The following is a selected excerpt (on secularism precisely) from an article by Bhikhu Parekh, published in Economic and political weekly in January of 1991. Today on the eve of Nehru’s 125th birth anniversary his idea of secularism, its limitations in traditionally conservative societies of India should and must go through a thorough retrospection, especially when the idea of secularism has become a largely vague term among individuals and subject to violation by its very protectors themselves. It’s a long article but patience is a virtue.
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Nehru and the National Philosophy of India: Secularism
Bhikhu Parekh
Since the early years of the twentieth century especially the agitation surrounding the partition of Bengal, the relation between the state and religion had become an important political issue. The resolution of the difficult question was complicated by several factors that were almost unique to India. India has several religions with very different history and background. Islam had ruled large parts of the country for many centuries. And though it had become indigenised, unlike Christianity it never wholly lost its quasi-alien character at least in the eyes of the Hindus. Hinduism had a vague and diffused identity, consisted of countless schools and sects sharing little in common, and was unable to speak with one voice let alone from the basis of the state. Unlike Islam it prided itself on its pluralism, tolerance and respect for all religions, and that rendered the idea of the Hindu state even more problematic.
The answers to the question of the relation between the state and the religion in independent India covered a very wide spectrum, ranging from the incoherent notion of ‘Hindu Raj’ to the impractical idea of suppressing religion altogether. Most, however, fell under three categories. First, for some India should become a Hindu state, not in a religious but cultural or civilisation sense. Over several millennia India had developed a common civilisation, that is, a shared body of values, attitudes, ways of looking at the world and forms of social relationship. Though the civilisation had benefitted from the contributions of Muslims, Parsis, Christians and others, it was basically a creation of the Hindus. Hinduism or Hindu religion was unique to the Hindus and distinguished them from the other Indian communities, but the Hindu pr rather the Indian civilisation or Hindutva was common to them all. Over the centuries the Indian civilisation had moulded and provided a common underlying bond between the different Hindu sects and schools. It had also shaped and indigenised such alien religions as Islam and Christianity. Despite their different origins, belief systems, and social structures, all Indian communities thus shared a common ‘ethos’ or ‘spirit’ and were bound together by deep civilisational bonds. A common civilisational basis was thus not only available in India but formed the ineliminable substance of its collective life. However the secular the Indian state might pretend to be, it could never transcend and avoid being structured by the ‘spiritual’ ethos of the civilisation in which it was deeply embedded. Both intellectual honesty and prudence required that it should explicitly recognise this central fact and constitute itself accordingly. The advocates of this view argued that such a civilisationally but not religiously Hindu state tolerated and even welcomed religious diversity as the necessary expression of its inner nature, and granted the minorities full legal and cultural protection.
Second, some Indian leaders argued that India had no alternative but to become a multi-religious state, that is, a state that did not just respect religious diversity but embodied it in its very structure. Such major Indian religions as Hinduism, Islam and Sikhism were ethnic religions, religions integrally connected with specific communities and intensely self-conscious of their unique history, customs, legal systems and ways of thought of life. They desired and demanded to preserve their communal identity. The Indian state should therefore be so constituted that it left them alone to be governed by their own legal systems, and granted them proportional representation in the institutions of government. Such a state was obviously neither secular nor merely ‘tolerant’ of all religions. They were woven into its very structure and ran it together in a spirit of partnership. The fact that the colonial rulers had instituted separate electorates for some of the religious minorities and communalised the state lent plausibility to this idea.
Third, most Indian leaders pleaded for a secular state but disagreed on its meaning. For some it meant sarvadharmasambhhava or equal respect for all religions. The state was not to be tied to a particular religion and was to patronize them all equally. They differed from the advocates of the previously discussed multi-religious state in insisting that religious plurality was not to be built into the structure of the state. The state, resting on liberal individualistic foundations, was to keep religion at a respectable institutional distance. For some others, secularism meant dharmanirapeksha or indifference to religion. Religion had nothing to do with the state and was to be confined to the private realm. They never, however, defined the nature and boundary of the private realm and tended to equate the state with the nebulously defined public realm. For yet others secularism meant not just indifference but hostility to religion. Though the state was not to suppress the religion, it was to do all in its power to undermine its continuing hold over the Indian mind by educational and other means.
Nehru vigorously pleaded for a secular state, but his view of secularism was complex and vague. He distinguished between the spiritual and ideological-cum-institutional dimensions of religion. He was intensely hostile to the latter but deeply sympathetic to the former, especially during the pre-independence days and the last years of his premiership. Though he frequently talked about spirituality, he never clearly defined the term. Sometimes he equated it with morality. On other occasions he used it to refer to concern with the nature and destiny of man and the meaning and purpose of life; to be spiritual was to be sensitive to these important and ‘irrepressible’ questions. On yet other occasions Nehru gave the term substantive content and took it to mean a broadly advaita metaphysic; spiritually consisted in recognising the presence of a creative force or vital energy at work in all living beings and appreciating the unity of life.
Despite this ambiguity Nehru was convinced that although spirituality was the inspiring principle of religion, it was not confined to the latter and formed part of every thinking man’s consciousness. No human being could avoid asking questions about the meaning of his actions, his relation to the non-human world and the point and purpose of his life. Spirituality thus dealt with issues falling outside the jurisdiction of science and complemented and gave it philosophical depth. Religion sought to deal with these issues and was close to spirituality. However, religious answers were not the only ones possible. Indeed they introduced an untenable theological baggage and wholly distorted the original questions. For these and other reasons Nehru sometimes sharply separated spirituality, a delicate sensitivity to the deeper and perplexing dimensions of life, from religion, a dogmatic body of assertions claiming to offer definitive answers to questions that did not permit conclusive resolution.
Nehru had no sympathy whatever for the ideological and institutional aspect of religion. By the former he meant theological dogmas including the belief in the existence of God and the after-life, and by the latter organised church, religious organisations and religiously prescribed rules and practices. For him this aspect of religion had been a source of unmitigated harm. It had encouraged ignorance and superstition, ‘shackled’ the human spirit, discouraged science and rationality, and rendered the human mind ‘vague and soft and flabby’. It had also hindered economic and social progress, sanctioned oppressive and exploitive systems, perpetuated grave injustice and led to most brutal wars. It had also bred profound selfishness and encouraged an ‘asocial quest for god’. In these and other ways it impoverished man and contained a deep anti-humanist thrust.
Like Gokhale and Gandhi, Nehru thought that spirituality had an important role to play in political life. Unlike them, however, he assigned it a limited, diffused and largely psychological role. The awareness of the spiritual dimension of life ensured that politics did not confine itself to the pursuit of material well-being, and remained mindful of larger questions about the meaning and significance of life. It also ensured that politics did not become all-encompassing and totalitarian, and remained deeply aware of the fact that it has little to say about the large and profound questions lying outside its jurisdiction. Nehru also thought that something like advaita, which stressed the unity of man and epistemological and moral pluralism, provided the philosophical basis of and encouraged the spirit of internationalism, religious tolerance, and moral and intellectual humility.
While welcoming spirituality in politics, Nehru saw no political role at all for religion, that is, for its ideological and institutional apparatus. Apart from its generally deleterious consequences, religion created additional problems in political life. It introduced absolute moral principles inconsistent with the pragmatic and consensual nature of politics. Besides religion had always been a deeply divisive fore in all societies, having led to bloody civil wars in Europe and to the partition of the country in India. ‘How long that will take I cannot say, but religion in India will kill that country and its peoples if it is not subdued’. The state could not be run without an agreed body of values. And since religious morality varied, the state had no choice but to follow its own autonomous and secular morality based on a shared conception of material interests. For these and other reasons religion had to be scrupulously kept out of political life. The state should neither patronise nor associate itself with any of them.
For Nehru then the state had to be secular in the sense of transcending and being indifferent to religion. The state was a ‘public’ institution, religion an entirely ‘private’ matter. Secularism in this sense informed his policies and attitudes. He condemned religious political parties and, although he did not ban them, he refused to have any dealings with them. He did not officially associate himself with religious leaders and religious functions. He strongly but unsuccessfully objected to Rajendra Prasad inaugurating the rejuvenated Somnath temple. He objected to Bande Mataram on the grounds that, among other things, it had a religious provenance and connotations. He did not allow religious symbols and images to be associated with official functions, and insisted on debating such religious or religiously mediated issues as the Hindu personal law and ban on cow-slaughter in secular terms.
Since no state could be wholly secular in Nehru’s sense especially in such a religiously embedded culture as the Indian, his secularism remained limited in its scope and depth. In spite of his desire to change parts of it, he dared not touch either the Muslim personal law or the Hindu, Muslim, Christian and other denominational schools. The state continued to observe public holidays on major religious occasions. The Benaras Hindu University and the Aligarh Muslim University, the only two universities to be associated with specific religious communities, were accorded the privileged status of central universities. Chief Ministers in various states continued to attend religious, mainly Hindu functions. And constructions of several government buildings and dams were preceded by religious ceremonies.
Though religion had no place in political life, Nehru knew the state could not remain indifferent to it. It was concerned with such vital tasks as preservation of the country’s integrity, its economic and social development, and protection of the constitutional rights of all its citizens. If some religious beliefs and practices frustrated the realisation of these goals, it had both a right and a duty to interfere with them. The fact that they were religiously enjoined did not put them outside the reach of the law. That was why he thought that the Constitution was right to declare untouchability a cognisable offence. That was also why his government did not hesitate to pass the Hindu Code Bill and regulate the management of some Hindu temples. When it came to the Muslim personal law, Nehru refrained from ‘interfering’. He found some of its practices unacceptable, and even when he did not mind them, he was anxious that all Indians should be subject to a uniform civil code. However he concluded that any ‘interference’ with the Muslim personal law so soon after the partition was likely to arouse deep fears and provoke strong resistance, and that he ought to wait until the Muslim opinion was ready.
While he was right to do so, he exposed himself to a legitimate criticism. Many a Hindu including the president of India were opposed to some of the provisions of the Hindu Code Bill. Yet Nehru insisted on their enactment and threw all his prestige and authority behind them. They were also uneasy with the government interference in the management of temples, yet he refused to give in. He and the overwhelming majority of his cabinet and parliamentary colleagues were Hindus, and thought that they were not and could be seen to be ‘interfering’ with Hindu practices. Besides, as Hindus they knew what were the best interests of their religion and were entitled to press ahead. In other words Nehru’s state acted as, and claimed all the rights of a Hindu state in its relation to the Hindus. It was because he and his colleagues were and thought themselves as Hindus and dared not take them with respect to the Muslims and even the Sikhs. This created a problem. In claiming the rights of a Hindu state, Nehru’s government encouraged the Hindu expectation that it will also accept the obligations of such a state including defend and promote their religion and collective interests. It rightly refused to do so, thereby incurring the charges of inconsistency and disingenuity, of behaving in its relations to the Hindus as both a Hindu and a secular state as suited its interests.
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