Israel's Air and Sea Based Delivery systems
Aircrafts
Israel’s air-based, nuclear-capable delivery vehicles include approximately 50 F-4E-2000 Phantom aircrafts with a 1600 km range, and 205 F-16 Falcon aircrafts with a 630 km range, which are capable of carrying nuclear and chemical bombs.11 Both aircrafts are American in origin. It is believed that Israel’s nuclear forces were put on high alert during the 1973 Yom Kippur War. An F-4E squadron was placed on high alert, ready to strike with the country’s nuclear arsenal. Although the battle turned in Israel’s favour, it appears that in 1973 the Middle East came quite close to a nuclear conflict.
Submarines
Israel has also acquired three Type 800 Dolphin class submarines from Germany in 1998-9. Two of these were ‘donated’ by Germany. There are some suspicions that the US might have paid for the submarines. The Dolphins have nearly a 3,000-mile operating range and are equipped to launch conventional torpedoes or long range nuclear-capable cruise missiles.12 Reports by Federation of American Scientists of a May 2000 test launch indicated that Israel has a 1500 km range nuclear-capable cruise missile that can be launched from its new Dolphin-class submarines.13 A version of Popeye Turbo cruise missiles is being developed to be deployed on Dolphin submarines.
According to one report, Israel and the US officials have admitted collaborating to deploy the US-supplied Harpoon cruise missiles armed with nuclear warheads in Israel’s fleet of submarines, giving Israel the ability to strike at any of its Arab neighbours.14 Although it had long been suspected that Israel bought the three German submarines with the specific aim of arming them with nuclear cruise missiles, the admission that the two countries have collaborated in arming the fleet with a nuclear-capable weapons system has come significantly at a time of growing crisis between Israel and its neighbours. The disclosure was made amid rapidly escalating tensions following a raid by Israeli jets in October 2003, on an alleged terrorist training camp near the Syrian capital, Damascus, and after Israel had announced that states ‘harbouring terrorists’ are legitimate targets (similarity with the US pre-emptive strategy discussed in later sections). Making the knowledge public that the submarines are armed with nuclear weapons was designed to deter a counter-attack on Israel. In an interview with the Los Angeles Times, Israeli and Bush administration officials stated that the sea-launch capability gives Israel the ability to target Iran more easily, in case the Iranians develop their own nuclear weapons – a statement that holds an open threat.15
The Dolphins can operate in the Mediterranean, and can hit any target in Libya. Moreover, they can patrol the Indian Ocean, permitting targeting of sites in Iran or any of the key Saudi bases in the country’s southern desert. Israel’s sea borne nuclear doctrine is designed to place one submarine in the Persian Gulf, the other in Mediterranean, with a third on standby.
Israel’s fleet of submarines is the first such force in the region to be armed with nuclear-tipped missiles and gives it a second-strike capability, which means that if its nuclear arsenal, which is primarily land-based, were destroyed in a missile attack it would still be able to retaliate with devastating power from the sea against any aggressor. It also gives Israel the ability to launch pre-emptive strikes, nuclear or conventional, far from its own shores. Having established a triad of nuclear forces, Israel can now target any country in the Middle East and beyond, if it chooses, while remaining relatively immune from counter-attack.
Israel’s Nuclear Strategy
The twin pillars of Israeli nuclear policy have been – ambiguity about its own nuclear programme; and a commitment to denying Arab states any level of nuclearisation.
Israel does not have an overt nuclear doctrine beyond its insistence that it will not introduce nuclear weapons into the region. Instead, it follows a policy of what Avner Cohen calls ‘nuclear opacity’ – possessing nuclear weapons while denying their existence. This has allowed Israel to enjoy the benefits of being a nuclear weapons state in terms of deterrence without having to suffer the international repercussions of acknowledging their arsenal.16
This neither-confirm-nor-deny posture has evolved since the late 1960s, partly as an Israeli hedge against the Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty (NPT). Israel resisted pressure by the Johnson administration to sign the NPT in 1968, and in 1970 it obtained from the Nixon administration a set of ‘don’t ask, don’t tell’ understandings. Those understandings persist till today, and the US no longer presses Israel to sign the NPT. In return, Israel is committed to maintaining a low-profile nuclear posture-no testing, no declaration, no acknowledgement.17
All states in the Middle East have signed the NPT except Israel. The UN General Assembly and IAEA have adopted 13 resolutions since 1987 appealing to Israel to join the treaty, which have been ignored by Israel. This is also part of Israel’s strategy of ambiguity; signing the NPT would mean opening Israel’s nuclear sites to IAEA inspections, and the ambiguity would be lost. Israel’s refusal to sign the NPT has hampered regional arms negotiations and negotiations for a nuclear weapons free zone in Middle East. Other states in the region resent the fact that despite possessing the nukes, Israel stubbornly refuses to acknowledge them openly.
Israel also has a strong commitment to preserving its nuclear monopoly by preventing other states in the region from developing nuclear weapons capability, as was evidenced by Israel’s 1981 raid on Iraq’s Osirak nuclear installation. The danger in this policy lies in the fact that Israel is willing to use any means to prevent other states in the region from acquiring nuclear weapons.
Israel’s unofficial stance regarding its nuclear weapons has been that they were developed for deterrence purposes, to ensure the survival of the small state, and that they are weapons of ‘last resort’. However, Israel’s nuclear weapons capability goes far beyond any conceivable ‘deterrence’ requirements.
Israel has long practiced a strategy of pre-emption, following the US lead post 9/11, dangerous turn in its policy can be seen from the statement of Israel’s Foreign Ministry spokesman that ‘Israel views every state that is harbouring terrorist organisations who are attacking innocent citizens of the state of Israel as legitimate targets out of self defence’18 — a clear echo of the US president Bush’s doctrine of pre-emption. What needs to be understood is that Israel is widening its scope of use of force — conventional or nuclear.