they were already trailing them, or they were cued by the Soviets’ complex ocean surveillance system. The latter was graphically demonstrated in 1968 when a Soviet November-class submarine intercepted USS Enterprise en route to Vietnam.

Current naval views of nuclear propulsion are inevitably colored by the way in which Adm. Hyman G. Rickover, for decades the chief of the program, handled it – and, more importantly, nuclear personnel. Rickover had a keen sense of the tactical and strategic potential of nuclear power. In effect he created a separate nuclear machinery organization outside the Bureau of Ships and its successor. His experience with conventional machinery convinced him that the nuclear innovation would succeed only if nuclear power was perceived as absolutely reliable. To that end, he insisted on intense training for all reactor operators (and all officers of nuclear ships had to be qualified operators). He rejected automation, the result being that nuclear engine rooms needed unusually large numbers of personnel who also were much more expensive than the average. Personnel made nuclear ships more expensive than might have been imagined. So did extremely strict standards for construction – which Rickover pointed out were the inevitable cost of the attractive new technology.

The pressurized-water reactors Rickover developed were inherently stable, hence safe. They operated at relatively low-steam conditions, which meant that the turbines they drove were considerably larger than those of contemporary fossil-fuel steam plants. Nuclear ships were larger than their non-nuclear counterparts. That was not always a bad thing. For example, nuclear carriers had large spaces, which were normally filled with fuel for escorts and for their aircraft. It does suggest that future nuclear ships will again be larger than their non-nuclear counterparts. That difference may be accentuated because current gas turbines are more compact than their steam predecessors – and they need far fewer personnel.

In the past, one attraction of nuclear power for surface ships was, first, that they needed much less support in the form of tankers. Although the Navy currently relies on unarmed tankers, that is only because it expects danger areas to be very localized, so that its ships can fuel in safety. In a harsher world, there would be no safe places. Tankers would have to be escorted, because they would always be at risk. Even now it can be argued that fueling is dangerous: USS Cole was attacked when she entered Aden to fuel. The example is probably misleading, because Colewas in Aden more to show the flag, but it will probably often be cited. If the future Navy is going to be severely limited in numbers, anything that provides more teeth for less tail may be appreciated – the question will be whether the higher cost of nuclear warships will cut teeth even more severely.

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It can also be argued that the fewer ships that are needed to support any one ship, the more difficult it will be for an enemy to be sure that a particular ship spotted by radar or satellite is actually a warship, or at least a U.S. warship. Thus limiting or eliminating support for future warships might be valued as a way of making them more survivable. Formations of ships are certainly more recognizable than individual units.

A second attraction is the ability to deploy at high sustained speed. Ships normally steam at well below their maximum speed because they have to limit fuel consumption. One reason nuclear submarines seem so valuable is that, unlike surface warships, they can move at maximum speed to distant places (they can also take advantage of not being subject to weather). For submarines, this is a new advantage, because in the past, submarines generally deployed at low speed to remain silent. With no major foreign power listening in most places, that no longer matters. The strategic mobility now associated with submarines may make nuclear surface combatants attractive.

A third advantage, related to the other two, is effectively infinite time on station, again without much afloat support. The Navy is currently intensely interested in the anti-missile mission, which is a key justification for the future cruiser. Anti-missile operations require such ships to loiter in forward areas. They must be survivable, which includes an ability to operate without giving an enemy the opportunity to cut them off by cutting their fuel support. Unlike most ships, the missile cruisers may be unable to withdraw every few days to fuel in a safe area; there may be no safe areas at all nearby.

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Yet another claimed advantage is the sheer power output of a reactor. When the Navy operated oil-fueled carriers, it was often said that they had to slow down when launching large numbers of aircraft because they could not generate enough steam for both flight operations and for full speed. In the late 1950s, when the Navy contemplated a new class of Typhoon missile ships, it planned to give them nuclear power specifically to provide sufficient power for their massive radars. It may be argued that a future anti-missile ship will need similar radar energy output. That might also apply to the power required for future beam weapons.

Reactors need fueling well before they literally exhaust their uranium. As it reacts, uranium forms by-products, notably xenon, which gradually poison it. Changing the amount of uranium or the configuration of the fuel can extend lifetime. Even if the amount of uranium has to be changed drastically, that is far less expensive than refueling.

Once the Soviets deployed fast nuclear submarines, it seemed that carrier groups needed antisubmarine protection. To use sonar effectively, they could no longer rush along at 30 knots; they had to limit themselves to about 20 to 25 knots. Once the Navy was used to such speeds, some asked whether higher speed was even worthwhile. This was one factor that led, by the end of the 1990s, to the decommissioning of all the Navy’s nuclear-powered cruisers. Without any enemy filling the sea with fast-attack submarines today, however, the argument may reverse. High sustained speed is exactly what the fleet needs in order to deploy to meet distant emergencies. In the past, the Navy maintained battle groups on station near possible hot spots, but that limited the number available at any one time. More recent practice has been to keep carriers home, often deploying them en masse as needed. In that case, sustained deployment speed matters a lot more.

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The other factor in the fall of the nuclear cruisers was the post-Vietnam crash in defense funding. Whatever its full-life cost, a nuclear cruiser cost a great deal more to buy. It needed a much larger crew, because its two reactors needed so many operators. In the 1960s, Congress mandated nuclear power for any surface warship of more than 8,000 tons. Post-Vietnam, that seemed more a matter of Rickover’s enormous political power than of naval logic. When Adm. Elmo Zumwalt Jr. became Chief of Naval Operations (CNO), he wanted to build a new cruiser or destroyer armed with the new Aegis system. Because of the law, he asked his ship designers to produce an Aegis destroyer, which turned out to be too small to be worthwhile. Ultimately, Aegis was shoehorned into the Spruance hull, which was just smaller than the mandated tonnage. It was generally understood that further nuclear surface combatants were not affordable. The existing nuclear cruisers were never fully modernized, and they were discarded at the end of the Cold War.

Currently the Navy operates two types of nuclear-powered warships: aircraft carriers and submarines. Carriers are powered by two huge reactors, producing at least 120,000 SHP each. Submarines occupy the other end of the U.S. scale. The Virginia class probably has about the same output as the earlier Los Angeles, about 30,000 SHP. Seawolf is more powerful. The much more massive (because inherently much quieter) reactor in Ohio-class missile submarines probably produces about 35,000 SHP. By way of comparison, a destroyer needs 80,000 to 100,000 SHP and a large amphibious ship 40,000 to 50,000 SHP. The missile cruisers of the 1960s were rated at 60,000 SHP, using two reactors like those in a Los Angeles. The big carrier reactors were developed as part of a program to reduce the number of reactors needed per ship, and hence the number of very expensive reactor operators. Its initial product was to have been a single destroyer reactor (i.e., 60,000 horsepower) and the carrier reactor is apparently the next step up in size.

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At least in the Navy, the lifetime cost of a nuclear-powered ship follows a very different cycle from that of a conventional warship. The ship is refitted when the reactor is refueled, and typically that is when the most money is spent. That makes sense because refueling inevitably involves cutting the ship open for access to a reactor buried deep inside. The reactor is deepest in a carrier, with her flight, hangar, and other decks over the reactor. In a submarine, the reactor is nearer the outside of the ship, but cutting into her pressure hull is difficult and must preserve the hull’s strength. For these reasons, for decades, the main thrust in reactor development has been toward extending lifetime. Reactors need fueling well before they literally exhaust their uranium. As it reacts, uranium forms by-products, notably xenon, which gradually poison it. Changing the amount of uranium or the configuration of the fuel can extend lifetime. Even if the amount of uranium has to be changed drastically, that is far less expensive than refueling. In submarines, the time between fuelings began at little more than a year, but by the 1960s it was eight years or more. Submarine operating life began to be expressed in terms of the number of fuelings the ship needed. Current submarine reactors are described as one-shot: They are never refueled during the 25- or 30-year life of the ship. Carriers are expected to last much longer; they are one-refueling ships.

Operators also make nuclear ships expensive to run. They need exhaustive training. Like pilots, their skills are valued by the civilian economy. Many naval reactor operators ended up running power plants ashore. Although the civilian nuclear power industry has been running down for years under the pressure of environmentalists, in the last few years there has been increasing understanding that nuclear power may be the main hope of reducing greenhouse gas emissions in the U.S. It also offers independence from foreign sources of oil – and many believe that money spent on foreign oil often ends up in terrorist hands. It seems likely that the next five years will see a revival of the American nuclear power industry. Any evaluation of naval reactor programs has to take such a possible revival into account. On one level, revival would benefit enormously from training given to naval operators. Such training might be seen as a government investment in civilian nuclear power, with the understanding that naval operators might not stay at sea nearly as long as the Navy might like.

For that matter, increasing investment in naval nuclear plants might fund expansion of nuclear reactor production in the United States and thus reduce the overhead cost associated with an expanded civilian nuclear power industry. In the 1960s, the last time the Navy seriously contemplated building nuclear surface ships (other than carriers), civilian use of nuclear power was expanding rapidly. If anything, the Navy was competing with the civilian sector for reactor production. There was no need to support the producers, but now there may be a very important need.

Kirovs have an unusual mixed plant. Their two reactors suffice for 24 knots, and oil-fired superheaters apparently provide extra steam to achieve their full 31 knots. If this description is correct, it probably reflects the fact that it is difficult to boost the power of a nuclear plant once it has been designed.

The $70 calculation probably concentrated on first cost and fuel cost. It is unlikely to have taken into account personnel cost, which many naval officers remember as the single worst factor in operating nuclear surface combatants. Another question, only rarely raised, is the effect of battle damage. A carrier operates so far offshore that the current littoral threats are probably irrelevant to her. A destroyer or a large amphibious ship might have to come a lot closer. These ships have very little protection, at least as currently designed. It would seem unwise to rule out battle damage. Even a relatively small shaped charge missile might penetrate to a reactor compartment. In that case, what sort of damage control would be possible? Would the standard response have to be scuttling the ship? In that case, working out the cost of a nuclear-powered surface ship would have to take into account her very different survivability. This sort of calculation was irrelevant to the Navy of the 1960s, which envisaged a short, sharp war against the Soviets rather than the sort of protracted, global low-level conflict in which we now find ourselves. In the short, sharp war, a ship out of action for a few weeks would have been as good as lost, because within those weeks either both sides would have come to terms or the war would have escalated into a nuclear holocaust (this vision may not have been terribly realistic, but it dominated defense thinking at the time). Now ships are periodically damaged – like USS Stark in the Gulf or USS Cole at Aden – and it is well worth our while to put them back into service, because we rightly think in terms of decades.

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The foreign nuclear ships amount to Russian, British, and French nuclear submarine forces, the French carrier Charles de Gaulle, and the Russian Kirov-class nuclear cruisers. The Royal Navy uses technology similar to ours. In the 1960s, it saw nuclear power as its future, but it had to abandon that idea because nuclear ships seemed unaffordable as its own resources plummeted. Like us, the British have embraced the one-shot reactor as a way of keeping nuclear warships affordable. Their submarine reactor technology was originally developed from ours, but their current natural-circulation reactors are apparently entirely their own.

The French took an approach very different from the United States. U.S. and British reactors are fueled by highly enriched uranium, which gives them long operating lifetimes. The French decided that high rates of enrichment were too expensive, so they chose instead to design ships specifically to use limited-life fuel, which they call caramel (because the pieces of fuel resemble large candies). Reactor lifetime is about eight years, and the current plant in a Le Triomphant- class strategic submarine produces about 41,500 SHP. When the high-level decision was taken that the next carrier would be nuclear, no money was allocated for a powerful new reactor; it may be that caramel fuel is not compatible with power outputs much above 40,000 SHP. The nuclear reactor project for theCharles de Gaulle replaced an earlier one for a much smaller nuclear-powered helicopter carrier, and possibly some of those involved did not realize how different a full-scale carrier would be. Carrier internal volume was inevitably limited, partly by the (again political) decision to build the ship at Brest naval shipyard, with a building dock of limited dimensions. Apparently there was enough space for two of the big Le Triomphant-type power trains, including the reactors, giving the carrier 83,000 SHP – about a third of what the U.S. Navy uses to power its Nimitz-class carriers, which are something more than twice her displacement. Unsurprisingly, Charles de Gaulle proved slow for a carrier, and the French Navy plans to use conventional power if it builds a second carrier. For the future, nuclear power in the French Navy will probably be confined to submarines. That does not indicate any disenchantment; the French abandoned their non-nuclear submarine force because they found nuclear power far more worthwhile.

The Russians embraced nuclear submarine construction on a larger scale than any other navy. They did not, apparently, accompany that embrace with sufficient investment in means of refueling reactors or, for that matter, decommissioning them. The Soviet system emphasized quantity production over developing infrastructure, and apparently it did not support the kind of longer-life reactor fuel developed in Britain and in the United States. The big reactor in an Akula or Sierra is rated at 50,000 SHP, which is probably somewhat more than in a U.S. Seawolf. Kirovs have an unusual mixed plant. Their two reactors suffice for 24 knots, and oil-fired superheaters apparently provide extra steam to achieve their full 31 knots. If this description is correct, it probably reflects the fact that it is difficult to boost the power of a nuclear plant once it has been designed. Soviet warship designs notoriously grew as work progressed, as more and more improvements were piled on. The choice of reactor had to be made at a very early stage, the design of the reactor proceeding more or less in parallel with that of the ship. At some point, a nuclear plant that would have been perfect for, say, a 10,000 tonner fell far short of what a much larger ship needed. At that point, the only way to regain speed would have been the oil-fired booster. Like much of the former Soviet fleet, the nuclear cruisers of the Kirov class have suffered from lack of maintenance, and only one, Pyotr Velikiy, is active. Two more are undergoing repairs or are laid up, and may or may not go to sea again.

Whether new U.S. Navy nuclear-powered surface ships other than carriers will one day put out to sea remains an open question.

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Two refit Iowa Class battleships, the nuclear guided missile cruiser USS Long Beach, aSpruance Class destroyer and what looks like a pair of Knox Class frigates all churn through the ocean as a wall of haze-gray painted steel. All of these ships have since been retired but the exotic mix of classes that made up Reagan's '600 ship navy' is still an awesome sight to behold.

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Nuclear Air Force?




At the height of the Cold War, U.S. Air Force scientists dreamed of a fleet of nuclear-powered aircraft. They almost made it happen.

It was 1955. The atomic power industry was maturing in the United States, and President Eisenhower had already made his call for "atoms for peace." The industrial race to domesticate the atom was underway.

A modified B-36 Bomber became the nation's only flying nuclear reactor in 1955. The plane, which became as the Nuclear Test Aircraft, help explore nuclear-powered propulsion and the effects of radiation on airframes.
The military race to employ to our nation's defense was already more than 15 years old.

"Popular Mechanics" painted visions of a helpful "nuclear genie" that included everything from nuclear-powered excavation to atomic-powered homes. The atom was being trained to become man's best friend.

Meanwhile, the U.S. Navy had its nuclear-powered vessels like the U.S.S. Nautilus - the Navy's first nuclear-powered submarine. Down the hall in the Pentagon, Air Force leaders wanted a nuclear-powered craft of their own for similar reasons - unlimited range, power and endurance.

The interest in atomic-powered aircraft began in 1946 in the Nuclear Energy for the Propulsion of Aircraft (NEPA) program managed by the Army Air Force and later the independent U.S. Air Force. By the end of 1948 the U.S. Air Force had invested nearly $10 million. While experts prepared extensive studies on their feasibility, actual aircraft development waited until after 1951 when the Aircraft Nuclear Propulsion (ANP) program replaced NEPA.

ANP aimed to "produce full-scale development aircraft reactor and engine systems" according to Brian Bikowicz, a nuclear history scholar. While Project Pluto successfully tested nuclear ramjets and Project Rover tested nuclear-powered rockets, an operational atomic aircraft was never actually developed.

"[M]anned nuclear aircraft pose the most difficult engineering development job yet attempted with in this century," said ANP Director B.C. Briant in 1954.

The difficulty didn't stop the Air Force and its team of scientists from trying.

In 1952, the Air Force started the X-6 program to produce two flying testbeds powered by atomic energy. The Air Force chose a modified Convair B-36 "Peacemaker," designated the NB-36H. Only one of these special aircraft ever made it to testing - Serial No. 51-5712, the Nuclear Test Aircraft (NTA).

The NB-36H carried a small air-cooled reactor in the aft bomb bay. The NTA had shielding around the reactor itself and a totally new nose section, which housed a twelve-ton lead and rubber crew compartment. In the fuselage and behind the crew compartment, designers installed water jackets to absorb radiation. Due to the modifications only the pilot and copilot could see through the foot-thick, leaded-glass windshield. A closed-circuit television system allowed the crew to check the reactor as well as other sections of the aircraft.

Between 1955 and 1957, the NTA made 47 test flights yielding valuable data on the effects of radiation upon airframe and components.

The United States had competition in creating atomic-powered aircraft. The Soviet Union operated a similar test program. One Soviet plan envisioned a "flying boat." In the plans for the aircraft "the wing span was more than 130 meters, and the total power of the engines exceeded one-half million horsepower. This airplane was supposed to carry 1,000 passengers and 100 tons of load at a speed of 1,000 kilometers per hour" according to R. G. Perelman in "Soviet Nuclear Propulsion" (1960).

In late 1958, "Aviation Week" reported that the Soviets successfully flew a prototype of an atomic-powered bomber. This report, accompanied by the general paranoia created by Sputnik and the enthusiasm of a technological race, temporarily fueled ANP to increased budgets.

But, the enthusiasm would not last. In the end, the program produced too few results over too long a period. The development of accurate and powerful missiles and the growing emphasis on space also lessened the appeal of atomic-powered aircraft. On March 28, 1961 President Kennedy cancelled the ANP program writing, "Nearly 15 years and about $1 billion have been devoted to the attempted development of a nuclear-powered aircraft; but the possibility of achieving a militarily useful aircraft in the foreseeable future is still very remote." President Kennedy redirected much of the effort toward space and the race to reach the moon -- an effort and endeavor that captivated the American imagination, public support and eventually succeeded.

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HTRE 3 and 1 - nuclear aircraft engine test bed
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J3 reactor prototype
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"Between 1946 and 1961, the Air Force and the Atomic Energy Commission spent more than $7 billion trying to develop a nuclear-powered aircraft. Although no airplane ever flew under nuclear power, the Air Force converted a B-36 bomber, known as the Nuclear Test Aircraft, to carry an operating three-megawatt air-cooled reactor to assess operational problems (it made 47 flights over Texas and New Mexico between July 1955 and March 1957). The NB-36H carried the reactor in its aft bomb bay and incorporated a new nose section, which housed a 12 ton lead and rubber shielded crew compartment with 10-12 inch (25-30 centimeters) thick leaded-glass windows. Water pockets in the fuselage and behind the crew compartment also absorbed radiation (due to weight constraints, nothing was done to shield the considerable emissions from the top, bottom or sides of the reactor)." (Source: Brookings Institute)
In theory, nuclear-powered aircraft could stay in flight for weeks at a time. General Electric built two prototype engines for such a plane. These engines exist today and can be viewed outside the EBR-1 complex in Arco, Idaho.

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A Brief History of Nuclear Airplanes

Airplanes were an integral part of combat during WWII, but flight time was limited by each plane’s fuel capacity—this was a time before mid-flight refueling technology. Planes had to land to refuel fairly frequently making it nearly impossible to fly long distances. One proposed solution for the fuel problem was using atomic energy to power the aircraft.

THE CRUSADER
In 1951, the Atomic Energy Commission ordered the first nuclear-powered airplane into production. The existing B-36 was selected as the base model for the plane, and was modified to carry a reactor and shielding to protect the crew from radiation. The plane’s name was changed to NB-36 to note the nuclear aspect of the plane.

By 1955, the NB-36 (top), christened “The Crusader” by the crew, was able to fly with an operational nuclear reactor on board, though the reactor did not power the plane’s engines. The Crusader and her crew of five flew 47 test flights, mostly over New Mexico and Texas, between 1955 and 1957. The plane’s reactor was operational during 89 of 215 flight hours.

The aim of the test flights was two-fold. First, we wanted to see if nuclear reactors would operate as expected in an airplane (remember, this is early in the Atomic Age), and second, to see if the plane’s shielding would protect the crew from the nuclear reactor’s radiation during flight. This was risky business. In fact, so risky that each test flight was shadowed by a transport plane full of marines. The marines' purpose? To seal off the radioactive crash site should the plane crash. Thankfully, the marines were never needed to seal off a crash site.

THE ENGINES

Once we knew that nuclear reactors operated as expected in flight and that adequate shielding could be provided to a crew, the U.S. turned its attention to the design of a nuclear engine. Two approaches were taken, by two separate contractors. General Electric set about designing a direct cycle engine, while Pratt & Whitney worked on an indirect cycle engine.

General Electric’s design involved a reactor with longitudinal holes, through which cold air entered the reactor. The cold air then moved into tiny holes, where it was heated by the heat put off by the nuclear reactor during fission. The heated air would then expand and produce thrust, which in theory would power the airplane. The idea is simple in principle, but quite dirty; the direct cycle engine essentially spewed radioactive air all over the place.

Pratt & Whitney’s design was more complex, but safer. The indirect design involved a nuclear reactor and a separate propulsion unit. Molten metal was used to transfer heat from the reactor to the propulsion unit, so there was much less radioactive air in the mix. But the indirect design involved much more plumbing, and so was heavier, which was problematic in an airplane.

Development of both types of engines hummed along steadily, but slowly, until the end of 1958.

AVIATION WEEK
On December 1, 1958, Aviation Week ran an article titled, “Soviets Flight Testing Nuclear Bomber.” The article claimed that the Soviets had flown an atomic-powered plane more than 40 times, with great success. Not to be outdone, the U.S. stepped up their nuclear engine development game.

By 1960, progress was being made with both the direct and indirect cycle engines. The direct cycle engine was running routinely, and test flights looked to be not too far off, but it somehow seemed that Eisenhower was spinning his wheels getting the whole program off the ground. It was a presidential election year. Frustrated that Soviets had an operational atomic airplane before we did, and at Eisenhower’s seeming ambivalence to it, Kennedy promised to pump additional resources into the atomic airplane project should he be elected.

Kennedy won the election—and within several months of taking office, he cancelled the nuclear airplane program all together. What happened? Well, it turns out that Eisenhower’s ambivalence to the whole thing was warranted. Late in his term, he found out that the Soviets did not in fact have an atomic airplane. The whole thing was a hoax. And we bought into it hard.

So, the atomic airplane scheme faded into history. Until the fall of the Iron Curtain.

THE 1990S
In the '90s, when the Berlin Wall fell and communism crumbled away, we found out that the Soviets did in fact have an atomic airplane, just not when we thought they did. The Soviets never stopped working on the idea of a nuclear airplane, and during the '60s, they flew an honest- to-goodness atomic powered airplane—forty or so times throughout the decade.

So how did they do it? Shielding the crew from radiation had always been the piece of the puzzle we couldn’t land; in order to provide ample protection to the crew, the shielding would be so heavy that the plane wouldn’t be able to leave the ground. How did the Soviets solve this riddle? They didn’t. The Soviets’ nuclear powered airplane did not provide sufficient shielding to the crew, and the first crew member died three years after the test flights from his exposure to radiation.
 
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:o:... did you actually read all of it? If so:yahoo:, I feel so proud!!! I get a feeling most people don't:(.

Power reading, mon ami. ;)

In the late 1950s, it was assumed by some observers that at some point the U.S. Navy would build only nuclear warships. About 1955, the Bureau of Ships (the ancestor of the current Naval Sea Systems Command [NAVSEA]) produced a booklet of futuristic surface combatants, down to the level of frigates (then called destroyer escorts), all of them nuclear. The nuclear power organization within the bureau developed a range of reactor designs, including ones suitable for a cruiser(Long Beach) and, what was considered remarkable at the time, a large destroyer (Bainbridge), as well as for the carrier Enterprise. Excluding carriers, the Navy commissioned nine nuclear surface ships between 1961 and 1980. Long Beach(CGN 9), Bainbridge (CGN 25), and Truxtun (CGN 35) were each unique, the only ships of their class. These were followed by the two cruisers of the California class – California (CGN 36) and South Carolina (CGN 37) – and the four cruisers of the Virginia class – Virginia (CGN 38), Texas (CGN 39), Mississippi (CGN 40), and Arkansas (CGN 41). All of these ships were attractive because they could operate at maximum speed on a sustained basis. They were no faster than conventionally powered ships, but a ship using oil fuel cannot maintain high speed for very long. Particularly before the Soviets had nuclear submarines, speed itself offered considerable immunity to submarine attack. Even after the Soviets had submarines as fast as U.S. aircraft carriers, they could not hope to intercept such fast ships unless they were already trailing them, or they were cued by the Soviets’ complex ocean surveillance system. The latter was graphically demonstrated in 1968 when a Soviet November-class submarine intercepted USS Enterprise en route to Vietnam.

I never knew that the USN actually operated nuclear surface ships , besides the carriers. I know this is going on a side tangent, but are there any plans at the moment for the US Navy to develop successor ships for the Ticonderoga Class Cruisers? Will they be nuclear powered as well?
 
I know this is going on a side tangent, but are there any plans at the moment for the US Navy to develop successor ships for the Ticonderoga Class Cruisers? Will they be nuclear powered as well?

Not a tangent at all. Actually, there has been talk about a return to the nuclear navy concept, though the Navy isn't too keen on cruisers any more

Talk has mostly centered around nuclear battleships:

Warfare is always evolving and advancing, and the US Navy is no stranger to this fact. Weapons that were once considered science-fiction are now a reality. Lasers, railguns, robotic assistants all may be in their infancy but the next generation of warships fielded on the high seas will all but assuredly sport these tools of warfare once considered fantasy.

The potential impact weapon platforms like railguns and lasers can have on the battlefield is enormous. Even in their fledgling state this technology can boast impressive numbers. Railguns can hurl projectiles with raw kinetic power through multiple layers of steel-reinforced concrete effortlessly. Lasers can detonate the fuel tanks of small ships and UAVs long before they pose a threat to the fleet.

But the US Navy is not content with what already seems like exciting capability. They want more. More range, more power, more ferocity. As the effectiveness of these weapons scale further into the extreme, the cost of operating these weapons on a sea vessel will increase as well. Right now, one of the biggest missing pieces to supporting lasers and railguns with far greater power than seen today is power, and lots of it.

The US Navy is anticipating this increased need for power and is currently fielding a new class of destroyer called the Zumwalt with a next-generation power plant capable of supporting a railgun or laser system. The Zumwalt can only accommodate a limited number of these weapons and the current or near-future iterations of these platforms. As mentioned earlier, Navy has shown no interest in keeping around what is available today if more powerful options are developed in the future. The Zumwalt’s power system also runs on fossil fuels, which carries with it a number of disadvantages independent of power requirements but when combined with the exponentially increasing demand for power appears as if it is moving towards obsolescence.

THE NUCLEAR OPTION
Currently, only a select few classes of vessels are powered by nuclear reactors. With the 2009 retirement of the USS Kitty Hawk the US carrier fleet is now entirely powered by nuclear fuel. Unsurprisingly, the US submarine fleet also boasts nuclear power. However, the backbone of carrier group fleets, namely that of destroyers and cruisers, still operate based on fossil fuel engines.

The concept of having an entirely nuclear surface fleet is not merely theoretical, a many of the US Navy’s surface craft were nuclear powered during the 1980s where a number of advantages over fossil fuels were documented and solidified. However, the 1990s saw a number of defense cutbacks in the wake ofDesert Storm and the large number of nuclear surface craft requiring refuel (and the high bill that goes with it) spurred Congress into decommissioning these nuclear propulsion components.

Given the rate at which technology in nearly all areas advances, the two decades since a nuclear surface fleet roamed the seas may have seen enough increases in cost and efficiency such that a nuclear propulsion option may be worth another look. Apart from the increased power production potential available through nuclear power, there are a number of other advantages in mothballing fossil-fuel based systems:

  • The increase in power output translates to a higher sustained tempo of operation (less time needed to stop and refuel/more time combat-ready in a warzone)
  • Ships can travel faster and for a longer period of time
  • Fossil fuel engines and fuel storage can require more space than nuclear alternatives
  • Less frequent refueling requirements translates to less need for logistics ships accompanying surface fleets
  • The price of oil is very volatile whereas nuclear fuel stays relatively constant
The last two items on this list can translate to some pretty compelling cases for cost saving via nuclear power as well. Since Congress is likely to remain cost conscious as it has been in the recent past, monetary considerations may outweigh the other points, important though they may be.

FUTURE WEAPONS
All of the inherent advantages that come with nuclear-powered surface ships still may be a secondary consideration to the power requirements coming with the weapon platforms of the not so distant future. The oft-touted railgun and laser weaponry the Navy is moving to deploy are in infancy stages, but many of the engineers and scientists on the cutting edge of these fields foresee the a capabilities of these devices increasing in an exponential fashion. It would not be a stretch to imagine that as laser and railgun effectiveness increases through technological developments that so will the power requirements to keep these beasts of war well fed.

In a recent Popular Science article, one can see just how important the scalability of power is to the capabilities of railguns:

How far the shot goes depends on the power supplied. Smaller railguns might release a projectile at 20 megajoules, which means that at flying level it can go up to 60 miles. A larger railgun, the kind that draws 25 megawatts of power, can release projectiles at 32 megajoules of energy, where they will travel up to a 110 miles at a level trajectory. With the 25 megawatts, a railgun can also fire up to 10 times a minute, creating an anti-ship or anti-coastal weapon that's fast firing, cheaper than a missile, and at least as deadly.

Lasers, as well, will be gluttons for power. Given that a laser is essentially a beam of pure energy, for this weapon platform virtually everything relies on a steady, powerful stream of energy. Given that there are no real munitions being fired, lasers could theoretically be fired indefinitely without being reloaded. This offers the Navy a considerable advantage in surface combat as would-be adversaries focus on developing high numbers of cheap unmanned war vessels much like the United States has.

Lasers also come with some significant technical hurdles around cooling. But here again, engineers have proposed some cooling solutions that would require high amounts of energy to help mitigate high temperatures that inevitably occur when using a high-powered laser.

Additionally, some of these futuristic weapons aren’t exactly light on the space requirements themselves. The amount of capacitor-stored power necessary to generate the current to propel a railgun object is no trivial matter. Even if current nuclear technology leads to more cargo space for warships, even that net gain may not be enough to accommodate future weapons as they scale in power.

THE CASE FOR THE DREADNOUGHT
So if fielding vessels that produce awesome amounts of power will likely require more space than the current ship size of choice and the future weapons platforms of the day will also require their share of real estate aboard, is it so hard to foresee the rise of a new class of capital ship? It seems impossible that a surface capital ship will replace the current doctrine of destroyers and cruisers of the day, but when taking into account coastal fire support, ballistic missile defense, and even the unlikely surface combat there is plenty of historical precedent for needing these large battle behemoths. The case of ballistic missile defense is particularly poignant in light of longstanding findings that the Navy’s new Zumwalt ships will likely fall short in their ability to provide area air defense – in particular when it comes to ballistic missile attacks.

The US Navy is no stranger to bringing back “the big guns” when a clear need has arisen. For numerous conflicts the United States has called on the service of their mothballed battleships to provide fire support in the nearby waters of the battlefield.

The USS New Jersey was reactivated after 10 years of dormancy to help with fire support in Vietnam after the US sustained heavy pilot losses from NVA anti-aircraft measures. The New Jersey would again be called up during the Reagan years as part of his initiative to revitalize the US surface fleet. This time the venerable battleship would provide fire support in Lebanon during their civil war in the 1980s. Similarly, theUSS Missouri, a ship which holds the distinct honor of being the venue for Japan’s surrender during WWII, was reactivated after a long hiatus to provide fire support for soldiers during Operation Desert Storm.

Will we see massive capital ships roaming the world’s trouble spots loaded with futuristic weapons and fantastical capabilities? Not any time soon. But the potential is there and unless a game-changing method of producing an abundance of safe, reliable power on a warship is developed soon it’s possible that more space will be required to meet the Navy’s need for firepower and operational capabilities. Of course, all of this is speculation and, frankly, wishful thinking. Seeing a dreadnought loaded with lasers and railguns is undeniably an exciting thought but one can only imagine the price tag. Regardless of how the navies of tomorrow accommodate new technologies available to them, the next few decades will no doubt prove to be ever-changing and very interesting to follow.

I never knew that the USN actually operated nuclear surface ships , besides the carriers.

The USN operated several nuclear cruiser/destroyer variants:

USS Bainbridge (CGN-25) - Wikipedia, the free encyclopedia

Virginia-class cruiser - Wikipedia, the free encyclopedia

California-class cruiser - Wikipedia, the free encyclopedia

USS Truxtun (CGN-35) - Wikipedia, the free encyclopedia

USS Long Beach (CGN-9) - Wikipedia, the free encyclopedia


Sorry, the posts got merged!!!


Nuclear Navy - Carriers

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It has been a little over half a century since the first nuclear-powered warship, the submarine USS Nautilus, signaled that she was under way on nuclear power in 1955. Carriers like USS George H.W. Bush (CVN 77) are among the main beneficiaries of the naval revolution she represented. Nuclear power can drive such a ship at full speed for years on end. It provides the sort of electric power needed for modern electronics and, in the next carrier generation, for new devices like electric catapults and, possibly, lasers for self-defense. As a side benefit, a nuclear carrier does not suffer from the sort of smoke corrosion that used to destroy carrier radars and other electronics, not to mention carrier aircraft themselves.

Rickover’s decisive contribution was to realize as early as 1948 that he knew enough to build a prototype power plant. That was very courageous. Money was tight, and further studies might easily have uncovered some unsuspected problem.

The U.S. Navy’s journey to nuclear power began in 1946, when two scientists at the Office of Naval Research (ONR) pointed out that a submarine so powered would have unlimited underwater endurance at high speed. There was intense interest in high underwater speed because the Germans had pioneered it during World War II. The batteries which then powered submarines offered about an hour or less of endurance at maximum speed. The Germans had partly developed a closed-cycle Walter power plant that promised 10 hours at high speed. Nothing more seemed possible because a submerged submarine had no access to air for her diesel. The Germans had pioneered the snorkel, through which the diesel could breathe when the submarine was at periscope depth, but a submarine could not operate at maximum speed when snorkeling, and no submariner wanted to be limited to periscope depth.

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At that time the only reactors in the world were used to make plutonium for atomic bombs. It was widely expected that atomic reactors would soon produce plentiful electric power, but that was a dream rather than a reality. Much of the enormous industrial team assembled to build the wartime atomic bombs (and the plutonium-making reactors) had dispersed, and the wartime bomb program run down to the point where, in 1946, the United States had no usable atomic weapons at all. Submariners were interested in new kinds of propulsion, but that generally meant various forms of closed-cycle engines, like the semi-developed German Walter plant. Surely it would be decades before nuclear power reached any sort of potential. The Bureau of Ships formed a small nuclear propulsion team, headed by Capt. Hyman Rickover.

Rickover was interested in the potential of nuclear power throughout the navy. His whole career had been built in naval propulsion machinery, and he had witnessed several major U.S. advances, leading up to the remarkably efficient and reliable high-pressure high-temperature power plants of World War II.

Rickover sponsored studies of various alternative power reactors from which heat might be extracted in the form of hot water or molten metal or gas. Rickover’s decisive contribution was to realize as early as 1948 that he knew enough to build a prototype power plant. That was very courageous. Money was tight, and further studies might easily have uncovered some unsuspected problem. Indeed, Rickover initially bet on liquid metal, and only later switched his main focus to water. However, his decision led to the construction of a prototype plant. Rickover further accelerated development by deciding that the land-based prototype would be matched by the prototype planned for installation in the first nuclear submarine. Changes to the prototype to solve problems as they were encountered would be duplicated in the submarine reactor. By 1950, the Bureau of Ships was designing the prototype submarine. Rickover contributed further by demanding that it be armed, as a combatant, rather than limited to power plant tests. There was already interest in arming such a submarine with guided missiles, but Rickover wanted to separate the test of the power plant from the tests of such new weapons.

Rickover’s program was viable despite tight defense funds because major companies like Westinghouse and General Electric saw it as an opening into a potentially huge civilian power market. In 1948, Rickover attended a Submarine Officers’ Conference in Washington that discussed progress in the new power plants. Captains in charge of various programs complained that companies would not assign their best engineers, because it seemed unlikely that the navy would ever build many such plants, and because they had no civilian applications. Then Rickover spoke. He had no such problems. The companies were building the necessary laboratories at their own expense. They were pushing their best people into the nuclear program. It turned out that his plant was ready years before any of the others – and it was inherently far superior, because the closed-cycle plants offered only a few hours underwater at high speed. Even in 1952, he offered weeks, and that soon extended to months and then years before a submarine had to be refueled.

Rickover was interested in the potential of nuclear power throughout the navy. His whole career had been built in naval propulsion machinery, and he had witnessed several major U.S. advances, leading up to the remarkably efficient and reliable high-pressure high-temperature power plants of World War II. Their technology had given the wartime navy unprecedented mobility. One lesson was that new power plant technology had to be spread across the fleet if it was to offer its full potential. For example, a nuclear fleet would gain high-speed mobility, which would protect it from submarine attack (in a pre-nuclear submarine era). It would not be tied to tankers, which themselves might be attacked by an enemy. Once he felt he understood nuclear engineering, he proposed design of a range of larger and smaller plants. The smaller ones might be used to build less expensive submarines. The largest were clearly intended for carriers and cruisers. Chief of Naval Operations Adm. Robert Carney approved Rickover’s program in 1954, before the prototype Nautilus went to sea. The high end of the series of reactors offered 30,000 horsepower, twice what the Nautilus plant put out. The new Forrestal-class carriers required 280,000, so eight of the high-end reactors could power a carrier, particularly if their power could be boosted slightly.

Preliminary design work on a nuclear carrier began in 1955; USS Enterprise was included in the FY 58 program, for the year beginning 1 July 1957. She was a spectacular achievement, but she was also spectacularly expensive to build and to maintain. Each of her eight reactors required its own operators, for example. The hull large enough to accommodate this power plant was far more massive than that of a pre-nuclear carrier. Rickover argued vigorously that all future carriers should be nuclear, but the sheer cost of the new ship was a deterrent. After one more (non-nuclear) carrier, construction of new carriers paused for a few years (it had been running one per year) when money was diverted to the crash program to build Polaris strategic submarines – another type of warship which Rickover’s new kind of propulsion had made practicable.

Compared to a steam plant, a nuclear plant requires a larger cadre of more skilled operators. Rickover was acutely aware that any nuclear accident would kill nuclear power for the U.S. Navy, so he insisted on high (some would say extravagantly severe) standards for those operating the plants and commanding the ships they powered.

Meanwhile Rickover’s Naval Nuclear Reactor organization strove to simplify carrier power plants. It realized that the key was cutting the number of reactors. It proved possible almost to double reactor power, so that a carrier could be built with four rather than eight, albeit with less power than Enterprise. This ship was not built. Secretary of Defense Robert S. McNamara argued that it would still be so much more expensive than a conventional carrier as not to be worthwhile. Rickover and other nuclear supporters argued that was an illusion. The nuclear carrier would be far less vulnerable, thanks to her sustained speed, she would need far less tanker support (she would still need fuel for her aircraft), and she would be easier to maintain. McNamara’s decision was embodied in USS John F. Kennedy, the last U.S. non-nuclear carrier. Echoes of McNamara’s arguments could still be heard in the 1980s, in attempts to eliminate nuclear power so as to cut carrier cost. The issue was generally the purchase cost of the carrier as compared with the cost of operating her over her lifetime. At the time it was probably not imagined that the U.S. Navy would typically operate carriers for as long as fifty years, far beyond the operating lifetimes of earlier kinds of warships. That was possible partly because the sheer size of these ships limits the stress imposed by the sea.

Compared to a steam plant, a nuclear plant requires a larger cadre of more skilled operators. Rickover was acutely aware that any nuclear accident would kill nuclear power for the U.S. Navy, so he insisted on high (some would say extravagantly severe) standards for those operating the plants and commanding the ships they powered. Experience suggested that for a small ship, a cruiser or a large destroyer, nuclear power entailed too high a cost in personnel. That cost was well worth paying in a submarine. A carrier and her air wing require so many highly skilled personnel that the additional cost of a nuclear power plant was bearable. If, as advocates of energy independence and conservation suggest, nuclear power will have a larger role in the future, the naval nuclear program will provide most of the new reactor operators needed. The Navy will have to compete with a livelier civilian sector, and the cost of nuclear personnel will undoubtedly rise. So, perhaps, will the cost of reactors, if the companies making them have a larger civilian role. Even in the 1950s operators were seen as a major nuclear expense, because they required so much specialized training.

Enterprise was difficult to maintain because her eight reactors were closely coupled together. Like any other nuclear ship, she had to be opened up periodically so that the reactors could be refueled. In a carrier the power plant is buried deep in the ship, beneath the flight and hangar decks. These decks have to be cut open to give access to the reactors; there is no way to get at the vertical fuel rods from the side.

Thus Naval Reactors continued to develop larger reactors that would need fewer operators. By the 1960s the U.S. Navy had not only a nuclear cruiser (Long Beach) but even a large nuclear destroyer (Bainbridge, later redesignated a cruiser). Each had two reactors. The U.S. Navy was then planning a class of Typhon missile destroyers with huge radars, which, it seemed, would need nuclear power to drive them. Naval Reactors developed a single reactor that could replace the usual pair of destroyer reactors. It never entered service, but the lessons learned made it possible for Naval Reactors to double power again (and then some) into a reactor two of which could power a carrier. This new reactor was available when Secretary McNamara left office (1967) and the design of another new carrier began – USS Nimitz.

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This was remarkable progress. It was little more than a decade since Rickover had received authority to develop his range of reactors. Now his organization was offering one about four times as powerful – not to mention much more fuel-efficient.

Enterprise was difficult to maintain because her eight reactors were closely coupled together. Like any other nuclear ship, she had to be opened up periodically so that the reactors could be refueled. In a carrier the power plant is buried deep in the ship, beneath the flight and hangar decks. These decks have to be cut open to give access to the reactors; there is no way to get at the vertical fuel rods from the side. That is why other modifications to a carrier are generally held back to refueling time. Alternatively, it might be said that much of the cost of operating a nuclear ship is spent when she is refueled. Eight closely coupled reactors required a huge refueling hole and an enormous amount of special piping.

Moreover, concentrating a ship’s power plant in one place makes her vulnerable to a single underwater hit. Since before World War II, U.S. design practice had been to split power plants so that no single hit amidships could immobilize a ship. Enterprise violated that requirement because of the need to concentrate those eight reactors (they shared important auxiliary machinery). With their single funnels, conventional carriers did suffer from some concentration, but they still had dispersed power plants. Since they needed no funnels, reactor plants could, at least in theory, be spread out more widely than their conventional predecessors, giving their ships better survivability.

For a time, in the 1970s, there was a legal requirement that all U.S. combatants of over 8,000 tons be nuclear-powered, unless the president specifically waived that condition. The U.S. Navy built several large nuclear destroyers (later designated cruisers), but found them unsatisfactory. In contrast to a carrier, the nuclear power plant was too great a fraction of their building and operating cost. They proved cramped, and they lacked anti-submarine capability (they were too noisy, because it would have been too expensive to silence their power plants).

Nimitz embodied that potential. Each of her two quite separate reactors drives a pair of steam turbines. Physically separating the reactors made it possible to disperse other vital parts of the ship, such as magazines. The split power plant is less vulnerable to attack or to other damage. It is also much easier to open up the ship to refuel two widely separated reactors. George H.W. Bush, the U.S. Navy’s newest carrier, has much the same reactor arrangement as Nimitz, but Naval Reactors has been working hard over the intervening forty years.

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Since Nimitz, Naval Reactors has sought to lengthen the interval between fuelings, because that cuts the cost of running a nuclear ship. This is a matter of the design of the reactor’s nuclear core (new cores are designed to fit existing reactors, so in effect all nuclear carriers are upgraded over time). A reactor does not simply run out of fuel; when it is shut down there is still a good deal of burnable uranium in the fuel rods. Instead, as the fuel is used, byproducts such as Xenon form in the rods. Xenon in particular can poison the reactor, because it absorbs the neutrons that drive the chain reaction powering it. Changes in core design make it possible to run longer before the rods must be removed and the material inside purged of Xenon. Once enough Xenon has been formed, the reactor has to shut down. The Xenon poisoning problem recalls the very old problem of ships burning coal: periodically they had to turn down their boilers so that the ashes choking them could be removed. The difference is that Xenon cannot simply be sloughed off and the reactor restarted. It has to be chemically extracted from fuel rods along with other byproducts of nuclear fission (new rods are inserted into the reactor at refueling time). The time scale is of course far longer now. The goal is a core that lasts the life of the ship, so that she is never refueled. That is being done for submarines. Current cores last 20 to 25 years, limiting a carrier to one refueling during her career. The next carrier, USS Gerald R. Ford, is to have a full-life (50 year) core. Her reactors are also to be about a quarter more powerful than those of George H.W. Bush.

Rickover envisaged an all-nuclear task force with unlimited endurance. For a time, in the 1970s, there was a legal requirement that all U.S. combatants of over 8,000 tons be nuclear-powered, unless the president specifically waived that condition. The U.S. Navy built several large nuclear destroyers (later designated cruisers), but found them unsatisfactory. In contrast to a carrier, the nuclear power plant was too great a fraction of their building and operating cost. They proved cramped, and they lacked anti-submarine capability (they were too noisy, because it would have been too expensive to silence their power plants).

Moreover, a carrier battle group cannot be completely independent of tankers. Naval aviation is a very demanding profession. Even when a carrier is not fighting, her pilots must keep flying to maintain their proficiency. The carrier must take on aviation fuel periodically. Her gas turbine-powered escorts burn the same fuel, so it is not so very difficult for the carrier to fuel them periodically. The carrier herself benefits hugely from her nuclear power plant. It turns out that carriers need layers of liquids in their sides as torpedo protection; in non-nuclear days they carried the ship’s fuel oil. Eliminating the need for the carrier’s own fuel left the layers of fuel for her aircraft (which gained more flying days between refueling) and for the escorts. This compromise has proven quite successful.

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