North Korea drops withdrawal of US forces as condition of denuclearization, Moon says

[gambit]

You Chinese can cheer for China all you want, but even if it is too early to tell, it is not unreasonable to guess that NKR is slowly giving way to The Orange One. Maybe Xi had something to do with it. Maybe not. But if NKR decide to stop developing nuclear weapons, it will be perceived as US pressures did what China could not do.

 

[ZeEa5KPul]

Are you still claiming I'm an Indian? That all you jokers have these days?


China's challenge? China can't even dominate its own near abroad. The US operates on a daily basis in YOUR own region, and all you do is cry and complain. You have an island that sits a 100 miles off your mainland that has openly defied you for decades, and have done next to nothing about it. You have enough problems in your own neighborhood, and you want to tangle with the continental superpower that resides on the other side of the world?

Your a bag of hot air. Like an onslaught of empty rhetoric, with no real substance or credibility to support it.

It's clear why you have zero understanding of the scope and scale of China's challenge, you are immersed in a pathologically short-term culture that considers what Kim Kardashian wore last month to be ancient history. That culture is every bit as blind to developments outside it as it is morbidly self-obsessed.

I used to think that that was for the best, since China would then be able to build and develop in the shadows, but that's irrelevant now. China's already too big and too strong for you to harm, and it only gets bigger and stronger.

China is sharpening the blade with which it will cut America's throat, and there's not a dam*ed thing anyone can do about it.

 

[terranMarine]

I used to think that that was for the best, since China would then be able to build and develop in the shadows, but that's irrelevant now. China's already too big and too strong for you to harm, and it only gets bigger and stronger.

China is sharpening the blade with which it will cut America's throat, and there's not a dam*ed thing anyone can do about it.

From here on now, things are gonna change. When Xi recently said the transformation is more urgent than ever you can bet on it China is gonna kick into higher gear. The Communist block China-Russia-DPRK is one destructive force even America is afraid to initiate a war first unlike what is happening in the Middle East.

 

[大汉奸柳传志]

You Chinese can cheer for China all you want, but even if it is too early to tell, it is not unreasonable to guess that NKR is slowly giving way to The Orange One. Maybe Xi had something to do with it. Maybe not. But if NKR decide to stop developing nuclear weapons, it will be perceived as US pressures did what China could not do.

The next stage of NK's nuclear program, naturally, is to develop the capability of targeting/reaching the ConUS, which should not be any of China's concern. So from this point, we can all agree to leave China out of this

 

[gambit]

The next stage of NK's nuclear program, naturally, is to develop the capability of targeting/reaching the ConUS, which should not be any of China's concern. So from this point, we can all agree to leave China out of this

You should stop making pronouncements. The latest news is that Kim offered to stop development in exchange for Trump stop making threats.

 

[大汉奸柳传志]

You should stop making pronouncements. The latest news is that Kim offered to stop development in exchange for Trump stop making threats.

Well then that is the best deal you can get. I think Trump will take it, after all the whole thing is about getting himself a Nobel peace prize, like his predecessor did with Iran N-deal, and securing a second term

 

[Oldman1]

North Korea invaded south in the 50s is encouraged by Soviet Union. PRC is just form in 1949. Why would Chinese encourage NK to attack south and start another war when the basic is not even settle. Get your history right.

Fast forward to 2018. SK Military is far advanced and powerful than NK obsolete weapon and outdated doctrine. NK chances of getting wiped by SKM is far higher than NK invading SK.

Mao was already winning in the Chinese Civil War. Why shouldn't they encourage NK to invade since they were not involved until later when American led forces were pushing towards China's borders. Which Mao had to prevent that since he didn't expect they were winning. Think about it. North Korea was winning early in the stages of the war. Also the irony is that the U.S. was pulling troops out of South Korea prior to the invasion. And Mao did support the invasion.

https://calhoun.nps.edu/bitstream/handle/10945/44622/14Dec_Monger_Bradley.pdf;sequence=3

Stalin sensed that the revolutionary movement in Korea could force Mao into conflict with American policy. During Mao’s visit to Moscow but prior to treaty negotiations, Stalin inquired of Mao his thoughts on Kim’s desire for Korean unification. Mao expressed his approval of the plan and “also expressed the opinion that the United States wouldn’t interfere in an internal matter which the Korean people would decide for themselves…We still should help Kim.” 191 Stalin had laid the ground work of support between the Chinese and Korean leaders. He would soon bring Korea’s reunification to Mao’s strategic view, arguably well before the Chairman had envisioned.

Korean and Chinese communists had a developed close ties during the early twentieth century. In the 1920s, the newly formed CCP was a political outlet for Korean communists and many joined the party, to include the future North Korean leader Kim Ilsung. Building upon a mutual anti-Japanese nationalism, the Korean and Chinese communists had developed a strong bond during the 1930s, through World War II, and into the Chinese civil war. Chen Jian estimates that “in the last stage of the war against Japan and during China’s civil war, around 100,000 Korean residents in China joined Chinese Communist forces.” 192 Additionally, Korean citizens supported the People’s Liberation Army (PLA), and by “the late 1940s the PLA’s 156th, 164th, and 166th Divisions, three of the best divisions of the Fourth Field Army, were mainly composed of Korean-Chinese soldiers.” 193 North Korean support for the CCP during the civil war represented a major element in the CCP’s strategic aims. In September 1945, the CCP had decided to establish defensive operations in the south. Then, with North Korean support, the PLA would conduct offensive operations to eliminate the KMT in Northern China.194 As military operations escalated in Manchuria during 1946, the CCP sought further assistance from North Korea. Chinese leadership requested to transport wounded PLA soldiers across the border for treatment, to maintain communications between PLA units

Having watched this bond form between Chinese and Korean communists, Stalin saw an opportunity to exploit their relationship and create further distance between Beijing and Washington. It is in this light that Stalin brought Korea into Mao’s thoughts prior to the Sino-Soviet treaty negotiations. Thus, on January 8, 1950, Stalin urged Soviet Ambassador to North Korea Terenti Shtykov to discuss with Kim the return of Korean troops.196 Shtykov dutifully obliged and by January 19, Kim had requested that the remaining Korean soldiers and their equipment be returned to Korea. The matter went before the CCP Central Committee and was approved on January 22. Jian claims in China’s Road to the Korea War that nearly “14,000 Korean nationality PLA soldiers, with their equipment, returned to Korea.” 197

When Mao questioned Stalin on his intentions for North Korea, Stalin dismissed the charge of subterfuge by crediting the plan to Kim alone.200 Whether Mao accepted Stalin’s explanation or is immaterial; it was now clear to the Chinese leader that Korea would play a strategic role in East Asia. Stalin asked Mao on his thought of American involvement in Korea. Richard Thornton outlines his response through an interview with Mao’s interpreter Zhi Zhe’s recollection of the conversation in Odd Man Out. Zhi claims that “Mao replied after some reflection that ‘the Americans might not come in because this is Korea’s internal affair, but the Korean comrades need to take America’s intervention into account.” 201 While this discussion did not give Kim the go ahead for military action in Korea, it sparked comprehension that Mao and Kim would compete for Soviet aid to achieve their strategic goals to take Taiwan and South Korea, respectively.

CONCLUSION During the periods of Mao’s isolation in Moscow, Stalin was secretly aimed to prevent any potential cooperation between China and the United States.202 Stalin’s strategic aims in Asia depended on Chinese dependency on the Soviet Union. As both sides prepared to negotiate the Sino-Soviet Alliance, Stalin took steps to ensure the treaty would further push China into the Soviet sphere of influence. Stalin’s first major step was to convince Mao to protest the continued occupation of the Nationalists’ government seat on the United Nations Security Council. Although both Mao and Kim suspected that potential military action on the Korean peninsula would not involve the United States, Stalin considered it unlikely that the Washington would maintain a hands-off approach. To ensure that a possible military action would occur under a UN banner, and not the United States, Stalin orchestrated the Soviet boycott of the UN.203 The boycott, along with Stalin’s insistence that only a state of war could trigger the military support clause in the treaty, made Soviet support for military action in Korea unlikely.

"Mao’s decision to approve aid and assistance for a North Korean offensive was likely in an effort to continue an amicable relationship with the Soviet Union. The new Sino-Soviet Alliance granted air and naval assistance that Mao desperately needed for the assault on Taiwan. Thus, according to Stueck, “to deny Kim his wish would threaten Mao’s relationship with both the North Koreans and, more important, the Soviets.” 254"

Therefore, Mao’s reluctant approval to Kim was necessary to continue his hopes for a unified China. The specifics of Kim’s military plans, however, remained a closely guarded secret, and during his visit to Beijing Kim “released no details of his military plan, let alone the date of the action.” 255 As a possible avenue for procuring Kim’s war timeline, Mao even offered to provide as many as three Chinese armies along the Yalu River.256 Confident in his own war plan, Kim dismissed the offer to station the PLA along the North Korean border. There is debate among historians as to how much Mao opposed Kim’s plans for invasion. Chen Jian in China’s Road to the Korean War argues that “Although Mao seemed to have some reservations; he never seriously challenged Kim’s plans.” 257 Richard Thornton, citing an interview with Chinese Marshal Peng Dehuai, states that “he [Mao] vehemently disagreed with Kim’s proposed action … Mao raised the dire possibility of American intervention, ‘but Kim did not take it seriously.’” 258 The authors of Uncertain Partners express a similar concern over American involvement in Korea, but argue that Mao may have been compelled to support Kim regardless of his true opinion. They argue that since “the Chinese leader had secured a promise of Soviet support for the invasion of Taiwan. He [Mao] could not express his fears of American intervention in Korea without admitting to Stalin the likelihood of the same U.S. involvement in Taiwan, thereby jeopardizing that support.” 259 However, the balance between apprehension and opportunism may be struck, it is clear that Kim left China with Mao’s support for military operation on the Korean peninsula.