Notes from Paktika

[sparklingway]

Notes from Paktika
​

By Cyril Almeida
August 7th, 2010

Improved coordination with the Pakistan Army and a determined push against insurgents in the eastern Afghan provinces of Paktika, Paktia and Khost is causing “something to turn” in the battle against the Haqqani-led insurgency in the area, according to Col Viet Luong, brigade commander of the approximately 6,000 American troops in the three Afghan provinces.

Col Luong’s remarks came in an hour-long briefing for a team of Pakistan media representatives at Forward Operating Base Tillman in Paktika province, some 3 km from the Pak-Afghan border and near the intersection of Paktika, Khost and the North Waziristan Agency.

Security at FOB Tillman was extremely tight. The Blackhawk helicopters ferrying the visitors stayed on the ground only briefly, allowing passengers to disembark before hurrying off into the distance — helicopters on the ground are liable to draw insurgent fire. Fortified bunkers were visible on the surrounding hilltops. Hesco barriers lined the entire perimeter of the camp and hugged the buildings. Body armour was mandatory for everyone outside the buildings. Soldiers were friendly and relaxed indoors, but focused and alert outdoors, guns at the ready.

FOB Tillman is also the site of the third Border Coordination Centre, an intelligence-sharing nerve centre meant to improve military-to-military cooperation between Isaf, Afghan and Pakistani forces.

A tour of the centre revealed a newly constructed building with a conference room, computerised work stations, giant flat-panel TVs and living quarters for up to several dozen personnel.

American officers present at the site were hopeful the centre would be operational in a matter of “weeks, if not days”. The centre will also host an unspecified number of Pakistani security officials.

In his remarks on the state of the insurgency in the provinces under his command, Col Luong painted a picture of a tough environment in which serious challenges remain, but where positive results have also been in evidence since the start of a sustained offensive by American forces last summer.

The brigade commander refused to be drawn into commenting on the allegations of a ‘double game’ and Pakistani support for the Haqqani network, instead emphasising that the group has safe havens on “both sides of the border”. “We know where the training camps are, where the hideouts are, even some of the madressahs (run by the Haqqanis) are part of the insurgent network,” claimed Col Luong.

The tough, mountainous terrain and a 268-km border with Pakistan rendered the area incredibly porous according to Col Luong, allowing insurgents to cross over from both sides with ease. The Border Coordination Centre, Col Luong hoped, would help bridge the ‘information deficit’:

“It’s no use to me if someone tells me 24 hours later that insurgents have crossed over (into Pakistan). I need that information immediately if I’m to be able to do anything about it. Same goes for the Pakistani side. At the highest level there’s information sharing, but we need that lower, at the brigade level, the battalion level.”

That the area is a bewildering mix of factors was apparent from inside the helicopters on the trip to FOB Tillman. Small hamlets with patches of greenery dotted the largely barren and mountainous landscape below. A US Air Force officer accompanying the group pointed out pockmarks on the terrain, visual evidence of bombing runs from perhaps as far back as the Russian occupation.

And yet, somewhat incongruously, more encouraging signs of modernity were also evident: mobile phone signals were fairly strong on much of the route between Kabul and Paktika; paved roads wound through chunks of the territory below; and a number of construction sites were visible to the naked eye.

When asked what, in his opinion, was sustaining the insurgency in the area, Col Luong replied: “Coercion is a big part of it. They (the Taliban) cut off ears and noses of villagers, force them to hand over boys to fight.”

However, the colonel also acknowledged that attitudes towards the foreign troops played their part: “For a long time we (Americans) were confused. We’re doing all these things for them (the locals) and yet they seemed to dislike us.”

Part of the answer, according to Col Luong, was understanding what the Americans were doing wrong. The colonel gave the example of an $8 million project, a modern hospital in the area, “We set up this modern facility, but then it occurred to us, ‘Does the ministry in Kabul have the capacity to run it?’ ‘Where are the funds to run those big ol’ generators going to come, thousands of dollars a day?’ Now we’re starting to get that stuff right.”

Another part was focusing on what the Afghan population in the area needs: “These are remote areas. Land, water and timber disputes are frequent. They (the population) needed a quick dispute-resolution system. The Taliban provided that, however problematically.”

In addition, a strong but more targeted military campaign against insurgents in the area has helped, according to Col Luong: “We’ve killed 500 insurgents. Captured 220 HVTs. It’s not quite as easy for them to operate as it used to be.”

Yet, this ‘population-centric’ counterinsurgency has far from yielded conclusive results, something acknowledged even by two senior editors of Military.com embedded with American troops in eastern Afghanistan.

Writing in May about a visit to a village in Paktika, they noted: “In this rural portion of Afghanistan’s Paktika province, nothing is simple and straightforward in terms of moving the population toward self governance — including establishing security against the Taliban.”

In describing the non-cooperation of villagers in the “hotly contested” area, the writers underlined the difficulty in determining if the villagers were genuinely scared of the Taliban or actually uninterested in providing American troops with information.

So are the Americans winning or losing?

Col Luong was in equal parts optimistic and cautious, “The people are starting to turn. We’ve seen it from the interest of the local leadership in the shuras.” Then, the caveat: “But the year ahead is pivotal. We need to get this right.”

 

[H2O3C4Nitrogen]

i hope it contributes to the peace engagments some how, i guess fighting against the haqqanis might help the Isaf to win a few bargains in the final peace pact .. hwever i dough they would be seriously going deep inside for a kill..!!!

 

[H2O3C4Nitrogen]

will there be an ops of that sort in NW too ??

 

[DESERT FIGHTER]

I heard Zardari talking about negociations with taliban today on TV.

 

[fatman17]

ISAF enhances cooperation with Pakistan Army

Saturday, August 07, 2010

KABUL: International Security Assistance Force (ISAF) in Afghanistan has recently established three Coordination Centers along Afghanistan-Pakistan border to check the movement of suspected terrorists.

The move was seen as meeting, to some extent, with Pakistan’s long-standing demand to increase security to check slipping of terrorists from the Afghan frontier. “We have established three coordination centers along the Pakistan-Afghanistan border - inside Afghan territory—to check their cross border movement,” said ISAF Commander of 3rd Brigade Col Luong.

He was talking to media-persons from Pakistan who were especially flown to the newly established center called “Tillman Forward Operating Base” in Paktika province on Tuesday.

The Brigade is responsible for keeping vigil along 260 km long chunk of Pakistan-Afghanistan border in the North Eastern flank of the war ravaged country.

Both the neighbors share around 2100 km long porous border, most of which comprises difficult hilly terrain. Another Coordination center has been established in Nawa while a coordination center already exists in Torkhum area.

Presently around 115,000 troops of the coalition led by USA are deployed in the whole of Afghanistan while around 140,000 soldiers of Pakistan’s security forces have been deputed on their side of the border.

 

[fatman17]

“It’s no use to me if someone tells me 24 hours later that insurgents have crossed over (into Pakistan). I need that information immediately if I’m to be able to do anything about it. Same goes for the Pakistani side. At the highest level there’s information sharing, but we need that lower, at the brigade level, the battalion level.”

this 'gap' exists and until both sides dont overcome this issue, accusations and counter-accusations will continue and the reports of the 'lower level' will once again be 'leaked' in another wikileaksII and we will start all over again. pakistan does this and pakistan does that!!!

---------- Post added at 11:51 AM ---------- Previous post was at 11:51 AM ----------

“It’s no use to me if someone tells me 24 hours later that insurgents have crossed over (into Pakistan). I need that information immediately if I’m to be able to do anything about it. Same goes for the Pakistani side. At the highest level there’s information sharing, but we need that lower, at the brigade level, the battalion level.”

this 'gap' exists and until both sides dont overcome this issue, accusations and counter-accusations will continue and the reports of the 'lower level' will once again be 'leaked' in another wikileaksII and we will start all over again. pakistan does this and pakistan does that!!!

 

[muse]

Well, that's interesting - and yet so predictable, isn't it - I mean look at each of the storys' or article posted on the thread and tell me what's changed with regard to the US or NATO or ISAFs' willingness to cooperate with Pakistan on a strategic level? Have consulates on the Pakistan border been shut down? Have significant numbers of Afghan/ISAF troops been commited to those areas along the border that Pakistan wants these troops stationed so that TTP cannot use Afghan territitory as "safe havens"? Has the ISAF/NATO/US/GIRoA or whatever acronym they prefer, agreed to change the IO and psycops messages deseminated in Afghanistan and the international media against Pakistan?

Look, guys, this is just another show, there is zero substance to this - some will point out that the Pakistani security officials will be stationed at this center and this is a plus -- but wait Pakistani officeers have been stationed at US facilities in Afghanistan before, I mean they have been in Bagram and other places for at least the six years - however. there is no real interaction between them and their US/ISAF hosts, neither side trusts the other, and I can tell you the Fauj have good reasons to not trust the US/ISAF --

I would bring readers attention to the following quote, US military are slow learners abd do not learn unless ordered to, in other words, politics, read ideology, is very big:

the colonel also acknowledged that attitudes towards the foreign troops played their part: “For a long time we (Americans) were confused. We’re doing all these things for them (the locals) and yet they seemed to dislike us.”

Part of the answer, according to Col Luong, was understanding what the Americans were doing wrong. The colonel gave the example of an $8 million project, a modern hospital in the area, “We set up this modern facility,

but then it occurred to us, ‘Does the ministry in Kabul have the capacity to run it?’ ‘Where are the funds to run those big ol’ generators going to come, thousands of dollars a day?’ Now we’re starting to get that stuff right

.”

Another part was focusing on what the Afghan population in the area needs: “

These are remote areas. Land, water and timber disputes are frequent. They (the population) needed a quick dispute-resolution system. The Taliban provided that, however problematically

.”

Look at what the Col. is admitting that it took them 10 years to learn to what basic management stdents learn in a semester - now you might be asking why and you should -- because while the US types talk the talk about "helping the Afghan" this or that, what they are really interested in something most military types will be familiar with - that is ot say they are there for relatively short tour, they want everybody coming back safe to their wives, children, husbands, etc; but while they are there they have access to a great deal of money, and it does not matter whether they spend it on stuff that makes sense or is in coordination with the GIRoA, what does matter is how it will look, what they can claim to have done or achieved, and of course, promotions are tied into that, entire careers.

Then look at what the Col. ends up admitting, that the Talib are percieved by the locals as more legitimate than the US sponsored GIRoA, that the Talib actually provide the most important government service there is, that is to say dispute resolution -- think about it --- earlier in the piece the Col. says that the Talib coerse the local population, then ends up admitting that he's been less then truthful about that because the local population trust the Talib enough to use Talib courts.

You see the problem with trusting these idiots - they care more about their ideology, their politics, than they do about cooperating with the Paak Fauj to rid the area of Saudi extremism.

It's sad and regrettable, but the Fauj has been dealt these cards and these are what pass for our "friends" - Pakistani readers therefore ought not take the US/ISAF/NATO or whatever acronym soup they want to called, seriously and cannot depend on their cooperation.

 

[fatman17]

^^^muse - i dont agree with what u say, but at this point in time we cannot 'turn off the switch' in the middle of the battle - they are listening to our 'reasoning' and coming around, albeit rather slowly to our POV. they will not be able to impose their 'democratic values' on the afghan nation like they want to - this is crystal clear to them also.

 

[H2O3C4Nitrogen]

It's sad and regrettable, but the Fauj has been dealt these cards and these are what pass for our "friends" - Pakistani readers therefore ought not take the US/ISAF/NATO or whatever acronym soup they want to called, seriously and cannot depend on their cooperation.

Another thing which is quite noteable is the haqqanis have never stood up against the state of Pakistan and one wonders why are we inviting the wrath by collaborating with US in eliminating them... !!! this would have an ugly results in our urban areas.
Plus if the Nato-PakFauj has close collaboration than there must have been something to contour the indian sponcered terrorism in Pakistan via Afghanistan. Has there been any development reached out on that issue and thats by the way core of the trust defficit which exists btw Nato and Pak Fauj..!!!

 

[muse]

i dont agree with what u say

Fatman17


PLease be more specific - with exactly what do you find yourself in disagreement and exactly why.

I am always open to informed, persuasive and compelling arguments and I would be pleased to revise my position if offered such a argument.

That "they" have becgun to listen to us after 10 years of a continuing policy of maligning Pakistan and acting against Pakistani interests, it seems to me that if they are listening today, it is because their project is now a dismal failure and the political fallout is something they will want Pakistan to clean up --- but I am very keen to read your argument.